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 Chapter I 
Introduction 
1.  BACKGROUND  
During the last couple of decades there has been a growing societal 
concern about different kinds of ethical issues related to the financial 
sector in general and financial investments in particular. Whereas the 
traditional view of the world of finance may have been that it is all 
about making money in whatever way (legally) possible, this view has 
been challenged by an increasing amount of reports in the popular 
press; and also by an increasing number of academic scholars. More and 
more financial services actors (e.g., banks and fund companies) have 
begun to market financial vehicles with an explicit ethical, social or en-
vironmental dimension – most often referred to as either ‗ethical‘ or 
‗socially responsible‘ funds. And more and more private persons and 
institutions have also opted to put their assets in these kinds of funds or 
to take putatively ethical or social considerations into account when 
deciding how to invest. According to some recent reports, the total 
amount of investments with an explicitly ethical, social or environmental 
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profile was as much as $2.29 trillion in the United States and €1.03 tril-
lion in Europe at the end of 2005.1 
 This book tries to make sense of this growing societal concern, and I 
will discuss different ideas as to what genuinely ethical investing may 
consist in. Part of the aim will be to determine precisely what is wrong 
with the traditional view of the financial world, if there indeed is some-
thing wrong with it; and how this view should be revised. For the most 
part, however, the discussion will focus on what to think of the alterna-
tives that the ‗ethical‘ or ‗socially responsible‘ investment movement has 
to offer. Some examples of the kind of issues I will be discussing are: 
Do investors always have moral reasons to avoid investing in certain 
business areas such as, for example, the weapons industry, because it is 
wrong in principle to invest in such areas? If not (or even if so), do in-
vestors sometimes have moral reasons to do something more – for in-
stance, to invest in morally problematic industries and try to make com-
panies change their evil ways? How much does morality really demand 
of an individual investor – must she invest in a morally problematic 
company that she will be able to influence in this way, or is it justifiable 
for her to do considerably less? Or perhaps this kind of aggressive in-
vesting conflicts with a more basic responsibility connected to share-
holding, namely that of taking good care of the companies one invests 
in? 
 Before introducing in more detail the kind of questions that will be 
my main concern in this book, I will give a background to the growing 
societal concern over ethical issues related to the financial sector and 
financial investments. According to many commentators, this develop-
ment has roots that go much further back in time. There are some reli-
gious groups, for instance, who have let ethical considerations influence 
their investment practices for many hundreds of years.2 Somewhat more 
recently, the social protest movements of the 1960s and -70s would also 
seem to be important precursors to the social investment movement of 
today. At a time when there was a general antipathy in many parts of 
society against, for example, the Vietnam War and the apartheid regime 
of South Africa, worries also grew about the corporate involvement 
related to these conflicts. Many churches, universities and private in-
 
1 Cf. Eurosif 2006, Social Investment Forum 2006. However, these estimates are probably 
exaggerated – see chapter IV, section 4.1. See also Entine 2003, Munnell and Sundén 2005, 
Schepers and Sethi 2003. 
2 Cf. Domini 2001, Powers 1971, Schwartz 2003, Sparkes 2002 
3 
vestors started to boycott commercial companies which were perceived 
to facilitate the Vietnam War effort or to support the South African 
government by withdrawing their financial investments from these 
companies.3 Others tried to raise issues about labour rights and racial 
equality at the annual general meetings of some of the largest companies 
in the West, like General Motors and Eastman Kodak.4 
 While these historical precedents certainly would seem to be impor-
tant for the practices of the present social investment movement, some 
more recent societal trends could perhaps explain why the commotion 
over ethical issues in relation to financial investments has continued to 
increase during the last couple of decades. First of all, there has been a 
general trend towards corporate deregulation and privatisation in many 
parts of the Western world since the 1980s. Whereas citizens previously 
may have been able to rely on governments and the political processes 
to hold the corporate sector in check and to hold commercial compa-
nies accountable for their practices, the power and influence of the 
modern corporation has increased dramatically in recent years.5 Add to 
this the development toward globalisation and integration of the world‘s 
economies, and the rise of the multinational corporations with immense 
powers over the lives of people in many different parts of the world, 
and it is not hard to see why an increasing number of people want to 
put ethical demands on the corporate sector of today. According to 
many commentators, deregulation, privatisation and globalisation has 
increased the need for companies to take on a quasi-political role, i.e. to 
take a stronger responsibility for the social effects of their practices.6 
 A trend which to some extent may be parallel to the globalisation of 
business is the globalisation of information. Perhaps this informational 
revolution, which most people in the Western world see many proofs of 
in their everyday lives, could be one of the explanations of the increased 
uneasiness among the general public about different kinds of ethical, 
social and environmental issues related to the corporate sector and fi-
 
3 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Brill and Reder 1993, Domini 2001, Domini and Kinder 1986, 
Harrington 1992, Judd 1990, Kinder at al. 1993, Melton and Keenan 1994, Miller 1991, 
Sparkes 1995, 2002, Taylor 2001 
4 Cf. Brill and Reder 1993, Domini 2001, Domini and Kinder 1986, Harrington 1992, Kinder 
et al. 1993, Lowry 1993, Melton and Keenan 1994, Simon et al. 1972, Sparkes 1995, 2002, 
Vogel 1970, 1983 
5 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Hellsten and Mallin 2006, Sparkes 2002, Vogel 1978 
6 Cf. Sparkes 2002, Vogel 1978 
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nancial investments.7 According to some writers, environmental con-
cern has gone from only being perceived to belong to some ―left-wing‖ 
groups in society to being a more or less mainstream concern.8 Further-
more, in the wake of recent corporate scandals such as those of Enron 
and WorldCom, consumers are becoming increasingly aware of and 
concerned about issues such as third world poverty, human rights and 
business ethics.9 While it is hard to know where this growing awareness 
really originated, a good guess is probably that it is correlated with an 
increase in media coverage of ethical, social and environmental issues in 
general.10 
 An important upshot of the trend outlined above is the turn toward 
and existence of a commercial niche for companies perceived to be 
more socially responsible or ethical than others. The concepts of, for 
instance, Corporate Citizenship and Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) have been viable ingredients in the marketing schemes of an in-
creasing number of companies during the last couple of decades.11 And 
here the successful marketing of the concepts of ‗ethical‘ and ‗socially 
responsible investment‘ (SRI) itself should probably be given at least 
some credit for having attracted more investors into taking ethical or 
social considerations into account in their investment decisions. As al-
ready noted, more and more funds have been launched with explicit 
references to ethical, social or environmental concerns and, since these 
dimensions have also been discussed so much in the media, it is perhaps 
not surprising that so many people have been attracted to these kinds of 
funds.12 
 What I think is the most important development in terms of explain-
ing the increase in societal concern about ethical issues related to finan-
cial investments, however, is the simple fact that an increasing number 
of private persons, or individuals, are becoming involved in the financial 
investment process. Partly because of deregulations of the pension sys-
tems of many countries, and partly perhaps because of general increases 
 
7 Cf. Hellsten and Mallin 2006, Schueth 2002 
8 Cf. Gardyn 2003 
9 Cf. Auger et al. 2003, Harrison et al. 2005, Krumsiek 1997, Schepers and Sethi 2003, 
Worcester and Dawkins 2005 
10 Cf. Berry and McEachern 2005, Harrison 2005, Nilsson 2007, Wagner 2003 
11 Cf. Bhattacharya and Sen 2004, Nilsson 2007 
12 According to some recent reports, over 200 so-called ‗socially responsible‘ funds exist in the 
US, representing $179.0 billion in total net assets (Social Investment Forum 2006), and over 70 
such funds exist in the UK, with £6.1 billion assets under management (Eurosif 2006). 
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in wealth, more and more individuals are today, either directly or indi-
rectly, shareholders in at least a couple of companies on the world‘s 
stock markets.13 According to one estimate, as much as 94% of the Swe-
dish population could in fact be said to be investors in some manner – 
either directly, i.e. through having bought shares or bonds themselves, 
or indirectly, i.e. through having at least some of their retirement assets 
in some deregulated pension scheme.14 The total wealth invested in unit 
trusts (funds) in Sweden represented around SEK 997 billion in 2005 
compared to SEK 65 billion in 1986, and approximately 70% of all 
Swedes actively invested in unit trusts in 2005.15 
 So the stage is set as follows: An increasing number of ‗regular 
people‘ are becoming concerned about different kinds of social and 
environmental issues, and these people are also coming into contact 
with the world of financial investments for the first time, a world which 
in their minds has run slightly wild and whose power perhaps has to be 
harnessed in some manner. Surely, it is not hard to imagine that the tra-
ditional view of finance will be disputed in different ways in such a sce-
nario. But what is really a plausible view on the ethical responsibilities of 
investors?  
2.  DEFINING THE ISS UE  
There are surely a large number of ethical issues related to the financial 
sector in general and financial investments in particular, which it could 
be very interesting to discuss from a philosophical perspective and in a 
book like this. While the title of the book, The Ethics of Investing, may 
seem to indicate that I will discuss every possible such issue, it should be 
noted right away that it obviously is impossible to do so in a book of 
this length – a book which I also intend to be accessible and interesting 
for most people concerned about the ethical responsibilities of inves-
tors. In the present section, I will present the kind of question which 
will be my main focus here and try to make it as clear as possible. In the 
sections that follow, I will first delineate this kind of question from cer-
tain other issues which often are discussed in the literature on ‗ethical 
investing‘, and I will then say something general about the method I will 
be using for analysing and hopefully answering the question under con-
 
13 Cf. Domini 2001, Nilsson 2007, Teweles and Bradley 1998 
14 Nilsson 2007 
15 Nilsson 2007 
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sideration. Finally, I will give a more detailed introduction to the specific 
suggestions which will be our focus of attention throughout the book. 
 The general question which will be my main interest here is a ques-
tion which I take to be at the core of most discussions concerning the 
ethics of investing, namely: What ought investors to do? Or, to put it in 
another way: How ought one to invest? Formulated this generally, it may 
seem difficult to know even where to begin to analyse it, let alone to 
answer it. It should be noted, first of all, that I will speak of what in-
vestors ought to do, the moral or ethical responsibilities of investors, and what 
investors have moral reasons to do somewhat interchangeably. I take these 
formulations to be roughly synonymous, although I will note some ad-
vantages of formulating certain positions in terms of moral reasons as we 
go along (see, e.g., chapter II, section 4, for the first time this is dis-
cussed). In keeping with the standard view in moral philosophy, I take 
the terms ethical and moral to denote roughly the same thing. What is 
more, however, is that I will understand ethical reasons and responsibil-
ities in a fairly broad sense so as to also incorporate what is often for-
mulated as social, environmental and even financial reasons. Perhaps this is 
somewhat unorthodox in the context of discussions of the ‗ethical in-
vestment‘ movement – as the reader soon will see, this kind of investing 
is often understood as one which incorporates ―ethical, social or envi-
ronmental‖ concerns in the otherwise strictly financial investment 
process (sometimes ―governance‖ concerns are also mentioned – see 
chapter V). According to this kind of formulation, it may be noted, ethi-
cal concerns are only one kind of concern which may motivate the in-
vestor interested in ‗ethical investing‘. But one may wonder exactly what 
distinguishes ‗ethical‘ concerns from ‗social‘ and ‗environmental‘ ones. 
And, more importantly, how should these be weighed against the finan-
cial concerns of the investor in the final analysis? 
 There may be many reasons for why different writers have chosen to 
speak of ―ethical, social and environmental‖ concerns in this kind of 
context. Since the question which I think is most interesting here is not 
what investors have ethical or social reasons to do in this narrow sense, 
however, but rather what they ought to do all things considered (that is, 
when all kinds of reasons are taken into account), I will understand ethi-
cal reasons and responsibilities in the broader sense indicated above.16 
 
16 This understanding of ethical reasons and responsibilities, I believe, is not unorthodox in 
the context of discussions in applied ethics – see, e.g., Glover 1977, pp. 22-23. 
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In my terminology, then, there is no real difference between saying that 
investors have social or environmental reasons for doing a certain thing and 
saying that they have ethical reasons for doing so (although the latter ob-
viously is more inclusive) – both kinds of statements will be understood 
as suggestions about what investors ought to do.17 In chapter VII, I will 
also discuss suggestions about what investors have financial reasons to 
do, and I will understand these as genuine rivals to suggestions about 
what investors have (other) ethical reasons to do.18 I hope that this termi-
nology should not cause any problems for the reader, but will actually 
make it easier to understand the fundamentally normative issues under 
discussion (especially in the later chapters of the book). 
 The focus of attention in this book will be on what investors ought to 
do, or what we ought to do as investors. Now, there are obviously a lot of 
other kinds of agents involved in the investment process and financial 
markets in general, such as financial companies and their managers, 
financial intermediaries, analysts, bank officials and corporate managers 
and directors, but the ethical responsibilities of these groups will not be 
my main concern here. Even when we restrict the inquiry to investors, it 
may be noted, there are a lot of different kinds of investors for which 
quite different ethical issues may be relevant and salient – there are, e.g., 
institutional investors, fund managers, corporate asset managers and 
both professional and non-professional individual investors. While I 
believe much of what I will have to say is relevant to the ethical dimen-
sion of all of these different kinds of actors‘ investment decisions, my 
primary focus will be on typical non-professional individual investors. By ‗typi-
cal non-professional individual investors‘, or henceforth simply ‗individ-
ual investors‘, I mean people ―like you and me‖ – people who are not 
too familiar with the most intricate workings of the stock market, and 
who only have a moderate amount of disposable income available for 
investments in shares or bonds.19 
 There are many reasons for why I have chosen this focus on individ-
ual investors. One is the trend already mentioned, i.e. that an increasing 
 
17 Although I will sometimes speak of the moral responsibilities of investors, then, my main 
interest is not in the issue of whether or not investors are blameworthy for performing certain 
actions (which some have called retrospective responsibility), but rather in what actions they have 
moral reasons to perform (which some have called prospective responsibility). For a discussion on 
this distinction, see Zimmerman 1988. 
18 For some further comments on this terminology, see note 1 in that chapter. 
19 For a similar understanding of typical non-professional individual investors, see Kolers 
2001. 
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amount of ‗regular people‘ now are becoming investors, either directly 
or indirectly, and will have to take some kind of stand on the ethics of 
different investment strategies. It is my hope that the discussions in this 
book, even though many readers perhaps may disagree with my conclu-
sions, will help to (further) inform these people of at least some of the 
most important features of the ethical challenge they are facing. As 
noted above, furthermore, it is also my conviction that an important 
explanation of the growing societal concern about ethical issues related 
to financial investments is this infusion of ‗regular people‘ into the 
world of finance and investments. That is, the initiatives of the ‗ethical‘ 
or ‗socially responsible‘ investment movement, although proponents of 
these in recent years have started to talk more and more about the role 
of institutional investors20, would seem to be designed primarily for 
typical non-professional individual investors. We will soon see that 
many books on this topic are explicitly directed to people ―like you and 
me‖, and they are seemingly designed to try to convince the average 
investor why this new kind of investing may be something for him or 
her. Now, I am not sure that a focus on the ethics of regular people‘s 
investment decisions actually is the most fruitful one in a context like 
this, at least not if one wants to come up with the most effective solutions to 
the kind of problems in the corporate sector from which the discussion 
on the ethics of investing could be said to originate. At the very end of 
the book (chapter VIII, section 2), I will therefore comment on some 
general features of the issues that have been considered which indicate 
that political, or legislative, solutions may be suitable for many of these 
problems. 
 With regards to individual investors, some readers may have noted 
that the formulation ‗What ought investors to do?‘ is ambiguous in a 
certain sense. On the one hand, it may be taken to mean ‗What ought 
these people, who now happen to be investors, really to do?‘. According to 
this interpretation, it seems perfectly possible that the correct answer 
has little to do with financial investments – what those people who now 
are investors, or whom we refer to by the term investors, really ought to 
do may be to move to Africa and work as volunteers, or to dedicate 
their lives to writing beautiful symphonies, or to do something com-
pletely different. On the other hand, the question may be taken to mean 
‗What ought investors to do qua investors, i.e. what ought they to do in 
 
20 For further comments on this, see chapter IV, section 6.2 and chapter VIII, section 2. 
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their role as investors?‘. For the most part, it is this second understanding of 
the question above that I will be interested in here. That is, I will be as-
suming that the agents of concern either already are investors or are be-
coming investors – either they already hold some shares or bonds, or they 
have a certain amount of money and are trying to decide how to invest 
them – and the question I will be discussing is what they then should do 
with these investments, or how they should go about investing this amount of 
money. While there may be a lot of interesting ethical issues surrounding 
other parts of individual investors‘ lives, then, I am chiefly interested in 
the ethical comparisons between different kinds of investment actions or 
strategies open to individual investors and, for this reason, the formula-
tion ‗How ought one to invest?‘ would seem more suitable. At the end 
of chapter VII (section 4), however, I will discuss what happens if we 
drop this kind of focus and discuss more freely what people with a cer-
tain amount of disposable income generally ought to do with their 
money. 
 A few more comments are in place in relation to the kind of focus 
just outlined. Since I for the most part will be discussing what investors 
ought to do, given that they are going to invest in some manner or the other, 
some may want to accuse me of basically assuming that the practice of 
investing is not morally corrupt in a more systematic way – that is, accord-
ing to my take on the ethics of investing, investors can never have moral 
reasons to refrain from investing altogether. But it is not totally obvious that 
the practice of investing is not morally corrupt in this way – according 
to some writers, there may be fundamental moral problems connected 
with the very idea of financial investments, or with the stock market as a 
societal phenomenon. This view is often connected to discussions about 
the immorality of financial interest (or ―usury‖) and different views on 
this among certain political and religious fractions.21 Now, it is correct 
that I will not be discussing this particular kind of arguments in the 
present context – since the kind of political and religious issues they 
raise are so complicated, I believe this would require a book of its own. 
In a certain sense, then, I am assuming that there is nothing structurally 
dubious about the practice of investing. However, with regards to the 
kind of arguments I will be discussing, this kind of assumption is only a 
tentative one – that is, while I am not assuming from the start that all forms 
of investing are morally problematic, a possible result of my discussion is 
 
21 Cf. Haigh and Hazelton 2004, Lang 1996, Lewison 1999, Moore 1988 
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that they actually are. Indeed, as we soon will see, some of the most ba-
sic intuitions many people have about what constitutes genuinely ethical 
investment would actually seem to imply that there simply is no such 
thing, i.e. that investors have moral reasons to refrain from investing 
altogether (see, e.g., chapter III, section 2.1). 
 A further ambiguity in the qualification of my main question here 
may arise from different understandings of the importance of the role of 
investors referred to above. While I said that the focus of this book will 
be on the issue of what investors ought to do in their role as investors, or 
qua investors, this should not be taken to imply that I have any more 
specific role in mind, nor that I only am interested in the responsibilities 
investors may have because of a certain role they normally play in the corpo-
rate governance setting. According to some writers, shareholders could be 
said to have certain moral responsibilities exactly because they play a 
certain role in this setting – roughly put, since they are generally consi-
dered (part) owners of companies limited by shares (henceforth simply 
limited companies22), they also ought to take on the responsibilities 
which this role implies and behave as responsible owners. Now, most of the 
suggestions about the moral responsibilities of investors I will be dis-
cussing in this book are not like this.23 If they could be said to stem 
from some kind of role investors have, it may be noted, it is from a role 
that also many others have – perhaps that of being a member of society, 
or, that of being a moral agent in general. As indicated above, most of 
the current discussion surrounding the ethics of investing is formulated 
in terms of the ―ethical, social and environmental” responsibilities of inves-
tors. I will return to the difference between role-specific and (what 
could perhaps be called) social responsibilities in chapter V, where I will 
also evaluate the idea of responsible ownership in more detail. 
 
22 Since the kind of financial investments I will be discussing here mainly is investments in 
corporate shares (stocks), the relevant kind of company is mainly so-called companies limited by 
shares, or simply limited companies (also known as limited liability companies, joint stock companies or 
corporations) – that is, companies who have issued shares and are owned by their shareholders 
(unlike, for instance, sole proprietorships and partnerships). Furthermore, I will most often be 
concerned with so-called public limited companies – that is, companies that are quoted on a 
stock exchange and whose shares are available for purchase there (unlike so-called private 
limited companies). For more on this, see Rini 2002. 
23 As noted above, furthermore, the primary focus here is non-professional individual investors – 
for this reason, I am not interested in the ethical responsibilities investors may have because of 
their professional role. Nor will I say anything about the issue of insider trading, which I take to 
arise mainly with regards to professional investors – for some good discussions of this issue, 
see McGee 2008, Moore 1990, Werhane 1989. 
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 As a final clarificatory point it may be expedient to say something 
about how the terms ‗investment‘ and ‗investing‘ will be understood in 
this context. Although I will use the terms ‗investment‘ and ‗investing‘ 
somewhat loosely in what follows, it should be noted that my main con-
cern is with financial investments and not, e.g., investments in property 
or land.24 Defining ‗financial investment‘ in a way which fits the pur-
poses of the present discussion, however, turns out to be a rather tricky 
business. It may be noted that the concept of investment is seldom de-
fined in the academic discussion on the ‗ethical investment‘ movement, 
but rather an intuitive understanding of this concept could be said to be 
in use. I don‘t think this must be a problem. Consider, for instance, the 
following attempt at a definition of ‗investing‘ by Avery Kolers: ―As I 
understand investment, a person invests when she uses money in such a 
way that the primary useful return for her money is, or is intended to be, 
money. This definition does not imply that investors necessarily share 
the financial risk of the endeavor in which they invest. Rather, the cru-
cial issue is participation by the proxy of one‘s money in an economic 
enterprise‖.25 Now, Kolers is quick to point out that this may not be an 
economist‘s definition of ‗investment‘, but he thinks it covers the most 
paradigmatic examples of what is commonly referred to as investments 
– when one puts some money in, for example, a retirement plan, corpo-
rate shares or bonds, a unit trust or a bank deposit.26 To what extent 
this is true, however, I think depends on how his central concepts of 
―the primary useful return‖ of a certain use of money, and ―participation 
in an economic enterprise‖, are spelled out more exactly.  
 In chapters III and IV, I will distinguish between several possible 
interpretations of Kolers‘ and others‘ understanding of investment as 
‗participation‘ and argue that they are problematic in many ways. In or-
der to indicate already at this stage how previous attempts at defining 
‗investment‘ are problematic, however, consider the following problems 
with the idea of ―the primary useful return‖: Should we take Kolers‘ 
definition to suggest that the investor herself must intend that the primary 
useful return on her money is money? If this is the case, then it would 
seem conceptually impossible that investments chosen primarily for 
non-financial reasons could be ethical investments (or how should ‗useful 
 
24 Some writers, however, have extended their discussion on financial investments to also 
cover other kinds of investments – see, e.g., Ward 1991. 
25 Kolers 2001, p. 436 
26 Ibid. 
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returns‘ be understood?). Yet this seems like a perfectly possible under-
standing of the most genuinely ethical kind of investment.27 Perhaps we 
should take the definition to suggest that the socially intended primary re-
turn of a certain use of money must be money in order for this use to 
classify as investment? This idea of a ‗social intention‘ is actually some-
times used by writers who are sympathetic to the idea of responsible 
ownership already mentioned (see chapter V, section 2.1) – since the 
institutional setting surrounding shareholding would seem to ‗intend‘ for 
them to have a certain role, their ethical responsibilities are also tied to 
this role (and, some writers say, other uses of shares or bonds are simply 
not proper investments28). Since this only is one idea of the ethical respon-
sibilities of investors, however, and, furthermore, an idea which I 
believe clashes with many of the intuitions of proponents of the ‗ethical 
investment‘ movement (at least when properly understood), one should 
certainly not assume from the start that it is correct.  
 These are just some of the reasons why this one attempt at defining 
‗investment‘ may be problematic, but I believe similar problems will 
befall most other attempts as well. Perhaps part of the problem is that 
the kinds of innovative investment strategies nowadays referred to as 
‗ethical‘ or ‗socially responsible‘ simply are so different from their tradi-
tional counterparts that it is hard to see what the two have in common. 
As I indicated above, however, I don‘t think these complications with 
giving a clear definition of ‗investment‘ need to be an insuperable prob-
lem in the present context. In keeping with most of the previous discus-
sions on the ethics of investing, I will focus almost exclusively on what 
seems to be the most paradigmatic example of financial investments, 
namely direct investments in corporate shares (stocks). In order to give propo-
nents of the socially responsible investment movement the benefit of 
the doubt, however, I will allow that almost any kind of use of corporate 
shares – that is, even social campaigns where shareholding is only a ra-
ther peripheral part – can be adequately classified as investing. Even 
though some may think this is misleading, what is important in the end 
is not what you call a certain line of action, I believe, but rather whether 
this line of action is morally justified. 
 In most situations, there are certainly a vast amount of actions open 
to investors, that is, there is a vast amount of things that the investor 
 
27 Similar points are made by Bruyn 1987, Moore 1988. 
28 See chapter V, section 2.1, note 43. 
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could do which would qualify as investing in the loose sense outlined 
above. In order to facilitate my discussion of what investors ought to 
do, however, I will limit this discussion to a smaller set of investment strat-
egies, i.e. a limited set of (composite) lines of action which are open to 
individual investors. Even though there may be many more things that 
investors could do, and many more lines of action are open to individual 
investors, I will be discussing some of the investment strategies that are 
most commonly thought to have some further moral merit. But what 
characterises an investment strategy more generally? And how can I be 
sure that the strategies I have chosen to discuss are most morally meri-
torious in this context? Hopefully, my answers to these questions will 
become clearer throughout the following sections. 
3.  TW O LEVELS OF INQ UIRY :  BUS INESS -  AND  
INVESTMENT -EVALUATIVE ISS UES  
Since the ethics of investing concerns ethical issues related to the finan-
cial sector in general and investments in corporate shares in particular, it 
has been common to regard this field of inquiry as a part of the larger 
field of business ethics.29 Indeed, several books on business ethics in 
general contain a chapter on the ethics of investing30, and many books 
and papers on the ethics of investing or ‗socially responsible investment‘ 
contain chapters or sections on, e.g., whistleblowing, the rights of em-
ployees, discrimination at the workplace, consumer safety, corporate 
philanthropy and recycling31. This may only be natural – as noted above, 
the growing societal concern about ethical issues in relation to financial 
investments is probably largely correlated with a growing concern over 
ethical issues related to business and the corporate sector in general. In 
many cases, it would also seem like it is the same set of intuitions about 
the ethical responsibilities of companies that are involved in both fields 
– exactly the fact that some company is engaged in a practice which is 
perceived to be morally unacceptable, for example, is often cited as a 
reason for thinking that it is morally problematic to invest in this com-
pany or for morally castigating those who hold its shares. But where 
does this leave our prospects for saying something useful about the 
 
29 Cf. Mackenzie 1997 
30 Cf. De George 1999, Harvey 1994, Sorell and Hendry 1994 
31 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Judd 1990, Kinder et al. 1992, 1993, Miller 1991, Schwartz 2003, 
Sparkes 2002 
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ethics of investing? In this section, I will elaborate on how the question 
outlined above relates to these more general issues in business ethics 
more exactly, and also explain why I will not say very much about them. 
 The range of interesting and important ethical issues related to cor-
porations or business in general, it should be noted, is dauntingly vast. 
In order to arrive at a fully informed answer to the question of what 
investors ought to do, however, I believe it is simply impossible to avoid 
these kinds of issues. While different ideas about what genuinely ethical 
investing consists in connect in different ways to issues about the ethics 
of different corporate practices, and this connection can actually be ra-
ther weak in some cases (as I will explain below), it seems hard to 
maintain that these kinds of more general issues in business ethics are 
totally irrelevant to the ethics of investing. In order to give a full answer to 
exactly what investors ought to do in a world as complex as ours, then, 
one would more or less have to settle the ethical issues surrounding, 
e.g., labour rights, gender equality, the importance of the environment, 
animal rights, global justice, and so on. Obviously, it is impossible to 
even begin to do justice to the seriousness and complexity of all these 
kinds of issues in a book like this. 
 It should be noted from the start, then, that there are many kinds of 
issues that are highly relevant to the ethics of investing yet which I will 
not be able to adequately address in this context. However, I believe 
there are certain other issues which it actually is possible to say some-
thing constructive about in a context like this, and these are issues which 
are characteristic exactly for the ethics of investing. Perhaps the best way 
of introducing these is to distinguish between different levels on which 
different kinds of issues lie, or between two levels of inquiry within the 
field of investment ethics: On one level, we have the issues pertaining to 
the ethics of different corporate practices, or concerning the ethical re-
sponsibilities of commercial companies. We might call these business-
evaluative issues, and the level of inquiry where these are central is at the 
business-evaluative level. On a higher level of inquiry, we have the issues 
pertaining to the ethics of different kinds of investments, or concerning 
the ethical responsibilities of investors. We might call this the investment-
evaluative level, and the issues on this level investment-evaluative issues. 
 The level of inquiry that is central in the field of investment ethics is 
obviously the investment-evaluative level, that is, my main concern is 
the question of what investors ought to do and what we should think 
about the ethics of different kinds of financial investments. Now, the 
‗problem‘ outlined above, however, is that many kinds of business-eva-
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luative issues would seem highly relevant to this kind of investment-
evaluative issues. To the extent that it seems plausible to morally criti-
cise investments in companies which are engaged in morally unaccepta-
ble business practices, for instance, it would simply seem impossible to 
determine what investors ought to do without also determining which 
kinds of business practices are morally acceptable and which are not. So 
can we really say anything intelligible about the ethics of investing with-
out first also saying something about a whole range of business-evalua-
tive issues? Well, my ‗solution‘ to this ‗problem‘ lies in the following 
considerations: While I agree that a whole range of business-evaluative 
issues are highly relevant to the issue of what investors ought to do, I 
believe too little emphasis actually has been put in the previous discus-
sion on investment-evaluative issues with regards to certain structural 
issues which are characteristic of the investment-evaluative level of inquiry. It is too 
often assumed, for instance, that exactly because some business practice 
is open to moral criticism of a certain sort, we should conclude that in-
vestors ought to refrain from investing in companies which engage in 
this kind of practice. But this line of reasoning contains a hidden pre-
mise which is seldom explicated – namely the idea that it is morally 
wrong to invest in companies which are engaged in morally unaccepta-
ble business practices. It is these kinds of premises that I wish to discuss 
in this context. 
 The main focus of the discussions of this book, then, will be on cer-
tain structural issues which are characteristic of the investment-evalua-
tive level of inquiry or, perhaps I should say, the kind of issues that are 
left once all business-evaluative issues are settled. Now, this is not to say that I 
will ignore the business-evaluative level completely in what is to come. In 
trying to analyse these more general ideas about what investors have 
moral reasons to do, I believe there is reason to analyse certain structural 
issues on the business-evaluative level as well. While too much discussion con-
cerning the ethics of investing has ignored the distinction above and 
focused on what is really business-evaluative issues, it may be noted, 
there are also writers who have made this distinction but who seem to 
overemphasise it and thus to make it too easy for themselves. The pre-
vious writer who has made the distinction above most explicitly, I 
believe, is once again Kolers – who suggests a distinction between two 
ways of ―theorising‖ about the ethics of investing: 
First, one might offer an account of which industries, companies, and 
types of behavior one ought to avoid or promote, based on moral and 
empirical premises. [...] Call this a special theory [of corporate ethics]. 
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Such a theory applies moral conclusions about what sorts of obligations 
investors have regarding their investment behavior. [...] A second ap-
proach, [...] offers a general theory of ethical investment behavior. A 
general theory answers two questions: whether morality generates obli-
gations regarding investment decisions; and if so, what form those obli-
gations take.32 
Now, since Kolers is interested in the latter, more general, form of theo-
rising, he leaves his argument open to be amended with what he calls a 
special theory of corporate ethics. His interest is, among other things, in 
the general idea that it is morally wrong to invest in companies which 
are engaged in morally unacceptable business practices. This idea, he 
suggests, can be discussed without reference to a theory about what 
constitutes a morally unacceptable business practice. He writes: 
My argument in this paper is independent of any particular view about 
which industries one should avoid, or which activities would be im-
moral, should they occur. For this reason, I leave notions like ―unethical 
practices‖ (of companies) undefined. My argument should be compati-
ble with a range of special theories of corporate ethics. While I will cer-
tainly give examples of activities I consider unethical, my thesis is inde-
pendent of them.33 
Kolers‘ distinction between general and special theories or theorising, 
one may note, is quite similar to my distinction between the investment-
evaluative and business-evaluative levels of inquiry. While I think it is 
important to make this distinction in this context, and also correct to say 
that the investment-evaluative level is the more general and central one 
in the ethics of investing, I think it should be noted that Kolers‘ idea of 
the relative independence of investment-evaluative and business-evalua-
tive issues is only half right. In his defence of the idea that investors 
have moral reasons to refrain from investing in companies engaged in 
morally unacceptable business practices, he perhaps does not have to 
presuppose any more elaborate idea about what qualifies as a morally un-
acceptable business practice. However, he needs to presuppose that 
there is some idea about what qualifies as a morally unacceptable business 
practice that is reasonably plausible, and that this idea could be plugged in to 
his idea of what investors have moral reasons to do. I will argue in 
chapter III that, depending on how the kind of general idea that Kolers 
defends is understood, this would also seem to give rise to rather differ-
 
32 Kolers 2001, pp. 436-37 
33 Ibid. 
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ent kinds of positions on the business-evaluative level, and these posi-
tions may, in turn, make the practical implications of the more general 
investment-evaluative idea more or less plausible. As will soon become 
evident, furthermore, depending on what general take you have on the 
issues on the business-evaluative level, different kinds of arguments 
would seem to become salient on the investment-evaluative level. In 
chapter II, for instance, I will discuss the idea that investors have moral 
reasons to avoid investing in companies whose business practices they 
themselves find morally unacceptable. With regards to this idea, an argu-
ment from personal consistency would seem relevant which is not as 
relevant with regards to other investment-evaluative positions. 
 Of course, as I indicated above, I believe there are positions on the 
investment-evaluative level which are relatively independent of there 
being any kind of answer to business-evaluative issues. According to 
one idea which I will discuss to some extent, for instance, it is perhaps 
not really important exactly what kind of companies or business areas 
investors invest in as long as they donate (enough of) their investment returns 
to socially worthwhile charities. For the most part of the book, however, I 
will be discussing different suggestions as to how investors generally 
should relate to the fact that some business areas or practices may be mor-
ally acceptable, unacceptable, praiseworthy, or something of the like. 
For this reason, as I have said, I will sometimes have reason to say 
something quite general about what ideas about these business-evalua-
tive categories that could be plugged in to these suggestions and to what 
extent these are plausible. 
 The different ways of generally relating to certain business-evaluative 
categories that I will be discussing, as the reader may have figured out 
by now, will of course be specified by the set of investment strategies re-
ferred to above, and which I will soon introduce in some more detail. 
Before introducing these, however, I will say something about the me-
thod I will be using in order to analyse and try to settle the kinds of is-
sues outlined here. 
4.  THE METH OD :  APPL IED ETHICS AS REF LECTIVE  
EQUILIB RIUM  
Since the ethics of investing, like business ethics, is interdisciplinary by 
its very nature, it may be noted that it has been approached from a 
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number of quite different angles, and by writers with quite diverse aca-
demic backgrounds.34 Both economists, sociologists, psychologists, 
business scholars and philosophers have been interested in the pheno-
menon of ‗socially responsible investment‘, and while many have been 
interested in describing it, explaining it, and comparing it to mainstream 
investments – financial comparisons between ‗socially responsible‘ and 
conventional portfolios, it may be noted, is the topic of an overwhelm-
ing part of this literature35 – only some have been interested in discuss-
ing the normative issues it gives rise to. Since it is this latter kind of is-
sues I am interested in here, the present inquiry most straightforwardly 
belongs to the field of moral philosophy, or what is sometimes called ap-
plied ethics. In this section I will try to explicate some of how I take the 
method (or, at least, one of the methods) of applied ethics to work and, 
through this discussion, I hope to make clear some of the most impor-
tant characteristics of the method I will be using in order to analyse and 
answer the kind of issues outlined above. 
 Quite intuitively, the best method to use for a certain inquiry should 
obviously be the method which has the greatest chance of allowing one 
to answer the inquiry‘s central question(s) – the method that tells you 
what you want to know. Following this line of reasoning, the appropri-
ate method in this context would obviously be the method which has 
the greatest chance of allowing us to determine what investors really 
ought to do, or what investment strategies really are preferable from a 
moral point of view. But which method is this? Unfortunately, it seems 
fair to say that applied ethics is a field where not only the answers to 
many central questions are disputed, but where there is not even a con-
sensus on what the best method for arriving at good answers is (nor, for 
that matter, is there a general consensus in moral philosophy on what 
constitutes a good answer to a normative question). I will, for this reason, 
not attempt a complete defence of any more elaborate view on the ap-
propriate method of applied ethics, but simply outline some of the main 
tenets of a method fairly commonly used in this field, so-called reflective 
equilibrium, and discuss some of the merits of this method as compared 
to other possible methods. 
 Perhaps the best way of introducing the standard method(s) of ap-
plied ethics is by way of discussing some recent criticisms directed at the 
 
34 Cf. Laufer 2003, Mackenzie 1997 
35 For an overview of some of these studies, see Kreander 2002. 
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place of philosophy in business ethics in general and in the ethics of 
investing in particular. In his dissertation on the ethics of investing and 
the ‗ethical investment‘ movement in the UK, Craig Mackenzie criticises 
the tendency of certain business ethicists to engage too much with philo-
sophical theories – a tendency which he thinks is intimately connected with 
the conception of business ethics as a part of applied ethics: 
One common way of conceiving of business ethics is as a part of the li-
terature of ‗applied ethics‘. The term ‗applied ethics‘ implies a particular 
way of going about ethical thinking: theory applied to practice. In busi-
ness ethics as elsewhere, by applied ethics people usually mean applied 
philosophy. The theories that are applied in applied ethics are philo-
sophical theories such as varieties of Kantianism or utilitarianism. [...] In 
business ethics, [these] theories are applied to specific issues such as 
‗whistle blowing,‘ broader ones such as the duties of the company to its 
stakeholders, or broader ones still such as the merits of capitalism.36 
The method outlined above is problematic for a number of reasons, 
Mackenzie suggests. What seems to bother him most is actually that it is 
too exclusive – that is, that it excludes people who are not so familiar with 
philosophical theories.37 What is more important in our context, how-
ever, is the further complaint that it tends to be rather abstract, and 
therefore insensitive to the social particularities of different communi-
ties.38 Rather than seeing business ethics as ‗applied ethics‘, Mackenzie 
wants to approach the issues of the ethics of investing from a perspec-
tive ―which does not set a gulf between theory and practice in ethics, 
but see ethical deliberation as a contextually situated practice‖39. And he 
thinks the works of writers like Michael Walzer40 and Alasdair MacIn-
tyre41, or what he calls interpretive or communitarian methodology, facili-
tates such a perspective. ―Rather than appealing to philosophy or reve-
lation, say, as the basis for ethical thinking‖, Mackenzie writes, ―these 
theorists appeal to the understandings of a particular community‖42. 
Furthermore: 
The lesson that the interpretive turn offers is that intelligent ethical ar-
guments can be built on the basis of critical engagement with the shared 
understandings of a particular community, tradition, or institution. On 
 
36 Mackenzie 1997, p. 20 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., pp. 22-32 
39 Ibid., p. 21 
40 Cf. Walzer 1983, 1987 
41 Cf. MacIntyre 1984, 1988 
42 Mackenzie 1997, p. 22 
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this approach one can evaluate the ethics of a particular practice, or a 
particular community, not primarily with reference to a philosophical 
theory, but by means of critical engagement with the shared under-
standings of the people who engage in various ways in the practice con-
cerned. I can evaluate the ethics of ethical investment by means of a 
critical engagement with the shared understandings and traditions of the 
ethical investment ‗community‘.43 
It is not obvious how Mackenzie‘s line of argument against traditional 
moral philosophy and applied ethics should be understood more ex-
actly. To some extent, I believe this kind of criticism – although it has 
been stated more conspicuously by other writers44 – is important to ac-
knowledge and take into account in a sound approach to the ethics of 
investing. I believe it should be noted first of all, however, that the gen-
eral understanding of the method of ‗applied ethics‘ outlined above is 
rather misapprehended. While some philosophers certainly have ap-
proached issues in applied ethics from a kind of ‗top-down‘ perspective, 
seeing it as a simple application of theories like Kantianism or utilita-
rianism to issues like euthanasia, abortion, or the ethics of war, most 
modern works in applied ethics are much more dynamic than this. It has 
become increasingly common to stress the importance of a coherence 
between abstract ethical principles and our considered moral judgements in 
more particular cases. And I think this is only reasonable – how can one 
otherwise know that the moral theory one applies really is the most 
plausible one?  
 Since the idea of coherence between abstract principles and more 
particular judgements will be a central part of the method I will be using 
in this book, it may be useful to say something more about this here. 
According to Tom Beauchamp, in a paper on ―The Nature of Applied 
Ethics‖, whereas the term ‗applied ethics‘ itself at first sight perhaps may 
be taken to imply the kind of straightforward ―application of theory to 
practice‖ model outlined above, it has become increasingly common to 
refer to concepts like ‗coherence‘ and ‗reflective equilibrium‘ in modern 
inquiries into applied ethics: 
―The top‖ (principles, theories) and ―the bottom‖ (cases, particular 
judgements) are both now widely regarded as insufficient resources for 
applied ethics. Neither general principles nor particular circumstances 
have sufficient power to generate conclusions with the needed reliabil-
ity. Principles need to be made specific for cases, and case analysis needs 
 
43 Ibid., p. 33 
44 See below. 
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illumination from general principles. Instead of a top-down or bottom-
up model, many now support a version of another model, variously re-
ferred to as ―reflective equilibrium‖ and ―coherence theory.‖45 
The term ‗reflective equilibrium‘ originally comes from John Rawls46, 
and is most often understood as a kind of philosophical method where 
moral judgements about particular cases, e.g. ―In circumstances C, ac-
tion A is wrong‖, are compared with the recommendations of more 
general moral principles, e.g. ―It is always wrong to A‖, and vice versa. 
That is, particular judgements are ―tested‖ against more general prin-
ciples, and these principles are in turn ―tested‖ against other particular 
judgements. Alternatively, ‗reflective equilibrium‘ could also be unders-
tood as the final state which this kind of method (ideally) leads to, i.e. a 
state where our moral principles and judgements about particular cases 
are in perfect coherence.47 In the present context, however, it is the me-
thod we are after. Beauchamp writes: 
The goal of reflective equilibrium is to match, prune, and adjust consi-
dered judgments in order to render them coherent with the premises of 
our most general moral commitments [(―considered judgements‖ is a 
technical term referring to judgments in which moral beliefs and capaci-
ties are most likely to be presented without a distorting bias)]. We start 
with sound judgments of moral rightness and wrongness, and then con-
struct a more general and more specific account that is consistent with 
these paradigm judgments, rendering them as coherent as possible. We 
then test the resultant action-guides to see if they yield incoherent re-
sults. If so, we readjust these guides or give them up and renew the 
process. We can never assume a completely stable equilibrium, so the 
pruning and adjusting can be expected to occur continually.48 
The method I will be using in this book is a form of reflective equili-
brium. That is, rather than mechanically applying some ethical theory to 
the world of finance, I will be trying to make sense of different ideas 
about what a genuinely ethical investment strategy consists in by com-
paring them both to (1) what would seem like reasonable and important 
theoretical considerations about morality and moral principles, and to (2) 
what would seem like plausible moral judgements about particular cases, both 
real and hypothetical ones. Since moral judgements about particular 
cases are invariably the result of the judges‘ context, taking context into 
 
45 Beauchamp 2003, p. 10 
46 Rawls 1971 
47 For an extended discussion of the idea of reflective equilibrium, cf. Tersman 1993. 
48 Beauchamp 2003, p. 11 
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consideration is in fact an unavoidable part of applied ethics as reflective 
equilibrium – unlike in the scurrilous picture of applied ethics painted by 
Mackenzie above. Since different parts of our moral thinking may 
sometimes come into conflict, and the goal is to achieve coherence be-
tween them, we will sometimes be forced to give up either a favoured 
moral principle or a favoured judgement in certain particular cases. Al-
though it is not always easy to know which of these roads to choose, I 
will indicate what road I believe is the most reasonable from the pers-
pective of reaching an as sound and coherent view as possible on the 
ethical responsibilities of individual investors. 
 Now, how does this method relate to the one outlined by Mackenzie 
above? Well, while his account of the method ―usually‖ employed in 
applied ethics would seem misapprehended, I believe there actually is 
something to the kind of criticism he delivers against the way inquiries 
into applied ethics often are conducted. Even though I think most 
writers in applied ethics in general and in business ethics in particular 
actually implicitly use some kind of reflective equilibrium approach to 
settle contested ethical issues, it may be noted that both the ethical prin-
ciples and the particular moral judgements they discuss very often are 
only their own, which they somehow have picked up ‗a priori‘ and without 
much discussions with the people involved in the kind of ethically con-
tested situations they discuss. That is, many writers – especially philoso-
phers – would seem to be ignorant or outright sceptical of the relevance of 
empirical research, and also hesitant to engage too much with the views of 
‘regular people’ and the practitioners in the professional fields they study. Tom 
Sorell refers to this phenomenon as ―armchair applied ethics‖49, or as 
the ―objectionable ivory-towerism‖50 of much work in business ethics. 
He writes: 
[T]he business ethics literature [is quite often] unsympathetic to, even 
censorious of, routine business practice. It can also be ignorant and ill-
informed – that is to say, written without the benefit of the legwork 
most academics need to do to find out a little about how markets and 
businesses work. In short, it is not unusual to find business ethics writ-
ing that has been composed without any travel from an armchair or a 
desk chair. Where credibility among the practitioners is [already] at such 
a premium, armchair applied ethics is particularly objectionable. It gives 
business ethics a bad name in business, and so connives at limiting the 
 
49 Sorell 1998, p. 82 
50 Ibid., p. 84 
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influence that the best applied ethics always exercises on the practices it 
discusses.51 
Many other writers have given similar comments on the lack of sensi-
tivity in much of the philosophical business ethics literature to the parti-
cularities of the issues and practices discussed, and the general divide 
between normative and empirical camps within the business ethics 
community.52 While some see this as a reason for saying that business 
ethics research radically needs to change direction – like Mackenzie 
seems to do – others are more moderate in their recommendations. It 
seems fair to say, however, that there is a general consensus on the idea 
that philosophical inquiries into ethical issues in the corporate sector can 
be substantially improved by a greater attention to the views of corporate 
practitioners and empirical details surrounding markets and competi-
tion.53 
 The main focus of this book is on a certain normative issue, namely 
what individual investors ought to do with their investments, and so my 
inquiry could be said to rest firmly in the field of (moral) philosophy. 
However, I think it is very important to avoid the mistakes of ―ivory-
towerism‖, or ―armchair applied ethics‖. For this reason, I have gone to 
great lengths to make my discussion sensitive to the particularities of the 
practices under consideration, and also firmly established in the views of 
the relevant practitioners. First of all, although I have not conducted any 
empirical investigations myself, I will frequently cite empirical research into 
and relevant facts about the way in which financial investments and 
shareholding in particular, and markets in general (albeit mainly stock 
 
51 Ibid., p. 81 
52 Cf. Crisp 1998, Cowton 1998a, Freeman 2000, Lucas 1998, Stark 1993, Trevino and Weaver 
1994, Victor and Stephens 1994, Weaver and Trevino 1994 
53 It is interesting to note that few writers – even within the philosophical community – have 
come out against this kind of view. An exception may be the renowned philosopher R. M. 
Hare who, in a paper entitled ―One Philosopher‘s Approach to Business Ethics‖, seems to be 
rather skeptical of the idea that it is the philosopher‘s duty to spell out the relation between 
abstract principles and real-life cases. He writes: ―Although I do now spend about half my time 
on the study of practical issues (the other half being still devoted to theory), I do not want to 
set myself up as an expert on the issues themselves. A philosopher, interested in many differ-
ent practical issues, is bound to get much of his information about them from secondary 
sources like the newspapers (which I spend a lot of time reading). Nobody can become an 
expert on the facts involved unless he is immersed in the practicalities of a particular field, as 
business people are in business, doctors in medicine, planners in environmental planning, and 
so on. It might be thought that the philosopher, who will always know less about such subjects 
than the practitioners, cannot contribute much. But he has his own contribution to make, 
namely the study of the logic of the arguments; and the experts in the field are often not so 
versed in this as they might be‖ (1998, p. 45). 
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markets), work. Where this is not available, I will also cite parts of 
contemporary financial and economic theory which have bearing on the issues 
under discussion. As will soon become evident, many of the most com-
mon ideas about what genuinely ethical investing consists in actually rest 
on a rather simplistic view about how financial investments and stock 
markets work, and it becomes a lot more complicated to spell out their 
practical implications for individual investors in light of the particulari-
ties of the real world (see, e.g., chapter III, sections 2.2 and 3.1, and 
chapter IV, section 3). Although certain parts of the financial theory that 
I will discuss are somewhat complicated (see especially chapter IV, sec-
tion 3.1), I have tried to explain them as well as I can and I hope that it 
will not be too problematic for the reader to follow my arguments in 
these sections. 
 To be adequately informed by the relevant empirical facts and theo-
ries from other academic disciplines, I believe, is a minimum require-
ment on a philosophical inquiry that wants to avoid the mistakes of 
―ivory-towerism‖. But perhaps this is not enough. The most important 
concession I have made to the critics of ―ivory-towerism‖ is that I – just 
like Mackenzie – have chosen to focus almost exclusively on the ideas 
about what investors have moral reasons to do suggested by practition-
ers in or proponents of the already existing ‘socially responsible investment’ 
(SRI) movement. That is, the investment strategies I will be discussing and 
comparing from a moral point of view are the investment strategies gen-
erally used and/or suggested by various parts of the SRI movement, and most of 
the ideas about how and why these strategies may be justified from a 
moral point of view will also be ideas from practitioners in or proponents of 
the SRI movement. While I have not interviewed these people myself, 
the reader will soon see that there is a plethora of literature on ‗ethical‘ 
and ‗socially responsible investment‘, most often written by practitioners 
in or proponents of this field, and this literature gives rise to plenty of 
ideas about what investors have moral reasons to do which can form 
starting points for the philosophical discussions to come. Obviously, I 
will take into account how other academic writers have understood and 
rationalised (or sometimes criticised) the views of these practitioners as 
well. But the starting point for most discussions will be the practitioners‘ 
own ideas about what ‗ethical investment‘ consists in. 
 Having noted the concession above, and the similarity with Macken-
zie‘s project in this respect, however, an important difference between 
my method and Mackenzie‘s should also be noted. While the main focus 
of this book will be on the investment strategies generally proposed by 
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proponents of the SRI movement, and the ideas about moral justifica-
tion which will be discussed for the most part also will be ideas from 
proponents of or commentators on the SRI movement, a great deal of 
energy will be devoted to critically assessing these strategies and ideas and to 
putting them into a larger (philosophical) perspective. Although Mackenzie 
wants to ―critically engage‖ with the ―procedures, purposes and prob-
lems‖ of the SRI movement as well54, since he subscribes to the kind of 
communitarian methodological framework outlined above he is careful 
to say that we will not attempt to evaluate these things from a perspec-
tive ―outside‖ the SRI movement. Rather, he says that ―I have tried to 
evaluate the methods of ethical funds against my understanding of their 
own convictions about the purposes of ethical investment. Similarly, 
when I talk about the ‗effectiveness‘ of ethical funds, I am discussing 
how effective their chosen means are for achieving what I consider to 
be their purposes‖55. But what if the purposes of the ‗ethical investment‘ 
movement are morally questionable in the first place? 
 The position which Mackenzie ends up defending in his dissertation 
is actually a version of the idea of responsible ownership mentioned 
above and, as I will suggest in chapter V (section 2.1), this should not 
come as a big surprise – the kind of communitarian methodology he 
subscribes to, because of its allegiance to communities and traditions, 
tends to reproduce a bias towards the status quo. Many writers have 
noted this kind of problem with the communitarian methodology and 
other kinds of ‗bottom-up‘ methods in applied ethics.56 I take it as a 
strength of applied ethics in the guise of reflective equilibrium that it not 
only allows us to try to construct an as strong case as possible for the 
suggestions given by different parts of the SRI movement, but that it 
also allows us to question the most fundamental assumptions of these 
suggestions. As my discussions in the rest of the book will show, while I 
believe many of the suggestions given by SRI proponents carry at least 
some moral merit, there are also many points where I think these sug-
gestions are either (partly) mistaken or fundamentally implausible. Quite 
generally, I will argue that the ethical responsibilities of individual in-
vestors are less rigid than they are often made out by SRI proponents, but 
also more demanding than is usually admitted in the SRI literature. 
 
54 Mackenzie 1997, p. 36 
55 Ibid., emphasis in original 
56 Cf. Beauchamp 2003, Bell 1993, Dworkin 1985, Tännsjö 1993 
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 Before commencing my inquiry into the moral merits of the more 
particular suggestions of SRI proponents, however, it may be suitable to 
introduce these different suggestions in some more detail, as well as to 
say something more on the SRI movement in general. 
5 .  ‗SOCIALLY RESP ONSIB LE ‘  INVESTMENT ST RAT EGIE S  
In order to delineate the present inquiry into the question of what in-
vestors ought to do, I said above that I will focus on a limited set of 
investment strategies and, in order to avoid the mistake of making my in-
quiry completely ‗a priori‘ and insensitive to the views of the relevant 
practitioners, I will focus on the investment strategies commonly suggested 
by practitioners in or proponents of the existing ‘ethical investment’ movement. But 
which are these strategies more exactly? And how can one define the 
‗ethical investment‘ movement without already assuming some idea 
about what investors have moral reasons to do? In this section, I will 
briefly elaborate on these issues and say something more about the set-
up of my discussions in the remainder of the book. 
 As noted above, more and more financial services actors (such as 
banks and fund companies) have begun to market financial vehicles 
with an explicit ethical, social or environmental dimension, and the total 
value of investments with this kind of profile has reached staggering 
heights in recent years. Perhaps not surprisingly, there are great differ-
ences between different parts of this phenomenon, and it is not always 
clear what the common denominator between the various parts is. Al-
though the most common terms used in this context are ‗ethical invest-
ing‘ (or ‗ethical investment‘)57 and ‗socially responsible investing‘ (or 
‗socially responsible investment‘, ‗SRI‘)58, for instance, other terms that 
are not uncommon are, e.g., ‗social investing‘59, ‗responsible investing‘60, 
‗alternative investment‘61 and ‗green‘ or ‗sustainable investments‘62. 
 
57 Cf. Anderson 1996, Cooper and Schlegelmilch 1993, Cowton 1994, 1999, De George 1999, 
Domini and Kinder 1986, Kolers 2001, Kreander 2002, Lang 1996, Lowry 1993, Mackenzie 
1997, Simon et al. 1972, Sorell and Hendry 1994, Sparkes 1995, 2001 
58 Cf. Brill and Reder 1993, Camejo 2002, Cowton 1998b, Domini 2001, Haigh and Hazelton 
2004, Harrington 1992, Judd 1990, Kinder et al. 1993, Miller 1991, Monahan 2002, Rivoli 2003, 
Sparkes 2002, Sparkes and Cowton 2004, Ward 1991 
59 Cf. Bruyn 1987, Entine 2003, Kinder et al. 1993, Lowry 1993, Munnell and Sundén 2005, 
Powers 1971, Waddock 2003 
60 Cf. Dembinski et al. 2003, Harrington 1992 
61 Cf. Cowton 1998b, Lowry 1993 
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Furthermore, while these terms most often are given similar definitions 
– for instance, ―the exercise of ethical and social criteria in the selection 
and management of investment portfolios‖63 – both wider and more 
narrow definitions of different terms can also be found.64 
 Many writers have previously commented on the heterogeneity of the 
‗ethical investment‘ movement.65 In light of this heterogeneity, some 
academics have called for more rigorous definitions of ‗ethical invest-
ment‘66 and, indeed, some have even attempted to give their own defini-
tion. According to Russell Sparkes, for instance, the term ‗ethical‘ seems 
to convey a kind of rather altruistic objectives, i.e. a desire to do good 
even at some cost to oneself but, since they seldom would seem to allow 
for reduced financial gains for social reasons, most of the so-called 
‗ethical funds‘ do not have ethical objectives in this sense. For this rea-
son, Sparkes argues, we should ―restrict the use of the term ‗ethical in-
vestment‘ to investment carried out on behalf of values-based organisa-
tions such as churches and charities, with the term ‗socially responsible 
investment‘ used in all other cases‖67. Furthermore, since initiatives such 
as community banking and shareholder lobby campaigns would seem to 
lack the kind of strong financial objectives of regular socially responsible 
investment, and these initiatives also use techniques for realising their 
objectives quite different from that of ethical funds, Sparkes suggests 
that these initiatives ought to be considered phenomena distinct from 
socially responsible investment as well.68  
 With regards to the kind of definitional suggestions exemplified 
above, I think it is important to distinguish between descriptive and nor-
mative definitions of ‗ethical investment‘ – or perhaps between definitions 
of ‘ethical investment’ on the one side, and the normative discussion concerning 
the ethics of investing on the other. It is often suggested that the perennial 
question for the ethical investment movement is how to define the term 
 
62 Cf. Heinkel et al. 2001, Louche and Lydenberg 2006, Miller 1992. Other, less frequent, 
terms are, e.g., ‗natural investing‘ (Brill et al. 1999), ‗values-based investing‘ (Fehrenbacher 
2001), ‗socially responsive investments‘ (Melton and Keenan 1994) and ‗socially conscious 
investments‘ (Harrington 1992). 
63 Cowton 1994, p. 215 
64 For a comparison of some early definitions, see Sparkes 2001. 
65 Cf. Cooper and Schlegelmilch 1993, Dunfee 2003, O‘Rourke 2003, Schepers and Sethi 
2003. For some recent research into explanations of this heterogeneity, see Louche and 
Lydenberg 2006. 
66 Cf. Bruyn 1987, Michelson et al. 2004, Monks 2002, Owen 1990, Sparkes 2001 
67 Sparkes 2001, p. 119 
68 Ibid., pp. 201-3 
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‗ethical‘.69 If this is understood as the same question as the one I am 
interested in here, i.e. as a question about what investors ought to do, 
however, it should be fairly obvious that this cannot be settled by a sim-
ple definition, but rather requires an open discussion about many kinds of 
underlying issues. Of course, I hope the discussions in this book can 
help to fill what many perceive as a gap in the existing literature on 
‗ethical investment‘ on this point. Some writers suggest that one reason 
why some parts of the ‗ethical investment‘ movement prefer to use the 
term ‗socially responsible investment‘ instead is that they want to dis-
tance themselves from the normative connotations of the term ‗ethical‘ 
– that is, that it would seem to imply that mainstream investments 
simply are unethical.70 However, as these writers note, the term ‗socially 
responsible‘ could probably be said to be equally normative – implying 
that mainstream investments are either ‗antisocial‘ or ‗irresponsible‘. 
 In order to avoid confusion about descriptive and normative uses of 
the terms ‗ethical‘ and ‗socially responsible‘, I will in what follows use 
the acronym ‗SRI‘ as the descriptive term, i.e. as referring to the range 
of funds and other investment vehicles which take putatively ethical, so-
cial and environmental considerations into account in their investment 
practices, and retain the terms ‗ethical‘ and ‗moral‘ for my discussion 
about the substantive merits of these kinds of practices. Furthermore, even 
though there is a great deal of heterogeneity surrounding SRI, I will, 
following many other writers71, continue to talk about the SRI movement 
as though it was a largely homogenous entity. For my present purposes, 
namely, what many practitioners in and proponents of the SRI move-
ment actually have in common is more interesting than what they do not. 
Most importantly, most accounts of SRI revolve around a limited set of 
investment strategies which are generally thought to carry some important 
moral merit, and these are also the investment strategies which my dis-
cussions in the remainder of this book will focus on. 
 According to most accounts of SRI, there are three central ways in 
which investors can incorporate ethical, social or environmental consid-
erations into their investment practices. The one most frequently em-
ployed by so-called ethical funds, and perhaps also the one most com-
monly associated with ‗ethical investing‘ among the general public, is 
 
69 Cf. Laufer 2003, Schwartz 2003, Taylor 2001 
70 Cf. Cowton 1998b, Sparkes 2002, Sparkes and Cowton 1994 
71 Cf. Haigh and Hazelton 2004, Harrington 1992, Louche and Lydenberg 2006, Monks 2002, 
Schepers and Sethi 2003, Waddock 2003, Ward 1991 
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what is often called ‘the avoidance strategy‘72 (alternatively, ‗the avoidance 
approach‘73 or ‗negative‘ or ‗exclusionary screening‘74). Investors who 
employ this kind of strategy attempt to avoid investing in companies en-
gaged in business areas or practices which are morally unacceptable, or 
problematic, in some sense75 – that is, they incorporate negative ethical criteria 
in their decisions on what companies‘ shares to acquire, hold or get rid 
of. If a company they can invest in is engaged in some kind of morally 
problematic business area or practice, they simply refrain from investing 
in this company. And, furthermore, if they already hold shares in the 
company in question, they sell them ‗as soon as possible‘.76 According 
to some recent reports, as much as 70 percent of the American and Eu-
ropean SRI industries may employ some kind of avoidance strategy.77 
Even though the amount of companies excluded by ethical funds varies 
to a great extent,78 it seems fair to say that the avoidance strategy is the 
most central part of SRI. 
 According to many practitioners in and proponents of the SRI move-
ment, however, the avoidance strategy is not enough on its own. A 
second way in which investors can incorporate ethical, social or envi-
ronmental considerations into their investment practices is through ‘the 
 
72 Cf. Cowton 1994, 1998b, 1999, Miller 1991 
73 Cf. Domini and Kinder 1986, Sparkes and Cowton 2004 
74 Cf. Kinder and Domini 1997, Statman 2000. Some other terms are, e.g., ‗avoidance screen-
ing‘ (Brill et al. 1999), ‗negative sanctions‘ (Powers 1971) and ‗negative policies‘ (Ward 1991). 
75 Exactly how the companies or business areas/practices that are avoided should be de-
scribed is somewhat unclear – they are referred to in the literature as everything from evil 
(Irvine 1987), unethical (Sparkes and Cowton 1994), bad (Cowton 1994, Judd 1990, Lang 
1996) socially irresponsible (Miller 1991), to unacceptable (Cooper and Schlegelmilch 1993, 
Heinkel et al. 2001, Lang 1996), undesirable (Cooper and Schlegelmilch 1993) or simply ―un-
ethical‖ (Judd 1990) or ―bad‖ (Domini and Kinder 1986, Cowton 1999). Exactly what these 
last formulations are meant to indicate is perhaps not clear. I will return to the issue of what 
business-evaluative classification should be plugged in here in chapters II and III. 
76 On most accounts, the general idea of the avoidance strategy would seem to be that invest-
ments in morally unacceptable companies should be disposed of immediately. However, for 
certain reasons, this is not how the avoidance strategy most commonly is practiced. See chap-
ter IV, section 3.2, note 75. 
77 Eurosif 2006, Social Investment Forum 2006. Since the terminology is far from clear in 
these reports, it should be noted, the exact percentage here is hard to determine. The Eurosif 
report, for instance, distinguishes between ‗ethical exclusions‘, ‗simple exclusions‘ and ―inte-
gration of risks associated with social, ethical and environmental concerns‖. It is hard to tell 
exactly what proportion of this last category is adequately classified as avoidance investing. 
While the SIF report speaks only of the broader category of ‗social screening‘, the lion‘s share 
of this category is probably avoidance investing (see also Munnell and Sundén 2005). 
78 According to the SIF report (Social Investment Forum 2006), as much as 25 percent of the 
US ethical funds only avoid companies involved in one specific business area (most often, 
companies involved in the tobacco industry). As much as 36 percent use less than five ‗social 
screens‘. 
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supportive strategy‘79 (also known as ‗the positive approach‘80, or  ‗qualita-
tive‘ or ‗affirmative screening‘81). Investors who employ this kind of 
strategy attempt to seek out and invest in companies engaged in business 
areas or practices which are morally praiseworthy, or exemplary, in some 
sense82 – that is, they incorporate positive ethical criteria in their decisions 
on what companies‘ shares to acquire, hold or get rid of.83 If a company 
they can invest in is engaged in some kind of morally praiseworthy busi-
ness area or practice, or if it is reasonable to think that it is socially bene-
ficial in some other way, they simply invest in it. This strategy is not 
employed as commonly as the avoidance strategy by the ethical funds – 
according to a recent estimate, less than 10 percent of the European SRI 
industry employs it.84 Part of the aims of the present inquiry, however, 
will be to try to determine whether this is as it should be or not. 
 A third strategy commonly employed by ethical funds is what we 
might call ‘the activist strategy’, or ‘shareholder activism‘‘85 (also known as ‗ac-
tive shareholding‗86, ‗active‘ or ‗constructive engagement‘87 or ‗direct 
dialogue‘88). Investors who employ this kind of strategy attempt to in-
vest in companies who are engaged in business areas or practices which 
are morally unacceptable and use their shareholder influence to make them 
 
79 Cf. Cowton 1998b, 1999 
80 Cf. Domini and Kinder 1986, Taylor 2000 
81 Cf. Beabout and Schmiesing 2003, Brill et al. 1999, Domini 2001, Kinder and Domini 1997. 
Some other terms are, e.g., ‗positive policies‘ (Ward 1991), ‗incentive investment‘ (Powers 
1971, Powers and Gunnemann 1969), ‗economically targeted investing‘ (Melton and Keenan 
1994, Munnell and Sundén 2005), or simply ‗alternative investing‘ (Miller 1991).  
82 Once again it is unclear how the companies or business areas sought out should be de-
scribed more exactly – in the literature they are variously described as good (Cowton 1994, 
Domini and Kinder 1986, Judd 1990), ―good‖ (Cowton 1999), socially useful (Cooper and 
Schlegelmilch 1993, Lang 1996) and socially responsible (Miller 1991). More elaborate formu-
lations can also be found, like ―companies that enhance the quality of life‖ (Domini and 
Kinder 1986). 
83 For obvious reasons, the avoidance and supportive strategies are sometimes lumped 
together under the term ‗screening‘ or ‗social screening‘ (Cf. Brill and Reder 1993, Domini 
2001, Rivoli 2003, Schueth 2003, Social Investment Forum 2006, Sparkes 2002), alternatively 
‗guideline portfolio investing‘ (Kinder et al. 1993) or ‗stock market social investing‘ (Bruyn 
1987). Combinations of these strategies are also possible, see chapter IV, section 1 – especially 
note 10. 
84 Eurosif 2006 
85 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Brill and Reder 1993, Cowton 1998b, Domini and Kinder 1986, Guay 
et al. 2004, Kinder et al. 1993, Melton and Keenan 1994, Sparkes 2001, 2002, Vogel 1983 
86 Cf. Lang 1996, Viederman 2002 
87 Cf. Domini and Kinder 1997, Eurosif 2006, Hellsten and Mallin 2006, Lewis and 
Mackenzie 1997, Sparkes 1995 
88 Cf. Domini 2001. Some other terms are, e.g., ‗shareholder advocacy‘ (Schueth 2002, Sparkes 
2002), ‗shareholder action‘ (Sparkes 1995, Ward 1991), ‗the activist approach‘ (Domini and 
Kinder 1986), ‗activist investing‘ (Miller 1991) or simply ‗social investing‘ (Lowry 1993). 
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change their ways. The starting point for this strategy is the contention that 
investors, as shareholders in or (part) owners of limited companies, en-
joy certain rights and privileges in relation to these companies. Most 
commonly, shareholder activists use their right to introduce and vote on resolu-
tions at limited companies‘ annual general meetings in order to try to 
make the companies in question take a stronger responsibility for the 
societal effects of their actions. However, also other kinds of campaigns 
are commonly associated with shareholder activism – for example, 
starting a dialogue with corporate managers, writing letters to institu-
tional investors and sending out press releases. Around 30 percent of 
the US SRI industry is reported to be engaged in some kind of share-
holder activist activity.89 
 The three investment strategies outlined above will be the main focus 
of attention in this book. Obviously, these are not the only strategies 
which are open to individual investors. For instance, some SRI propo-
nents suggest that so-called ‗community investing‗90 (also known as 
‗community lending‘91, or ‗ethical‘ or ‗socially responsible banking‘92) 
could be regarded as a separate strategy, or strand, of SRI.93 Investors 
who engage in this kind of investing attempt to support minority com-
munities or communities with poor economic development by, for in-
stance, loaning money directly to local banks or credit unions which 
collaborate in job-creation programs and housing projects. Since there 
are obvious similarities between this kind of investing and the suppor-
tive strategy, however, at least at the structural level, I will not treat it as 
a completely separate investment strategy in this context.94 However, I 
will argue in chapter IV (section 3.2) that community investing actually 
is a particularly promising part of the supportive strategy. 
 There are, however, two other investment strategies, or suggestions 
about what investors have moral reasons to do, which I will consider in 
the discussions to come. In my discussion about shareholder activism, 
 
89 Social Investment Forum 2006 
90 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Kinder et al. 1993, Nixon 2002, Schueth 2002 
91 Cf. Domini 2001 
92 Cf. Brill and Reder 1993, Sparkes 1995, 2001. Some other terms are, e.g., ‗alternative invest-
ing‘ (Lowry 1993, Sparkes 1995) and ‗investing in the social economy‘ (Lang 1996). According 
to a recent estimate, about 1% of SRI assets in the US could be classified as community 
investing (Social Investment Forum 2006). 
93 Cf. Beabout and Schmiesing 2003, Brill et al. 1999, Domini 2001, Kinder et al. 1993, 
Louche and Lydenberg 2006, Schueth 2002, Social Investment Forum 2006 
94 These strategies are also often intertwined in the literature – cf. Bruyn 1987, Lang 1996, 
Melton and Keenan 1994, Miller 1991. 
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first of all, I will compare an idea about the role-specific responsibilities 
of shareholders which is common in the SRI literature to a similar, but 
more comprehensive, idea in the literature on corporate governance (a litera-
ture that sometimes overlaps with the literature on SRI). I will argue (in 
chapter V) that it seems far from obvious that this more comprehensive 
idea about the role-specific responsibilities of shareholders actually en-
tails the activist strategy, at least as SRI proponents understand it. As a 
competitor to the activist strategy, then, I will discuss what I will call ‘the 
relationship strategy’. What this kind of strategy amounts to more exactly, 
and how it relates to shareholder activism more specifically, will hope-
fully become more evident in the discussions in chapter V.  
 A strategy which at least some Swedish ethical funds employ95, finally, 
and which has also been discussed in at least some of the literature on 
SRI or the ethics of investing96, is what I will call ‘the philanthropic strategy’. 
Although this strategy could be combined with the others in different 
ways, I will discuss it mainly as a radical alternative to the avoidance and 
supportive strategies. Investors who employ the philanthropic strategy, 
namely, attempt to invest in whatever they can make the most profit from and 
then donate (part of) the proceeds to socially worthwhile charities. That is, for 
these investors, the issue of whether or not a certain company is morally 
unacceptable, acceptable or praiseworthy is not what is most important 
– rather, the central issue is how they can make as much money as 
possible, money which they then can donate (parts of) to particularly 
effective social charities. 
 The reader should note that many combinations of the strategies 
above certainly are possible and, although I cannot discuss all of these 
here, I will discuss some of the most prevalent combinations along the 
way. I have now introduced the main investment strategies, i.e. the main 
ideas about what investors ought to do, which will be the focus of at-
tention in the following chapters. In the following section, I give a gen-
eral outline of the chapters to come and indicate briefly what kinds of 
strategies, issues and arguments I will be discussing in what parts of the 
book. 
 
95 Cf. O‘Rourke 2003, Skillius 2002 
96 Cf. Bruyn 1987, Kinder and Domini 1997, Harrington 1992, Kolers 2001, Zweig 1996 
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6.  PLAN OF  THE BOOK  
The remainder of this book will proceed as follows: In chapter II, a first 
look will be given at how many accounts of SRI focus on individual in-
vestors, and I will offer some possible explanations for this phenome-
non. More specifically, I will focus on how this relates to the avoidance 
strategy by discussing the suggestion that investors have moral reasons 
to avoid investing in companies whose business areas or practices they 
morally disapprove of themselves. The standard argument from SRI pro-
ponents for this idea is an appeal to consistency, and I will discuss differ-
ent ways of understanding this appeal. I will argue that there are serious 
problems with the appeal to consistency, and suggest that proponents of 
investing ‗with your conscience‘ would do better by some appeal to con-
scientiousness, or moral seriousness. In the end, however, I will argue 
that also this kind of appeal is unsatisfactory from a moral point of 
view. If investors indeed have moral reasons to avoid certain kind of 
companies, these must be morally unacceptable in some more robust, or 
impartial, sense. 
 In chapter III, following this strain of thought, I will discuss argu-
ments for the avoidance strategy more generally. My primary focus in 
this chapter will be on what I call (putatively) principled arguments for 
this strategy, that is, arguments which suggest that the fact that some 
company is engaged in some business practice which is morally unac-
ceptable is a direct reason for thinking that it is morally problematic to 
invest in this company. I will discuss three kinds of principled argu-
ments for the avoidance strategy: First, the idea that it is morally prob-
lematic to profit from morally unacceptable activities. Second, the idea 
that it is morally problematic to support morally unacceptable activities in 
the sense of sustaining them or contributing to their harmful effects. Third, the 
idea that it is morally problematic to support morally unacceptable 
companies in the sense of accepting them, or approving of their activities. I 
will suggest that a problem which is common to all of these ideas is that, 
because of the way investments work, their practical implications are 
much more complicated than their proponents generally have assumed. 
Even though they are often understood as arguments for the avoidance 
strategy, it is not always obvious that this actually is what they recom-
mend. Furthermore, even though they are often understood as principled 
arguments for the avoidance strategy, it is not obvious that they always 
are that principled. 
34 
 In chapter IV I will turn to discuss what I call pragmatic arguments for 
the avoidance and supportive strategies, that is, arguments which sug-
gest that investors can ‗make a difference‘ by employing some of these 
strategies. Since a common argument in this context would seem to be 
that buying and selling the shares of different companies can have a 
certain financial impact on their activities, the discussion will take me 
knee-deep into certain aspects of economic and financial theory. How-
ever, I will also discuss suggestions about how this kind of financial be-
haviour may have indirect social effects – for example, making it more 
likely that other investors will invest in a certain way, or creating a de-
mand on information about the social effects of corporate practices. In 
general, my argument in this chapter will be that we should demand 
more empirical evidence from proponents of the avoidance and sup-
portive strategies before we assume that individual investors can make a 
difference simply through buying and selling shares in different ways. 
Lacking this evidence, there are good theoretical reasons to think that 
this is very hard for individual investors. I will suggest an important ex-
ception to this rule but suggest that it generally seems hard for individ-
ual investors to make a difference without considerable self-sacrifice. Accord-
ing to some SRI proponents, even though individual investors cannot 
make a difference on their own, they may still have reasons to screen their 
investments because they could make a difference together with others, or, 
at least, if everyone behaved in a similar way. However, I will suggests that it 
is questionable whether these ideas really apply as things currently stand 
in the investment community. If it doesn‘t matter much exactly what 
kind of companies individual investors invest in, I will suggest, perhaps 
the philanthropic strategy is actually not so implausible as it is often 
made out to be. 
 In chapter V I will turn to discuss shareholder activism. My primary 
focus in this chapter will be on the idea that investors have moral rea-
sons to engage more actively with the companies they invest in because 
they generally are considered (part) owners of limited companies. I will suggest 
that it is not obvious what this idea implies more exactly – in the litera-
ture on corporate governance, it is often understood as an argument for 
what I call the relationship strategy rather than for shareholder activism. 
However, since the traditional understanding of the appeal to the re-
sponsibilities of ownership is problematic, perhaps there is no real con-
flict between these two approaches. I will suggest a somewhat different 
understanding of this appeal, in any case, and argue that it is compatible 
with the standard line of argument for the activist strategy. 
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 In chapter VI I will discuss whether investors can ‗make a difference‘ 
through becoming shareholder activists. Writers who have stressed the 
importance of this dimension of SRI tend to look favourably on the 
possibilities of activist strategies. However, once again, I will argue that 
more empirical evidence is needed before this can be assumed. Lacking 
this evidence, the circumstances surrounding standard corporate gover-
nance procedures seem to indicate that it is very hard for individual in-
vestors to make a difference in this way – at least when it comes to pro-
posing and voting on resolutions at limited companies‘ annual general meet-
ings. Perhaps there are some more promising ways in which individual 
activists can make a considerable difference – I note that everything 
from writing letters to sending out press releases has been suggested in 
the literature. In order for such kinds of more radical activist campaigns 
to have a chance of influencing corporate behaviour, I will suggest that 
they probably have to be directed at forces outside the modern corporation, i.e. 
power centres which can balance the immense powers of corporate 
managers and directors. Furthermore, successful campaigns will proba-
bly have to be a lot more self-sacrificial than is commonly admitted by SRI 
proponents. 
 These points about self-sacrifice give rise to the question about how 
much morality demands of individual investors. In chapter VII, I will comment 
on the fact that few SRI proponents actually tackle this kind of question 
– it seems important to most writers that ethical investing should also 
be profitable. I will try to tackle this question myself, however, by im-
porting and commenting on some of the more general philosophical 
discussion about the demandingness of morality. Even though a case 
perhaps could be made for resisting too extreme demands on self-sacri-
fice in some cases, I will argue that giving up investment proceeds is not 
extreme. Rather, I will suggest that investments themselves are a kind of 
luxury products. And it would not seem extreme to insist on that the 
needs of, e.g., the poor in the third world are more important than the 
‗luxury needs‘ of the kind of people who can afford to become inves-
tors. 
 In chapter VIII, finally, I will summarise some of the main conclu-
sions of my previous discussions. I will also try to put these into some 
perspective by introducing the political dimension of the ethics of in-
vesting. While SRI proponents are very critical of many parts of the 
corporate sector, it is interesting to note, they are seldom critical of the 
free market system which could be said to enable many of the moral 
problems in the corporate sector – nor are they particularly sceptical of 
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the trend towards corporate deregulation and privatisation noted above. 
But, I will suggest, some of their own lines of reasoning seem to indicate 
that they should be.
  
Chapter II 
‗Investing with Your Conscience‘1 
1.  A  DOUBLE FOCUS ON INDI VID UAL INVESTORS  
‗Ethical‘ or ‗socially responsible investing‘, according to most accounts, 
is a kind of investing which attempts to integrate ethical, social or envi-
ronmental considerations into investment decisions. During the last 
couple of decades, a large number of books and articles have been pub-
lished which seek to entice new investors to this kind of investing, and 
the intended audience for most of these books and articles are typical 
non-professional individual investors. It is often suggested that most individ-
ual investors, like people in general, want to be ethical and behave in 
ways which are consistent with their most basic values. Whereas issues 
like labour rights, environmental sustainability and global justice may 
previously only have been the concern of an educated few, more and 
more people are now becoming aware of different kinds of ethical, so-
cial and environmental problems related to the corporate sector. But, 
SRI proponents suggest, perhaps this then calls for exactly an integra-
tion of considerations of these kinds into one‘s investment decisions.  
 
1 Parts of this chapter have been published previously (see Sandberg 2007a), although I now 
have changed my mind on a number of points. See especially note 46 below. 
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 Amy Domini and Peter Kinder, co-founders of one of the largest SRI 
firms in the US, write as follows in the opening paragraph of their book 
on ‗ethical investing‘: 
Should your ethics play a significant role in what you do with your 
money? Unlike Charles Foster Kane, perhaps you refuse to separate 
your ethics from your investments. If so, this book is for you. Today 
many people recognize the dilemma of profiting from enterprises whose 
goals, methods, or products they know are inconsistent with their per-
sonal philosophy. What environmentalist, for instance, wants to profit 
from dioxin? What parent wants to benefit from sponsors of television 
violence?2 
In this chapter, I will discuss what I take to be an interesting feature of 
this kind of ‗argument‘, or sales pitch, for SRI – namely that it would 
seem adapted to, or designed for, individual investors in more than one 
way. Not only are individual investors the intended audience and the idea is 
that they have moral reasons to integrate ethical, social or environmental 
considerations into their investment decisions. What is more is also that 
the idea often would seem to be that individual investors have moral 
reasons to integrate the kind of ethical, social or environmental consid-
erations they themselves care about into these decisions. That is, according to 
many SRI proponents, it is the individual investors‘ own moral views on 
business-evaluative issues that seemingly are relevant for assessing the 
ethical status of his or her investments. 
 This second kind of adaptation to individual investors is salient in 
many books and articles on SRI. Extensive parts of many such books 
are dedicated to helping individual readers, or potential individual in-
vestors, decide what moral issues related to the corporate sector are es-
sential to their own understanding of social responsibility.3 Not uncom-
monly, simple questionnaires are offered where investors may choose 
what areas of concern, among those most commonly considered by so-
called ethical funds, are most pressing to themselves.4 Indeed, this focus 
on the investors‘ own moral views is actually salient already in the titles 
of many books on SRI. Many books on this subject bear titles such as, 
 
2 Domini and Kinder 1986, p. xi. The reference to Charles Foster Kane is a reference to the 
main character of Orson Welles‘ film Citizen Kane, who at one point both defends the writing 
of a critical newspaper article about a certain company, because he is the publisher of the 
newspaper, and opposes it, because he is a major shareholder in the company. (An excerpt 
from the script appears in Domini and Kinder‘s book, p. x.) 
3 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Brill and Reder 1993, Domini and Kinder 1986, Harrington 1992, Miller 
1991 
4 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Brill and Reder 1993, Domini and Kinder 1986, Harrington 1992 
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e.g., ―Ethical Investing – How to make profitable investments without 
sacrificing your principles‖5, ―Socially responsible investing – How to 
invest with your conscience‖6, ―Investing with your conscience – How 
to achieve high returns using socially responsible investing‖7, and ―Put 
your money where your morals are – A guide to values-based invest-
ing‖8. All these titles refer to your, or the reader‘s/investor‘s, moral con-
cerns. What this implies is made explicit by Jack Brill and Alan Reder, in 
their introduction to SRI: 
The full term, socially responsible investing, simply means money man-
agement and investment decisions made according to both financial and 
ethical criteria. Not just any ethical criteria, however – your criteria. SRI 
is not about satisfying someone else‘s political or social agenda. Al-
though most socially responsible investors would agree generally about 
a broad range of issues, the emphasis in SRI is on your individual ethical 
stance.9 
Now, there may be many explanations for this kind of focus on individ-
ual investors‘ own moral views among proponents of the SRI move-
ment. It should be noted from the start that much of the SRI literature 
has what we might call a marketing dimension – that is, the goal is often 
to portray SRI in a way which makes it interesting to the reader, or 
which has a high chance of enticing the reader to becoming an SRI in-
vestor.10 If the intended audience is ‗regular people‘, most of these are 
after all potential investors and so also potential ‗ethical‘ investors and it 
is probably easier to attract investors to a certain type of financial pro-
duct if you appeal to the specifics of your target customers and take 
their values seriously, than if you start to moralise over their choice of 
investment practice. The existence of this marketing dimension may in 
turn be given different explanations. Many of the authors of these 
books on SRI, it may be noted, are actually owners of or practitioners in 
fund companies which offer different kinds of SRI vehicles themselves. 
Thus, the focus on investors‘ own ethical stances could perhaps be said 
to make monetary sense for the SRI industry – the funds specialising in 
 
5 Domini and Kinder 1986 
6 Miller 1991 
7 Harrington 1992 
8 Fehrenbacher 2001 
9 Brill and Reder 1993, p. 12 
10 According to Moskowitz, much of the SRI literature is ―evangelical‖ in nature, ―sort of a 
cross between The Wall Street Journal and the Bible‖ (1992, p. 71). See also Anderson 1996, 
Entine 2003, 2005, O‘Rourke 2003. 
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providing ‗ethical‘ or ‗socially responsible‘ investment vehicles.11 As long 
as investors are motivated to invest according to at least some kind of 
non-financial values, fund companies can design different SRI vehicles 
to suit the values of different customer groups and the result is an ―SRI 
market‖, fully equipped with competition and specialisation – a market 
which financial companies of course are familiar with.12 
 From similar considerations, many commentators have criticised the 
SRI movement for being too simplistic and populist. Digby Anderson, 
for instance, argues that current ethical funds are better understood as 
pure customer products than anything genuinely ethical. Hence, notions 
such as ‗ethical‘ and ‗socially responsible‘ investing are misnomers: 
What is the principle on which certain ―unethical‖ products or practices 
are selected for listing and certain others ignored? One answer [...] is 
that the criteria reflect the criteria demanded by investors. If so, well 
and good. The investments these companies favor indeed satisfied a 
customer demand. But that does not mean that what they are doing has 
a right to be labeled ―ethical‖ with the at least occasional implication 
that other investments are unethical. [...] [Standard ethical investments] 
might variously be more accurately labeled ―investments reflecting in-
vestors‘ opinions‖, ―investments reflecting fashionable causes‖, ―scru-
pulous investments‖, ―ethically simplistic investments‖, or a range of 
others. The one term, which prejudges the issues and which is not justi-
fied is ―ethical‖. What has ethical investment to do with ethics? Not 
much.13 
We need not go into the details of Anderson‘s position here, but it is 
worth noting that an implicit assumption in his argument seems to be 
that investments that simply are made to reflect the moral opinions of 
 
11 According to Cowton, it is ironic that the development of SRI products could be explained 
in this way: ―At one level, ethical investment can be seen as just another product innovation 
that helps widen choice, which would probably be seen as a good thing. [...]  The irony is that 
its occurence can be explained in pure, profit-seeking, capitalistic terms, as financial institutions 
seek to influence and exploit their environment in the interests of profitability. Thus individual 
investors can, potentially at least, have their values met or satisfied by institutions/people who 
do not share those values at all, whose sole motive might be to make more money‖ (1994, p. 
228). See also Hellsten and Mallin 2006. 
12 According to Monahan, the SRI movement indeed exhibits a kind of ―value schizophrenia‖ 
– seeking to integrate ethical, social or environmental concerns while still working in a tradi-
tional market-based set-up. He writes: ―The traditional market-based axiology of profit and 
growth is now being blended with a more qualitative axiology that embraces specific moral 
concerns. The result of this blend seems to be a ‗you tell me the values, and I‘ll make the 
money‘ type of fund management strategy. This value schizophrenia is reflected by the over-
whelming emphasis in the current literature on performance rather than ethics‖ (2002, p. 30). 
13 Anderson 1996, p. 4. Similarly, Sparkes suggests that the kind of investing outlined above 
perhaps can be called ‗conscience investing‘, but questions whether it can adequately be called 
‗ethical‘ (2001, p. 195). 
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individual investors do not have any real moral merit. Is this right? Well, 
perhaps agreeing with this position already at this stage is somewhat 
premature. In what follows, I will discuss a line of reasoning which I 
think could be taken as a kind of argument from SRI proponents to the 
effect that it indeed is individual investors‘ own moral views on busi-
ness-evaluative issues that are relevant for assessing the ethical status of 
investments. For the sake of simplicity, although this kind of argument 
most often is made out as an argument for SRI generally, I will focus on 
the avoidance strategy in this context. According to the most common 
set-up of this kind of argument, namely, the idea is that investors have 
moral reasons to avoid investing in business areas they morally disapprove of.14 
 The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: In section 2, I 
present the kind of reasoning, common among SRI proponents, which I 
think could be understood as a kind of argument for ―investments re-
flecting investors‘ opinions‖. I call this the appeal to consistency, and I 
discuss different understandings of this appeal. In section 3, I argue that 
the case for this kind of investments could be made stronger by an ap-
peal to conscientiousness, or moral seriousness – such an appeal could 
rationalise what seems intuitive with the appeal to consistency, at the 
same time as it could avoid some of what seems counterintuitive with 
this appeal. In section 4, however, I suggest that there are problems also 
with the appeal to conscientiousness. My general argument in this sec-
tion is that Andersson is on to something in his critique of the SRI 
movement – that is, focusing on the moral views of individual investors 
is not very fruitful from an ethical point of view. To the extent that in-
vestors indeed have moral reasons to invest ―with their consciences‖ 
(which I think we should demand more arguments for before accept-
ing), these moral reasons would seem quite weak in the overall context 
of the ethics of investing. In section 5, I make some remarks about the 
direction in which I think we must go in order to make ‗ethical invest-
ing‘ have ―something (more) to do with ethics‖. Finally, in section 6, the 
main conclusions of the chapter are briefly summarised. 
 
14 A similar line of reasoning could perhaps be that investors have moral reasons to invest in 
business areas they find morally praiseworthy. Although I will not discuss this idea explicitly, 
much of what I say in this chapter also concerns this idea. 
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2.  THE APPEAL TO CON S IST ENCY  
The most common line of reasoning which accompanies the idea that 
investors have moral reasons to avoid investing in business areas they 
morally disapprove of, I believe, was already implicitly invoked in the 
introduction to ‗ethical investing‘ by Domini and Kinder above. They 
write: ―Today many people recognize the dilemma of profiting from 
enterprises whose goals, methods, or products they know are inconsistent 
with their personal philosophy. What environmentalist, for instance, wants to 
profit from dioxin? What parent wants to benefit from sponsors of tele-
vision violence?‖15 We might call this kind of argument the appeal to con-
sistency. Loosely stated, the idea is that it would be morally inconsistent in 
some way to both be opposed of, say, the weapons industry and at the 
same time invest in that industry. Assuming that most individual inves-
tors have certain business areas or practices (like environmental pollu-
tion, or the sale of weapons, tobacco or alcohol) which they find mor-
ally problematic, then, they would seem to have some kind of reason for 
integrating ethical, social or environmental considerations into their 
investment decisions. In her later book on ‗socially responsible invest-
ing‘, Amy Domini makes this appeal explicit: 
There are two basic reasons for integrating social or ethical criteria into 
the investment decision-making process: the desire to align investments 
with values and the desire to play a role in creating positive social 
change. Consistency is almost always the motivation that causes inves-
tors to start down the path of becoming socially responsible in their 
investments.16 
Elizabeth Judd does not use the term consistency, but summarises this 
idea quite neatly: 
Socially responsible investing encompasses a wide range of complicated 
issues, but the principle is simple: investors make statements by the in-
vestments they choose, and these statements should reflect the inves-
tor‘s beliefs.17 
 
15 Domini and Kinder 1986, p. xi, emphasis added 
16 Domini 2001, p. 13 
17 Judd 1990, p. 7. Similar ideas can be found in many other accounts of SRI. According to 
Lowry, for instance, the simplest form of SRI ―involves individual and institutional investors 
who decide what their most important ethical values are and make their investment decisions 
reflect those values‖ (1993, p. 21). According to Miller, ―[a]ny individual or group which truly 
cares about ethical, moral, religious or political principles should in theory at least want to 
invest their money in accordance with their principles‖ (1992, p. 248). 
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Although the appeal to consistency here is not presented as an argu-
ment, in the strict sense, for the kind of conscience-reflecting investing 
under discussion, I think it is fair to interpret the appeal to consistency 
as a kind of argument for, or a description of what is attractive in, this 
sort of investing. In his article on SRI for the Encyclopedia of Applied 
Ethics, Christopher Cowton seems to think along similar lines when he 
describes what he calls the argument from ―investor integrity‖, or 
―moral purity‖:  
What, then, is the ethical basis for SRI as described earlier? [...] The first 
[of two discernable strands], which follows naturally from the prima facie 
case [for ethical considerations in investment decisions], seeks to ensure 
that consistent standards of behavior are applied in all areas of life. 
Thus, at a very basic level, it might be considered inappropriate for 
someone who practices and advocates teetotalism to hold shares in a 
distillery. Similarly, the British Medical Association was subject to criti-
cism a number of years ago because, while it had an antismoking policy, 
it held shares in companies which had substantial tobacco interests. To 
many observers, passively holding a stock and making a return from it 
indicates some support for a particular activity. [...] An attempt is made 
to avoid the type of inconsistency which represents one of the central 
types of hypocrisy. A pure avoidance strategy might be the outcome of 
such a perspective.18 
My interest is mainly in the argument pertaining to individual investors 
here (like the teetotaller), and not on an argument concerning compa-
nies or associations (like the British Medical Association). Although it 
seems clear that it is considered ―inappropriate‖ or, I guess, morally in-
criminating, for someone who, like the above teetotaller, is morally op-
posed to the sale of alcohol to at the same time invest in a distillery ac-
cording to Cowton, Domini, Judd and other writers, unfortunately I 
think that it is far from obvious what it is that makes for this inappro-
priateness. Exactly how should we understand the ―inconsistency‖ that 
apparently gives rise to the moral fault of Cowton‘s teetotaller and simi-
lar complaints in parallel cases? In order to pave the way for some of 
the later discussions, it may be interesting to elaborate some on this 
point. I can see at least five different interpretations of how the appeal 
to consistency might be understood more exactly. 
 (1) Perhaps the salient feature is that the teetotaller is involved in 
some kind of logical inconsistency, i.e. that she holds moral beliefs (or 
 
18 Cowton 1998b, p. 187 
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expresses moral attitudes19) that contradict each other. One might argue 
that assuming that she ―practices and advocates teetotalism‖ is tanta-
mount to saying that she believes it is always wrong to support the sale of alco-
hol (or to profit from it, or something of the like). Yet she invests in a 
distillery, which could be taken to suggest that she in this instance does 
not find it wrong to support the sale of alcohol (or to profit from it, or 
something of the like).20 These two convictions, that it is always wrong 
to support the sale of alcohol, and that in this instance it is not wrong to 
support the sale of alcohol, contradict each other. Perhaps the argu-
ment, then, turns on that the teetotaller is involved in a straightforward 
logical inconsistency.21 
 (2) Perhaps this is not so, but the inconsistency she is claimed to be 
involved in is more accurately described as arbitrariness. Considering the 
reference to the ―prima facie case for ethical considerations in investment 
decisions‖ that Cowton gives, one might interpret the teetotaller‘s con-
victions as being the following: She believes that most instances of sup-
porting the sale of alcohol are wrong, yet, for no good reason, she does 
not believe that the instance of supporting it where her shares in the 
distillery are involved is wrong. The prima facie case is spelled out earlier 
in Cowton‘s article: 
The prima facie case for ethical considerations in investment decisions is 
that as an area of human activity it should not be immune from ethical 
considerations. There is, it is suggested, nothing special about invest-
ment in general that warrants its exclusion from the ethical considera-
tions that are brought to bear on other areas of life.22 
Following an interpretation of this line of reasoning, perhaps what is 
salient in the appeal to consistency is the following: Believing that sup-
porting the sale of alcohol is generally wrong, and yet excluding from 
this the support generated by investing in a distillery, for no good rea-
son, is completely arbitrary. There is nothing special in this kind of sup-
 
19 Whether moral opinions are beliefs or attitudes, and whether attitudes can stand in logical 
relations to each other, are issues that are much debated in philosophy. I will not take a stand 
on these here. However, as we will see in the next chapter (section 4), the idea that investments 
in some manner express moral attitudes seems to be widespread in the SRI literature. 
20 A similar interpretation of investment choices seems to be what Judd is getting at, when she 
argues that ―investors make statements by the investments they choose‖ (1990, p. 7). 
21 This interpretation is suggested by the rhetoric of some writers, for example: ―Should the 
pension fund of the American Medical Association invest in Philip Morris, whose cigarettes 
cause a major health problem? Such an action would defy logic!‖ (Harrington 1992, p. 4). 
22 Cowton 1998b, p. 187. Similar statements of the prima facie case can be found in Cowton 
1999 and Sparkes and Cowton 2004. 
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port of the sale of alcohol, it is argued, that warrants its exclusion from 
the general principle that is brought to bear on other areas of life. In this 
version, the argument is one about the arbitrariness of excluding in-
vestment choices from the scope of otherwise general principles. 
 (3) Another interpretation of the argument, and of the prima facie case, 
is that it is not about consistency between convictions at all, but rather 
about some type of practical inconsistency of the teetotaller. The fact 
that she holds shares in a distillery does not necessarily imply some con-
viction on her side to the effect that this is also correct. Maybe we 
should say that she practices and advocates teetotalism, i.e. believes it is 
always wrong to support the sale of alcohol. Yet she somehow fails to 
apply this conviction in her actions – she actually supports the sale of 
alcohol through her investing in a distillery (or, so the argument goes). 
The inconsistency she is involved in is, then, an inconsistency between 
what she believes in and what she actually does, i.e. between principle 
and action. She simply fails to comply with her own moral standards of 
action. 
 (4) An interpretation that is not so far from the previous one is that 
the inconsistency of the teetotaller is some error of instrumental ratio-
nality. Perhaps it is presumptuous to assume that the teetotaller some-
how just fails to comply with her moral convictions. One might instead 
assume that she, falsely, believes that her holding shares in the distillery 
does not amount to her supporting the sale of alcohol. Because she 
falsely believes this, she has no problem with holding shares in the dis-
tillery and so is not subjectively inconsistent in the formerly mentioned 
senses. Yet, the argument might go, her holding shares in the distillery de 
facto amounts to her supporting the sale of alcohol, so she is instrumen-
tally irrational. The instrumental irrationality here is constituted by the 
fact that she contributes to the realization of something she (morally) 
disapproves of. 
 (5) Yet another interpretation of the example, which I think is not far-
fetched in real-life situations, is of course that the inconsistency of the 
teetotaller is only apparent. Her investment in the distillery actually re-
veals her true moral beliefs – she is not such a devout teetotaller as she 
makes herself out to be. Under this interpretation, no real inconsistency 
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is involved, but perhaps something of equal moral importance – the 
hypocrisy of pretence.23 
 It is unclear which of these interpretations proponents of the appeal 
to consistency would choose, or if they would give some other inter-
pretation.24 It may be noted that the different interpretations have dif-
ferent characteristics. First of all, while (1) may seem like the most natu-
ral interpretation of the talk of consistency, it is controversial if this case 
has anything to do with ethics. Having logically inconsistent views might 
certainly be irrational, or even stupid, but is it really immoral? Further-
more, while (3) and (4) may seem to describe worse situations for the 
teetotaller, morally speaking, they also involve stronger claims than the 
other interpretations about the facts of the situation. In order to show 
that the teetotaller is practically inconsistent or instrumentally irrational 
it needs to be established that she, through her investing, actually does 
what she thinks is wrong – i.e. actually supports the industries she is 
opposed of, or profits from them, or whatever she is opposed of 
doing.25 We might call these kind of claims the underlying premises of the 
argument – as will soon become evident, these premises are actually vital 
to any plausible argument for the avoidance strategy building directly on 
the characteristics of certain companies or business areas. 
 Do we have to choose among the interpretations above, however? I 
do not think we have to, and, in fact, I think we should not. I will 
shortly (in section 3) argue that, in order to build a more inclusive and 
robust case for investments ―according to conscience‖, proponents of 
this kind of investments should appeal to a more comprehensive idea of 
conscientiousness, or moral seriousness, instead of simple consistency. 
Before elaborating on this idea, however, I will consider a slightly differ-
 
23 This interpretation is suggested by (a perhaps superficial reading of) Cowtons reference to 
―one of the central types of hypocrisy‖ (Cowton 1998b, p. 187). In an article with Roger Crisp 
(Crisp and Cowton 1994), Cowton separates the hypocrisy of pretence from the hypocrisy of 
consistency. See further note 38 below. 
24 Some authors develop their conception of consistency so as to be able to cover more than 
just the relationship between investments and beliefs. Brill et al., for instance, include a chapter 
in their book on how to change your entire lifestyle to become more consistent with your 
moral beliefs (2000, chapter 13). As noted in the previous chapter, Sparkes (2001) doubts that 
investing in companies through a retail SRI fund can be consistent with any conception of 
morality – because of the profit motive of such funds. Perhaps, he suggests, the term ethical 
investment should only be used for the (consistent?) investments of churches and charities. 
25 Cowton refers to the idea that ―[t]o many observers, passively holding a stock and making a 
return from it indicates some support for a particular activity‖ (1998b, p. 187). Domini and 
Kinder (1986) focus, instead, on the fact that an investor may profit from business activities 
that she disapproves of. For more on how these things should be understood, see the next 
chapter. 
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ent understanding of the appeal to consistency as it stands. Perhaps I 
have already been getting ahead of myself, and understood the argument 
as a stronger claim than it actually is? 
2.1 Valu in g cons i s t en cy  
It seems possible to understand some of the authors above as saying 
that consistency is not normatively relevant in itself, nor for all inves-
tors, but that it is only relevant to the extent that some investors them-
selves value consistency. This interpretation of the argument, it may be 
noted, appeals to the consciences of investors also when it comes to the 
justification of the appeal to consistency itself. Hal Brill, Jack Brill and 
Cliff Feigenbaum seem to suggest this interpretation when, in order to 
explain the moral justification of SRI, they give us the following hypo-
thetical conversation: 
Bob: What‘s the use of screening investments, Annie? 
Annie: Everyone has their own reasons, but it usually comes down to 
this. People value integrity; they don‘t want to profit from activities with 
which they disagree.26 
I will here understand the reference to integrity along the lines of what 
has been previously said about consistency. One way to understand An-
nie‘s position is that what kind of inconsistency should be avoided, and 
to what extent this should be avoided, simply depends on what kind of 
consistency investors themselves value, and how much value they ac-
tually assign to it. The appeal to consistency, on this understanding, 
would not need to be supplemented with any of the more precise inter-
pretations of consistency suggested above. Different investors might 
have different conceptions of consistency in mind and still agree that 
consistency is valuable. The point is that consistency, whatever it is, is 
valuable to the extent that actual investors value it. 
 This sort of argument may seem simple enough. I think it is hard to 
deny that many investors attracted to SRI value some sort of consis-
tency. Domini, for instance, describes what she calls her ―moment of 
realization‖: 
One day the research department at the firm I worked for sent out a 
recommendation for a company that they thought had good prospects 
 
26 Brill et al. 1999, p. 76 
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for winning a major military contract. On the basis of this expectation, 
most of my fellow brokers were calling their best customers and re-
commending a purchase of the stock. I felt sick. How far had I fallen 
that I might consider calling people I was fond of and urging that they 
make an investment in a killing machine? 
 It was a moment of realization for me, and since that day, I have 
come to recognize that most social investors have experienced a similar 
moment. There is value to being more consistent with yourself and with 
your value system. You don‘t need perfect consistency; every step in 
that direction feels better than no step in that direction.27 
I take this quote to mainly say something about the value of a certain 
perceived consistency for Domini, and other investors, personally.28 I 
am not denying that many investors might agree with Domini on the 
value of consistency, along the lines of her story. Even if we grant that 
most investors would agree with her on this issue, however, I think it is 
unclear how this should be understood as a moral argument for invest-
ments according to conscience. 
 First of all, saying that most investors value consistency is not the same 
as saying that all investors do. The reference to ―most social investors‖ 
already seems to assume that these investors have some interest in join-
ing the SRI movement. Other investors may not value consistency at all, 
and may, even when proponents of the appeal to consistency point out 
that they in some sense are inconsistent, fail to feel the slightest bit un-
nerved by this. Others may perhaps be persuaded to feel somewhat hy-
pocritical in their inconsistency, but overall feel content with such in-
consistency because of the profit they make on their investments, or 
because they cannot see any reasonable way for anyone to avoid being at 
least somewhat hypocritical.29 
 Moreover, even if all investors were to value consistency, some might 
not agree with what I above called the underlying premises of the argu-
ment from consistency, and therefore fail to feel inconsistent simply 
because they are investing in areas they morally disapprove of. Some 
investors might, for example, hold that their investing into an area that 
they morally disapprove of does not make them inconsistent since it 
 
27 Domini 2001, pp. 15-16 
28 It is perhaps not obvious that this personal value of consistency is the only thing that is 
thought to speak in favor of consistency here. Domini might ultimately agree that consistency 
is valuable, even if no investor thinks so. I think it is fair to say that the personal value of 
consistency is at least a part of what is thought to be good about consistency, however. 
29 For some empirical research on the commitment among ‗ethical investors‘, see Webley et al. 
2001. 
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allows them to persuade the companies they have invested in to change 
their ways. Investing with such a purpose, they might say, does not 
amount to supporting the company in the morally incriminating way – 
so they are not being inconsistent with their moral beliefs. But perhaps 
this is not a real problem for SRI proponents – as indicated above, the 
appeal to consistency is often understood as an argument for SRI gener-
ally, and not only for the avoidance strategy (so perhaps proponents of 
the appeal to consistency would have this investor become a share-
holder activist). 
 The considerations above both focus on problems with the scope of 
an argument from facts about investors‘ own valuations of consistency. 
More importantly, I think there is also an internal problem with this 
kind of argument. What is it that makes it wrong for investors who 
value consistency to engage in inconsistent behaviour? If it is only the 
possible fact that this may make them ―sick‖, as Domini puts it, then 
there seems to be no difference between moral inconsistency and other 
types of actions that may go against the preferences of investors. If an investor 
dislikes the gambling industry, say, simply because she has lost a lot of 
money playing slot machines, the argument under discussion – just as in 
cases where the investor morally disapproves of some business area – 
seems to imply that she has a reason to avoid investments into the gam-
bling industry to the extent that she values consistency. After all, she 
might feel even more ―sick‖ from such investments than from invest-
ments into areas she morally disapproves of. The fact that an investor 
simply dislikes some industry does not seem to constitute a moral reason 
for such an avoidance, however. If any sort of disapproval of some 
business area is sufficient for there to be moral reasons for consistency, 
it may be noted, also the failure to avoid unprofitable investments 
(where these are unwanted) might be regarded as inconsistent and im-
moral. But such a result is obviously absurd. Where the present inter-
pretation of the appeal to consistency goes wrong, we might say, is in its 
equation of being undesired with being morally undesirable – plausibly, not 
all things that are undesired by investors are morally undesirable.30 
 Now, it is important not to overstate the present argument against 
proponents of investments according to conscience. The present argu-
ment indicates that if all that was won by investing in an ethical fund 
 
30 In line with Irvine (1987), we might require a distinction between ethical and aesthetic reasons 
for investing in a certain manner.  
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was the realization of the kind of personal values for investors outlined 
above, then ‗ethical investing‘ indeed seems to be just another product 
on the financial market – as Anderson so forcefully claims. That is, 
simply because certain investors may want to invest ―according to their 
consciences‖, this does not mean that such investments also carry some 
further moral merit. But some proponents of the SRI industry may not 
find this problematic. Perhaps some SRI proponents actually are con-
tent with ‗ethical investing‘ just being another product on the market – 
as noted in the previous chapter (section 5), there are some indications 
that the term ‗socially responsible‘ sometimes is preferred over the term 
‗ethical‘ exactly for reasons of avoiding discussions of whether SRI 
products carry some further moral merit (which non-SRI products, 
then, by implication do not). In what follows, however, I will assume 
that this is not how the views of most SRI proponents should be un-
derstood – my project, if not theirs, is to find a plausible answer to the 
question of what investors have moral reasons to do. 
 Given, then, that we want to find a difference between cases of moral 
inconsistencies and other cases, what could this difference be? Well, one 
might argue that there is something special about an agent‘s moral con-
victions that makes it wrong for a person who values X (in this case, 
consistency) to engage in behaviour that is contrary to X, or which em-
bodies something contrary to X. This is why it is wrong for someone 
who values consistency to engage in inconsistent behaviour. But what 
sort of argument is this? It seems to me that this is nothing but the ap-
peal to consistency all over again. It is inconsistent of someone who 
values X to at the same time engage in behaviour that is contrary to X, 
and that is why it is wrong. But then we are back to where we started – 
how should we understand the appeal to consistency, and why should 
we accept it? 
3.  THE APPEAL TO CON S CIE NTIOUSNES S  
I think it is unfortunate that so many of those discussing the SRI 
movement seem to understand the appeal to consistency along the lines 
of the discussion in the previous section. A stronger defence of invest-
ments according to conscience, I think, would be an appeal to a more 
comprehensive conception of conscientiousness, or moral seriousness. Among 
philosophers, there has been some debate regarding so-called ‗moral 
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non-dogmatism‗, i.e. the idea that the only duty we have is to do what 
we ourselves think is our duty.31
 
In this debate, both sides seem to give 
some room for an appeal to conscientiousness. For instance, Daniel 
Goldstick argues that whoever is opposed to moral non-dogmatism 
ought to concede that there is at least some moral ‗pull‘ in the idea that 
one ought to follow one‘s conscience: 
We ought to concede, I think, that conscientiousness, an active concern to 
behave in a moral fashion, is in itself a morally good thing. However evil 
and depraved an individual‘s moral principles are, there is indisputably 
something morally admirable in his dedicatedly following them at real 
cost, it may be, to his own personal interests.32 
Unfortunately, exactly what is meant by conscientiousness is not devel-
oped much by Goldstick. Exploiting the wider notion of conscientious-
ness he refers to, i.e. ―an active concern to behave in a moral fashion‖, 
seems to allow an appeal to conscientiousness which is a lot stronger 
than the appeal to consistency discussed above, however. Although I 
will find reasons to question it below, the idea that investors ought to 
have an active concern to be moral (or to do what is right) might, for 
reasons I will now sketch, not only help to explain the point of the ap-
peal to consistency, but also offer a way to handle the most implausible 
sides of this appeal.  
 Consider a case similar to that of the teetotaller‘s:  
Incons i s t en t  Fredr ik : Say that some investor, Fredrik, morally 
disapproves of supporting the sale of weapons in the manner 
generally assumed here. When he reads about the enormous pro-
portions of military spending in the US, for instance, he is ap-
palled by the support which the US government would seem to 
give to the sale of weapons. Increasing the sale of weapons, he 
thinks, can only lead to more death and destruction in the world. 
Incidentally, Fredrik has inherited a large chunk of shares in 
companies involved in the arms trade. He does not give much 
thought to such matters, however, and is only glad to receive his 
annual dividends allowing him to slightly increase his living stan-
dards. It has never occurred to him that, because of his invest-
 
31 The term moral non-dogmatism is from Cohen (1967). For discussions about moral non-
dogmatism, see also Cohen 1972, Govier 1973, Hunter 1970, Kordig 1969, Sturch 1970. 
32 Goldstick 1980, p. 248, emphasis in original 
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ments, he could be said to be supportive of or profiting from the 
sale of weapons. 
I think most proponents of the appeal to consistency would find the 
investor described above inconsistent. In other areas of his life, Fredrik 
is of the opinion that the sale of weapons is not something that one 
should support or profit from. Yet, this is exactly what he himself does, 
through his investing (for the sake of argument, we may assume that the 
underlying premises of the argument are true in this way). First of all, let 
us return to the different possible interpretations of this consistency for 
a moment. The rhetoric of the proponents of the appeal to consistency 
might suggest that it is practical inconsistency they are talking about – 
people who invest in businesses they are morally opposed to are flat out 
failing to comply with their own moral standards of action.33 Well, let us 
assume that Fredrik really has given no thought at all to the fact that he 
is supporting the sale of weapons through his investments, so that Fred-
rik‘s case resembles interpretation (3) of the teetotaller‘s case most. 
 I think it is fair to say that this is the most unnerving sort of inconsis-
tency from a moral point of view. Notice, however, how easy it is for 
Fredrik to avoid the accusation of practical inconsistency. Perhaps, 
when confronted with his apparent practical inconsistency, Fredrik 
would reply: 
Fredr ik ’ s  f i r s t  r ep ly : ―Thank you for helping me get my head 
straight. All this time, I have been morally opposed of all kinds 
of support of the sale of weapons, and that seems to have in-
cluded my own investments in the arms trade. Now I know bet-
ter, however. I am now not opposed to each and every kind of 
support of the sale of weapons, but only those kinds which do 
not involve my own investments. Support of this kind, I think, is 
not morally relevant. Of course, on my new set of moral prin-
ciples, I am not practically inconsistent.‖ 
From the variations of the teetotaller‘s case above it is quite easy to see 
what Fredrik does here. After changing his moral views in this manner, 
Fredrik is no longer practically inconsistent but rather, I will assume, 
 
33 Practical consistency, it may be noted, is also a central part of Goldstick‗s conception of 
conscientiousness – conscientiousness involves, at least, following one‘s own moral principles 
with a certain dedication, and at a certain ―real cost‖. 
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subscribing to an arbitrary set of moral principles.34 He thinks all kinds 
of support of the weapons industry are morally wrong, except for the 
support generated by himself investing in companies involved in the 
arms trade – he is not, however, able to deliver any good reasons for 
why this kind of support should be excluded from the general rule he 
subscribes to. His case now resembles interpretation (2) of the teetotal-
ler‘s case. What should we say about this move? 
 Well, I think most people would still find something about Fredrik‘s 
behaviour morally problematic. The difference between cases of prac-
tical inconsistency and cases of moral arbitrariness, one might say, is 
itself (normatively) arbitrary. What matters is whether Fredrik has an 
active concern to behave in a moral fashion or not, and not to what ex-
tent he is consistent under some of the possible interpretations of con-
sistency. He does not seem to have such a concern when he is practi-
cally inconsistent, nor when he is morally arbitrary. A conscientious per-
son, namely, not only applies his moral principles to his actions, but also 
makes sure his moral principles are universalisable – i.e. he treats similar 
cases similarly, and he does not allow any difference in treatment unless 
there is a morally relevant difference between cases. To fail to do this is 
not necessarily to be inconsistent, but it would not be done by a person 
with an active concern to be moral. 
 I will not go into the details here and consider if all other interpreta-
tions of the teetotaller‘s case above are excluded by an appeal to con-
scientiousness.35 The point I am trying to make is simply that the multi-
tude of possible interpretations of the appeal to consistency considered 
are rationalised by an appeal to conscientiousness. What the different 
interpretations of the teetotaller‘s case above have in common, I sug-
gest, is that they describe the behaviour of someone who does not have 
 
34 Of course, Fredrik might have good reasons for changing his principles in this manner. If 
this is the case, the analysis of Fredrik‘s change of view would be different. 
35 Gensler (1996) argues that principles roughly corresponding to the five interpretations of 
the teetotaller‘s case above are widely considered to be the basic principles of morality – for 
instance, ―Be logically consistent in your beliefs‖, ―If you want to achieve an end, then carry 
out the necessary means‖, ―Follow your conscience‖, ―Practice what you preach‖, ―Make 
similar evaluations about similar cases‖ and ―Don‘t act in a way that you‘ll later regret‖ (p. vii). 
These are principles that most of us agree with, and which can be rationalised from almost all 
philosophical understandings of morality. Depending on how we use the terms, they might be 
labelled principles of consistency or conscientiousness (although Gensler suggests a more 
advanced terminology). Some may want to describe this as the ―formal‖ requirements of 
morality, requirements that apply independently of any substantive view of morality (pp. 5-13). 
Another way to put it is that they describe a ―minimal‖ set of requirements, that have to be 
fulfilled regardless of what else morality prescribes. 
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an active concern to be moral. In this sense, the appeal to conscien-
tiousness explains what may intuitively seem right with the appeal to 
consistency. 
 To further establish the power of an appeal to conscientiousness, 
consider a case where the appeal to consistency seems to yield counter-
intuitive results. Once again, Fredrik is confronted with the apparent 
practical inconsistency of his investment behaviour. He is morally op-
posed to the sale of weapons, yet he holds shares in companies dedi-
cated to this very thing. On the appeal to consistency as an argument for 
the avoidance strategy, it is here commonly argued that Fredrik should 
immediately sell his shares in the relevant companies. However, Fredrik 
might now give the following reply: 
Fredr ik ’ s  s e cond r ep ly : ―Thank you for pointing out that I am 
practically inconsistent, this is something I want to avoid at all 
costs. However, I also want to retain my investments in the arms 
trade, and I think I have found a loophole for that. Notice that I 
really have two ways of achieving consistency between my in-
vesting and my moral beliefs. One is of course to change my in-
vesting – I could divest all my shares in companies involved in 
the arms trade. The other is to change my beliefs. I could gener-
ally start to praise companies involved in harmful activities – or, 
more specifically, I could start to praise companies involved in 
the arms trade. Since I want to keep my investments in compa-
nies engaged in the sale of weapons, I have decided to opt for the 
latter – to simply develop a more positive moral view towards 
this activity. I have decided to become a consistent warmonger!‖ 
What should be said about this example? As it appears, it causes prob-
lems not only for the appeal to consistency, but also for the appeal to 
conscientiousness. To start with the first point, however, I think most 
of us would probably be less inclined to say that Fredrik‘s consistency, 
when becoming a consistent warmonger, is a morally good thing.36 If 
 
36 Some proponents of the appeal to consistency might argue that it is unrealistic to think that 
an investor can change his moral beliefs in the way I propose that Fredrik can do here. Our 
values are not something we choose, they could say, but something that we are taught at an 
early age, or something that evolves through life. Perhaps this is generally true, but I don‘t 
think it excludes that we sometimes can make alterations in our values in the way I propose 
Fredrik can here. If the reader is not convinced, imagine some investor that is less certain of 
her reasons to be morally opposed of a certain industry in the first place. Surely, for this kind 
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this intuition is right, then it cannot just be consistency that investors 
should aspire to. What should they aspire to? Well, I think we might say 
that Fredrik‘s change of beliefs, in order to be able to consistently invest 
in the arms trade, shows that he, just as proponents of the appeal to 
consistency, has mistaken an active concern to be moral for simple consistency. 
Consistency, however this is construed, may be one of the things we 
want to require of investors, or moral agents generally, but clearly not 
the only thing. One is not justified in switching from one consistent set 
of beliefs to another simply because it fits one‘s personal preferences. 
 In order to determine whether the appeal to conscientiousness can 
offer a reasonable answer to this example, it might help to compare the 
notion of conscientiousness used here with the notion of moral seriousness 
used by some philosophers. A conscientious person, I have said, is 
someone who shows an active concern to behave in a moral fashion. 
Another way to put this, it seems, is to say that a conscientious person is 
someone who takes morality seriously. Keith Ward explains the de-
mands of moral seriousness in the following way:  
What is it to be ‗morally serious‘? In one sense, it is quite obvious that a 
man who stands by his moral principles with difficulty and in face of 
many obstacles, even to the extent of giving his life rather than denying 
these principles, is a morally serious person. He might be contrasted 
with a man who gives up or modifies his moral principles whenever 
their implementation becomes difficult, or threatens to harm his inter-
ests; and this person might be called morally frivolous.37 
I think it is fair to say that, at least on Ward‘s use of this term, Fredrik‘s 
behaviour here is morally frivolous. Following this line of reasoning, it 
seems plausible to say that if we want to deny Fredrik the moral option 
of becoming a consistent warmonger, it is conscientiousness, or moral 
seriousness, that we should appeal to, and not only consistency – irres-
pective of how the appeal to consistency is construed more exactly. 
4.  THE LIMITS OF CONS CIE NTIOUSNES S  
As already suggested, Fredrik‘s second reply above has implications for 
the appeal to conscientiousness as well. I will now turn to evaluate this 
appeal and, in turn, present my view on what we may now call con-
 
of investor, there would be no problem with changing her mind on such issues to be able to 
invest in whatever business area she feels like. 
37 Ward 1970, p. 114 
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scientious investing. It may be noted, first of all, that other authors have 
discussed the implicit appeal to conscientiousness in arguments similar 
to the appeal to consistency. So, for instance, Roger Crisp and Christo-
pher Cowton argue that a common feature of all kinds of behaviour 
which we describe as hypocritical (including what they call the hypocrisy 
of inconsistency38) is that it would be avoided by someone who takes 
morality seriously. They understand moral seriousness in very much the 
same way as I have understood conscientiousness here, i.e. as ―an active 
and genuine concern to be moral‖. More specifically, they argue, moral 
seriousness is best understood as a sort of virtue, or perhaps a ―meta-
virtue‖: 
[All kinds of hypocrisy] would be avoided by a person who took (mor-
ally) seriously the relation between her self and morality, someone who 
demonstrated an active and genuine concern to be moral. This concern 
is in a sense a ―metavirtue,‖ since it is a concern to be virtuous. But it is 
nevertheless an excellence, the lack of which in various ways is likely to 
issue in hypocrisy when its possessor is engaging in moral practice or 
the moral language game.39 
One may ask what reasons there are for considering moral seriousness a 
virtue, or a metavirtue, in this manner. Crisp and Cowton‘s argument, I 
take it, is mainly that such an understanding of moral seriousness ex-
plains what is wrong with hypocrisy: ―If anything is morally blamewor-
thy, then lack of concern for morality itself surely is‖40. Furthermore, 
understanding moral seriousness this way explains why arguments about 
hypocrisy, and perhaps arguments similar to the appeal to consistency, 
are so prevalent in the modern debate: 
 
38 The hypocrisy of inconsistency is described as follows: ―In Matthew 23.13, Christ advises 
his listeners to pay attention to what the Pharisees say because they are in the seat of Moses, 
and goes on, ‗But do not follow their practice; for they say one thing and do another.‘ Were 
[Senator Joseph] McCarthy [who publicly castigated gays for immorality] to have been a prac-
ticing gay, he would provide another example. [...] Hypocrisy of inconsistency consists in 
failure to live up to a self-professed moral requirement that does in fact apply to oneself‖ 
(Crisp and Cowton 1994, p. 345). Unfortunately, this description is not clear enough to com-
pare directly with the teetotaller‘s case above. On the surface it may resemble (3), where the 
teetotaller simply fails to apply the moral standard that she believes in (this is ―a failure to live 
up to a self-professed moral requirement‖). On further inspection it seems to resemble (2) 
more, however, as it seems like both the Pharisees and Senator McCarthy fail in the respect 
that they cannot give good reasons for why they should be excused from the general principle 
they otherwise preach. So, they are arbitrary in favour of themselves, one might say.  
39 Crisp and Cowton 1994, p. 347 
40 Ibid. 
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Hypocrisy‘s being a failure to possess a metavirtue explains why [...] ac-
cusations of hypocrisy are so prevalent in our present age of widespread 
disagreement about the content of morality. Such accusations enable a 
critic to pursue her agenda without engaging with the question of just 
which virtues comprise morality itself.41 
In order to determine to what extent this view on conscientiousness is 
plausible, it is now time to consider the full implications of Fredrik‘s 
second reply above. Why was it possible to say that Fredrik‘s choice of 
becoming a consistent warmonger was a failure of conscientiousness 
here? Well, the reason seems to be that Fredrik originally is morally op-
posed of the weapons industry in a very strong manner. From the de-
scription of Fredrik‘s moral views at the outset, it is obvious that he is 
not opposed of the weapons industry for reasons of personal prefe-
rence, but for moral reasons. Since this is the case, we may legitimately 
say that becoming a consistent warmonger is failing in the respect that 
one should not simply change one‘s moral principles to satisfy one‘s 
personal preferences. Now, it is entirely possible, however, that some 
other investor starts off from a completely opposite view of what is 
right – there might be investors who are warmongers for moral reasons, 
and not because of the possibility of making money from investments in 
the weapons industry. Examples such as the following, I think, show 
that there is a serious flaw in the appeal to conscientiousness outlined 
above: 
The Pr in c ip l ed  Warmonge r : Consider a warmonger who be-
lieves in supporting the production and sale of weapons of mass 
destruction because of a firm belief in Nazism. Because of this 
belief he also invests all his capital in companies engaged in the 
weapons industry – in the same way as Fredrik so casually did. 
Assume further that this warmonger cannot be persuaded by the 
standard arguments against warmongering and Nazism – he does 
not care about the Holocaust, and he is firmly committed to the 
view that a continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion in the world will be beneficial to the goal of, say, enslaving 
the non-white population of the earth. 
 
41 Ibid. 
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A fairly intuitive response to the kind of example above would seem to 
be that it is rather implausible to say that people like the principled 
warmonger have moral reasons to be conscientious, or to take morality 
seriously in the sense sketched above. It might actually be better, from a 
moral point of view, if a principled warmonger did not take morality 
seriously and became inconsistent in the application of his beliefs. This 
is so since taking morality seriously, and consistently applying his beliefs, 
actually makes the warmonger act wrongly more often! In taking morality 
seriously, the warmonger invests in the weapons industry and does other 
sorts of things that are consistent with Nazism. From a moral point of 
view, it would be better if he did not do this.42 
 In a classic paper on the conscience of Huckleberry Finn, Jonathan 
Bennett makes a similar point. Being raised in the slave-owning Ameri-
can south, Huck is of the opinion that it would be wrong to assist 
another man‘s slave to escape from the clutches of his rightful owner. 
When he finds himself helping his slave friend Jim to escape on a raft 
down the Mississippi, however, he is unable to act on this conviction. 
The sympathy he feels for Jim overpowers his moral conviction that 
what he is doing is wrong. Bennett argues: ―This passage in the novel is 
notable‖, among other things ―for its finely wrought irony, with Huck‘s 
weakness of will leading him to do the right thing‖43. Conclusion: Some-
times we simply ought to let our sympathy guide us, and not be exces-
sively conscientious – especially if we are subscribing to what everyone 
else can see is a ―bad morality‖44. 
 What do these examples show? Well, one might take either of two 
positions, I think. One possibility would be to give up on the appeal to 
conscientiousness altogether, at least as an independent source of moral 
reasons, and say that some form of impartiality obviously is required. 
Investors do not have moral reasons to avoid investing in areas they 
 
42 It should be noted that, on my use of the term conscientiousness, it is an open question if it 
is right to act in accordance with one‘s conscience. Some may want to use the term differently 
and require of a conscientious person, not only the he is (internally) concerned with acting 
correctly, but also that he to some extent (externally) succeeds with this. Although the prin-
cipled warmonger in my example may be taking his own principles seriously, it may be argued, he 
hardly takes morality seriously. Although I will not understand conscientiousness in this way 
(for extended discussions of how to understand conscientiousness, cf. Lewis 1945, Thomas 
1964), it may be noted that I actually agree with the basic tenet of this suggestion – that is, that 
the principled warmonger does not live up to all that morality requires of him. Being conscien-
tious, on this suggestion, would seem more or less synonymous with being wholly virtuous. I 
will return to this idea below (section 5) and also in the next chapter (section 4.2). 
43 Bennett 1974, p. 127 
44 Ibid., p. 125 
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themselves morally disapprove of simply because this is what their con-
sciences recommends, since different investors may have more or less 
misguided conceptions of ethics – some might be Nazis and others 
might be depraved in other ways. Rather, on this view, the kind of con-
siderations which most straightforwardly could give investors moral 
reasons to avoid investing in certain business areas would be that these 
businesses are impartially morally unacceptable in some sense (or impar-
tially socially irresponsible) – that is, unacceptable regardless of the in-
vestors‘ own moral convictions.45 We might call this an impartialist posi-
tion46 on the issue of what business-evaluative categories are relevant 
for the question of what investors ought to do. As will become evident 
in the following chapter, in contrast to the representatives of the SRI 
movement considered here, most philosophers who have discussed is-
sues pertaining to the ethics of investing actually seem to assume this 
type of position. I will give some further comments on this kind of po-
sition below. 
 Although the denial of part of the basic tenet of the appeal to con-
scientiousness inherent in the view above may strike some readers as 
rather radical in the present circumstances, I believe further arguments 
actually are needed in order to refute this view. While it initially may 
seem plausible to think that conscientiousness is important, The Prin-
cipled Warmonger certainly casts doubts over this kind of intuition. It 
should be noted, furthermore, that the impartialist position is consistent 
with the idea that conscientiousness sometimes may be indirectly morally 
valuable. That is, although the fact that one‘s conscience recommends a 
certain action is not in itself a moral reason for performing that action, 
and so the appeal to conscientiousness is not an independent source of 
moral reasons, being conscientious may sometimes help us achieve 
some other goals which we have moral reasons to achieve. I will discuss 
at least one way in which conscientiousness or consistency may be con-
sidered indirectly valuable in chapter IV, section 6.2 below.47 
 
45 This is the position which Govier (1972) would seem to take. According to her, the act of 
‗following one‘s own moral principles‘ cannot be separated from what specific actions one‘s 
moral principles actually imply. Thus, what is good about good people‘s following their con-
sciences is simply that they do good things, and nothing over and above this. 
46 I previously called this the objectivist position (Sandberg 2007a, p. 80). However, see section 
5 below for a discussion of the relation between objectivity and impartiality. 
47 The impartialist position is also consistent with saying that conscientiousness is directly 
important for determining blameworthiness – at least, that is, if the question of whether a certain 
agent is blameworthy is separated from the question of whether he or she acted rightly or 
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 Having noted all of this, some might argue that the impartialist posi-
tion still is too radical and does not give reasons of conscience adequate 
room. While the examples above may show that it is not always wrong not 
to be conscientious, they might say, the examples are compatible with 
the view that investors always have at least some moral reason to invest 
with their conscience. Now, in cases like The Principled Warmonger, there 
are obviously stronger moral reasons that pull in a different direction – 
the consequences of being conscientious in this scenario would after all, 
be devastating – and such other reasons may sometimes override or 
outweigh investors‘ moral reasons to be conscientious. However, and 
this is where the impartialist position goes wrong, this does not rule out 
that there is at least something which pulls in the direction of conscien-
tious investing – even in such a scenario. According to this weaker un-
derstanding of the appeal to conscientiousness, then, while it may not 
always be wrong not to be conscientious, investors always have at least 
some moral reasons to follow their consciences.48 The possibility of for-
mulating this kind of weaker positions, I believe it should be noted, is an 
advantage of talk about ‗moral reasons‘ over talk about, e.g., ‗moral ob-
ligations‘, or what agents ‗ought to do‘ (period). 
 Actually, if we continue to read Goldstick‘s paper, he seems to take 
this weaker position: 
However evil and depraved an individual‘s moral principles are, there is 
indisputably something morally admirable in his dedicatedly following 
them at real cost, it may be, to his own personal interests. Which is not 
to say that this consideration must count for very much when weighed in 
the scale against the depravity manifested in commitment to truly mon-
strous moral principles.49 
 
wrongly. Since it is this latter kind of question I am interested in here, however, I leave this 
point aside. 
48 Govier (1972) suggests a third option: Maybe conscientiousness could be considered a 
‗conditional virtue‘, i.e. something that is only good under certain circumstances. I think it is 
clear that my version of this weaker position is superior to Govier‘s, however. What one is 
saying if one argues that conscientiousness is a conditional virtue is, in effect, that what deter-
mines if investors have moral reasons to invest according to their consciences or not is a 
further set of circumstances, and not the fact that the investors‘ consciences say something or 
the other in itself. Under certain circumstances – perhaps when investors‘ conceptions of 
social responsibility are fairly reasonable – there are moral reasons to let one‘s conception of 
social responsibility guide one‘s investments, or so the idea would seem to go. But isn‘t this the 
same as saying that investors have moral reasons to invest according to what is (impartially) 
socially responsible? The postulation of a moral reason of conscientiousness, over and above 
the reason from (impartial) social responsibility, seems to me to do no work in this suggestion. 
49 Goldstick 1980, p. 248. Many others have proposed a similar understanding of 
conscientiousness – see, e.g., Hunter 1970, Lewis 1945, Sturch 1970. According to some, this 
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My own view on this matter is wavering but, for the sake of argument, I 
will assume that this weaker understanding of the appeal to conscien-
tiousness basically is sound. As Goldstick points out, however, it may be 
noted that the question left for this appeal is when these weaker reasons 
of conscientiousness are of real moral importance. When can the exis-
tence of this kind of reasons influence what it is that investors really 
ought to do? The answer to these questions, I believe, depends on how 
much is at stake in investment decisions. The more that is at stake in such 
decisions, the less room there would seem to be for reasons of con-
scientiousness to come into play – and, in effect, the less difference 
there would seem to be between this weaker appeal to conscientious-
ness and the impartialist position introduced above. For reasons I will 
now suggest, I believe there is actually not much difference (at least not 
practically) between these two positions. 
 How much is really at stake in investments decisions? Well, although 
the impartial sense of moral unacceptability may not be the only one that 
matters in the present context, I believe, The Principled Warmonger sug-
gests that it must play an important role in determining what investors 
ought to do. If investing in a company involved in the arms trade basi-
cally amounts to supporting the arms trade, and, in the end, to sup-
porting war, then this seems to be a fairly strong reason for morally 
castigating such investments. Interestingly enough, a sort of paradox 
actually seems to arise here for proponents of conscientious invest-
ments. This is due to the fact that how much is at stake in investment 
decisions seems to depend, in turn, on whether the underlying premises 
(noted above) of the argument from conscientiousness are correct, and 
how morally important these are. How important is it that investing in a 
certain company may amount to supporting it or profiting from it – and 
is it true that one really supports the companies one invests in in the 
sense commonly assumed by SRI proponents? If what I just said is true, 
i.e. that investing in the arms trade in the end basically amounts to sup-
porting war, then I fail to see what reasons of conscientiousness add – 
everyone who invests in the arms trade is more or less doing what the 
principled warmonger is doing, and their acting in this way seems just as 
wrong. Only if the choice of investments on the stock market has little 
moral relevance in other ways do reasons of conscientiousness become 
 
view of conscientiousness is needed if one wants to defend the right of pacifists to refuse 
serving in the military (so-called conscientious objectors), but at the same time refuse the right 
of fanatics to do whatever they feel like (Lewis 1945, Sturch 1970). 
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of higher moral importance. As the discussion in later chapters will 
show, however, this does not seem very plausible.50 
 Just out of curiosity: What happens if the choice of investments on 
the stock market has little moral relevance in other ways? According to 
the argument above, this might create some space for the moral impor-
tance of conscientiousness. However, this is where the paradox shows 
its ugly face – if the underlying premises of the argument are not correct 
(or not relevant), this would mean that the case for investments ac-
cording to conscience would be much weaker than initially assumed. It 
is not true that investors who invest in businesses they morally disap-
prove of can be accused of being practically inconsistent in some im-
portant sense, for instance, because they are simply not connected to 
these businesses in the relevant way. They are not, for instance, sup-
porting them in the sense commonly assumed and so they are not doing 
what they morally disapprove of doing.51 
5 .  IMPARTIAL ITY AND OBJE CTIVITY  
The outcome of the discussion above is that to the extent that investors 
indeed have direct or independent moral reasons to invest ―with their 
consciences‖, which I think we should demand more arguments for 
before accepting, these moral reasons would in any case seem quite 
weak in the overall context of the ethics of investing. This, I think, im-
plies that it is not very fruitful from a moral point of view to continue to 
stress the importance of what I have called conscientious investing. It 
should be noted, however, that we are not forced to conclude from the 
arguments above that terms such as ‗socially responsible‘ or ‗ethical‘ 
investment are misnomers. In the previous section, I introduced an im-
partialist position quite close to the basic idea of most SRI proponents 
but without any reference to individual investors‘ own moral views on 
business-evaluative issues. On this position, it is possible to argue that 
investors have moral reasons to avoid certain businesses that are morally 
unacceptable in a more robust sense – and this may well be companies 
 
50 As the ultimate balancing of reasons is a rather complex deal, the final word on this will not 
be given until in chapter VII, section 3. 
51 It may be noted that the paradox does not arise for all of the interpretations of consistency 
discussed above. One might still argue, for instance, that there are reasons from logical con-
sistency that should be considered in investing. However, it seems correct to say that the case 
for conscientious investing is weakened considerably if the underlying premises referred to 
here are false or morally irrelevant. 
63 
involved in the weapons and tobacco industries, or some other industry 
commonly avoided by contemporary ethical funds. Before closing this 
chapter, it may perhaps be in place to say something more about this 
impartialist position. 
 It may be noted that impartiality sometimes is connected with objectiv-
ity, and it is often regarded as controversial to talk about objectivity 
when it comes to moral matters. According to many people, including 
many prominent moral philosophers, it is misguided to think that mo-
rality can be objective in the sense that, e.g., the things that the natural 
sciences concern can be objective. A similar idea can also be found in 
the literature on SRI. Although he finds the emphasis on subjective val-
ues in much of SRI problematic, for instance, Michael Monahan writes 
as follows: 
When I discussed this topic with a local group of financial advisors the 
first question was, ―Well, who decides what counts as ‗socially responsi-
ble‘ anyway?‖ Of course, there is no easy answer. The simple fact is that 
there is no overarching structure by which we can objectively determine 
the social responsibility of a given company or product. Each individual 
will certainly have his/her own notions [...] of [...] what it means to be 
socially responsible. There are then, from this perspective, two options 
for the investor. He/she can shop around and examine the holdings of 
a variety of different pre-screened funds, or he/she can sit down with 
an advisor and construct a fund based on his/her own values and re-
search. In either case, the nature of the screens to be used is highly de-
pendent on the individual and his/her own view of what kinds of things 
count as socially responsible. Consequently, the values that guide the 
screening process cannot help but be subjective.52 
I think Monahan‘s questioning of objectivity with regards to business-
evaluative issues could be understood in at least two different ways. On 
one interpretation, he simply denies that there can be any form of objective or 
independent answers when it comes to matters of right and wrong. As I said 
above, this position is not uncommon among moral philosophers and 
the issue of the objectivity of morality is a highly controversial one. 
While I cannot explore this controversy any further here, I think it 
should be noted that impartiality in ethics is far less controversial than 
objectivity. What the impartialist suggests is simply that our subjective 
views on morality are not necessarily right – i.e. that we might actually be 
mistaken about, for instance, what companies we ultimately have moral 
reasons to avoid investing in. This view does not involve any meta-
 
52 Monahan 2002, pp. 31-32 
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physical speculations about an objective realm of moral facts – another 
way to formulate this view, I believe, could be to say that the business 
areas which are morally unacceptable in an impartial sense are those 
business areas which we would find morally problematic if we were wholly 
virtuous (and fully informed). Following this line of reasoning, my argu-
ment above could be understood as saying that while conscientiousness 
certainly may be one virtue, in order to determine what business areas 
investors really have moral reasons to avoid investing in it may be ne-
cessary to consult other virtues as well, or what the wholly virtuous in-
vestor would do. 
 Although much SRI literature focuses on conscientious investing, I 
believe the impartialist position should not be too implausible in the 
greater context of ‗ethical investing‘. Even proponents of the appeal to 
conscientiousness, it should be noted, normally presuppose at least one 
sort of impartiality similar to the one above – irrespective of what indi-
vidual investors themselves think, it is suggested that all investors have 
moral reasons to align their investments with their values. That is, main-
stream investors who do not agree with this may be mistaken about what 
they have most (moral) reason to do. I argued above that a conception 
of this kind of appeal which does not invoke any kind of universal or 
impartial moral principles like this, but simply appeals to the preferences 
of investors all the way, fails to make ‗ethical investing‘ into something 
over and above a pure customer product. Given that most SRI propo-
nents want ‗ethical investment‘ to stand for something more than this, 
then, it would seem to be in the interest also of these proponents to 
assume that there can be more or less (impartially) ethical ways of in-
vesting – and I see no reason for why a similar assumption should not 
be made with regards to the business-evaluative level of inquiry.  
 A weaker interpretation of Monahan‘s position could be that he 
simply thinks it is very difficult for individual investors to know what is 
impartially morally acceptable or socially responsible.53 There is no 
―overarching structure‖ from which we easily can retrieve this informa-
 
53 According to some authors, a problem for impartialists is that it is impossible to know these 
things. Perhaps this is an alternative interpretation of Monahan here. If individual investors 
cannot avoid being subjective in their choice of investments (there is no way of ―objectively 
determining‖ social responsibility), this idea could go, they simply cannot have a moral obliga-
tion to follow something over and beyond their own moral views. As others have noted, how-
ever, this kind of arguments (appealing to the rule of ‗ought implies can‘) are seriously flawed 
(see, e.g., Goldstick 1980, Govier 1973). Certainly investors can do things that are not sanc-
tioned by their own moral views (why do we otherwise have a ―bad conscience‖ sometimes?). 
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tion, and so we may never know if our moral beliefs are mistaken or 
not. I actually think we should agree with this characterisation of the 
situation. As I indicated in the previous chapter (section 4), both our 
intuitions about what moral principles are reasonable and our moral res-
ponses to particular cases are probably fallible – that is, they are not per-
fectly reliable guides to moral truths. The best we can do is to try to 
make the different parts of our moral thinking as coherent as possible, 
along the lines of the method of reflective equilibrium. When it comes 
to business-evaluative issues, I also said in the previous chapter that this 
may be very difficult indeed. In order to spell out a detailed view on 
what business practices should be considered morally unacceptable in an 
impartial sense one would more or less have to settle the ethical issues 
surrounding, e.g., labour rights, gender equality, the importance of the 
environment, animal rights, global justice, and so on. But, the fact that 
this seems rather difficult does obviously not imply that it is useless. Even 
though investors may never know with absolute certainty that they are 
avoiding investments in companies that are impartially morally unac-
ceptable, they may perhaps be able to arrive at a reasonably justified posi-
tion on at least certain business-evaluative issues. In the following chap-
ter, I will approach the matter of what such a reasonably justified posi-
tion may look like at least indirectly. 
 I think it is fair to say that previous theorists who have discussed the 
appeal to consistency, and other principles thought to justify SRI strate-
gies, have failed to specify if they are concerned with subjective or im-
partial ideas of social responsibility.54 There might, of course, be many 
reasons for this. The most obvious one is that not many people would 
consider becoming warmongers just to achieve consistency between 
their investments in the arms trade and their moral beliefs. As some 
suggest, we might after all agree to a large extent on what business areas 
are morally unacceptable.55 If this is so, the implications in terms of the 
avoidance of a large number of morally problematic business areas 
might be the same for most of us on both subjective and impartial ac-
counts. 
 Moreover, of course, investors do not arrive at their subjective ideas 
of social responsibility in a vacuum (at least not to the extent that they 
 
54 For some examples of this, see the next chapter. 
55 Cf. Brill et al 1999, Brill and Reder 1993. Research into the motivations of individual SRI 
investors seems to indicate a more complicated picture than this, however – see Cooper and 
Schlegelmilch 1993 for an overview. 
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are conscientious). Rather, they, most probably, focus on certain (objec-
tive) properties of different business areas and form their idea of the 
unacceptability of these areas by reason of such properties. For instance, 
most of the investors that are opposed of the sale of weapons might be 
so inclined because of the potential destruction in the world that this 
industry is a part of. There is, then, an important connection between 
the objective properties of certain business areas and practices and the 
fact that many investors morally disapprove of them. However, what my 
argument in the previous section says is that it is misguided to think that 
it is mainly the fact that an investor morally disapproves of some busi-
ness area that, as such, gives rise to moral reasons for the investor to 
avoid investing into such an area. Rather, it is the objective properties of 
certain business areas themselves that might give us moral reasons to avoid 
investing in them. If one wants to make a reasonable argument for why 
we ought to employ an investment strategy involving some systematic 
avoidance of certain industries, then, one must appeal to some impartial 
account of social responsibility. 
 As was noted at the end of the previous section, the issue of the 
moral reasons for this kind of avoidance strategy depends largely on 
how plausible, and morally important, the underlying premises of the argu-
ments from consistency and conscientiousness are. Is it really so, for 
instance, that investors holding shares in weapons companies support 
these companies in some morally relevant manner? This is the kind of 
issues I will turn to in the following chapter. 
6.  CON CLUS IONS  
In this chapter, I have discussed what could be taken as the most simple 
conception of what characterises ‗ethical investing‘ among proponents 
of the SRI movement, namely the idea that genuinely ethical investors 
are those who avoid investing in companies whose business areas or 
practices they morally disapprove of themselves. The most common line 
of reasoning accompanying this idea is that it would seem inconsistent 
of someone who is opposed of, say, the weapons industry to at the same 
time invest in that industry. Assuming that most individual investors 
find certain business areas or practices morally problematic, then, they 
would seem to have some kind of reason to integrate ethical, social or 
environmental considerations into their investment decisions.  
 However, I have argued that this kind of reasoning is problematic 
from a moral point of view. First of all, since consistency can be un-
67 
derstood in so many different ways, and what is salient about the ‗incon-
sistency‘ cases which SRI proponents want to criticise in any case would 
seem to be a lack of moral seriousness, I suggested that an appeal to the 
richer concept of conscientiousness seems more promising than an ap-
peal to consistency. However, since the moral views which different 
individual investors start from also can be quite diverse, I argued that 
the appeal to conscientiousness is problematic as well. If one wants to 
make a reasonable argument for why investors ought to employ an 
investment strategy involving some systematic avoidance of certain in-
dustries or companies, one does best in appealing to some impartial ac-
count of moral acceptability or social responsibility – that is, to features 
of these industries or companies which have little to do with the values 
of individual investors. 
  In the following chapter(s), I turn to discuss arguments for the avoid-
ance strategy more generally.
 Chapter III 
Avoiding Moral Contamination 
1.  PRIN CIPLED ARGUME NTS FOR AVOID ANCE  
The probably most common idea about what a genuinely ethical in-
vestment practice consists in, both within the SRI movement and 
among the general public, is that it involves the avoidance of a certain 
kind of companies or industries – companies or industries that sell 
products or engage in activities which in some sense are morally unac-
ceptable. Ethical investors, according to this idea, are those who refrain 
from investing in, for example, the weapons industry, big tobacco pro-
ducers or companies that pollute the environment. In the previous 
chapter, I argued against the idea that investors have (strong and direct) 
moral reasons to avoid investing in certain business areas because they 
happen to morally disapprove of them themselves. In this chapter and 
the next, I will discuss more generally the issue of whether investors 
have moral reasons to avoid investing in certain kinds of companies or 
industries (regardless of their own moral views towards these companies 
and industries). Even though an avoidance of certain kinds of compa-
nies is the practice most commonly employed by what is popularly 
known as ‗ethical funds‗, I believe it should be noted, it is not obvious 
whether this sort of avoidance has any more substantial moral merit. In 
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any case, this is the issue that will form the centre of attention in these 
chapters. 
 In order to facilitate the discussion, we may distinguish between two 
broad ways in which I believe proponents of the SRI movement (and 
other writers) have generally tried to justify the avoidance strategy. Ac-
cording to some writers, as will become obvious later, the justification 
of the avoidance strategy lies mainly in the positive societal effects which a 
systematic avoidance of certain companies may have. Refraining from 
investing in certain morally problematic companies, according to these 
writers, can be a good way of letting these companies know what you 
think of their activities, and also of letting others know exactly what 
kind of activities the companies are up to. Thus, the avoidance strategy 
can be a powerful tool in trying to change the way certain businesses are 
run, and also in trying to change the way people think about the moral 
responsibilities of corporations. We might call this way of thinking a 
pragmatic, or (in a wide sense) consequentialist, line of reasoning.1 In the 
literature on SRI, it may be noted, this line of reasoning is most often 
formulated in terms of ‗making a difference‘ – a phrase which the reader 
has already made some acquaintance with. I will elaborate further on 
these kinds of pragmatic arguments for the avoidance strategy, as well as 
discuss their merits and demerits more extensively, in the next chapter.  
 In the present chapter, I will focus on what might be called (puta-
tively) principled, or non-consequentialist2, lines of argument for the avoid-
ance strategy. What I mean by ‗putatively principled‘ is that these lines 
of argument seek to justify the (employment of the) avoidance strategy, 
not by reference to the possibly positive societal effects of employing 
such a strategy, but with reference to some idea about what is wrong per 
se with investing in companies who are engaged in morally unacceptable 
 
1 By consequentialist ‗in a wide sense‘, I here mean two things. First of all, although the 
present line of reasoning makes the issue of whether investors have moral reasons to employ 
an avoidance strategy depend on what the (probable) effects of such an employment are, 
proponents of the argument need not say that effects are all that matter morally. Secondly, it is 
left entirely open exactly what it is that makes effects positive. See further the discussions in 
chapter IV, section 2, and chapter VII, section 2. 
2 The distinction between consequentialism and non-consequentialism is a common one in 
moral philosophy. Sometimes it is formulated as a distinction between consequentialism and 
deontology, but I will use the wider term non-consequentialism in order to allow ideas which I 
believe are not strictly deontological (see, e.g., my discussion of virtue ethics in section 4.2). As 
I make the present distinction mainly between different kinds of arguments, it should be noted 
again that it is possible for proponents of non-consequentialism to embrace at least some 
consequentialist arguments, and vice versa. For a similar distinction in the context of invest-
ment ethics, see Powers 1971. See also note 4 below. 
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business areas or practices (henceforth simply morally unacceptable compa-
nies3). That is, it is a matter of (moral) principle that investors should not 
invest in morally unacceptable companies. Even if there were no posi-
tive effects (either on the companies themselves or the general public) 
with employing an avoidance strategy, these arguments hold, it would 
still be wrong not to do so, or investors would still have moral reasons 
to do so. This is because simply the fact that certain companies are mor-
ally unacceptable, in itself or directly, makes it morally problematic for 
investors to invest in them. Many writers would seem to appeal to some 
idea along these lines, I believe, although it is not always obvious how to 
interpret their position more exactly. Part of the task, then, will be to try 
to understand exactly what kind of principled argument, or what kind of 
moral principle, different writers are appealing to in their defence of the 
avoidance strategy. More generally, the main question of this chapter 
will be whether it is at all possible to defend the avoidance strategy on 
this kind of principled basis, i.e. without resorting to a more pragmatic 
kind of reasoning. While most previous authors contend that this ob-
viously is possible, I will suggest that matters actually are a lot more com-
plicated than this.  
 To some degree, it should be noted, the kind of reasoning of interest 
here is related to the kind of reasoning discussed in the previous chapter 
(and, as I noted there, many writers fail to separate these lines of argu-
ment from each other4). In the previous chapter, I discussed the sugges-
tion that investors have moral reasons to avoid investing in companies 
which they morally disapprove of themselves (or companies whose 
business areas or practices they morally disapprove of). An underlying 
premise of this suggestion, I said, was the idea that investing in a certain 
company amounts to supporting it, or profiting from it, or something of 
this kind, which (at least in part) is why investing in a certain company 
 
3 I will use ‗morally unacceptable companies‘ as a generic term to refer to those companies, 
whichever they might be, which investors have moral reasons to avoid investing in according 
to different principled arguments for the avoidance strategy. Although I will formulate all of 
these arguments with the help of this generic term, it should be noted that different writers 
may have quite different ideas about exactly what companies qualify as morally unacceptable. 
Furthermore, the different arguments themselves would seem to imply different ideas about 
this. I will return to this issue many times below. 
4 For this reason, a distinction roughly similar to the one above is sometimes made between 
the appeal to consistency, on the one hand, and the call for making a difference, on the other – 
cf Cowton 1998b, Domini 2001, Mackenzie 1997. (Mackenzie distinguishes between what he 
calls solutions to the ―investment ethics‖ problem, which I take are roughly appeals to consis-
tency, and solutions to the ―corporate harm‖ problem, which I take are roughly calls for 
making a difference – cf. Mackenzie 1997, pp. 7-8.) 
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indeed is something quite contrary to opposing it. Now, this more sim-
ple idea was problematic, I argued, because what business areas people 
morally disapprove of can vary to a great degree and, thus, many cases 
of truly conscientious investing will still strike us as morally repugnant 
(remember The Principled Warmonger). If one demands more impartial cri-
teria for calling a certain company morally unacceptable in this type of rea-
soning, however, one would seem to get the kind of ideas I am now 
interested in. Perhaps it is simply wrong to invest in companies that are 
morally unacceptable in some more robust, impartial, sense – exactly 
because investing in such companies would amount to supporting them, 
or profiting from them, or something of the like? Well, it is roughly 
ideas of this kind that I wish to discuss in the present chapter. 
 Perhaps the general idea of the sort of principled arguments I am af-
ter is stated most clearly by certain philosophers. Richard De George, 
for instance, I believe formulates this quite nicely in the following pas-
sage: 
[N]o one is ethically allowed to invest in an unethical operation. If we 
know an operation is unethical, we have the ethical obligation not to in-
vest in it or, if we are already invested in it, to withdraw from it. Clearly, 
because the basic transaction of selling cocaine is unethical, it would be 
unethical to invest in a cocaine ring, even if one were guaranteed ex-
tremely high returns on one‘s funds. If Murder, Inc., were quietly seek-
ing investors, investing in that enterprise would be unethical. The gen-
eral principle is that if a corporation is established for an immoral end, 
then no one can morally support its activities through the purchase of 
its stock. The ordinary public corporation does not have an immoral 
end. Yet by analogy we can argue that even if a company is established 
for a legitimate end, if it in fact has a policy of engaging in unethical 
practices, then no one can morally support its activities through the 
purchase of its stock.5 
Before going further, a few words of caution may be necessary. Judging 
from most formulations of more principled arguments in favour of the 
avoidance strategy, I believe, the general idea involved would seem to be 
that the moral unacceptability of certain companies ‘spills over to’, or ‘con-
taminates’, those who invest in these companies, so that investing in 
these companies also, in some sense, becomes morally unacceptable. As 
De George puts it, ―[c]learly, because the basic transaction of selling 
 
5 De George 1999, p. 476 
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cocaine is unethical, it would be unethical to invest in a cocaine ring‖.6 
What may be morally problematic with investing in morally unaccepta-
ble companies, then, is that the moral problems connected with the ac-
tivities of these companies ‗spill over‘ to the act of investing in them. As 
a general characterisation of the basic idea of the kind of arguments un-
der consideration in this chapter, I think this characterisation is highly 
illustrative (and, thus, I will frequently discuss different arguments in the 
language of ‗moral contamination‘ or ‗moral dirt‘7). It should be noted, 
however, that the general idea involved here could be spelled out more 
exactly in many different ways – the strength of the moral reasons in-
volved could be varied, and the quite general formulation above could 
be kept as it is or it could be made more specific in different ways. 
 In one of the first philosophical treatments of the ethics of investing 
– a paper which I will have reason to return to many times throughout 
both this chapter and the next – William Irvine argues against the kind 
of extremely general formulations of the principled argument suggested 
above. According to what Irvine calls the evil-company principle, ―[i]f a 
company is at present ―evil,‖ it is [always] morally wrong for us to buy 
its stock‖8. I will discuss later, in section 3.2, exactly what Irvine means 
by ―evil‖ companies here. Now, consider the following variation of Ir-
vine‘s argument against the evil-company principle:9 
Slaveho lder s  Aga ins t  Slavery : One day you are contacted by a 
group of investors, calling themselves ‗Slaveholders Against Sla-
very‗. These investors all own shares in a company in some re-
mote country which, with full backing by this country‘s regime, 
uses slave labour to manufacture some kind of cheap export 
goods. At first you are appalled by the fact that these investors 
don‘t sell their shares in this company immediately, but the in-
vestors manage to assure you that their primary aim with holding 
shares in the company is not to support its activities, but rather 
to be able to make the company change its evil ways. Unfortu-
 
6 Mackenzie similarly writes that the basic idea of many fund managers and commentators 
(although this is often connected to the appeal to consistency discussed in the previous chap-
ter) is that ―it [is] unethical to invest in a company which is pursuing unethical practices‖ (1997, p. 
119, emphasis added).  
7 For similar terminology, see Hollenbach 1973, Powers 1971, Simon et al. 1972. 
8 Irvine 1987, p. 234 
9 Cf. Irvine 1987, p. 235. I have adjusted the argument slightly in order to avoid some inter-
nal problems (pointed out by Larmer 1997, p. 398). 
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nately, they‘re just one investor short of being able to force the 
company to change its evil ways, and you‘re their only hope. If 
you invested in the slaveholding company and cooperated with 
this group of investors, the group would gain just enough votes 
at the company‘s annual general meeting to be able to stop its use 
of slave labour. You decide to invest in the company and to coo-
perate with ‗Slaveholders Against Slavery‘. Shortly thereafter, the 
slaves are set free. 
What should one say about this case? According to Irvine, cases like this 
show that the evil-company principle is fundamentally mistaken.10 I 
think most people would agree with this and, therefore, if anyone 
thought that a principled argument for the avoidance strategy could be 
stated this generally, i.e. as generally as the evil-company principle is 
formulated, I believe they would obviously be mistaken. The problem is, 
however, that I think very few commentators would actually support 
such a general formulation of this kind of argument. Would it really be 
wrong to invest in morally unacceptable companies under all circumstances 
– that is, even when this would be the only way of making the company 
change its morally problematic ways? 
 Perhaps one should distinguish between a very rigid, or a ‗pure‘, em-
ployment of the avoidance strategy on the one hand and some more 
complex investment strategy where avoidance is only one part.11 Inter-
estingly enough, even though the majority of the so-called ethical funds 
would seem to practice a more or less ‗pure‘ avoidance strategy – i.e. the 
only thing that separates them from mainstream funds is that they avoid 
certain types of ―unacceptable‖ companies12 – very few SRI writers 
seem keen on defending such a strategy. According to almost all writers 
in this field, it may under certain circumstances be morally permissible, 
perhaps even obligatory (!), for investors to invest in companies which 
are otherwise regarded as morally problematic – especially if by doing so 
they are able to influence these companies into changing their evil ways. 
As the reader may have recognised by now, this is actually what the so-
called activist strategy of the SRI movement, or ‗shareholder activism‗, is 
all about. Even writers like De George, we may note, seem to grant the 
contention that becoming a shareholder activist sometimes may be mor-
 
10 Irvine 1987, p. 235 
11 Cf. Cowton 1998b, 1999, Domini and Kinder 1986 
12 For some figures on this, see chapter I, section 5. 
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ally permissible. The reason for why he does not say anything about this 
in the quote above, I believe, would mainly seem to be that he doubts 
that the activist strategy is an effective alternative for individual 
investors. In a later passage, he writes that ―the analysis is not quite the 
same with respect to large investors and institutional investors. [...] 
Large shareholders may [...] be in a position to influence corporate pol-
icy from within a firm in a way that small shareholders cannot. Hence, 
larger shareholders might legitimately not sell stock in a company if they 
in good faith intend to produce a change in corporate policy and have 
some hope of doing so‖13. I will discuss to what extent the activist strat-
egy is an effective alternative for individual investors in chapter VI. 
 Now, what can proponents of the avoidance strategy say in response 
to Irvine‘s argument above? Well, I discussed a way of making moral 
principles weaker at the end of the previous chapter, and proponents of 
the avoidance strategy may perhaps pick that suggestion up again here.14 
A more plausible position in this context, and indeed the position I be-
lieve most proponents of the avoidance strategy (both within the SRI 
movement and in the academic literature) actually take, is that investors 
have at least some moral reason not to invest in morally unacceptable 
companies. As previously noted, this kind of position is consistent with 
the idea that the moral reason involved may sometimes be overridden, 
or outweighed, if there are stronger moral reasons to do something 
which conflicts with the first kind of reason. In the case above, for in-
stance, proponents of the avoidance strategy could claim that this is ex-
actly what happens – if investing in a certain morally unacceptable com-
pany is the only way of counteracting some horrendous activity which it 
is engaged in, then the moral reasons to avoid investing in morally unac-
ceptable companies may be outweighed. But this does not cancel the 
fact, proponents of the avoidance strategy may say, that it would be 
wrong of investors to invest in morally unacceptable companies in most 
other cases. Perhaps it would even be wrong to invest in these kinds of 
companies in the absolute majority of cases?15 
 
13 De George 1999, p. 479 
14 I will discuss a more direct way in which a certain principled argument for the avoidance 
strategy can allow for shareholder activism in section 4.1 below. 
15 To be fair, Irvine suggests an idea somewhat similar to the one above. He writes: ―Given 
[that] it isn‘t necessarily wrong to buy the stock of an evil company, we must abandon the Evil-
Company Principle: From the mere fact that a company is evil (in some sense of the word), it 
does not follow – and we are not entitled to conclude – that it is morally wrong to buy the 
stock of the company. Instead, we should take a conditional approach to investment ethics: It 
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 Well, this is the kind of issue which I will be discussing more exten-
sively in the present chapter. Compared to Irvine‘s very strong formula-
tion of the evil-company principle, then, it is ideas of a weaker kind that I 
will be discussing in what follows. Furthermore, compared to the very 
general formulation of the evil-company principle, it should be noted, I 
will discuss principles that are more specific in a certain sense. As I noted 
in the previous chapter, and again above, an underlying premise of the 
argument from conscientiousness (or, originally, from consistency) 
seems to be that investing in a certain company in some way must 
amount to supporting it, or profiting from it, or something other of this 
kind. If the kind of moral fault involved in investing into areas which 
one morally disapproves of is supposed to be a kind of practical incon-
sistency, for instance, (i.e. an inconsistency between ones‘ principles and 
ones‘ actions), for someone opposing the sale of alcohol, say, to be 
practically inconsistent because of her investments in the alcohol indus-
try, this latter relationship somehow has to make the blame of inconsis-
tency ―stick‖ to her. That is, it needs to be shown that her investing in 
the alcohol industry in fact is something quite contrary to opposing it. 
Now, the case is very much the same, I believe, with the kind of prin-
cipled arguments for the avoidance strategy currently under discussion. 
 In the quote above, De George not only endorses the general posi-
tion that ―no one is ethically allowed to invest in an unethical opera-
tion‖, it may be noted, but he also suggest why this is not ethically al-
lowed. ―The general principle‖, he says, ―is that if a corporation is es-
tablished for an immoral end, then no one can morally support its activi-
ties through the purchase of its stock‖16. Quite generally, I believe we 
should demand of proponents of principled arguments for the avoid-
ance strategy in this context that they give some explanation of this kind 
of their position. Of course, it is possible to simply say that investors 
have moral reasons to avoid investing in morally unacceptable compa-
nies, full stop – i.e. without indicating more exactly what this kind of 
moral reason is. But in order for this kind of argument to be plausible, I 
 
is morally wrong for us to buy the stock of an evil company only under certain circumstances” 
(Irvine 1987, p. 235). Unfortunately, Irvine does not appreciate the fact that exactly the kind of 
reasoning behind the evil-company principle, if only made somewhat weaker, could survive his 
argument – and that the conditionality of the wrongness of investing in morally unacceptable 
companies could be explained with reference to conflicting moral reasons. See further chapter 
II, note 48, for some comments on why I take the conflicting reasons-approach to be more 
fruitful than conditionality. 
16 De George 1999, p. 476, emphasis added 
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believe, it needs to be shown that the moral ‗dirt‘ of the activities of 
morally unacceptable companies, as proponents of the principled argu-
ment imply, in fact also ‗spills over to‘ or ‗contaminates‘ those who in-
vest in these companies in some morally relevant way. For this reason, I 
believe, plausible versions of the principled argument should be more 
specific, i.e. they should not only say that investors have moral reasons 
to avoid investing in morally unacceptable companies, but also why this 
is so. 
 Another way to put this point is the following: Surely, proponents of 
a principled argument for the avoidance strategy would not want to hold 
that everyone who, say, grows up in the vicinity of the main headquar-
ters of some morally unacceptable company, or everyone who lives in 
the same world as some such company, shares some of the moral ‗dirt‘ 
of the activities of these companies (or have moral reasons not grow up 
this way or live in such a world). But, then, why is it morally problematic 
to invest in a morally unacceptable company, but not to be (closely) asso-
ciated with it in other ways? Proponents of the kind of arguments of 
interest here, I believe, owe us an explanation as to why this is so, i.e. an 
explanation as to why the relationship between a morally unacceptable 
company and its investors is especially morally incriminating in the re-
spect indicated above. 
 According to Mackenzie, besides the idea that investors ‗support‘ the 
companies they invest in, there are a lot of ideas as to what the incrimi-
nating relationship between investor and company might consist in 
more exactly. Most accounts from fund managers and other commen-
tators of why it is unethical to invest in unethical companies, he says, 
―rest on the idea that by investing in a company you are supporting it, 
contributing to the harm it does, sustaining it, or otherwise helping it‖17. 
Some in fact appeal to a very strong version of the ‗support‘ argument, 
which Mackenzie himself rejects, assuming a quite direct causal relation-
ship between investment transactions and the harm done by the activi-
ties of certain companies.18 However, others would seem to share the 
view of Domini and Kinder indicated in the previous chapter, i.e. that 
the problematic relationship is that of profiting from the harm done by 
unacceptable companies.19 Yet again others seem to hold that having 
 
17 Mackenzie 1997, p. 119 
18 Ibid. For the rejection, see p. 199. 
19 Ibid., p. 120 
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―any kind of relationship‖ with an unacceptable company is morally for-
bidden, whatever that means.20 
 In the present chapter, I will discuss three general ideas about what 
the morally incriminating relationship between companies and investors 
consists in, which I believe are the most distinct and important ones in 
this context. First of all, in section 2, I will discuss the idea that investors 
have moral reasons not to profit from morally unacceptable companies 
or, more generally, that it is morally problematic to benefit from the 
wrongdoings of others. In sections 3 and 4, I will discuss two versions 
of the idea that investors have moral reasons not to support such compa-
nies: First, in section 3, a version which understands support causally, 
roughly saying that investors have moral reasons not to contribute to the 
harmful effects of morally unacceptable corporate practices. In section 
4, finally, I will discuss a version which understands support symbolically, 
roughly saying that investors have moral reasons not to approve of certain 
wrongful activities that companies may engage in. As I argued above, it 
seems highly implausible to take references to the wrongness of having 
―any kind of relationship‖ with morally unacceptable companies literally. 
In both sections 3 and 4, however, I will suggest variations of the idea 
that it is wrong to support morally unacceptable companies which make 
use of references to ‗participation‘ and ‗involvement‘. In section 5, fi-
nally, I give a brief summary of the main conclusions of the many dis-
cussions of this chapter. 
2.  THE TAINTED -PROFIT S PRINCIPLE  
As indicated above, a common idea among proponents of the avoidance 
strategy is that it is somehow morally problematic to profit from morally 
unacceptable companies, or to profit from the unethical activities of 
such companies. Before evaluating this idea, I will briefly consider what 
role it has played in the history of the SRI movement. According to 
Sparkes, an idea of this kind has been highly influential in the formation 
of SRI as such: 
Socially responsible investment (SRI) began in the late 1960s/ early 
1970s when a number of different concerns came together. One was 
that of churches and universities about profiting from big business‘s in-
volvement in the Vietnam War. Of course, this period saw violent dem-
 
20 Ibid. 
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onstrations on many US campuses about the war and the draft of young 
men to fight in it. American universities and religious bodies questioned 
whether they should own shares in companies supplying war materials 
and whether they should use their power as shareholders to force 
change. [...] The churches were very much in the lead at this time. When 
in 1971 a group of Methodist clergy, worried about the Vietnam War, 
discovered that there was no investment fund available to avoid profit-
ing from the war, they simply set one up – the Pax World Fund.21 
Many other authors note the importance of the Vietnam War for the 
SRI movement.22 It might be added that the Pax World Fund was one 
of the first (modern) retail funds that practiced an elaborate and syste-
matic avoidance strategy of the kind under consideration here.23 Ob-
viously, then, the idea that it is morally problematic to profit from cer-
tain types of business areas or practices was highly influential in how the 
SRI movement got started. 
 Perhaps this idea is actually a central part of most religious concep-
tions of morality. Many writers note, along with Sparkes, the religious 
connotations surrounding early SRI initiatives – especially their connec-
tion to the convictions of the Methodists and the Quakers.24 The fact 
that religious groupings may demand more of their investments than 
simply financial return is not strange, according to some, since a guiding 
notion for most religious groups is that of stewardship.25 Because human 
beings are the care-takers of God‘s creation, this idea goes, we have an 
obligation to watch over all worldly possessions according to God‘s 
principles. Exactly what the obligations of stewardship are, and when 
these are applicable, could perhaps seem somewhat unclear here. I be-
lieve it should be noted, however, that an idea of what the notion of 
stewardship implies which is very interesting in the present context can 
 
21 Sparkes 1995, pp. 114-15 
22 Cf. Brill and Reder 1993, Cooper and Schlegelmilch 1993, Domini 2001, Guay et al. 2004, 
Harrington 1992, Miller 1991, Monahan 2002, Powers 1971, Schueth 2002 
23 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Guay et al. 2004, Judd 1990, Kinder et al. 1993, Miller 1991, 1992, 
Sparkes 2001, 2002 
24 Some accounts suggest that practices akin to the avoidance strategy have been used for a 
long time by such different denominations as Buddhists, Jews, Muslims, Protestants and 
Catholics – cf. Domini 2001, Powers 1971, Schwartz 2003, Schwartz et al. 2007, Sparkes 2002. 
The investment philosophies of the Methodists and Quakers, however, seem to have had an 
incomparable influence on how the first ethical funds were set up – cf. Kreander et al. 2004, 
Mackenzie 1997, Sparkes 1995. 
25 Cf. Kreander et al. 2004, Mills 1996, Moore 1988, Vogel 1978. Not coincidentally, the first 
UK retail ethical fund was called ‗Stewardship‘ – see Mackenzie 1997, Sparkes 1995. For some 
examples where churches stress stewardship, see Christian Ethical Investment Group 1992, 
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops 2003. 
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be found in the works of John Wesley, the founder of Methodism. Per-
haps proponents of the SRI movement have actually underestimated the 
power of their heritage when they say that investors simply ought to 
refrain from investing in the companies they find morally problematic 
themselves. 
 In his sermon on The use of money26, Wesley argues that ―three plain 
rules‖ ought to be followed, ―by the exact observance whereof we may 
approve ourselves faithful stewards‖27 of worldly possessions such as 
money. Firstly, we ought to ―gain all we can‖28, i.e. make as much profit 
as possible, as to make the best of the possibilities that God has given 
us. Secondly, we ought to ―save all we can‖29, i.e. not waste this profit 
on unnecessary pastimes or amusements, so that we don‘t waste God‘s 
gifts. Thirdly, we ought to ―give all we can‖30, i.e. share what is left after 
our expenses are paid, so that others less fortunate might enjoy the 
fruits of the land as we do. It is the first of Wesley‘s rules, ―gain all you 
can‖, which I think is the most interesting in this context. Quite gener-
ally, the reader may note the positivity towards the use of money ex-
pressed by this rule, as compared to what may be the popular concep-
tion of the Christian view on money. According to Wesley, good Chris-
tians ought not to avoid the use of money altogether, but to use money 
to do well. Money ―is a most compendious instrument of transacting all 
manner of business‖, he says, and ―of doing all manner of good‖ – at 
least ―if we use it according to Christian wisdom‖31. 
 Now, in laying out the first rule, however, Wesley puts forward a 
number of provisos that are to ensure that the use of money is indeed 
―according to Christian wisdom‖. We ought to gain all we can, he says, 
but not at the expense of ―our health‖ or ―our mind‖32 – nor by hurting 
our neighbour in ―his substance‖, ―his body‖ or ―his soul‖33. A number 
of business areas and practices are named which are considered harmful 
in these senses, for example extremely hard labour (which is considered 
harmful to our health), gambling and excessive interest rates (which is 
considered harmful to our neighbour ―in his substance‖), the sale of 
 
26 Wesley 1960, originally published 1760 
27 Ibid., p. 578 
28 Ibid., p. 579 
29 Ibid., p. 583 
30 Ibid., p. 586 
31 Ibid., p. 587 
32 Ibid., p. 579 
33 Ibid., pp. 580-82 
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alcohol (which is considered harmful to our neighbour‘s health) and 
sexually explicit behaviour (which is considered harmful to our neigh-
bour‘s soul). These business areas and practices, Wesley argues, ―are 
sacredly to be avoided, whatever gain they may be attended with‖.34 
 As others have noted, Wesley‘s account may be regarded as an early 
argument for an avoidance approach to investing.35 Since investing 
plausibly is an example of ―the use of money‖, his account seems to 
imply that investments in areas like the alcohol and gambling industries 
should be avoided – because by investing in such areas, investors are 
profiting from businesses that are harmful to ourselves and our neigh-
bours. So, then, what should one think of the sort of idea that Wesley 
lays out in this context?  
 I believe Irvine has idea very similar to Wesley‘s in mind when he 
writes: 
Some people will [explain why it is wrong to buy stock in unacceptable 
companies] by invoking what I call the Tainted-Profits Principle, which 
says that it is morally wrong for a person to take steps to benefit from 
the wrongdoing of others. According to these investors, what makes it 
wrong for me to buy the stock of [an unacceptable company] is the fact 
that its profits are tainted, so that by becoming a part owner of the 
company in question and sharing in its tainted profits, I myself become 
morally tainted.36 
Irvine‘s reference to the idea about how profits received from unaccept-
able companies are ―tainted‖ here, and may morally ―contaminate‖ the 
investor, I believe, is highly illustrative in the present context. Unfortu-
nately, some of Irvine‘s formulations in the passage above are somewhat 
ambiguous – according to some people, he says, it is wrong to ―take steps 
to benefit from the wrongdoing of others‖. On one understanding of 
this formulation, what is criticised is not actually benefiting from the 
wrongdoing of others, but trying to do so, or perhaps wanting to do so. I 
believe this actually is not an uncommon way of arguing against invest-
ments in morally unacceptable companies – I will discuss ideas of this 
general kind in section 4. In the present section, however, I will focus 
 
34 Ibid., p. 580. Interestingly enough, Wesley actually seems to give room for something akin 
to the appeal to consistency in his account of harm. On his understanding of ―harmful to our 
mind‖, a certain business practice may also be harmful to us if it is contrary to our personal 
beliefs – that is, if we find it morally problematic or offensive (1960, pp. 579-80). The impar-
tiality of his other conceptions of harm, however, is enough to make this an impartial account 
of morally unacceptable activities. 
35 Cf. Domini 2001, Kreander 2002, Schueth 2003, Sparkes 1998, 2002 
36 Irvine 1987, pp. 235-36 
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on the idea that investors have moral reasons not to actually profit from 
morally unacceptable companies and, following Irvine, I will refer to 
this idea as the tainted-profits principle.37 
 This principle, or, more generally, the idea that it is morally proble-
matic to ―benefit from the wrongdoings of others‖, I believe, certainly 
has some intuitive appeal. In the following subsections, however, I will 
argue that it is problematic in a number of ways. In sections 2.1 and 2.2, 
I will argue that the practical implications of the tainted-profits principle 
are not what proponents of this principle generally would seem to have 
assumed.38 Furthermore, I will argue in section 2.3 that, when one con-
siders certain interesting cases, the tainted-profits principle actually col-
lapses into the idea that it is morally problematic to support certain com-
panies.  
2.1 The  pe rvas ivenes s  o f  inve s tment  and the  aus t e r e  conc lus ion  
In order to evaluate the tainted-profits principle, it may now be expe-
dient to say something about what I generally think should be required 
of principled arguments for the avoidance strategy in the present con-
text. One way of dealing with these issues, I believe, would be to divide 
the general plausibility of these kinds of arguments into two parts: first, 
what we might call their theoretical plausibility and, second, what we 
might call their practical plausibility. The theoretical plausibility of a prin-
cipled argument for the avoidance strategy I understand as its plausibil-
ity on the level of principle, i.e. the inherent plausibility of the kind of moral 
principles or reasons it invokes, whereas the practical plausibility of such 
an argument is the plausibility of its practical implications, i.e. the plausibil-
ity of the recommendations of the principle in practical situations. 
Obviously, on the method of reflective equilibrium, both kinds of plau-
sibility are important and perhaps cannot be discussed in complete sepa-
ration from each other. For reasons of convenience, however, I will dis-
 
37 Many others have expressed ideas similar to this. According to Sparkes, for instance: ―It 
seems self-evident that it is morally wrong to make profits out of the arms trade with its ever 
more sophisticated ways of killing and maiming people. Likewise the profits from addictive 
and destructive habits such as cigarette smoking which unnecessarily kills thousands of people 
each year or gambling which causes huge misery, as can alcohol abuse‖ (1995, p. 4). According 
to Mills, ―the righteousness of any monetary return is conditional on the absence of the exploi-
tation of customer, workers, creditors and suppliers‖ (1996, p. 2). See also Irvine 2002 (where a 
similar idea is simply called ―the Profit Principle‖), Miller 1992, Schwartz et al. 2007, Simon et 
al. 1972, Ward 1991. 
38 I have presented some of these arguments before, see Sandberg 2005. 
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cuss them somewhat separately in what follows. I will discuss the theo-
retical plausibility of the tainted-profits principle in section 2.3. In this 
section and the next, then, I will mainly discuss the plausibility of the 
practical implications of the tainted-profits principle. 
 Quite generally, I believe it seems fair to say that proponents of prin-
cipled arguments for the avoidance strategy seldom have bothered to 
spell out the practical implications of their principles to a satisfactory 
degree. It is generally assumed, of course, that they imply that investors 
have moral reasons to avoid investing in certain morally unacceptable 
companies – but exactly what companies investors have moral reasons to 
avoid investing in, and when they should do this, is seldom spelled out 
more exactly. For this reason, the lion‘s share of this chapter will be de-
voted to trying to spell out the practical implications of the different 
principled arguments under discussion. In order to further delineate this 
issue, I believe it can be divided into two parts: A first problem con-
cerns exactly what kind of companies investors have moral reasons to avoid 
on a given moral principle, whereas a second problem concerns when 
investors have moral reasons to avoid these companies. With regards to 
the tainted-profits principle, I will consider the first of these problems in 
the present subsection and the second in the next. 
 As should hopefully be obvious to the reader by now, when I am 
talking generally about ‗morally unacceptable companies‘ in the present 
context, I am assuming that it is possible to define this group in some 
more robust, or impartial, manner, i.e. in a manner which does not 
simply refer to the fact that certain people may be morally opposed to 
the activities of these companies. Now, insofar as a certain principled 
argument tells us to avoid investing in a special kind of companies, I 
believe, the argument should reasonably imply that we ought to avoid 
companies which actually are morally unacceptable in this impartial 
sense (or which there is good reason to think are morally unacceptable in this 
sense). If a certain principled argument tells us to avoid investing in 
companies which quite plausibly are not morally unacceptable, there 
seems to be something wrong with this principle – the basic idea of 
principled arguments for the avoidance strategy, after all, is that inves-
tors have moral reasons to avoid investing in exactly the companies 
which are morally unacceptable. Furthermore, the principled argument 
should reasonably imply that we ought to avoid only these – i.e. it should 
not imply that we ought to avoid investing in companies which there is 
good reason not to think are morally unacceptable in this sense.  
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 Does the tainted-profits principle imply that investors have moral 
reasons to avoid investments into morally unacceptable companies of a 
more well-defined kind? Well, it may be noted that, although Irvine 
seems to capture the general idea that writers such as Wesley have de-
fended in this context, his understanding the tainted-profits principle in 
this regard is somewhat different from Wesley‘s. According to Wesley, 
the basic idea is that it is morally problematic to invest in companies 
whose activities are harmful in a certain way, either to ourselves or to 
others. Although Wesley‘s list of harmful activities, and indeed his dis-
tinctions between different types of harm, may be problematic in many 
ways,39 I think this general account is in line with how most of us intui-
tively think about these issues. According to Irvine, however, the 
tainted-profits principle could be formulated even more generally as the 
idea that ―it is morally wrong for a person to take steps to benefit from 
the wrongdoing of others‖40. I will not take a stand on which of these for-
mulations of the principle is the more plausible in this context. 
Depending on what view one takes on what constitutes wrongdoing, 
obviously, the two formulations may or may not converge. Perhaps, 
however, there are salient cases of companies which should be avoided 
on both accounts.41 
 The most conspicuous problem for the tainted-profits principle with 
regards to what companies investors have moral reasons to avoid in-
vesting in, I believe, is that, irrespective of which of the two definitions 
of the class of morally unacceptable companies above is chosen, the 
principle would seem to imply that investors have moral reasons to 
avoid far more companies than these. The reason for this implication is 
the fact that companies make their profit in more complex ways than 
proponents of the tainted-profits principle generally would seem to have 
assumed. In order to determine what companies investors have moral 
 
39 What is meant, for instance, by ―harmful to our mind‖ and ―harmful to our neighbour‘s 
soul‖? And what is meant by ―harmful to our neighbour in his substance‖? Even though the 
business areas and practices Wesley criticise may coincide with the ones often considered to be 
morally unacceptable within the SRI industry (see note 41 below), I believe we should demand 
a better explanation for why their activities are morally problematic. 
40 Irvine 1987, p. 235, emphasis added 
41 Interestingly enough, it may be noted that the industries most commonly avoided by so-
called ethical funds actually are more or less the kinds of industries ruled out by Wesley – the 
most common ―social screens‖ in American SRI funds concern tobacco (88%), alcohol (75%) 
and gambling (23%) (Social Investment Forum 2006). Shares in these industries are often 
referred to as ‗sin stocks‗, echoing the religious connotations of early SRI initiatives – cf. 
Cowton 1998b, Domini 2001, Harrington 1992, Judd 1990, Monahan 2002, Munnell and 
Sundén 2005, Schueth 2003, Schwartz 2003, Sparkes 2002. 
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reasons to avoid investing in according to the principle under discus-
sion, it is important to elaborate some on how companies actually make 
their profits. Now, for our present purposes, it may be enough to dis-
tinguish between two kinds (or sources) of income for commercial 
companies.42 Obviously, one way in which a company can make money 
(or, eventually, make a profit) is by selling the products it manufactures, 
or by selling the services it provides, either to consumers or to other 
companies. In accounting contexts, this is commonly referred to as the 
operating income of a corporation, i.e. the money a company makes from 
its own material operations. Another kind of income completely, how-
ever, is what could be called the financial income of a corporation, i.e. the 
money which a company can make by, for example, keeping its liquid 
resources in a bank, or by investing in shares or funds on the stock mar-
ket. The point of highlighting this second kind of income, it should be 
noted, is to emphasise the fact that companies themselves can be a kind of 
investor. Now, in what way may this fact make the practical implications 
of the tainted-profits principle more complex? 
 Well, if companies themselves can be a kind of investor, I believe, the 
picture one should have in mind when trying to cash out the practical 
implications of the tainted-profits principle is not one where investors 
only can profit from the operating incomes of different companies, and 
where these incomes then may be more or less morally ‗tainted‘ de-
pending on how morally corrupt these companies‘ material operations 
are. Rather, the profits investors can receive when holding the shares of 
one company could very well originate from the operations of a completely 
different company in which this company holds shares, or the operations 
of a third company in which that company holds shares, and so on, and so 
forth... Given the fact that most of the companies which it is possible to 
invest in today have financial incomes43, and thus actually have invested 
their money either in other companies‘ shares or in bank accounts, I 
believe, the financial interrelations between most commercial companies 
are extremely complex and elusive. So, what are the practical implica-
tions of the tainted-profits principle in light of these kinds of financial 
interrelations between companies? 
 Kolers refers to the complex structure of financial interrelations out-
lined above, or at least what is relevant for investors in this structure, as 
 
42 For more on this, see Fontanills and Gentile 2001, Keasey et al. 1998, Rini 2002, Wyss 
2000. 
43 Cf. Fontanills and Gentile 2001, Keasey et al. 1998, Rini 2002, Wyss 2000 
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the pervasiveness of investment.44 According to Kolers, it is hard to see how 
the pervasiveness of investment could imply anything else than that in-
vestors simply have moral reasons to avoid investing period. Consider, 
for instance, the fact that most companies keep deposits in commercial 
banks and receive interest on these deposits. According to Kolers, surely 
we cannot treat the case where you invest directly in a company which, 
say, pollutes the water supply of some remote Latin American village, 
―causing dozens of extra cases of cancer‖, differently from the case 
where you deposit some money in a commercial bank which in turn 
loans resources to the exact same company.45 Well, perhaps some would 
actually want to treat these cases differently,46 but with regards to what 
is implied by the tainted-profits principle, I believe, Kolers is correct – 
proponents of this principle must say that it is equally problematic to 
profit from this kind of harmful activity in both cases. If this is so, how-
ever, Kolers continues, surely it must also be morally problematic to 
hold shares in other companies which receive interest from their depo-
sits in such a bank. He writes: 
Banks pay interest because they use their depositors‘ money to invest in 
and lend money to third parties. The bank is essentially a go-between; it 
pools depositors‘ (that is, investors‘) money and redistributes it at a 
profit to borrowers. The investors, in turn, earn interest (a cut of the 
profit) on top of a guaranteed principal. So if [a commercial bank] uses 
my money to support businesses that in turn act immorally, we must de-
feasibly infer that I am partly responsible. Denying this would turn [the 
bank] into a money laundromat, and ethics must not respect money 
laundering.47 
According to Kolers, the case of commercial banks is a telling example 
in the present context. The kind of reasoning invoked above spells 
trouble for arguments like the tainted-profits principle, since the finan-
cial interrelations between most companies, as I have said, in fact are 
very complex and elusive: 
Money laundering is no less immoral, no matter how many washing 
cycles there are. Extra cycles are just further attempts to mask causal 
connections. This fact suggests that investors must iterate their ethical 
 
44 Kolers 2001, p. 442. See also Cooper and Schlegelmilch 1993, Lang 1996, Langtry 2002. 
45 Kolers 2001, p. 442 
46 It is not obvious from Kolers‘ text exactly what kind of principled position he endorses in 
this context – while he sometimes reasons like a proponent of the tainted-profits principle, at 
other places he seems to endorse other kinds of principles. I will return to this below (section 
4.1). 
47 Kolers 2001, pp. 439-40 
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screens throughout the economy. I may invest only in companies that 
act ethically; these companies must invest their money ethically; the 
companies in which they invest must act and invest ethically in compa-
nies that in turn act and invest ethically; and so on. I would be surprised 
if a single publicly traded company, or ethically screened mutual fund, 
even comes close to the kind of rigor, thoroughness and iteration that 
morality seems to require.48 
The conclusion Kolers draws from the line of reasoning above, as I 
have said, is that more or less no companies can be eligible for invest-
ment on principled arguments like the tainted-profits principle. He re-
fers to this as the austere conclusion – that is, that ―morality requires either 
total divestiture, or adherence to debilitatingly high, iterated ethical 
screens that would eliminate practically everything from our portfo-
lios‖.49 Certainly, if the tainted-profits principle entails this conclusion, 
this would be an ―unhappy result‖, as Kolers puts it, for proponents of 
this principle.50 Now, I don‘t think the outlook for proponents of the 
tainted-profits principle is exactly as bleak as Kolers says. Certainly, the 
tainted-profits principle would seem to imply that investors have moral 
reasons to avoid investing in far more companies than proponents of this 
principle generally assume. Before concluding that the principle actually 
entails the full austere conclusion, however, I believe it is important to 
turn to the second aspect of the issue of the practical implications of 
principled arguments for the avoidance strategy. When considering this 
second aspect, I believe, it actually becomes evident that proponents of 
the tainted-profits principle can avoid some of the force of the austere 
conclusion – although, perhaps, not in a way which they would appre-
ciate.  
 
48 Ibid., pp. 441-42 
49 Ibid., p. 439, emphasis removed. For similar ideas, see Cowton 1998b, Powers 1971. Per-
haps the austere conclusion could be reached in other ways. According to Mackenzie (1997, 
pp. 203-5), the simple fact that deposits in bank accounts and other more trivial investments 
are criticised by a certain principled argument suggests that it implies an excessively austere 
conclusion. According to a more technical argument from Hudson (2005), it is impossible to 
avoid profiting from how all other shares on the stock market fare, since the profitability of 
every share at least partly depends on the distribution of risk on the market as a whole. 
50 Kolers 2001, p. 440. It is interesting to note that many so-called ethical funds actually avoid 
investments in financial companies and banks (cf. Cooper and Schlegelmilch 1993). Perhaps 
this should be taken as an indication of that they are aware of the kinds of problems discussed 
here.  
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2.2 Unpro f i tab le  companie s  and cap i ta l  ga ins  
I am currently considering what I called the practical plausibility of the 
tainted-profits principle – that is, to what extent its practical implica-
tions are plausible. In order to further delineate this issue, I said it could 
be divided into two parts: The first of these, which I discussed above, 
was exactly what kind of companies the tainted-profits principle gives 
investors moral reasons to avoid investing in. Now, the second part 
concerns when investors actually have moral reasons to avoid investing 
in these companies. Quite generally, it may be noted, in order to work as 
arguments for the avoidance strategy, the kind of principled arguments 
under discussion in this chapter must reasonably imply that investors at 
least under certain circumstances have moral reasons to avoid investing in the 
kind of companies they classify as morally unacceptable. Unfortunately, 
I think the practical implications of most principled arguments for the 
avoidance strategy are more complicated in this regard as well. It is un-
clear, therefore, whether they can actually be used as arguments for the 
avoidance strategy as this is generally understood in the context of SRI. 
 A first complication for the tainted-profits principle in this context, it 
should be noted, is that not all investments are profitable investments. What 
does the tainted-profits principle say in cases of (sufficiently) unprofita-
ble investments? Well, it seems hard for proponents of this principle to 
avoid the conclusion that it is perfectly morally permissible to invest in 
such companies – unless, of course, they come up with some other jus-
tification of the avoidance strategy to handle this kind of cases. That is, 
it would seem to be morally permissible as far as the tainted-profits 
principle is concerned to invest in companies which are engaged in all 
kinds of activities which we intuitively find morally unacceptable – like 
slavery, warmongering and racial discrimination – as long as the compa-
nies in question are so unprofitable that investors do not profit from 
their investments in them. To some extent, it should be noted, this con-
clusion may actually help proponents of the tainted-profits principle. 
The fact that it is perfectly morally permissible according to this prin-
ciple to invest in morally unacceptable companies which are unprofita-
ble is the reason why I believe this principle does not entail the full aus-
tere conclusion – that is, there are companies, after all, which the 
tainted-profits principle allows investors to invest in. To the extent that 
the austere conclusion should be considered a dead end for the ethics of 
investing, I believe this possibility should not be frowned upon. How-
ever, I believe it should be obvious that the conclusion just noted is a 
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complication that many proponents of the avoidance strategy would not 
want to welcome. The tainted-profits principle is after all, as I have said, 
most often regarded as a principled argument against investments in 
morally unacceptable companies as such. Perhaps we already here, then, 
have a good reason to abandon the tainted-profits principle.51 
 The complications in terms of when investors have moral reasons to 
avoid investing in morally unacceptable companies according to the 
tainted-profits principle do not come to an end with the cases above, 
however. In order to determine when investors have moral reasons to 
avoid investing in morally unacceptable companies according to this 
principle, I believe it is important not only to elaborate on how companies 
actually make their profits, but also to elaborate some on the different 
ways in which investors may profit from their investments. There are two 
main ways, it should be noted, in which investors can profit from an 
investment in a given company.52 First of all, investors may receive a 
part of the company‘s profits directly, in the form of dividends distributed 
to investors on an annual basis. For individual investors who hold small 
amounts of shares in a company this profit will most often be marginal, 
as not all companies pay dividends and, even when they do, these tend 
to be quite low per share. A second way of profiting from investments, 
which would seem to be what most investors actually strive for,53 stems 
from the fact that the value of the company‘s shares may appreciate 
over time, and thus be worth more when the investor sells them than 
when she purchased them. By selling shares when the share price is 
high, then, investors can, (if all things go their way), make a profit pro-
portional to the change in value of the relevant shares – what is com-
monly referred to as a capital gain. Of course, if the investor originally 
has received her shares from someone else – perhaps by inheritance – 
this profit may be substantial. The investor then has not paid anything 
for the shares, and so makes a profit both proportional to the change in 
value and the original share price – i.e. proportional simply to the end 
price. 
 Now, should the tainted-profits principle treat both of these ways of 
profiting from investments in the same manner? This turns out to be a 
 
51 It may be suggested that the tainted-profits principle still can function as a kind of guideline 
for investors who are deciding how to invest, since most investors probably believe beforehand 
that their investments will be profitable. I will not elaborate on this suggestion here. 
52 Cf. Byström 2007, Irvine 1987, Keasey et al. 1998, Lang 1996, Rini 2002, Schwartz and 
Francioni 2004, Wyss 2000 
53 Cf. Byström 2007, Lang 1996, Wyss 2000 
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rather complex issue. A possible position in the present context could 
perhaps be that only dividends can morally ―taint‖ the investors in mor-
ally unacceptable companies. It is only with regards to this kind of 
profit, after all, that investors receive money directly from the underly-
ing companies and, thus, directly from the morally ―tainted‖ activities of 
morally unacceptable companies. With regard to capital gain, the money 
which investors make by selling their shares at a profitable price does 
not come from the underlying companies, but rather from other inves-
tors – those who actually buy the shares on the stock market. Further-
more, what causes share prices to fluctuate, some might want to say, is 
most often such things as the general economic trend in the country, or 
people‘s expectations about the profitability of different sectors – things 
which have no direct connection with the activities of individual com-
panies. Of course, there may be some connection between these things 
and the activities of the underlying companies, others may point out, as 
people‘s expectations about the profitability of a certain company to a 
large extent may depend on both its past activities and its present ones. 
Those who are critical of the suggestion above may also point to the 
fact that capital gain is a very common way in which investors actually 
profit from holding shares in public limited companies, including mor-
ally unacceptable ones. If it is morally wrong to profit from investments 
in this latter group, they may argue, it should be wrong to do it in both 
of the ways discussed above. 
 I will not take a stand on what the most plausible version of the 
tainted-profits principle should say in this regard. It may be noted, how-
ever, that most proponents of the tainted-profits principle fail to sepa-
rate between these ways of profiting from morally unacceptable compa-
nies and, thus, they would seem to imply that both ways are equally 
morally problematic.54 Now, what are the practical implications of the 
tainted-profits principle in terms of when investors have moral reasons 
to avoid investing in morally unacceptable companies, in light of the 
considerations above? Well, the interesting point in this context, I be-
lieve, is that the different ways of making money on investments out-
lined here happen at different times, or at different stages in the invest-
ment process.  
 
54 Cf. Domini and Kinder 1986, Mills 1996, Simon et al. 1972, Sparkes 1995, Ward 1991. 
Irvine (1987, p. 236) explicitly separates between these, but does not treat them differently. 
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 As I just said, dividends are distributed to investors on an annual ba-
sis and, thus, as long as an investor holds shares in a certain company – 
and this company is sufficiently profitable – she may receive dividends 
from the company in question. However, capital gains are not made 
when investments are held, but first when they are sold. What does this 
mean more exactly? Well, if investors are morally ―tainted‖ by receiving 
this kind of profits, I believe, they would seem to be the ‗dirtiest‘ exactly 
when they sell their shares in morally unacceptable companies, since this 
is when they actually receive the tainted profits.55 The present point, one 
may note, would seem to make the issue of how to spell out the prac-
tical implications of the tainted-profits principle far more complex than 
proponents of this principle generally would seem to have assumed. 
Again, it would seem to raise the question of whether this principle 
could be used as an argument for the avoidance strategy at all, at least con-
sidering how this strategy is normally understood by SRI proponents. 
 As I noted already in the introductory chapter, the general recom-
mendations of what I have been referring to as the avoidance strategy is, 
first of all, that investors should refrain from purchasing shares in mor-
ally unacceptable companies. Second of all, if they find out that they 
already are holding shares in such companies, they should sell these 
shares immediately. But, if the tainted-profits principle should be taken 
to imply that investors have moral reasons not to profit from morally 
unacceptable companies also in the form of capital gains, as I have just 
showed it is exactly when they sell their shares in morally unacceptable 
companies that they are being the most immoral. So what should they 
do in situations of the latter kind? A straightforward suggestion may 
perhaps be that they should wait until the price of the shares falls under 
the price for which they bought them and thus sell without profit. Al-
ternatively, they should perhaps try to give them away to someone with 
less moral scruples in the area of investment ethics. These are just sug-
gestions. The first kind of strategy may work in certain situations, it 
should be noted, but not when the investor has not bought the shares 
herself but rather received them from another through, for example, 
inheritance or donation. In such cases, no matter when the shares are 
 
55 One may perhaps argue, in an economist‘s fashion, that one does not make the profit from 
an increased share price upon selling the shares, but rather when the share price actually appre-
ciates. Thus, selling the shares only amounts to cashing out profits already made. From a moral 
point of view, however, this defence does not seem tenable. It must be the reception of tainted 
profits that may morally taint the investor, after all, and not the increased value of some of her 
belongings. 
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sold, the investor will have made a capital gain. Giving the shares away, 
on the other hand, while perhaps practically possible in all circum-
stances, may be argued not to wash away the moral ‗dirt‘ involved – if 
facilitating the immorality of others should be regarded as just as mor-
ally problematic as profiting from their behaviour (a point which I will 
return to below). A third possibility is, of course, that there simply is 
nothing which the investor can do in a situation like this that does not 
make her morally ‗tainted‘.  
 I will not take a stand on what the most plausible recommendation in 
the present context is. As indicated above, however, I take the present 
issue to suggest that the practical implications of the tainted-profits 
principle are far more complex than what proponents of this principle 
generally would seem to have assumed. Perhaps most proponents of 
this principle would actually find the implications so counterintuitive 
that they would choose to abandon the principle altogether in light of 
them. Or, then again, perhaps some would choose to stick with the 
principle and embrace its implications (perhaps in lack of better alterna-
tives). As I noted in the introductory chapter, the method of reflective 
equilibrium requires only that our moral principles and judgements 
about particular cases cohere with each other – when they do not, it is not 
always obvious what part of our moral thinking we should adjust. I have 
now said enough about the practical plausibility of the tainted-profits 
principle. In the following subsection, I turn to its theoretical plausibil-
ity. 
2.3 Pro f i t ing ve r sus  support ing  
Following the suggestion in the last passage above, it may be argued that 
it does not take us very far simply to show that the tainted-profits prin-
ciple has unexpected practical implications. If it is possible for propo-
nents of this principle to embrace its implications without abandoning 
their favoured moral foundation, then our previous considerations – far 
from speaking against the tainted-profits principle – could perhaps be 
said to have unveiled some important insights about what investors re-
ally ought to do. This line of reasoning, however, rests on the assump-
tion that the tainted-profits principle in itself expresses a more funda-
mental moral insight – that is, that the kind of reasoning exemplified by 
this principle is theoretically sound. In this subsection, I cannot say 
much about how theoretical soundness should be understood more ex-
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actly. However, I will discuss what I take to be a quite basic requirement 
on principled arguments in favour of the avoidance strategy – namely, 
that they are able to explain why investors have moral reasons to avoid 
investing in morally unacceptable companies (if they indeed have such 
reasons, that is).  
 In order for the tainted-profits principle to be able to present a case 
about why investors have moral reasons to avoid investing in morally 
unacceptable companies, I believe, it needs to be plausible to say that it 
is exactly the act of receiving tainted profits which is morally incriminating 
about investments in morally unacceptable companies. That is, there 
cannot be another kind of moral principle which better explains why it 
seems morally problematic to invest in such companies in exactly the 
cases where we think this is so. But, I believe there is such a principle. 
This point is perhaps best brought out by considering some further 
cases where the tainted-profits principle would seem to have counter-
intuitive implications. Consider, for instance, the following variation of 
Irvine‘s own argument against the tainted-profits principle:56 
The Burg lary Wave : One morning, three people – Peter, Bjorn 
and John – read in the local newspaper about an increasing wave 
of burglaries in their otherwise calm, upper-class neighbourhood. 
Being the kind of entrepreneurs they are, they all read the report 
very carefully and decide to do something about the situation. 
Peter decides to go into the guard business and to offer his 
neighbours the services of some sturdy night watchmen. Bjorn 
decides to go into the insurance business and to offer low-cost 
burglary insurances to his peers. Having a somewhat different 
social background from the others, however, John decides to go 
into the tool business and set up a sale of crowbars, glass cutters 
and tools fit for picking locks in the backyard of his house. 
Again, being the kind of entrepreneurs they are, before long, all 
three businesses are able to turn a profit. While out for an after-
noon stroll a couple of weeks later, Peter and Bjorn happen to 
walk past John‘s crowbar sale and they are both appalled by the 
disrespect they feel that John exhibits towards their community. 
They bring this up with John, to which he only replies: ―Oh, but 
 
56 See Irvine 1987, p. 236. I have modified the example only slightly, and mainly for reasons 
of presentation. 
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I‘ve heard about your own little business schemes, to be sure! 
*nudge, nudge* Haven‘t we all have made a bit of cash from this 
dreadful burglary wave, eh?!‖ 
What is a reasonable reaction to John‘s reply in this example? According 
to Irvine, proponents of the tainted-profits principle must accept John‘s 
line of reasoning as basically sound. Although the three people of our 
example perhaps could have different motivations and different views 
on the ethics of stealing, they are all basically benefiting from the 
wrongful activities of the burglars. If there had been no burglary wave in 
the first place, of course, none of their business schemes would have 
worked. Thus, according to Irvine, the tainted-profits principle must 
condemn the actions of all three.57 But, he continues, ―[t]his conse-
quence [...] is counterintuitive. Most people would hold that while I may 
be doing something wrong if I open the tool shop described above, I 
won‘t be doing anything wrong if I go into the guard business or the 
insurance business‖58. Thus, most people would intuitively disagree with 
the implications of the tainted-profits principle in this regard. A reason-
able explanation of this intuition, according to Irvine, is that whereas 
setting up a crowbar sale would seem to make it easier for the burglars to 
conduct their dirty business, going into the insurance business has no 
such effect – and going into the guard business actually counteracts the 
activities of the burglars.59 What makes it wrong for John to go into the 
tool business, thus, is the fact that his actions lend support to the activi-
ties of the burglars in a way which the activities of Peter and Bjorn do 
not. 
 According to Irvine, examples like the one above show that ―it isn‘t 
necessarily morally objectionable for a person to take steps to benefit 
from the wrongdoing of others. What is morally objectionable is taking 
steps in a way that enables others to do wrong‖60. I think a somewhat 
stronger conclusion could actually be drawn from this example. If taken 
literally, it should be noted, there is no real disagreement between Ir-
vine‘s conclusion here and proponents of the tainted-profits principle – 
at least not as I have understood their view. According to my under-
standing of the tainted-profits principle, namely, it is not so that it is 
 
57 Irvine 1987, p. 236 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
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necessarily morally wrong to profit from morally unacceptable activities – 
under certain circumstances, e.g. when investing in a certain company is 
the only way of making it change its evil ways, this may be morally justi-
fiable even according to these authors. The tainted-profits principle only 
holds, I have said, that investors always have at least some moral reason 
against profiting from morally unacceptable activities. But, don‘t the 
considerations above also speak against this weaker view? I think they 
do. When considering the example above, I believe most of us would 
agree that the fact that both Peter and Bjorn also in some manner profit 
from the activities of the burglars is something quite beside the point in 
the present context. When John tries to use this fact, then, to say that 
his critics are just as ‗tainted‘ as himself, most of us simply don‘t agree. 
 The conclusion to be drawn from the example above is not only that 
it is not necessarily wrong to profit from morally unacceptable activities. 
What is really doing the job in cases where we find some profits morally 
tainted, we are now able to see, is that the behaviour of those at the re-
ceiving end of the money tends to support the very activities which we 
find morally unacceptable. Thus, the appeal to tainted profits would 
seem to collapse into an appeal to support – that is, the best explanation 
of why we find it morally problematic to invest in morally unacceptable 
companies, rather than involving a reference to tainted profits, starts 
with the supposition that investors somehow support their activities. I 
believe this conclusion is essentially correct. Now, some may feel that 
the fact that the investors involved profit from such support makes their 
behaviour even worse – I will not discuss this idea further in this context.61 
Furthermore, exactly how we should understand the reference to sup-
port in this context may not be entirely obvious – there may be more 
ways of ‗supporting‘ a certain activity than to simply enable it, which is 
what Irvine focuses on. Most importantly, it should be noted, the idea 
that it is morally problematic to approve, or signal one‘s symbolic support, 
of morally unacceptable activities would also seem able to explain our 
intuitions in the case above. What is morally repugnant about John‘s 
behaviour, some may argue, is the fact that he would actually seem to 
condone the activities of the burglars in a way which Peter and Bjorn 
would not. I will discuss this idea in section 4. In the following section, 
 
61 Even though the tainted-profits principle perhaps could rationalise this kind of intuition, 
the fact that investors sometimes may profit from their investments in morally unacceptable 
companies is obviously not what most straightforwardly makes such investments morally 
problematic. 
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however, I turn to the idea that it is morally problematic to support 
morally unacceptable activities in Irvine‘s sense. 
3.  SUPP ORT AND THE NO -HARM P RINCIPLE  
The idea that it is morally problematic for investors to support morally 
unacceptable companies, according to most commentators, is an idea 
that has played a just as integral part in the formation of the SRI move-
ment as the tainted-profits principle. Many writers note, for instance, 
the importance of the campaign against the apartheid regime of South 
Africa for the growth of this movement.62 This campaign became widely 
known as the ‗divestment‘ movement, or ‗divestiture‘, since many in-
vestors – both individual and institutional – sold their investments in 
companies doing business in South Africa.63 On the historical underpin-
nings of the SRI movement, again, Sparkes writes: 
As the 1970s progressed the campaign against the apartheid regime in 
South Africa led to widespread concern within the churches that their 
funds should not be used to support the existing regime, and to broader 
awareness within society as a whole of such an approach.64 
I will not elaborate further on the historical roots of this idea in the 
present context except to note that, if Sparkes‘ account above is correct, 
this idea may in fact also be a part of the religious beliefs which were so 
influential in the early days of SRI. As indicated in the previous chapter, 
this idea is often an integral part of appeals to consistency or conscien-
tiousness. According to Cowton, for instance, ―it might be considered 
inappropriate for someone who practices and advocates teetotalism to 
hold shares in a distillery. [...] To many observers, passively holding a 
stock and making a return from it indicates some support for a particular 
activity‖65. A similar idea would also seem to be common in much of 
the commercial material from so-called ethical funds. In Mackenzie‘s 
words, ―[a]ccording to investors, funds, and commentators alike, by in-
 
62 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Brill and Reder 1993, Domini 2001, Domini and Kinder 1986, 
Harrington 1992, Judd 1990, Kinder et al. 1993, Lang 1996, Melton and Keenan 1994, Miller 
1991, Monahan 2002, Taylor 2001 
63 Cf. Brill and Reder 1993, Domini and Kinder 1986, Kinder and Domini 1997, Kinder et al. 
1993, Melton and Keenan 1994, Miller 1991 
64 Sparkes 2001, p. 196 
65 Cowton 1998b, p. 187, emphasis added 
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vesting in a company which acts unethically, one is ‘supporting’ that com-
pany and, in doing so, one is behaving unethically‖66. 
 I have already introduced one writer who embraces the present kind 
of idea more systematically. According to De George, ―[t]he general 
principle is that if a corporation is established for an immoral end, then 
no one can morally support its activities through the purchase of its 
stock. The ordinary public corporation does not have an immoral end. 
Yet by analogy we can argue that even if a company is established for a 
legitimate end, if it in fact has a policy of engaging in unethical practices, 
then no one can morally support its activities through the purchase of its 
stock‖67. In this section, I will evaluate this idea more thoroughly – or, 
at least, one (kind of) interpretation of this idea. As I have already indicated, 
it is not always entirely clear how to understand references to ‗support‘ 
more exactly. On some accounts, what is meant by saying that investors 
who invest in morally unacceptable companies in some manner ‗sup-
port‘ these companies, I believe, has little to do with the causal relation-
ship between the investor and the morally problematic activities of these 
companies. What is meant by such formulations, rather, would seem to 
be that investing in morally unacceptable companies somehow amounts 
to condoning the activities of those companies, or approving of them in 
some manner. I have already mentioned this idea in passing and, looking 
again at some of the quotes above, the reader may now see how close it 
is to the kind of ideas I will be discussing in the present section. Perhaps 
Cowton‘s reference to ‗support‘ should actually be understood along 
these lines – it may be noted, for instance, that Cowton does not suggest 
that investing in a certain company de facto amounts to supporting it. 
Rather, he says that ―[t]o many observers, passively holding a stock and 
making a return from it indicates some support for a particular activity‖.  
 I will discuss ideas about ‗symbolic support‗ in the next section. In the 
present section, then, I am primarily interested in a kind of actual sup-
port, or a causal relationship between investors and companies. Perhaps 
this is the kind of ‗support‘ most of the writers above are referring to – 
according to Mackenzie, as indicated previously, most ―accounts of why 
it might be unethical to invest in a company which is pursuing unethical 
practices rest on the idea that by investing in a company you are support-
ing it, contributing to the harm it does, sustaining it, or otherwise helping it and that 
 
66 Mackenzie 1997, p. 118, emphasis added 
67 De George 1999, p. 476, emphasis added 
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this is unethical‖.68 The general idea of the kind of ‗support‘ argument I 
will be considering in this section, in any case, is that investing in mor-
ally unacceptable companies in some manner enables these companies to 
do more of the bad things they do, or contributes to the harmful effects of 
their activities. Although this idea may seem fairly straightforward, a few 
general notes may be necessary before commencing with the inquiry.  
 First of all, according to Irvine, as I indicated above, what may be 
found morally objectionable in the present context is ―taking steps in a 
way that enables others to do wrong‖69. More specifically, Irvine defends 
what he calls ―the Enablement Principle‖, which says that ―[i]t is morally 
wrong for a person to do something that enables others to do wrong‖70. 
If taken literally, I believe it should be noted, this formulation is rather 
loose – in fact, it is so loose that it is absurd. Is it really morally proble-
matic to enable others to do a certain wrong, if they then do not also per-
form this wrong? If so, then almost all kinds of education, just to take 
one example, would be wrong – teaching children to talk obviously 
enables them to lie. To be fair, Irvine reformulates his position in a later 
paper to say that what is objectionable is ―taking steps in a way that in-
creases the suffering of others‖71. I believe this later formulation is closer to 
what one should be after here – the general idea under discussion is that 
investing in morally unacceptable companies in some manner contri-
butes to the harmful effects of these companies‘ activities, and that this 
is morally problematic. What seems morally relevant here, then, is the 
actual effects of a certain investment behaviour (i.e., what actually hap-
pens because of this) and not the counterfactual effects (i.e., what only 
could have happened). 
 Exactly what kind of actual effects are relevant in the present context? 
Well, it is important to note, I believe, that proponents of the idea in-
troduced above are not interested in just any kind of effects which may 
be the upshot of an investor‘s choice to invest in a certain way. More 
exactly, they are not interested in any positive effects which investing in 
different companies may have. According to proponents of what I call 
pragmatic arguments for the avoidance strategy, as will become more evi-
dent in the following chapter, investors may have moral reasons to re-
frain from investing in morally unacceptable companies because they 
 
68 Mackenzie 1997, p. 119, emphasis added 
69 Irvine 1987, p. 236, emphasis added 
70 Ibid. 
71 Irvine 2002, p. 59 
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have a general reason to promote the good. That is, insofar as an avoidance 
of investments into certain companies has the effect of, say, making 
these companies change their evil ways, or changing the way people 
think about the moral responsibilities of corporations, investors have 
moral reasons to try to bring this about. Furthermore, insofar as a simi-
lar avoidance can have the effect of improving the environmental 
records of certain companies, or improving the working conditions of 
their employees, investors also have moral reasons to try to bring this 
about. Although there certainly are many similarities between this way 
of thinking and the kind of argument presently under discussion, and 
although I will ultimately have to postpone parts of the discussion of 
the present kind of argument until the next chapter exactly for this rea-
son, I believe there are also certain dissimilarities.  
 The basic idea of the kind of ‗support‘ argument that will be consi-
dered in the present section, I have said, is that investing in morally un-
acceptable companies in some manner contributes to the wrongful or 
harmful effects of these companies‘ activities, and that this is morally 
problematic. According to some writers, it is not necessary to invoke a 
general duty of investors to ―promote the good‖ in order to morally 
criticise this kind of investing, but it is sufficient to say that they have 
moral reasons not to do harm. According to Alan Miller, for instance, the 
avoidance strategy could quite straightforwardly be seen as an embodi-
ment of the rule: ―First, Do No Harm‖.72 According to Gregory Bea-
bout and Kevin Schmiesing, two Catholic authors, ―[i]n following the 
norm to ‗avoid evil,‘ [which is distinct from the norm to ‗do good,‘] in-
vestors should avoid companies whose products or policies are contrary 
to the authentic dignity of the human person‖73. According to Cowton, 
furthermore, ―[i]f a duty not to impose damage or harm on other people 
is regarded as a minimum responsibility which runs through all morality, 
then it might be concluded that the avoidance of certain investments is 
appropriate‖74. 
 The distinction between promoting the good and not doing harm 
invoked here, it may be noted, is a well-known – although much criti-
cised – distinction in moral philosophy, which is often used by propo-
 
72 Miller 1991, p. 29 
73 Beabout and Schmiesing 2003, pp. 89-90 
74 Cowton 1998b, p. 188. For similar formulations, see Domini 2001, Lang 1996, United 
States Conference of Catholic Bishops 2003. 
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nents of deontological ethics.75 For obvious reasons, I cannot elaborate 
too much on this distinction in the present context except to note that, 
according to many deontologists, it is normally wrong to actively (and 
intentionally) harm others, but it is not necessarily wrong not to prevent 
something harmful from happening to them (which one has not caused 
oneself). That is, while doing harm is always open for moral criticism, 
simply allowing harm to happen is not regarded as (equally) proble-
matic.76 Perhaps the passages above should be understood along the 
lines of this kind of reasoning or distinction. Somewhat irrespectively of 
how the present distinction is understood, I believe it should be noted 
that some idea of this sort is needed in order for the present argument 
to work as an (at least putatively) principled, i.e. non-pragmatic, argument 
for the avoidance strategy. That is, there needs to be something wrong 
in itself with giving rise to or contributing to the harmful effects of the 
activities of morally unacceptable companies – what is wrong here can-
not simply be that one may be allowing such effects to happen by not 
―making a positive difference‖ through implementing the avoidance 
strategy. On this latter understanding, the present line of reasoning 
would collapse into a kind of pragmatic argument.  
 Perhaps saying that investors have moral reasons not to harm others 
is actually less controversial, as Cowton suggests, than saying that they 
have a general reason to ―promote the good‖ as well. In one of the first 
books written on the topic of ‗ethical investing‘, John Simon, Charles 
Powers and Jon Gunnemann defend the ―prima facie obligations of all 
citizens [...] to avoid and correct self-caused social injury‖, which they 
call a ―moral minimum‖77. They explain:  
We do not mean to distinguish between negative injunctions and affir-
mative duties solely in the interests of analytical precision. The negative 
injunction to avoid and correct social injury threads its way through all 
morality. We call it a ―moral minimum,‖ implying that however one may 
choose to limit the concept of social responsibility, one cannot exclude 
this negative injunction. Although reasons may exist why certain per-
sons or institutions cannot or should not be required to pursue moral or 
social good in all situations, there are many fewer reasons why one 
should be excused from the injunction against injuring others. Any citi-
zen, individual or institutional, may have competing obligations which 
could, under some circumstances, override this negative injunction. But 
 
75 Cf. Donagan 1977, Foot 1967, Frankena 1973, Glover 1977, Kagan 1989, Kamm 1996 
76 Cf. Bennett 1995, Foot 1967, Glover 1977, Kagan 1989, Kamm 1996, Quinn 1989 
77 Simon et al. 1972, p. 21 
100 
these special circumstances do not wipe away the prima facie obligation 
to avoid harming others.78 
I will follow these writers in calling the present kind of idea the no-harm 
principle in what follows, i.e. the idea that investors have moral reasons 
not to contribute to or sustain the harmful activities of certain compa-
nies. Although this principle certainly would seem to have some intui-
tive appeal – perhaps it is even correct to say that it ―threads its way 
through all morality‖79 – I believe it is problematic in many ways, just 
like the tainted-profits principle. I will not consider its theoretical plau-
sibility in this chapter, but wait with this matter until chapter VII. The 
issue I will mainly discuss is whether the no-harm principle is sufficient 
for a plausible justification of the avoidance strategy, or if proponents of 
this strategy will have to invoke a more general kind of pragmatic con-
siderations to support their view. In the two subsections below, I will 
suggest that proponents of the no-harm principle face a kind of di-
lemma when it comes to spelling out the practical implications of this 
principle. If the principle is taken at face value, i.e. without further re-
strictions on what effects it counts as relevant, it would seem to face 
problems similar to those discussed in relation to the tainted-profits 
principle (or at least so I will suggest in section 3.1). However, if the no-
harm principle is restricted in order to avoid these problems (and I will 
discuss two suggested revisions in 3.2), because the causal connections 
between investors and companies are quite complicated, it is actually no 
longer clear whether the no-harm principle can entail an avoidance 
strategy at all. 
 Before leaving these introductory notes, it may be fruitful to intro-
duce a further distinction which may help us understand how propo-
nents of the no-harm principle think. The reader may note that I have 
yet to expand on exactly what it may mean to say that a certain beha-
viour ‗contributes‘ to or ‗sustains‘ a certain (harmful) effect. According 
to a quite straightforward understanding of the present line of thinking, 
the idea would seem to be that each individual investment tends to help 
a company – either financially or in some other way – and thus to make 
it easier for the company to conduct its business. To the extent that my 
 
78 Ibid., p. 18 
79 It may be noted that a similar idea is often regarded as a central tenet of what is called 
‗common sense morality‘ – cf. Frankena 1973, Kagan 1989. A principle similar to the one 
outlined here has also been suggested as a central principle in biomedical ethics and elsewhere 
– cf. Beauchamp and Childress 2001, Jonsen 1977. 
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investment in a morally unacceptable company is an essential part in the 
causal chain which enables this company to do more of the bad things it 
does, then, I am morally ―tainted‖ by my causal relationship to these 
bad things. But, it should be noted, this is not the only possible under-
standing of ‗contribution‘ and ‗support‘ in the present context. Accord-
ing to another understanding of the present argument, in order for in-
vestments in morally unacceptable companies to be morally ―tainted‖ 
because of their effects on the activities of those companies, it is not a 
necessary condition that each and every individual investment (or inves-
tor) helps the companies in question. According to this other idea, being 
a part of a group which together makes it easier for morally unacceptable 
companies to do more of their bad things can be equally morally con-
taminating.80 
 Some proponents of the avoidance strategy, I believe, reason in this 
way. This may often be, for instance, how one should understand refer-
ences to the idea that it is morally problematic to participate in, or to have 
―any kind of involvement‖ with, the activities of morally unacceptable 
companies. Simon, Powers and Gunnemann, for example, say the fol-
lowing in relation to corporate ownership: 
In legal contemplation there are no owners other than the holders of 
equity shares. Surely an ―owner‖ is ―involved‖ in a transgression com-
mitted by ―his‖ company. His ―involvement,‖ obviously, is fractional. 
But so, in one degree or another, is the involvement of all the other 
owners of the company, unless it is a one-man corporation. [...] As long 
as [the traditional corporate-law] doctrine is respected, all owners must 
be regarded as having some form of involvement and participation in 
whatever social injury the corporation inflicts.81 
I will return to the idea of shareholders as owners of companies in section 
4 below, and then more thoroughly in chapter V. Although it is not ob-
vious how to understand references to collective responsibility more 
exactly – an issue I will not elaborate on until the following chapter 
(section 4) – I will here allow proponents of the no-harm principle to 
appeal to what we may call ‗participatory effects‘ – that is, effects which 
 
80 In the philosophical literature, this kind of thinking is often invoked to handle cases of 
‗overdetermination‘, and also in connection with what I call collective dilemmas (see chapter 
IV, section 5). Furthermore, several writers have suggested this line of thinking as a solution to 
the problem of democratic responsibility discussed below (section 4.2) – cf. Goldman 1999, 
Singer 1972a. For an outstanding discussion of this kind of thinking, see Parfit 1984, chapter 3. 
81 Simon et al. 1972, p. 150. See also Langtry 2002. 
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are caused by groups which individual investors at least are a part of.82 
According to a more general understanding of the no-harm principle, 
then, it is morally problematic to be causally responsible for corporate 
harm in either of two ways – either to be causally responsible oneself for 
this (to cause the harm in a fairly straightforward sense), or to be part of 
a group which is causally responsible for corporate harm (even though 
one does not cause any harm oneself ). 
3.1 The  complex i ty  o f  the  mod ern  corpora t ion  and the  
in t e r conne c t ednes s  o f  the  e conomy  
As I noted above, a critical issue for all principled arguments for the 
avoidance strategy, I believe, is exactly what the practical implications of 
these arguments are and to what extent they are plausible – what I called 
their practical plausibility. As with the tainted-profits principle, I will 
start my evaluation of the no-harm principle here with the issue of ex-
actly what companies investors have moral reasons to avoid investing in 
according to this principle. The problem with the tainted-profits prin-
ciple with regards to this issue, I said above, is that it would seem to lead 
in the direction of what Kolers calls the austere conclusion, i.e. that it 
supports the claim that investors have moral reasons to avoid investing 
in far more companies than those which we have good reasons to find 
morally unacceptable in some more objective sense. Now, taken at face 
value, I believe, the no-harm principle would actually seem to have sim-
ilar implications. While the salient problem for the tainted-profits prin-
ciple was what Kolers called the pervasiveness of investment, I will note at 
least two problems for the no-harm principle in the present context: the 
complexity of the modern corporation and the interconnectedness of the economy.  
 By the complexity of the modern corporation I am referring to the 
fact that most of today‘s public limited companies, i.e. companies eligi-
ble for investment through the stock market, are of such an enormous 
size, and are engaged in so many different kinds of operations, that it 
seems hard to find a company which does not engage in either wrongful 
 
82 The idea to understand ‗participatory‘ effects as a kind of effects, which then can be plugged 
into a consequence-oriented setting like my present one, is most directly from Regan (1980) 
who distinguishes between what he calls ‗marginal‘ and ‗contributory‘ effects – although see 
also Goldman 1999, Singer 1972a. It may be noted that there is some debate about whether 
this is an appropriate way of understanding appeals to collective responsibility – cf. Sartorio 
2004. 
103 
or harmful activities somewhere down the line. According to business 
scholars, partly because of the increasing amount of corporate mergers 
and acquisitions, both the size and the diversity of commercial compa-
nies has increased considerably since the middle of the last century.83 
Many large corporations now have a turnover that is greater than the 
GDP of numerous small states and, indeed, over half of the world‘s top 
100 ‗economies‘ are large commercial companies.84 The study of corpo-
rate diversification and the way in which many companies operate on 
multiple markets has become an increasingly popular topic in so-called 
strategic management or business strategy research85 and, although it is hard 
to find exact figures to describe the current state of diversification, it is 
easy to see that most of the companies quoted on the world‘s stock 
markets have large numbers of departments and/or subsidiaries in vari-
ous parts of the world – business units from which they make many 
billions of dollars in profit.86 
 Many SRI commentators actually seem to have appreciated the kind 
of complexity of the modern corporation outlined above, although they 
do not always say so explicitly, and agree that it seems unrealistic, if not 
downright naïve, to think that one can find a completely ―clean‖ limited 
company. According to Jason Zweig, for instance, ―[o]nce you start, it‘s 
hard to know where to stop. Look at Sara Lee Corp., which makes lots 
of things besides those yummy cakes, including Ball Park franks, Playtex 
bras and Kiwi shoe polish. So how come the [American Medical Associ-
ation] named Sara Lee one of its 13 toxic tobacco stocks? A small unit 
of Sara Lee, Douwe Egberts, sells loose tobacco for pipes and snuff, 
mainly in Europe. That business makes up less than 2% of Sara Lee‘s 
$17.7 billion revenues‖87. According to Charles Powers, in his own very 
early book on ‗socially responsible investment‘, the complexity of the 
modern corporation – coupled with the multitude of moral issues raised 
in relation to the corporate sector – creates a problem for churches that 
wish to construct a portfolio of only morally acceptable companies: 
[A]s long as a church is concerned only about [the South Africa issue], it 
could [perhaps] develop a ―clean‖ portfolio by selling and not purchas-
ing securities in [some 275] companies. [...] But add concern about ar-
 
83 Cf. Bettis and Pralahad 1983, Goldman and Van Houten 1977 
84 Cf. Steger 2003. See also Blair 1995. 
85 For an overview of some of this research, see Ramanujam and Varadarajan 1989. 
86 See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange 2007b and the webpages of the companies listed there. 
87 Zweig 1996, p. 64 
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mament production to the issues which disturb the church [...], and 
things become more difficult. Does one defence contract defile a com-
pany? If so, then the social investor‘s ―no-purchase list‖ gets very long 
indeed. [...] Now add the issues of (1) pollution, (2) fair employment 
practices, (3) wage standards in foreign countries, etc., etc., each of 
which involves problems similar to those already discussed, and the 
clean portfolio becomes an almost impossible ideal.88 
The considerations above may seem to suggest that the problems for 
the no-harm principle in the present context lie mainly with larger-sized 
companies. Perhaps, some may suggest, it is morally permissible to in-
vest in many smaller-sized, or single-market, companies according to 
this kind of reasoning.89 To the problem above, however, should be 
added what I call the interconnectedness of the economy, namely the fact that 
most companies collaborate in some manner or other with a range of 
other companies, which in turn collaborate with a further set of compa-
nies, and so on, and so forth. The point of noting this fact is that, just as 
there are financial connections between most companies in a given econ-
omy, I believe, there are also (other) causal connections between most of 
these companies. The study of these causal connections (often known as 
network research) has actually become an increasingly popular topic in 
strategic management research as well.90 What may the causal connec-
tions between commercial companies consist in more exactly? Well, in 
order to illuminate the present point, one may take a company which 
manufactures weapons as an example. 
 
88 Powers 1971, pp. 89-90. See also Brill and Reder 1993, Christian Ethical Investment Group 
1992, Hollenbach 1973, Lang 1996, Mackenzie 1997, Michelson et al. 2004, Schepers and Sethi 
2003, Schueth 2003, Schwartz 2003, Simon et al. 1972. 
89 Interestingly enough, the vast majority of so-called ethical funds try to ‗solve‘ the problem 
above by saying that it is okay to invest in companies with a less than so-and-so percentage of 
their return from morally unacceptable activities or investments (cf. Cowton 1998b, Michelson 
et al. 2004, Schepers and Sethi 2003, Schwartz 2003, Sparkes 2002). Some funds also employ a 
so-called ‗best in class‘ approach, picking out the ―least bad‖ companies of a given morally 
problematic industry (cf. Eurosif 2006, O‘Rourke 2003, Schepers and Sethi 2003, Sparkes 
2002, Taylor 2000). It seems very hard to see how such ‗solutions‘ could be justified from the 
point of view of the no-harm principle, however, or, for that matter, from the point of view of 
any principled argument for the avoidance strategy. As Schwartz writes: ―From an ethical 
perspective, [the percentage] approach is clearly problematic. If an individual behaves in a 
morally acceptable manner the vast majority of the time, but occasionally cheats on his or her 
customers or employees, how should such a person be evaluated? Should they be allowed to 
behave in an unethical manner twenty percent of the time? Ten percent of the time?‖ (2003, p. 
209). Now, I believe there is a way of justifying these practices of the ethical funds. From a 
pragmatic perspective, it should be noted, investing in the best of the morally unacceptable 
companies can perhaps serve as an encouragement for the others to do better. I will return to 
this point in the following chapter, section 2. 
90 Cf. Ahuja et al. 2007, Ford 1997, Ford et al. 2003 
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 In order for a weapons company to work properly, it needs the 
supply of a lot of other products and services – e.g., weapon parts, elec-
tronics, transportation, advertisement, catering, business travelling, etc., 
etc. Now, most companies do not take care of all of these things them-
selves, but they buy products and services from other companies.91 In 
order for a weapons company to work properly, then, it needs the ser-
vices of a whole range of other companies – different kinds of subcon-
tractors, electronics companies, transport companies, advertising com-
panies, catering companies, etc. etc. Following this line of thinking, it is 
easy to see how most of the companies in the (global) economy are cau-
sally related to each other in some manner or the other – if company X 
does not collaborate directly with the weapons industry, then it probably 
collaborates with some company Y that does. But, then, isn‘t company 
X actually helping the weapons industry in some manner? 
 The problem for the no-harm principle in the present context is that, 
given the complexity of the modern corporation and the fact that there 
are all kinds of different causal connections between the activities of 
most companies in the economy, it seems hard to find any company 
which is not either doing something immoral or harmful itself or help-
ing another with something similar.92 Obviously, it is almost impossible 
to say the exact degree to which, say, a certain clothing company contri-
butes to or sustains the harmful effects of the activities of, for example, 
the weapons industry (given of course that these indeed are harmful), 
but this degree need not be negligible.93 The problem is augmented con-
siderably, it should be noted, if one takes into account the kind of ‗parti-
cipatory‘ effects which some proponents of the no-harm principle 
would seem to appeal to. Perhaps the most straightforward conclusion 
to be drawn from the example with the weapons company above is that 
most business ventures are not isolated projects, but rather a kind of 
 
91 This is often referred to as the business (or industrial) market – cf. Ford 1997, Ford et al. 
2003. 
92 Other writers have noted this conclusion. According to Cowton, for instance, ―[o]wing to 
the interconnectedness of the corporate sector, it has been questioned whether purity is a 
feasible goal. Investors who embark on this route have been described as ‗hopelessly naive,‘ 
involving themselves in an endless series of illusions and arbitrary decisions. For such inves-
tors, it might be better not to invest at all [...]. In any case, a very long list of exclusions might 
leave a very restricted investment universe from which to select‖ (1998b, p. 182). See also 
Powers 1971, Schepers and Sethi 2003, Schwartz 2003, Simon et al. 1972. 
93 As an interesting case in point, in her recent book, The Travels of a T-Shirt in the Global 
Economy (2005), Pietra Rivoli follows a plain six-dollar t-shirt on its road from a Texas cotton 
field to a Chinese factory to a used clothing market in Africa, documenting its involvement in 
both unfair labour practices and the support of oppressive regimes. 
106 
collaborative activity. If it is morally problematic to be a part of a group 
which, taken together, acts wrongly or harmfully then the activities of 
almost all commercial companies could probably be said to be morally 
problematic in a number of ways. Although the actions of our clothing 
company may not have any direct effects on the activities of the weapons 
industry, it is presumably part of a network of companies which together 
makes the activities of the weapons industry possible. And so are most 
other kinds of companies. 
 The upshot of the considerations above, I have said, is that – just like 
with the tainted-profits principle – the no-harm principle would seem to 
lead in the direction of the austere conclusion. Now, with regards to the 
tainted-profits principle, I said in the previous section that this kind of 
implication is mitigated to a certain extent by certain considerations 
concerning when investors have moral reasons to avoid investing in 
morally unacceptable companies. Most importantly, the tainted-profits 
principle seems to make it morally permissible for investors to invest in 
all kinds of morally unacceptable companies as long as these are suffi-
ciently unprofitable. Since the issue of exactly what practical implica-
tions the no-harm principle has in terms of when investors have moral 
reasons to avoid investing in morally unacceptable companies is quite 
complicated, I cannot consider this issue fully in this section but will 
have to return to it in the next chapter. However, turning now to the 
second part of the issue of the practical implications of this principle, it 
may be noted that the no-harm principle in its current form is beset 
with another familiar kind of problem. Just like the tainted-profits prin-
ciple, I believe, it is not obvious whether this principle implies our fa-
miliar avoidance strategy – or at least not all parts of it. 
 Since a common way to profit from investments is to sell one‘s shares 
at a higher price than the purchase prise, I said in the previous section 
that a problem for the tainted-profits principle would seem to be the 
implication that it is equally (if not more) morally problematic to sell 
one‘s shares in morally unacceptable companies as it is to buy or hold 
them. Actually, I believe, the no-harm principle seems to have similar 
implications. As I have already noted in passing, most investors buy and 
sell shares in commercial companies on the stock market and, when it 
comes to these transactions, they buy and sell shares mainly from and to 
other investors – either individual or institutional. Now, if one assumes 
that investing in a certain morally unacceptable company indeed 
amounts to supporting it in the relevant sense here, i.e. contributing to 
or enabling some of its harmful activities, the following line of reasoning 
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would seem possible: If contributing to harm is wrong (at least ceteris 
paribus), and therefore buying shares in companies engaged in harmful 
activities is wrong, then, surely, contributing to another person’s contribution to 
harm would also be wrong. But, in selling one‘s shares in a morally unac-
ceptable company on the stock market one is doing exactly that – one is 
contributing to another investor‘s contribution to harmful activities. To 
put this point in another way, if investing in a morally unacceptable 
company is being part of the causal chain that leads to the harmful ef-
fects of that company‘s activities and, thus, to be causally responsible for 
harm, then surely selling one‘s shares to another is being part of the 
causal chain that leads that person’s being causally responsible for harm 
and so, once again, to be partly causally responsible for this harm one-
self. If it was not for your sale of the shares, after all, the other investor 
could not have bought the shares he or she bought and so would not 
have harmed anyone. Thus, according to the no-harm principle, selling 
shares in morally unacceptable companies would seem to be morally on 
a par with buying or holding such shares. 
 In connection with my discussion of the tainted-profits principle, I 
said that, when taking considerations like the one above into account, it 
is no longer obvious exactly what this principle recommends investors 
to do. Most importantly, the principle no longer seems to recommend 
the avoidance strategy in all situations – at least not when one already 
holds shares in morally unacceptable companies. Unfortunately, the 
reader now sees, the no-harm principle would seem to fare no better in 
this respect. For similar reasons, then, it is unclear whether the no-harm 
principle is a plausible justification of the avoidance strategy as this 
strategy is commonly understood within the SRI community. Perhaps, 
however, the no-harm principle could be revised in a fairly straightfor-
ward way in order to avoid these problems. I now turn to this issue. 
3.2 Revis in g the  no -harm p r in c ip l e  
According to the kind of no-harm principle considered above, I have 
said, investors have moral reasons not to be causally responsible for the 
(supposedly) harmful activities of morally unacceptable companies. 
More generally, I have allowed proponents of this principle to under-
stand causal responsibility in either of two ways – either one is causally 
responsible oneself for a certain harmful effect, or one is part of a group 
which is causally responsible for this harm. In light of the considerations 
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above, proponents of the no-harm principle may want to pass on this 
second possibility, as the appeal to ‗participatory‘ effects no longer 
seems favourable to their cause. It should be noted, however, that such 
a move does not take them very far – even though the interconnected-
ness of the economy becomes a bigger problem when participatory ef-
fects are taken into consideration, there is still a problem with individual 
effects – and the complexity of the modern corporation is still a prob-
lem. Furthermore, the second kind of problem discussed above does 
not depend on participatory effects at all. However, perhaps the no-
harm principle can be revised in some way to allow proponents of this 
principle to avoid both of these kinds of problems. I will consider two 
suggestions to this effect in the present section.  
 It may not be intuitively obvious exactly what part of my understand-
ing of the principle above should be considered the most problematic in 
this context. However, I wish to suggest that an important part of why 
the kinds of problems discussed above befall the no-harm principle is 
the fact that it is commonly not understood to make any restrictions in 
terms of how long and complicated the causal chains involved can be in order for 
a certain harmful consequence to affect the moral status of actions on 
the part of investors. With regards to the second of the problems above, 
I suggested that if it is morally problematic to contribute to a certain 
company‘s harmful activities, it should be equally problematic to contri-
bute to another investor‘s contribution to these activities. With regard to 
the first problem, furthermore, even though most (smaller-sized) com-
panies may not engage in harmful activities themselves, I said that most 
commercial companies probably have causal connections to other com-
panies which engage in harmful activities. Now, proponents of the no-
harm principle may wish to deny that the causal chain between the actor 
and the resulting harm can be of any length and complication – or, at 
least this is the kind of suggestions I will discuss in what follows. 
 A fairly straightforward way of revising the no-harm principle in the 
present regard, I believe, is to say that it is only being directly causally 
responsible for a certain harm which is morally criticised, i.e. being the one 
who actually harms others. Perhaps this is actually how proponents of the 
no-harm principle wanted us to understand their principle in the first 
place – it may be noted, for instance, that, according to Miller, the sa-
lient rule is ―First, Do No Harm‖94. According to Simon, Powers and 
 
94 Miller 1991, p. 29, emphasis added 
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Gunnemann, furthermore, very few considerations can ―wipe away the 
prima facie obligation to avoid harming others‖95. In some of the com-
mercial material from so-called ethical funds, it is not uncommon to 
justify the avoidance strategy with reference to the more restricted idea 
suggested by these formulations. Mackenzie writes: 
Some have suggested an even more direct relationship between the 
harm done by companies and the act of investing. One fund claimed 
that [―]Many investors are causing, albeit unwillingly, serious damage to 
our planet by investing in companies that are harming the environ-
ment.[‖] And Bishop Harries of Oxford, well known in ethical invest-
ment in the UK for his campaign to get the Church Commissioners to 
take ethical investment more seriously, has also argued this way. [―]If 
you have watched your mother die painfully of cancer and are totally 
opposed to smoking, [with the advent of ethical investment] it is now 
possible to invest your money in a way which does not kill other people 
in the same way.[‖]96 
The idea that investing in morally unacceptable companies harms or 
kills people in this very direct fashion, I believe it should be noted, is the 
most straightforward way of understanding the no-harm principle as a 
principled argument for the avoidance strategy. Before considering how 
the revision of the no-harm principle implicit in the accounts above 
works on the investment-evaluative level, I will briefly consider whether 
a similar idea on the business-evaluative level is a good solution to the 
question of what kind of companies investors have moral reasons to 
avoid investing in. An interesting distinction in this context, I believe, is 
Irvine‘s distinction between different kinds of ―evil‖ companies – those 
that are directly evil and those that are only indirectly evil: 
A directly evil company is a company which, in the very act of conducting 
its business, engages in wrongdoing. An indirectly evil company, on the 
other hand, is one which manufactures products that enable others to 
engage in wrongdoing. Thus, a company that uses slave labor to manu-
facture, say, pencils would count as directly evil, since in the very act of 
conducting its business it commits the moral wrong of treating people 
as slaves. On the other hand, a company whose main product is a poi-
son whose only known use is to cause people horrible lingering deaths 
would count as indirectly evil, since it manufactures a product that 
enables other people – namely, the company‘s customers – to do 
wrong.97 
 
95 Simon et al. 1972, p. 18, emphasis added 
96 Mackenzie 1997, p. 119 
97 Irvine 1987, p. 234 
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According to Irvine, it is possible for businesses to be either directly or 
indirectly evil, or both at the same time. Proponents of the avoidance 
strategy may choose what to consider morally relevant here – either they 
choose only to ban companies that are directly evil and allow invest-
ments into indirectly evil companies, or they choose to ban both types 
(– or, which seems incoherent, they choose only to ban companies that 
are indirectly evil and allow directly evil companies in their portfolios). 
What is the most reasonable choice for proponents of the avoidance 
strategy here? Well, it should be noted that the first revision of the no-
harm principle outlined above seems to give some direction on this is-
sue: According to this revision, investors only seem to have moral rea-
sons to avoid directly evil companies, i.e. companies whose own activities 
are harmful or unethical. After all, only these companies are those which 
harm others themselves. Now, the path most often chosen by so-called 
ethical funds, it may be noted, seems to be to avoid investments in both 
types of evil companies – companies which are perceived to be directly 
evil, like those which pollute the environment, are commonly avoided, 
but also companies which are perceived to be indirectly evil, like those 
selling tobacco or alcohol, are commonly avoided.98 But according to 
the revised no-harm principled above, this latter practice does not seem 
justified. For this reason, I believe, it is unclear whether this kind of re-
vision would be satisfactory to proponents of the SRI movement.  
 While the conclusion above, it should be noted, is no real counter-
argument to the first revision of the no-harm principle, I will now turn 
to the investment-evaluative level – where I believe the real problems 
for this account lie. Obviously, we must accept that there is a rhetorical 
point in formulating the no-harm principle, and the underlying relation-
ship between investors and different types of corporate harm, along the 
lines of the formulations which Mackenzie notes. The idea that it is 
morally problematic to directly harm or kill others is certainly intuitive. 
When ideas similar to the no-harm principle here are discussed in other 
contexts, furthermore, e.g., in bioethics, I believe it is most often a very 
direct form of harming and killing which is criticised.99 I think it should 
be equally obvious, however, that this kind of idea in fact is inapplicable 
in the case of investments. Surely, buying shares in a commercial com-
pany never causes harm as directly as, for example, doctors may harm 
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their patients – unless, of course, someone is deeply offended by my 
purchase of a certain share. Strictly speaking, it is obviously the under-
lying companies (or their managers or employees) that do the actual 
harming. What an investment might do is to make it easier for certain 
companies to engage in harmful activities, either through supplying 
them with fresh resources or through helping them in some other man-
ner. In their role as shareholders, furthermore, investors may perhaps 
take part in general discussions and decisions about the future of the 
corporation at its annual general meetings and, thus, about general is-
sues concerning the activities of companies. However, this hardly justi-
fies saying that investors themselves harm or kill people through their in-
vestments in those companies, or even that they participate in such ac-
tivities.100 If the idea is that only very direct ways of harming others are 
wrong, then, no investment is ever wrong. 
 What might a more plausible revision of the no-harm principle be in 
the present context? Well, if there are no restrictions on what effects 
should be counted as relevant for this principle, I have said, we get the 
austere conclusion and problems with selling investments further, but if 
the restriction is as tough as the one above, the avoidance strategy no 
longer would seem to follow. Judging from these considerations, the 
ideal for proponents of the avoidance strategy would seem to be an un-
derstanding with a somewhat larger scope than the previous one, but still 
with a much more restricted scope than my original understanding. 
Now, perhaps such a position is possible. Proponents of the no-harm 
principle could argue, for example, that if it at least is a fairly direct conse-
quence of an investor‘s act of investing, or holding investments, in a 
certain company that (more) harmful activities are performed by that 
company, this should count as violating the no-harm principle. Armed 
with some idea of this sort, they could say such things as, for instance, 
that while buying shares in morally unacceptable companies causes harm 
fairly directly, selling such shares and thus enabling others to do the 
same – while causing harm – does not cause harm sufficiently directly. 
Furthermore, selling cigarettes to smokers is a fairly direct way of caus-
ing harm, but simply transporting a cigarette company‘s goods to a 
warehouse is not sufficiently direct.  
 Whether a plausible conception of ‗fairly directly‗ could be spelled out 
in non-circular terms – that is, without reference to these intuitions 
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about what the no-harm principle reasonably should imply – may seem 
unclear, but perhaps this is not impossible. As a second revision of the 
no-harm principle I will consider the following suggestion: According to 
Earl Spurgin, a way of giving references to harm in the investment con-
text a more robust philosophical foundation is to appeal to the principle 
that ―if there is an ethical problem with undertaking an action on one‘s 
own behalf, there is an ethical problem with hiring an agent to do it in 
one‘s stead‖.101 On what he calls ―the direct model of shareholders‖, 
this principle would seem to imply something akin to the avoidance 
strategy. Spurgin writes: 
This [principle] speaks directly to what actions principals can expect 
from their agents, and applies to the relationships between shareholders 
and business managers. Just as clients cannot expect attorneys to act in 
the clients‘ interests by performing acts that would be immoral for the 
clients to perform, shareholders cannot expect business managers to 
increase the wealth of shareholders through actions that would be in 
violation of shareholders‘ own obligations. Imagine a client who is in 
serious legal jeopardy because of the potential testimony from a witness 
and expects his attorney to kill the witness. Obviously, it is morally 
wrong for the client to expect the attorney to take an action that would 
be morally wrong for the client to take. When the direct model applies, 
there is no reason to see shareholders and business managers any diffe-
rently. [...] When the direct model applies, then, shareholders can rarely 
escape responsibility for the effects of corporate activities.102 
While it is not clear exactly how Spurgin‘s suggestion here should be 
understood on the business-evaluative level,103 the applicability of this 
kind of reasoning in the context of investing may seem straightforward 
enough. But, can this second revision of the no-harm principle really 
justify the avoidance strategy? Obviously, the plausibility of Spurgin‘s 
suggestion depends on the plausibility of the ―direct model‖ referred to 
in the passage above. This is described as follows: 
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Business ethicists and economists often employ the direct model of 
shareholders. According to this model, shareholders research the activi-
ties of corporations and industries, purchase corporate securities based 
on the results of their research, attend shareholder meetings, determine 
the directions of corporations through their voting decisions, and reap 
the rewards or suffer the losses that result from those decisions. Busi-
ness managers, in turn, use their expertise to carry out the wishes of 
shareholders as directed by voting decisions and are compensated ac-
cording to their successes or failures.104 
Now, the salient part of this ―direct model of shareholders‖ for the 
present purposes of proponents of the avoidance strategy, I believe, is 
the part about investors attending shareholder meetings and voting on 
decisions – that is, the fact (already noted) that investors, in their role as 
shareholders, may take part in (or have a vote in) decisions about gen-
eral issues concerning the activities of companies at these companies‘ 
annual shareholder meetings. Certainly, if the decisions of companies to 
engage in a certain activity could always be traced back to some decision 
at a shareholder meeting and, thus, be traced back to shareholders, per-
haps proponents of the no-harm principle could have a plausible case 
against being a shareholder in morally unacceptable companies (and, 
thus, for the avoidance strategy). A fairly straightforward way in which 
companies could be said to be ‗hired‘ by investors to do something in 
their stead, of course, would be if investors somehow were involved in 
setting the agenda of the companies they hold shares in. But is the direct 
model an accurate model of the relationship between modern investors 
and limited companies? 
 Unfortunately, not even Spurgin himself thinks that the direct model 
is a very good description of the modern investment relationship. If this 
is correct, also the second attempt to revise the no-harm principle – or, 
at least one version of this attempt – fails to justify the avoidance strat-
egy. Exactly how investors can influence the activities of limited com-
panies is a complicated matter which I cannot settle in full at the present 
juncture, but perhaps some hints about things to come are in order here. 
I believe it should be noted, first of all, that the direct model would 
seem to assume that all investors in fact attend the annual general 
meetings of the companies they hold shares in and take part in discus-
sions and decisions at these meetings. However, experience seems to 
contradict this assumption – according to a recent estimate from the 
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UK, only one in a thousand shareholders actually attends the general 
meeting of ―his‖ or ―her‖ company.105 Furthermore, most of the atten-
dants are institutional investors or their representatives – that is, very 
few individual investors tend to attend the annual general meetings of 
the companies they hold shares in.106 It may also be noted, as Spurgin 
himself points out, that most individual investors invest only indirectly 
in company shares, i.e., they invest in unit trusts or other kinds of funds, 
and for this reason they are normally not even allowed to attend share-
holder meetings.107 
 The considerations above already seem to suggest that the direct 
model is mistaken, but perhaps they can be remedied – according to 
many writers, as will be shown in chapter V, shareholders have a moral 
obligation to attend annual general meetings. Failing to make the most of 
one‘s rights and privileges as shareholder may of course be considered 
morally problematic in some manner (a point which I will return to both 
in chapter V and in the next section here). The real question in the 
present context, however, is what influence individual investors would 
have even if they actually attended these meetings. According to Spur-
gin, most individual investors who invest in companies on the stock 
market hold far too few shares in these companies, and thus have far 
too little voting power, to be able to control what companies do and do 
not do.108 Although the responsibility for the general direction of a 
corporation could be said to rest with the shareholders jointly, then, it is 
hard to see how an individual investor can be held accountable for the 
harm which certain companies inflict. According to Spurgin, only the 
largest institutional shareholders could actually be held responsible in 
this way – ―[o]nly majority shareholders have any real control over cor-
porate activities by voting at shareholder meetings. The direct model, 
however, describes shareholders as directing the activities of corpora-
tions. This description, then, applies only to those few who are majority 
shareholders‖109.  
 I will discuss what influence individual investors can have at share-
holder meetings more extensively in chapter VI. It should perhaps be 
said already at this stage, however, that I believe Spurgin‘s conclusion 
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above to be basically correct. Perhaps individual investors can speak up 
at annual general meetings and try to influence managers that way, or 
perhaps they can try to persuade other investors to support a certain 
social resolution they have proposed. It should be noted, however, that 
this kind of reasoning is pragmatic in nature – the no-harm principle, I 
have said, has no problem with allowing harmful activities, it is only doing 
harm that is criticised. Unfortunately, then, also the second revision of 
the no-harm principle would seem to fail. Even De George, it should be 
noted, seems to agree with this conclusion. As already noted, De 
George is sceptical about the possibilities of individual investors to in-
fluence corporate behaviour through shareholder activism. As far as I 
can tell, however, De George actually admits that there are similar 
problems when it comes to the avoidance strategy: 
Managers, strictly speaking, work for the shareholders, who are the 
owners of the corporation. The managers act as agents for the share-
holders. Yet, any individual shareholder has in fact little, if any, control 
over the managers. [...] Hence, it seems farfetched to hold individual 
shareholders responsible for what the managers do on the basis of the 
claim that the owners are ultimately responsible for what the corpora-
tion does. [...] Shareholders cannot be held morally responsible for what 
the firm does since the shareholder is in fact very distant from the causal 
relation between an action of the corporation and its effects [...].110 
I have emphasised the words ―very distant‖ in the last sentence of the 
passage above since I believe De George‘s suggestion here is especially 
interesting in the present context. According to De George, it would 
seem, part of the reason for why individual investors cannot be held 
morally responsible for what a corporation does is the fact that the 
causal chain between their actions and the actions of the corporation 
normally is quite long and complicated – shareholders are, he says, ―very 
distant from the causal relation between an action of the corporation 
and its effects‖. Now, this is exactly why the version of the no-harm 
principle currently under discussion would seem to fail – according to 
this revision, I have said, the causal chain cannot be too long. 
 While I have only considered Spurgin‘s own version of the revised 
argument for the avoidance strategy here, it should be noted that there 
may be other ways of spelling out the second revision of the no-harm 
principle. One way of avoiding the problems above, of course, would be 
to appeal to participatory effects again. Even if individual shareholders 
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have no control over the activities of limited companies themselves, I have 
admitted that they may have such control together. Another way of un-
derstanding the idea that investors commission (or ‗hire‘) the activities 
of companies could perhaps be to talk about the effects of investments as 
such, rather than those of decisions at annual general meetings – i.e. to 
talk about financial effects. Even if shareholders are not involved in set-
ting the actual agenda of companies, it may be argued that buying shares 
in morally unacceptable companies fairly directly provides these compa-
nies with fresh resources, resources which they then can do whatever they 
like with. This would actually not seem to be an uncommon way of jus-
tifying the avoidance strategy among proponents of the SRI movement 
– according to Domini and Kinder, for instance, ―[b]y avoiding invest-
ments in ‗bad‘ companies, you‘re saying, ‗Not with my money, you 
don‘t.‘‖111. As the issue of exactly what financial effects a certain invest-
ment has and whether these are sufficiently direct as to salvage the 
second revision of the no-harm principle here is rather complicated, 
however, I will not consider it until in the following chapter.  
 For all I have said so far, then, there is little that proponents of the 
no-harm principle can do – if they want to maintain the connection 
between this principle and the avoidance strategy – in order to avoid the 
austere conclusion and the problems related to selling shares in morally 
unacceptable companies to other investors. In the next chapter, I will 
argue that not even very indirect causal chains exist between investors 
and companies, at least not on the individual level, and thus that no ver-
sion of the no-harm principle can justify the avoidance strategy if ‗parti-
cipatory‘ effects are not appealed to. Appeals to these kinds of effects, 
however, come with other kinds of problems. But I will leave this kind 
of discussion for now. 
4.  SUPP ORT AND APP ROVAL  
In the previous section, I discussed the idea that investors have moral 
reasons not to support morally unacceptable companies in the sense of 
not being causally responsible for their wrongful or harmful activities. I said 
that there are a number of problems concerning how the practical im-
plications of this idea should be spelled out more exactly, and in part 
this was due to the fact that the no-harm principle could be given dif-
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ferent interpretations – all in all, I discussed three versions of this kind 
of idea. As already noted, however, the idea that investing in morally 
unacceptable companies amounts to supporting these companies may be 
given an altogether different interpretation and, given the problems with 
the no-harm principle above, perhaps proponents of the ‗support‘ idea 
no longer would want to understand this causally. In this section, I will 
discuss a third and final kind of principled argument for the avoidance 
strategy – an argument related to what I have been calling symbolic sup-
port, or the idea that investing in morally unacceptable companies 
amounts to approving of them in some sense. Once again, perhaps it is 
actually more correct to talk of a group of ideas rather than a single idea 
here – the general idea just referred to, I believe, can be (and indeed has 
been) formulated in a large number of ways and I can only discuss the 
most important of these in the present section. 
 I have already noted one passage where I think the present kind of 
idea can be discerned – according to Cowton, ―[t]o many observers, pas-
sively holding a stock and making a return from it indicates some support 
for a particular activity‖112. But, perhaps the view of Simon, Powers and 
Gunnemann should actually be interpreted along the lines of symbolic 
rather than causal support as well. As I noted above, in defending the 
avoidance strategy they refer to the fact that shareholders are generally 
considered owners of limited companies and, because of this fact, they 
suggest that even individual investors could be said to be ―involved‖ 
with or ―participate‖ in the harmful activities of morally unacceptable 
companies. In the previous section, I understood this suggestion along 
the lines of so-called participatory effects, but perhaps this is not ade-
quate. In one passage, Simon et al. seem to connect both their idea of 
participation and their concept of ownership to the argument from ap-
proval: 
The ownership concept [...] is not in favor among many modern legal 
commentators, who find that corporate law does not accord much 
respect to the ownership status of shareholders and who urge that we 
understand the relations between shareholder and company in terms of 
function rather than title. A functional analysis of the participation 
question, however, leads to the very same conclusion. [...] In the first 
place, an institutional shareholder who votes routinely for management 
and who otherwise fails to complain about corporate practices lends a 
measure of apparent acceptance and approval to existing corporate policies, 
thus reinforcing the management‘s predisposition to pursue these poli-
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cies. In other words, until a shareholder ends his acquiescence in corporate 
violations of law or public policy, he encourages their continuation.113 
I will consider how the passage above should be understood more ex-
actly in section 4.1 below. It may be noted already at this stage, however, 
that Simon et al.‗s reference to acceptance or approval here actually may 
salvage some of the ideas discussed at the end of the previous section. 
Even if individual shareholders do not always attend the annual general 
meetings of the companies they invest in, and even if they wouldn‘t 
have much influence over corporate activities if they were to do so, in-
vesting in morally unacceptable companies could perhaps be said to ex-
press a symbolic support of, or an acquiescence to, the activities of these 
companies. After all, as owners of limited companies, investors must 
reasonably have some influence over corporate activities – but those who 
passively invest in morally unacceptable companies and simply reap the 
benefits from this would seem to ignore this possibility completely. 
Furthermore, I said above that, on one interpretation of the kind of 
thinking involved in the tainted-profits principle, what was morally 
problematic about profiting from morally unacceptable business prac-
tices in the first place may not have been actually reaping the benefits 
but wanting to profit from such immoral practices or, more generally, 
thinking that it is okay to do so. 
 The most explicit exposition of the idea that investing in morally un-
acceptable companies amounts to approving of them, I believe, is given 
by Robert Larmer, in his paper ―The Ethics of Investing: A Reply to 
William Irvine‖114. According to Larmer, there are many problems with 
the way in which Irvine understands the (different) principled argu-
ment(s) for the avoidance strategy. First of all, Larmer argues, it is not 
possible to distinguish between ―directly evil‖ and ―indirectly evil‖ com-
panies in the way Irvine does. The problem here lies mainly in the 
characterisation of indirectly evil companies, which are characterised as 
companies which ―manufacture[...] products that enable others to en-
gage in wrongdoing‖115. According to Larmer, it seems hard to think of 
any product that people may not misuse for mischievous or malicious 
purposes.116 So, is it always wrong for investors to invest in any com-
pany, then, on principled arguments for the avoidance strategy? Well, 
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Larmer doesn‘t consider this possibility but seems to think it is absurd. 
Perhaps Irvine might say that a reasonable understanding of ―indirectly 
evil‖ companies is that these are companies which manufacture pro-
ducts whose primary use is immoral. Larmer continues, however: 
This [...] highlights a second difficulty. A company which manufactures 
a product must be taken as approving and encouraging the use of that pro-
duct. If the sole or primary use of a product is immoral the company 
must, on the supposition that it will be aware of the chief use of its 
products, be taken as approving and encouraging that use. This qualifies 
the company as directly rather than indirectly evil, since to approve or en-
courage an immoral action is itself an immoral action and hence a direct evil.117 
Larmer concludes that the distinction between indirectly and directly 
evil companies collapses. Now, the same kind of reasoning invoked in 
connection with this distinction, Larmer uses in criticising the kind of 
argument against the no-harm principle outlined in the previous section. 
He writes: 
What is wrong in investing in an evil company is not that one is neces-
sarily providing the resources whereby it can engage in wrongdoing, but 
that even in the absence of providing such resources, one implicitly con-
dones its immoral behaviour. Irvine is correct in his claim that knowingly 
providing the resources by which a company will engage in wrongdoing 
is immoral, but he fails to realize that even in the absence of helping it 
to occur or profiting from it, simply approving of an immoral action is 
immoral. For this and other reasons I have mentioned, the Evil-Com-
pany Principle must be seen as more basic and fundamental than the 
[no-harm principle].118 
Although Larmer here refers back to Irvine‘s evil-company principle, 
which I said earlier is a too rigid and general one (– although a good 
characterisation of the general point of principled arguments for the 
avoidance strategy), I think the more specific kind of reasoning Larmer 
defends is very interesting. Perhaps the principled case for the avoidance 
strategy is most fruitfully understood exactly in terms of approval. This 
understanding, it may be noted, connects nicely to the terminology of 
moral disapproval discussed in the previous chapter. According to some 
understandings of the appeal to consistency, I said there, investing in a 
distillery, for instance, would seem to indicate that one thinks it is mor-
ally permissible to support the sale of alcohol, and this is why an ardent 
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teetotaller investing in distilleries should be seen as inconsistent in some 
manner. In what follows, however, I will discuss how the kind of argu-
ment outlined above should be understood more exactly.  
 Since I have already discussed the issue of what companies different 
principled arguments give investors moral reasons to avoid investing in 
at length in previous sections, I will focus mainly on the investment-
evaluative level here.119 My main line of argument in the subsections 
below will be that, even though the approval argument (as we may call it) 
fairly intuitively may be understood as an alternative to the no-harm 
principle discussed above, i.e. as understanding ‗support‘ symbolically 
rather than causally, it is often actually more plausible to understand it as 
an argument about a certain kind of effects. More specifically, I will dis-
cuss three suggestions about what the salient point of the approval argu-
ment consists in more exactly. In section 4.1, I will discuss two sugges-
tions which I believe fairly easily can be understood as appeals to indi-
rect effects, or even pragmatic considerations. In section 4.2., I will dis-
cuss a suggestion which does not deal with effects in the most straight-
forward sense, but I will argue that it is an open question exactly what 
this suggestion entails. To a large extent, I will suggest, this depends on 
how other arguments for and against the avoidance strategy fare. 
4.1 Causa l  in t e rpr e ta t ions  o f  approva l  
According to the kind of idea currently under discussion, I have said, 
investors have moral reasons to avoid investing in morally unacceptable 
companies because (or to the extent that) investing in such companies ex-
presses an approval of their activities. But how should this idea be spelled 
out more exactly? A first point of ambiguity is how to understand the 
idea that investing in a certain company expresses a certain attitude on the 
part of investors, towards this company or towards its activities. Judging 
from the accounts of this idea above, I believe at least two interpreta-
tions are possible in the present context: According to one idea, the 
kind of approval involved is the actual approval of the relevant investors.  
Larmer suggests, for instance, that ―[w]hat is wrong in investing in an 
evil company is not that one is necessarily providing the resources whe-
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reby it can engage in wrongdoing, but that even in the absence of pro-
viding such resources, one implicitly condones its immoral behaviour‖120. 
According to this idea, then, everyone who invests in morally unaccept-
able companies would actually seem to have some kind of positive atti-
tude towards these companies‘ activities – or, at least, they do not have a 
sufficiently negative attitude as to avoid such investments altogether. On 
another interpretation of the approval argument, however, the relevant 
point is not whether investors actually approve of the activities of mor-
ally unacceptable companies. According to this idea, investments in such 
companies expresses an approval of their activities, or – perhaps better – 
communicates such an approval to others, quite irrespectively of what 
actual attitudes the relevant investors have. According to Simon, Powers 
and Gunnemann, as previously noted, ―an institutional shareholder who 
votes routinely for management and who otherwise fails to complain 
about corporate practices lends a measure of apparent acceptance and 
approval to existing corporate policies‖121. Furthermore, according to 
Cowton, ―[t]o many observers, passively holding a stock and making a 
return from it indicates some support for a particular activity‖122.  
 What version of the approval argument is the most fruitful in the 
present context? Well, judging simply from the brief characterisations 
above, some may suggest that the latter version must be the most fruit-
ful. After all, the supposition that all those who invest in morally unac-
ceptable companies actually approve of these companies‘ activities could 
easily be disputed by some investors – ―When I invest in the companies 
you speak of‖, some investor may say, ―this is not because I particularly 
like what they do. Most of the time, I don‘t. I simply invest for an alto-
gether different set of reasons.‖ I will return to consider to what extent 
this kind of response is plausible, and what one more generally should 
think of references to investors‘ actual attitudes, in the following sub-
section. Before turning to these issues, I will suggest that there seems to 
be a fairly straightforward way of understanding the latter of the two 
versions above so that it deals with a kind of effects. Even though the 
approval argument intuitively is easily framed as an alternative to the no-
harm principle, then, understanding ‗support‘ symbolically rather than 
causally, perhaps this difference should not be exaggerated. 
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 According to the second version of the approval argument, I said, 
investing in morally unacceptable companies expresses an approval of 
their activities, or communicates such an approval to others, quite irres-
pectively of what actual attitudes the relevant investors have. Now, one 
might wonder how one knows that this actually is so – that is, how is 
one to determine what a certain action communicates? Obviously, pro-
ponents of the approval argument cannot appeal to the intentions of the 
agents who perform the actions themselves here if they want to avoid 
the kind of challenge outlined above. The most plausible story in this 
context, I believe, is that what a certain action communicates to a great 
extent is determined by what the recipients of the communication, i.e. 
those who experience or are affected by a certain communicative action, 
take the action to signify. Even though this may not be so direct – it seems 
possible to say that some recipients, at least under certain circumstances, 
may misunderstand what a certain action signifies (and so the action‘s 
meaning is not fixed by what the recipients take it to signify there and 
then, but rather by what could be called social convention) – an action 
cannot have a fixed (conventional) meaning if it is not at least normally 
understood to have this meaning by those who come into contact with 
it.123 Now, a first worry one now might have with regard to the idea 
above is whether its central tenet indeed is correct – that is, is it really so 
common for non-SRI people to understand investments as expressions of 
approval of the underlying companies? More generally, one may wonder 
what could be morally problematic with performing an action that other 
people take to signify an approval of something immoral or harmful. 
 I suggest that the kind of reasoning involved here, at least to some 
degree, actually is quite close to the kind of thinking discussed in rela-
tion to the no-harm principle above – that is, that investing in morally 
unacceptable companies could lead to more bad things happening. The sa-
lient point of this version of the approval argument, namely, would 
seem to be that communicating an approval of a morally unacceptable 
activity may encourage companies to continue with this kind of activity, or discou-
rage others from stopping it. In the passage already quoted repeatedly, it 
should be noted, Simon, Powers and Gunnemann suggest something 
very close to the first part of this line of reasoning – ―an institutional 
shareholder who votes routinely for management‖, they say, ―lends a 
measure of apparent acceptance and approval to existing corporate poli-
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cies, thus reinforcing the management‘s predisposition to pursue these 
policies. In other words, until a shareholder ends his acquiescence in 
corporate violations of law or public policy, he encourages their continua-
tion‖124. But perhaps the kind of causal chain implicitly referred to in 
this passage is not the only one possible in the present context. In con-
nection with this, another way of understanding Simon et al.‘s refer-
ences to the fact that shareholders generally are considered owners of 
limited companies could be noted. According to Simon et al., as we 
have seen, investors could be said to participate in the wrongdoings of 
companies in part exactly because they are considered owners in this 
way. But how should this connection be spelled out more exactly? Well, 
perhaps the idea is simply that because most people generally regard the 
shareholders of a certain limited company as the owners of that com-
pany, investing in a morally unacceptable company conveys the message 
to the general public that what the underlying company does is basically 
okay. As Cowton says, ―[t]o many observers, passively holding a stock and 
making a return from it indicates some support for a particular activ-
ity‖125. To put this point in other terms: Investing in a morally unac-
ceptable company could perhaps not only encourage its management to 
continue with what it is doing, but it could also encourage other investors to 
invest in this company (thus, of course, furthering more encouragement 
for the management), or perhaps discourage them from avoiding in-
vesting in the company for moral reasons. 
 The kind of effects referred to by both lines of reasoning above, it 
should be noted, are indirect, and mainly social, effects that investing in 
morally unacceptable companies could have.126 I will discuss such ef-
fects more thoroughly in the following chapter. Before leaving the issue 
of (indirectly) causal interpretations of the approval argument, I believe 
another interpretation should also be noted – an interpretation which 
 
124 Simon et al. 1972, p. 151, emphasis added 
125 Cowton 1998b, p. 187, emphasis added 
126 Perhaps a third interpretation of the causal chain and the indirect effects involved here is 
possible. According to some writers, the problem with investing in morally unacceptable 
companies is not that one necessarily approves of their activities at the present moment. However, 
holding the shares of a company and making a profit from them may lead to a change of 
attitudes and motivations – that is, it may lead to one‘s starting to approve of the companies‘ 
activities (cf. Brill et al. 1999, Irvine 2002, Lang 1996, Simon et al. 1972). Once again, one may 
ask what could be wrong with this. The most straightforward answer, I believe, is that ap-
proving of a certain activity may lead to one‘s performing actions which are beneficial to this 
activity and to one‘s refraining from performing actions which counteract it (cf. Irvine 2002). 
Thus, one may in effect encourage oneself to do more bad things. I will not comment further on 
this idea here. 
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actually seems to go all the way towards being a kind of pragmatic line of 
reasoning. What really is wrong in the present context according to 
Simon, Powers and Gunnemann, as we have seen, is ―vot[ing] routinely 
for management‖ or ―otherwise fail[ing] to complain about corporate 
practices‖. At least, this is the kind of behaviour which they suggest 
communicates an approval of the activities of the company in question. 
But, perhaps the idea simply is, then, that investors have moral reasons 
to do something more. In order for it to be morally permissible to invest in 
morally unacceptable companies, investors need to complain about the 
activities of these companies and, in essence, (try to) reform them. 
 A similar line of reasoning, I believe, can actually be found in Kolers‘ 
paper. According to Kolers, the austere conclusion stands as long as 
investors only have two choices – either (1) investing quietly in a certain 
company, or (2) not investing at all. When these are the only alterna-
tives, Kolers argues, investors should choose (2) and thus refrain from 
investing period. At one place, Kolers actually refers to the kind of rea-
soning put forward in Larmer‗s paper127 to rationalise this claim:  
One objection [to the claim that bank deposits pass on moral contami-
nation] is that each depositor‘s proportionate contribution to any loan 
of the sort that enables [morally unacceptable companies] to do wrong 
is miniscule, and so not blameworthy. One reply to this is that bank de-
positors implicitly condone the lending and investing behaviour of their 
bank [...]. And condoning immorality is immoral. Alternatively, we may 
focus on participation; to invest in an unethical enterprise is to participate 
in an unethical enterprise.128 
In the end, however, Kolers suggests that there actually is a way for in-
vestors to avoid (the full extent of) the austere conclusion. This is be-
cause there normally is another alternative open for investors besides 
the ones mentioned above: (3) one can become an activist investor and 
try to reform the (at least by implicature) morally unacceptable compa-
nies one invests in. Kolers writes: 
Shareholders are empowered to propose initiatives and vote ―proxies‖ 
at stockholder‘s meetings. This right did not always exist (and has 
periodically been jeopardized by corporate lobbying of regulators). 
Whenever and wherever it does not exist, the austere conclusion stands. 
For where the only choice is whether to add money to a pool, then we 
must avoid the cesspools. But as it is, shareholders frequently propose 
initiatives. Many of these measures are aimed not at maximizing returns, 
 
127 Larmer 1997 
128 Kolers 2001, p. 440, first emphasis added 
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but at ethical conduct of various sorts, from mandating equal opportu-
nity/affirmative action programs to avoiding environmental degrada-
tion.129 
As the reader might note, we are now back to the issue of the avoidance 
strategy versus the activist strategy. According to Kolers, it would seem, 
the only thing which can mitigate some of the bleak prospects of the 
austere conclusion is shareholder activism – that is, the only way to invest 
in a morally justifiable manner is to invest according to the activist strategy. 
I take it as a positive feature of Kolers‘ position here that he is able to 
explain rather directly why proponents of the avoidance strategy some-
times should give moral room for the activist strategy – if it is possible 
to change a certain company‘s evil ways by investing in it, the standard 
case for avoidance is not simply outweighed, on Kolers‘ account, but it 
disappears. Now, why is this so? Kolers explains his position by way of an 
analogy: 
It is instructive to consider resignation in protest from government of-
fice as analogous to divestment. Consider government officials who re-
sign after the first sign of shady dealings. We may consider such persons 
heroic, and say the same of those who embrace the austere conclusion. 
But we may also accuse these government officials of wasting valuable 
moral opportunities. Instead of resigning, a well-placed official can take 
proactive measures, and thereby contribute importantly to reform. After 
resigning, however, the ex-civil servant is useless to this effort. [...] 
Similarly, divestment is appropriate after multiple efforts have failed to 
reform an immoral company. But divestment is not a reasonable start-
ing point. Especially when consumers are ill-organized or apathetic, in-
vesting may be a necessary condition for having any positive effect on a 
company‘s policy. In such a case, aloofness helps no one.130 
I will return to this argument in the following subsection, and so some 
of the details of Kolers‘ account may be disregarded here. The point I 
wish to make in connection with the second version of the approval 
argument is simply that the following line of reasoning would seem to 
be Kolers‘ more general argument: The reason (or, at least, part of the 
reason) for why quietly investing in morally unacceptable companies 
expresses an approval of these companies‘ activities is that investors 
could have done so much more – they could have complained about the 
companies‘ activities and tried to reform them. It is this inaction which 
amounts to expressing an approval of immoral business practices. (As 
 
129 Ibid., p. 447 
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Martin Luther King is quoted as having said: ―The ultimate tragedy is 
not the oppression and cruelty by the bad people, but the silence over 
that by the good people.‖) But, how should this kind of argument be 
understood more exactly? Well, at least according to Kolers, the salient 
point of the argument is that investors – just like government officials – 
have moral reasons to ―take proactive measures, and thereby contribute 
importantly to reform‖, at least in the cases where this is realistic. 
 My interpretation of the kind of thinking invoked by Kolers above is 
that it actually is pragmatic in a fairly straightforward sense. According 
to pragmatic arguments for the avoidance strategy, I have said, investors 
have moral reasons to avoid investing in morally unacceptable compa-
nies because they have moral reasons to promote the good. Now, according 
to the present interpretation of the approval argument, what is wrong 
with investing in morally unacceptable companies is basically that not 
enough good is done. Simply investing quietly in these kinds of companies, 
when one could have tried to reform them instead, is wrong, then, be-
cause one does not do everything that morality requires of us as moral 
agents. I will consider the issue of what influence individual investors 
can have on public limited companies in chapter VI. In chapter VII, 
furthermore, I will tackle the issue of how much morality really requires 
of us as moral agents. If the approval argument is to work as a principled 
argument for the avoidance strategy, of course, the interpretation above 
does not fit very well. I will now turn to what I think is a more direct 
interpretation of (the intentions of proponents of) the approval argu-
ment in this regard. 
4.2 Vir tue  e th i c s  and appr opr ia t e  a t t i tudes  
According to one interpretation of the kind of argument currently under 
consideration, I have said, the salient point is that investing in morally 
unacceptable companies communicates some sort of approval of these 
companies‘ activities to others, and this is morally problematic mainly 
because of its effects. Although this sort of idea may qualify as a kind of 
principled argument in favour of the avoidance strategy, similar to the 
no-harm principle in many regards, I believe it should be noted that it 
rests on a somewhat unsteady foundation. Perhaps it is actually true that 
most investments in morally unacceptable companies have this kind of 
effect – but this is a contingent empirical matter. The ideal for those 
who wish to make the avoidance strategy a matter of principle, I believe, 
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would be if approving of morally unacceptable activities, or expressing 
such an approval, were somehow morally problematic in itself – that is, 
not because of some possible effects. In this section, I will discuss an 
interpretation of the approval argument which would seem to lead in 
this direction, inspired by another part of the non-consequentialist tra-
dition in moral philosophy. 
 The idea that it is morally problematic in itself to approve of certain 
immoral activities, I believe, is fairly intuitive. According to how most of 
us talk and think about moral matters, the scope of things which can be 
right and wrong, or more generally subjected to moral scrutiny, I be-
lieve, does not only include actions but also attitudes and intentions. So, for 
instance, not being sufficiently charitable may be wrong, not simply be-
cause it under most circumstances is wrong not to give money away to 
those who need it better, but because the underlying attitude is inconsis-
tent with the kind of attitudes which we believe morality requires. This 
kind of thinking has taken a more theoretical form primarily in the tra-
dition of virtue ethics.131 According to many proponents of virtue ethics, 
morality is actually first and foremost something which requires of us to 
be a certain kind of persons, namely virtuous persons, and it is only by 
implicature that morality requires of us to perform certain actions and 
abstain from others.132 I cannot discuss the general merits and demerits 
of virtue ethics at any considerable length in the present context. Armed 
with only this brief outline of this general kind of thinking, however, I 
will now try to interpret the approval argument in a way which does not 
appeal to pragmatism or indirect effects. 
 Exactly how the virtue component of the approval argument is 
spelled out most fruitfully is perhaps not clear. In order for the argu-
ment to work as an argument for the avoidance strategy, it should be 
noted, surely there needs to be some sort of connection to morally ap-
propriate actions, and not just appropriate attitudes. The understanding I 
suggest is the following: When an investor is confronted with the mor-
ally unacceptable nature of the activities of a certain commercial com-
pany, there is something morally inappropriate about her not (morally) 
disapproving of this company, and then also not acting on this disapproval. For 
instance, when an investor learns that a company she has invested in (or 
 
131 The virtue ethics tradition stems from philosophers such as Aristotle and David Hume. For 
some recent discussions of virtue ethics, see Crisp and Slote 1997, Hursthouse 1999, Slote 
1995. 
132 Cf. Crisp and Slote 1997 
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can invest in) has a practice of discriminating against women, it seems 
inappropriate for her not to feel at least somewhat dismayed by the activ-
ities of this company and to react with an action appropriate to dismay – 
that is, to sell her shares (or refrain from investing). On this account, 
virtue requires two things of investors: first of all, that they should (mor-
ally) disapprove of morally unacceptable companies, and, second of all, 
that they should perform an action which is appropriate to such an at-
titude, i.e. to employ an avoidance strategy towards these companies. 
Although the application of this kind of thinking to the present context 
may be my own idea, I believe this take on what virtue requires of moral 
agents should be in line with how most modern virtue ethicists reason 
concerning such things.133 It may be noted, furthermore, that this ac-
count could be seen as an elaboration of the appeal to conscientiousness 
discussed in the previous chapter, and thus should not be too far away 
from how many SRI proponents reason. Even though it is not neces-
sarily wrong to invest in companies one morally disapproves of oneself, 
there are simply certain companies that one should disapprove of, and 
therefore also refrain from investing in.134 Not doing so is either to fail 
to have the appropriate attitude towards morally unacceptable compa-
nies, or to fail to act in a manner appropriate to this kind of attitude.135 
 An advantage of the account above, I believe, is that it allows us to 
see how proponents of the approval argument can avoid the kind of 
challenge outlined in the previous subsection. A problem for the idea 
that everyone who invests in morally unacceptable companies actually 
approve of those companies‘ activities, I said, was that this easily could 
be disputed by investors themselves. Consider first a fairly straightfor-
ward attempt at meeting this challenge: Perhaps proponents of the ap-
proval argument simply could say that ―actions speak louder than 
words‖ – that is, say that it is possible for investors to be mistaken about 
their own motives or likings. Even though investors perhaps may say, 
and even feel, that they do not like the activities of the companies they 
 
133 Cf. Crisp and Slote 1997, Slote 1995. For a version of virtue ethics with an even stronger 
focus on appropriate actions, see Hursthouse 1999. 
134 A similar argument could perhaps be developed for the supportive strategy – there are 
certain companies one simply should think favourably of and invest in. I will not discuss this 
idea further here. 
135 Perhaps it is reasonable to give some room for inculpable ignorance in this account – that 
is, virtue may not require that one morally disapproves of a certain morally unacceptable com-
pany if its moral unacceptability is not sufficiently salient. For a discussion of the limits of 
inculpable ignorance in the investment context, see Spurgin 2001. 
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invest in, their investment behaviour indicates that they actually do like 
these activities – or, at least, that they do not have a sufficiently negative 
attitude towards them. If an investor truly morally disapproved of the 
relevant companies‘ activities, proponents of the approval argument 
may say, she would simply choose not to invest in it. This way of under-
standing preferences is not new in any way, but is actually very common 
in psychology and social science, not least economics (where it is often 
referred to as revealed preference theory136). 
 Even though there is some plausibility in this suggestion and we often 
may be mistaken about our own motives and likings, I believe, building 
one‘s entire defence of the avoidance strategy on this kind of idea has its 
problems. Certainly, we sometimes do things which we afterwards wish 
we had not done, which in itself suggests that some of our actions con-
nect quite badly to our motives. Furthermore, it is hard to believe that 
all human beings are instrumentally rational at every instance, which would 
seem to be what is required if we always are to be able to infer attitudes 
from actions.137 It should be noted, however, that there is a second way 
of meeting the kind of challenge indicated above: namely to say, as I 
have done, that virtue demands two things in the present context. It is 
not sufficient to simply have the appropriate attitude towards morally 
unacceptable companies, I have suggested, but one must also act in a 
way appropriate to this kind of attitude. Even if one invests ―for an al-
together different set of reasons‖, then, and one does not particularly 
like the activities of morally unacceptable companies, it is inappropriate 
not to be moved by the immorality of these businesses to the extent that 
one also takes action. As long as one invests in morally unacceptable 
companies, once again, one would seem to either not morally disap-
prove of these companies in the way which morality requires, or not 
take the actions which are appropriate in relation to such a disapproval. 
 As I said above, I believe this argument from virtue ethics should not 
be too distant from how many writers implicitly understand these 
things. In order to further exemplify the kind of thinking involved 
above, it may be noted that an idea of this sort has been suggested in the 
context of democratic responsibility. According to Geoffrey Brennan and 
Loren Lomasky, two of the most notable writers on this issue, it seems 
difficult to hold individual voters responsible for the outcome of general 
 
136 Cf. Samuelson 1938, 1948, Sen 1973 
137 For a classic paper on some of the problems with revealed preference theory, see Sen 1973. 
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elections on traditional, consequentialist (or outcome-oriented), con-
ceptions of responsibility. After all, the impact each individual vote has 
on such outcomes is miniscule and negligible.138 However, perhaps 
there is another way of understanding responsibility in this context. Ac-
cording to Brennan and Lomasky, ―it seems intuitively acceptable to 
hold up to reproach someone who voted for the Ku Klux Klan party 
candidate for president even though the Klandidate was not listed on 
the ballots of enough states to comprise a majority of the Electoral 
College, and hence could never win. One who registers himself as sup-
porting the thoroughly unsavory is culpable irrespective of the tendency 
that such expression has to generate the repugnant state of affairs‖139. 
But, why is this so? Brennan and Lomasky write: 
To cast a Klan ballot is to identify oneself in a morally significant way with 
the racist policies that the organization espouses. One thereby lays one-
self open to associated moral liability whether that candidate has a small, 
large, or zero probability of gaining victory, and whether or not one‘s 
own vote has an appreciable likelihood of affecting the election result. 
Even stronger, to express such support in a forum in which no out-
comes will be decided, such as in casual conversation or in response to a 
survey, is also odious. That is not, of course, to deny that any influence 
on electoral outcomes is morally relevant: To express support for A and 
to bring about the victory of A is worse than merely to express support 
for A. The point is not that effects on political outcomes do not matter, 
but they are not all that matters.140 
According to Brennan and Lomasky, then, ―[p]ersons are morally re-
sponsible not only for what they bring about, what they intend to bring 
about, and what they help to bring about; they are also responsible for 
what they endorse and for that with which they choose to identify them-
selves‖141. They call this an ―expressively grounded theory of democratic 
microethics‖142. Although it is not completely obvious from these 
characterisations whether they understand endorsement and identifica-
tion as actual or communicated attitudes, they go on to say that ―[o]ne 
might indeed go further and maintain that persons bear responsibility 
for their characters and attitudes whether or not they choose to give 
them expression‖143. I take this to indicate that Brennan and Lomasky 
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139 Ibid., p. 186 
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141 Ibid., p. 187, emphasis in original 
142 Ibid., p. 189 
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appeal to an idea similar to the one outlined above and inspired by vir-
tue ethics. I will now evaluate this line of argument.  
 The idea that it may be morally appropriate to have a certain kind of 
attitude towards morally unacceptable companies, I believe, is very in-
tuitive. Indeed, if something could be called the prima facie case for the 
avoidance strategy144, I believe, this is it. The problem for the kind of 
thinking introduced above, however, is, once again, what its practical 
implications more exactly are – that is, what actions are appropriate in the 
present context. From the fact that an attitude of disapproval may be 
morally appropriate, I believe it should be noted, it does not follow in 
any simple way that the avoidance strategy is the most appropriate line 
of action in relation to such companies. Perhaps, I suggest, it actually is 
not. According to Brennan and Lomasky, it may be noted, their expres-
sive theory does not imply that voters simply have moral reasons to vote 
in whatever fashion they see fit. Rather, it implies that voters have to 
take an active interest in matters related to elections, seek out informa-
tion about what different political parties stand for, and so on and so 
forth. They write: 
If the quality of expressive acts matters, it is not enough merely to go to 
the polls and vote any old how. Unless the act of voting is performed 
with the requisite preparation and attentiveness, it will not satisfy canons 
of good citizenship. Certainly this view accords with the message of 
common morality. Merely to vote, we are told, is insufficient; one who 
goes to the polls only vaguely aware of who the candidates are and what 
they stand for, and who pulls the lever closest to his hand so that he can 
be done with the business and return to his couch and television, stands 
hardly, if at all, higher than one who never left the couch. That is in part 
because one who votes in so desultory and absent-minded a fashion is 
not to be credited with taking a stand on anything. [...] One who votes 
should know the issues, scrutinize candidates‘ statements, and make up 
one‘s mind after weighing all the facts: This is how the voter‘s duty is 
often expressed.145 
The salient point of the line of reasoning above, I believe, is that not 
just any kind of action would seem appropriate for the virtuous voter. 
Simply avoiding the real political issues does not amount to taking an 
appropriate stand. 
 It now seems appropriate to return to Kolers‘ remarks about the inef-
fectiveness of divestment noted briefly above. According to Kolers, to 
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simply avoid investing in morally unacceptable companies, or to quietly 
sell the shares one has in these, is often an easy way out. His analogy, 
the reader may recall, is with government officials – ―[i]nstead of re-
signing, a well-placed official can take proactive measures, and thereby 
contribute importantly to reform. After resigning, however, the ex-civil 
servant is useless to this effort‖146. Kolers continues: 
Similarly, divestment is appropriate after multiple efforts have failed to 
reform an immoral company. But divestment is not a reasonable start-
ing point. Especially when consumers are ill-organized or apathetic, in-
vesting may be a necessary condition for having any positive effect on a 
company‘s policy. In such a case, aloofness helps no one.147 
I believe Kolers here is on to something important. A number of SRI 
writers have noted how simply avoiding morally problematic companies 
could be seen as a ―head in the sand approach‖148, the point of which 
mainly would seem to be to allow investors to ―keep their hands 
clean‖149 of certain societal problems rather than to actually try to ad-
dress them. A case could be made, I believe, for saying that virtue ethics 
requires more than this from individual investors. Now, surely this case 
requires a number of further arguments and considerations, many of 
which I have yet to discuss. What my present discussion indicates, how-
ever, is that the virtue interpretation of the approval argument brings 
proponents of the avoidance strategy no closer to a plausible justifica-
tion of this strategy. Just as the appeal to conscientiousness in the pre-
vious chapter, I suggested, needs to be amended with further arguments 
in order to give plausible recommendations to investors, so those in 
favour of the appeal to virtue ethics would have to appeal to other kinds 
of arguments in order to explain why this appeal really implies the 
avoidance strategy. 
 But what would these other kinds of arguments be? As far as my dis-
cussion so far is concerned, it would seem, there are no promising prin-
cipled arguments for the avoidance strategy. Perhaps, then, one has to 
look towards pragmatic considerations. 
 
146 Kolers 2001, p. 448 
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149 Cf. Cowton 1998b, Hollenbach 1973, Kolers 2001, Monahan 2002, Valor and de la Cuesta 
2007 
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5.  CON CLUS IONS  
In this chapter, I have discussed what I have called (putatively) prin-
cipled arguments in favour of the avoidance strategy. Such arguments 
are sometimes expressed in the simple form of ―it is wrong in itself to 
invest in morally unacceptable companies‖. However, I have required 
that some further specification should be made as to exactly why this 
may be wrong – and why, say, living in the vicinity of a morally unac-
ceptable company‘s headquarters, or having some other kind of (close) 
connection to such a company, is not wrong. I have discussed what I 
take to be the three most important suggestions as to how a (putatively) 
principled argument for the avoidance strategy could be spelled out – 
the tainted-profits principle, the no-harm principle and (what I have 
loosely called) the approval argument. Unfortunately, I have argued that 
none of these is completely satisfactory – at least as far as the versions 
of these arguments I have discussed so far are concerned. 
 The discussions in this chapter have covered many layers and it is 
therefore difficult to summarise them in any simple way. However, I 
have argued that a central problem with all three of the arguments out-
lined above is that their practical implications are far more complex than 
what proponents of the avoidance strategy generally would seem to 
have assumed. Many arguments would seem to imply, for instance, that 
it is equally morally problematic to sell shares in morally unacceptable 
companies as it is to buy them. Furthermore, most arguments lead in 
the direction of what Kolers calls the austere conclusion, i.e. that inves-
tors have moral reasons to refrain from investing in almost all compa-
nies eligible for investment. Now, perhaps these conclusions can be 
avoided by revising these arguments, or interpreting them in some other 
way, but I have suggested that in many such cases the basic implication 
that investors have moral reasons to avoid investing in morally unac-
ceptable companies actually disappears altogether. Far from being prin-
cipled arguments for the avoidance strategy, then, it is utterly unclear 
what many of these arguments should be taken to imply. There are 
some versions, however, which I have yet to consider. 
 On some understandings of seemingly principled arguments for the 
avoidance strategy, I have said, what is appealed to is basically a kind of 
pragmatic consideration. On others, what is appealed to is a kind of in-
direct, social effect and, on yet others, I have said that the issue of spel-
ling out all of the relevant considerations is so complex that it is best to 
leave it until the following chapter. In the following chapter, then, I will 
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consider pragmatic arguments for the avoidance strategy – but I will 
also have occasion to return to a number of things left untouched in the 
present chapter.
 Chapter IV 
Making a Difference Through Screening 
1.  PRAG MATIC ARGUME NTS A ND SCREENING  
What difference can an individual investor make through buying and 
selling shares on the stock market? In the previous chapter I discussed 
what I called (putatively) principled arguments in favour of the avoid-
ance strategy, i.e., arguments which aimed to show that it is morally 
problematic in itself to invest in morally unacceptable companies. In this 
chapter I will (mainly) discuss another group of ideas, which I believe 
are best described as pragmatic. The main characteristic of these kinds of 
ideas is that they focus on the effects or consequences of investments in dif-
ferent kinds of companies, that is, they are outcome-oriented in a certain 
fashion. It may be noted that there are many similarities between this 
group of ideas and one idea which I have already discussed, namely the 
no-harm principle – most importantly, the thought that what matters is 
the actual impact on companies is central in both accounts. For this rea-
son, I have saved some of the discussion of this principle for the 
present chapter. As will soon become obvious, however, the kind of 
pragmatic reasoning which will be my main concern in this chapter can 
go a lot further than the no-harm principle can. According to this kind 
of reasoning, what characterises a genuinely ethical investment strategy 
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is that it makes a positive ‗difference‘ in terms of corporate change or 
socially beneficial outcomes. 
 As noted already in the previous chapter, the campaign against the 
apartheid regime of South Africa played a central role in the formation 
of SRI as such. Now, according to many writers, not only did this cam-
paign have a tremendous impact on the growth of the SRI movement, 
but the South Africa campaign also shifted the focus of this movement. 
Domini and Kinder, for instance, describe the impact of the campaign 
as follows: 
South Africa marked the transition from divesting sin to investing for 
positive social change. Over the twenty years between 1969 to 1994, 
South Africa catalyzed a change among social investors from an inward-
focused desire for consistency between one‘s values and one‘s invest-
ments to an outward-oriented expression of how society should work.1 
Influenced by the South Africa campaign, Domini‘s book on SRI carries 
the conspicuous subtitle ―Making a Difference and Making Money‖.2 
According to Domini, SRI is properly understood as having two goals. 
One of these is personal consistency (along the lines of the idea descri-
bed in chapter II, section 2) and the other is ―being a part of a dynamic 
force for the process that creates positive social change‖3. To explain 
the vision behind this second goal, Domini writes: 
When a large percentage of the owners of the world‘s business enter-
prises believe that profit must not come at the loss of human or envi-
ronmental justice, then companies will respond. They will serve as ef-
fective means of delivering desired goods and services to the population 
in a manner that does not harm their owners, who are – after all – living 
beings. If the owners of the economic engine of the world recognize 
that money doesn‘t help if you can‘t breathe, then they will create rules 
that allow for both breathable air and financial return. Socially responsi-
ble investors recognize that at a certain level the owners of the eco-
nomic engine dictate the management of that engine. The socially 
managed portfolio is a part of something larger than itself; it is a part of 
a global reformation of the way business is done.4 
Many other authors seem to share Domini‘s view of SRI as an instru-
ment of change. Ritchie Lowry, for instance, defines SRI as ―putting 
 
1 Kinder and Domini 1997, p. 15 
2 Domini 2001. See also ―Investing with your values – Making money and making a differ-
ence‖ (Brill et al. 1999). 
3 Domini 2001, p. 16 
4 Ibid., p. 17 
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money to use in something that offers profitable returns and that ac-
tively supports and promotes a higher quality of life, welfare and social 
relations in society‖5. Miller writes: ―Do these approaches – avoidance, 
alternative, or activist – really have an impact on corporate behavior? We 
think the answer is yes, although, admittedly, at least in the case of an 
avoidance strategy, that is a difficult conclusion to document‖6. 
 According to Pietra Rivoli, the claim that investors can make a certain 
difference is perhaps one of the most controversial claims of the SRI 
movement. But nonetheless it is extremely common among its propo-
nents – not to mention in the commercial material for different kinds of 
SRI funds: 
Perhaps the most striking claim of the SRI industry – and certainly the 
most appealing to many socially conscious investors and perhaps the 
most dubious to critics – is the claim that SRI ―makes a difference‖ to 
society. Advertisements for Domini Social Investments state that ―social 
investors are shaping tomorrow‘s world by investing responsibly.‖ 
Material from the Friends Ivory Funds tells prospective investors that 
―you could help create a better world.‖ A recent conference for the SRI 
industry was titled ―Making a Profit while Making a Difference.‖7 
A few things should be noted about these types of formulations. First of 
all, the possibility of influencing corporate behaviour is most often 
viewed as an argument for SRI as such, or SRI generally, and not exclu-
sively as an argument for the avoidance strategy. In fact, some seem to 
say, if this is the main argument for SRI generally, then perhaps it shows 
that other types of strategies are also important – i.e. it is an argument 
for taking SRI a step further, beyond mere avoidance.8 Remember, for 
instance, how Cowton argued that there are two major strands of ethical 
basis for SRI, one of which was the appeal to consistency (see chapter 
II, section 2). Now, the other of Cowton‘s ―strands‖ is a quite complex 
story, which I will have reason to return to in the following chapter. Its 
main strain, however, is described as follows: 
The second discernable perspective, which can complement the first, 
tends to emphasize the consequences of corporate actions upon others, 
perhaps conceived of as different groups of stakeholders such as em-
ployees, consumers, or local communities. [...] If a duty not to impose 
 
5 Lowry 1993, p. 21, emphasis removed 
6 Miller 1991, p. 34 
7 Rivoli 2003, p. 273. For further examples of how this claim is expressed in commercial 
material from SRI funds, see Haigh and Hazelton 2004. 
8 Cf. Domini and Kinder 1986, Harrington 1992, Mackenzie 1997, Sparkes 2002 
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damage or harm on other people is regarded as a minimum responsibil-
ity which runs through all morality, then it might be concluded that the 
avoidance of certain investments is appropriate, as under an ―integrity‖ 
approach. However, a wider view of responsibilities is often taken 
which tends to justify supportive criteria or engagement in stockholder 
activism.9 
I will only discuss the idea that SRI makes a difference in reference to 
the avoidance and the supportive strategies in this chapter, and hence 
leave the discussion about shareholder activism until the next two 
chapters. Arguments for the former kind of strategies from the sup-
posed fact that they influence companies and/or society seem to have 
more in common than one might believe from the passage above – both 
lines of argument emphasise the way in which investors can make a dif-
ference through buying and selling shares in different ways. Of course, different 
writers may have different ideas as to which strategy is the more effec-
tive in this regard. As the strategies are possible to combine, however, it 
is actually not too uncommon for so-called ethical funds to combine the 
practice of systematically avoiding certain ―morally problematic‖ com-
panies with a practice of seeking out certain other companies with ―ex-
ceptionally high moral standards‖.10 I will evaluate the general idea be-
hind all of these possibilities here, i.e. the claim that investors can make 
a difference through so-called screening – acts of buying and selling shares 
in different companies for moral reasons. In order to put this claim into 
some perspective, however, I will at one point (in section 5) also say 
something about what I take to be the most direct alternative to 
screening, namely the philanthropic strategy outlined briefly in the chapter I. 
Bringing this kind of strategy into the discussion, I believe, puts some 
perspective also on the principled arguments for the avoidance strategy 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
9 Cowton 1998b, pp. 187-88. If read literally, Cowton talks about the consequences of corpo-
rate actions here, and not the consequences of different investment strategies. However, I take it 
that it must be references to the latter kind of consequences that is typical of the kind of 
argument under discussion. 
10 This combination can be made in many different ways, of course. Cowton distinguishes 
between what he calls the ‗two-stage approach‘, where morally praiseworthy companies are 
selected only after all morally unacceptable companies have been ruled out, and the ‗trade-off 
approach‘, where an ―overall score or rating for a company‖, including both negative and 
positive ethical criteria, is calculated (1998b, p. 183). For this latter approach, see also Gray et 
al. 1996, Schepers and Sethi 2003. It seems unclear to me if the latter approach really should 
count as a combination of avoidance and support. On this approach, it may be noted, very few 
of the effects which will be discussed in this chapter are likely to eventuate. However, see 
section 2 below. 
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 The claim that screening can (or does) make a difference is certainly 
controversial, as both Miller and Rivoli acknowledge in the passages 
above. My evaluation of this claim will go along the following lines: In 
the following section I elaborate some on how I think the claim should 
be understood more precisely. Although most of the quotes above 
would seem to share a common ground, I distinguish (among other 
things) between what I call an individualist and a collectivist interpreta-
tion of the pragmatic argument for screening. In section 3, I assume an 
individualist interpretation of this argument, and analyse a fairly 
straightforward suggestion about how buying and selling shares in cer-
tain ways might make a certain difference. My main argument in this 
section, which is further developed throughout the chapter, is that, 
lacking clear evidence to the contrary, the best guess would seem to be 
that individual investors very seldom can make any considerable differ-
ence to companies or society by (quietly) screening in or out public limi-
ted companies. I note an important exception to this rule but, for the 
most part, I suggest, considerations of financial theory and experience 
would seem to tell against the pragmatic argument for screening. 
 Perhaps, however, some proponents of the SRI movement should be 
understood as suggesting a collectivist interpretation of the pragmatic 
argument. In sections 4 and 5, I analyse this sort of interpretation, and 
contend that investors may be able to make a difference on the collec-
tive level, at least if the relevant collective is sufficiently large. I argue 
against the relevance of this contention to the issue at stake here, how-
ever – i.e. the issue of how individual investors ought to behave. In sec-
tion 6, I return to the individualist interpretation and analyse further 
suggestions about how individual investors might make a difference by 
screening investments in different ways. My negative conclusion is fur-
ther elaborated on here, but I also indicate in what direction I think the 
suggestions should go in order to become more promising. A brief 
summary of the results of the chapter is given in section 7.11 
2 .  ‗MAKING A D IFFE RENCE ‘ :  PRELIMIN ARY REMARKS  
Justifying the avoidance strategy (or, for that matter, the supportive 
strategy) by reference to claims about how investors can ―have an im-
pact on corporate behaviour‖, or can ―make a difference‖, certainly 
 
11 For an earlier sketch of some of the arguments of this chapter, see Sandberg 2007b. 
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seems different from invoking the kind of (putatively) principled argu-
ments discussed in the previous chapter. In the beginning of the pre-
vious chapter, I described this kind of reasoning as pragmatic, or (in a 
wide sense) consequentialist. According to such a kind of reasoning, I said, 
the justification of the avoidance strategy lies mainly in the positive effects 
which a systematic avoidance of certain companies may have. Before I 
begin my evaluation of the suggestions noted above, it may be useful to 
say something more about these general characterisations. Is it really 
plausible to interpret the writers quoted above as subscribing to this 
kind of generally pragmatic thinking? And, if it is, how should the 
pragmatic argument for screening be understood more exactly? 
 Looking at the passages above, I believe it should be obvious to most 
readers, first of all, that many are quite vague and perhaps also ambiguous. 
It may be noted, for instance, that some writers say only that investors 
ought to have an ―impact‖, or make a ―difference‖, but not what sort of 
impact or difference they think is necessary in this context. I think it is 
obvious, however, that the idea must be that investors ought to have 
some sort of positive impact on the relevant companies – that is, either 
they should counteract the immorality or harmfulness of their activities, or 
they should encourage the good things certain companies do – in order to 
receive moral credit. Otherwise, simply influencing a company to 
change the colour of some product of theirs, or even influencing them 
to make the product less safe for people to use, would count as ‗making 
a difference‘. It hardly needs saying that this is a highly unreasonable 
interpretation of these writers‘ claims. 
 Another feature of the passages above, one might note, is that most 
writers only say that investors ought to make ―a‖ difference, or that they 
ought to have ―an‖ impact. How should this feature of such suggestions 
be understood? On one interpretation, this feature would seem to go 
against a central tenet of consequentialism as most philosophers under-
stand it – namely as the idea that agents should maximize their positive 
influence on outcomes (or make outcomes as good as they can be).12 Per-
haps some SRI proponents would argue that as long as investors pro-
duce some positive effect, it is irrelevant whether or not this is the best 
possible effect – i.e. it is irrelevant whether or not they could have done 
something even better. I will discuss what I believe is the most plausible 
 
12 For a more stringent formulation of (and discussion about how to formulate) conse-
quentialism, see Carlson 1995. 
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view on these matters in chapter VII. Until that chapter, then, I will put 
the issue of how to understand ideas about ‗making a difference‘ in this 
respect to the side. That is, the general idea I want to discuss here is 
simply the idea that investors have moral reasons to invest in a certain 
manner to the extent that they thereby make at least some sort of positive 
difference. 
 This kind of idea, I believe it should be noted, is consistent also with 
many kinds of non-consequentialist moral theories – which is why I prefer 
to call it pragmatic (or consequentialist in a wide sense).13 According to 
most moral theories, if a certain action can prevent some evil or make 
the world a better place in some respect, agents have at least some moral 
reason to perform this action. This is because agents have at least some 
moral reason to promote the general good in society.14 Now, whether this is a 
reasonable position to take, and, if so, exactly how much weight should 
be given to this kind of reason, are matters which I will not address in 
the present chapter. As far as my present discussion is concerned, then, 
I am open to discuss the kind of general ‗makes a difference‘-claims 
which many other writers have discussed. Richard Hudson, for instance, 
describes one of the purported duties assumed by ‗ethical investors‘ as 
simply ―increasing the amount of good in society through the conse-
quences of their buying and selling behaviour‖15. Similarly, Rivoli – in 
trying to evaluate the idea that SRI makes a difference – poses the fol-
lowing question: ―[D]oes SRI in fact lead to better social outcomes than 
conventional investing?‖16. 
 One may now inquire as to exactly what sort of effects are relevant to 
the question of whether SRI makes a difference or not. It is interesting 
to note that, judging from the passages above, there seems to be some-
what different ideas about this within the SRI movement. Some writers, 
for instance, speak in quite general terms about the effects on people 
and society of different kinds of investment strategies – according to 
 
13 It may be noted that some proponents of the Christian view on investment ethics actually 
go very far towards requiring maximization of the good. According to a paper by the Christian 
Ethical Investment Group in the UK, for instance: ―In entering the world of the Stock Ex-
change, the Church must not imagine that it is operating in a realm of moral neutrality. Ethical 
complacency is no less of a danger to guard against. The Church‘s task is not simply to avoid 
the obviously objectionable investment, but to work constructively to maximise good and minimise 
evil in every investment‖ (1992, p. 8, emphasis added). For further discussion about the place of 
pragmatism in religion, see Powers 1971, p. 54-84. 
14 Cf. Kagan 1989 
15 Hudson 2005, p. 641 
16 Rivoli 2003, p. 273 
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Lowry, ―SRI, then, is putting money to use in something that [...] ac-
tively supports and promotes a higher quality of life, welfare and social 
relations in society‖17. This would also seem to how Hudson and Rivoli 
have understood the pragmatic argument, talking generally about ―good 
in society‖ and ―social outcomes‖. Other SRI writers, however, it may 
be noted, focus only on the effects on companies and corporate behaviour – 
as Miller asks: ―Do these approaches [...] really have an impact on cor-
porate behavior?‖18. It is unclear whether there is any real conflict be-
tween these ways of formulating the idea currently under discussion, i.e. 
the claim that investors can make a difference through screening. In 
order to preclude some possible misunderstandings of the pragmatic 
argument for screening, however, I think some further comments may 
be necessary here. 
 First of all, one reason for why some may have their focus on the ef-
fects on corporate behaviour may be that they think that corporate wrong-
doings should be considered especially problematic from an investor‘s 
point of view.19 In the previous chapter, I said that principled arguments 
for the avoidance strategy often are formulated (or, at least, can be un-
derstood) in terms of how the wrongfulness of certain corporate acts 
spill over onto the investor, making investments in companies which per-
form such acts wrong as well. Now, from the point of view of pragmatic 
arguments for screening, I do not think that this factor should be of 
equal importance. One way in which investors could make a certain dif-
ference is of course through reducing the number of wrongdoings per-
formed by certain companies. However, this does not seem to be the 
only, perhaps not even the most important, way of making a relevant 
difference. If an investor could influence, say, the slave-keeping com-
pany XYZ into treating their slaves just a little bit better, this would 
obviously make for a very relevant difference – even though the number 
of wrongdoings performed by the company may be exactly the same.20 
 
17 Lowry 1993, p. 21 
18 Miller 1993, p. 21 
19 Irvine seems to flirt with this idea, at least in his original article. According to his view there, 
the enablement principle ―is concerned [...] with how our investing in [a] company will affect 
its ability to do wrong in the future‖ (1987, p. 236). In his later article, however, both the 
enablement principle and the tainted-profits principle are stated in terms of suffering rather 
than wrongdoing: ―[T]aking steps to profit from the suffering of others is not necessarily 
wrong. What is wrong is taking steps in a way that increases the suffering of others‖ (2002, p. 59, 
emphasis in original). 
20 According to some consequentialists – for instance, act-utilitarians – the number of wrong-
doings produced by a certain act is totally irrelevant. What is relevant is only how the ratio of 
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Generally speaking, investors may make wrongful behaviour slightly 
more tolerable to the people subjected to it, and they may also make 
righteous behaviour even better from a societal point of view. I see no 
reason for why effects of this kind should not be taken into considera-
tion from the kind of pragmatic perspective currently under discussion.  
 An interesting implication of the previous point is of course that it 
would seem harder to decide what companies to invest in and what 
companies not to invest in on the pragmatic idea than on the ideas dis-
cussed in the previous chapter. In fact, on a pragmatic argument for 
screening, I believe, the issue of which companies should be avoided (or 
sought out) is impossible to isolate from the issue of what difference differ-
ent investment strategies make under different circumstances. What 
makes this so is the fact that the moral status of the relevant company‘s 
activities plays no direct part in the pragmatic justification of either the 
avoidance or the supportive strategy – that is, it is not simply because a 
company is morally unacceptable, for instance, that investors may have 
moral reasons to avoid investing in it. If the moral status of the under-
lying company‘s activities plays any part in this kind of reasoning, it is 
only indirectly, i.e. perhaps making it more probable that a certain avoid-
ance campaign may make some kind of positive difference.  
 A feature of this kind of implication which may seem problematic for 
SRI proponents is obviously that it does not seem clear whether the 
pragmatic argument supports exactly the kind of avoidance schemes 
employed by so-called ethical funds, i.e. an avoidance of only companies 
in, for instance, the tobacco and weapons industries. It does not even 
seem clear, by the way, that investor have any moral reasons to avoid 
companies in these industries. A feature of the pragmatic argument for 
the avoidance strategy which I take to be extremely positive for propo-
nents of the avoidance strategy, however, is that it seems to allow them 
to avoid the austere conclusion discussed in the previous chapter. Even 
though all commercial companies may be morally ‗tainted‘ in some way 
or another, it should be noted, investors could still have pragmatic 
moral reasons to avoid investing in the worst of these companies, and to 
seek out and invest in the best.21 I believe it should be obvious that this 
 
happiness over suffering in the world is affected by an act (see Gren 2004, pp. 33-35). I am not 
assuming this view here, but allowing that reduction of the number of wrongdoings performed 
by companies in itself may constitute making a positive difference. 
21 Thus, pragmatic considerations could justify the ‗best in class‘ practice of many ethical 
funds – see chapter III, note 89. 
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feature of the pragmatic standpoint really speaks to its favour, at least 
compared to the absolutist ideals of the (putatively) principled argu-
ments discussed in the previous chapter. 
 Now, are only the possible effects on companies relevant for the idea 
that investors can make a certain difference, or are also effects on the 
larger society relevant in this context? Well, I think it is best to leave this 
question open here, at least for the time being. An obvious reason for 
focusing on the effects on corporate behaviour, which does not involve 
the contention that corporate wrongdoings deserve special attention, 
has to do with what is often considered to be the point of the avoidance 
and supportive strategies. In the next section, I will analyse a fairly 
straightforward suggestion about how screening might make a certain 
difference, building on some suggestions noted already in the previous 
chapter. The idea here is that investors may influence the managers of 
certain companies into changing their ways, or choosing the activities of 
the company differently, through buying and selling the company‘s 
shares in certain ways. In section 6, I return to discuss other types of 
more indirect and societal effects of similar practices.  
 A last point before I leave the quotes above. How are we to under-
stand the idea that ―SRI‖ makes a difference, present in many accounts 
of the pragmatic argument for screening, and in what way do ―inves-
tors‖ have moral reasons to screen their investments? In the previous 
chapter, I distinguished between two interpretations of the notion of 
‗contribution‘ invoked by proponents of the no-harm principle; one 
fairly straightforward and one involving what I called ‗participatory ef-
fects‘. I believe a similar distinction could be useful also in the present 
context. It may be noted that some writers, like Domini, seem to speak 
mainly of the difference that investors can make as a collective – ―When a 
large percentage of the owners of the world‘s business enterprises be-
lieve that profit must not come at the loss of human or environmental 
justice, then companies will respond‖.22 This understanding of the 
‗makes a difference‘-claim seems, at least in principle, consistent with 
the idea that individual investors cannot make any difference on their 
own, but that only a large number of investors can make a difference 
together. However, other writers seem to support the further idea that 
investors can make a difference individually. Brill and Reder, for instance, 
 
22 Domini 2001, p. 17. See also Judd 1990. 
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comment as follows on the fact that socially responsible investing 
sometimes can be more demanding than its traditional counterpart:  
Certainly, as a socially responsible investor, you will need to process a 
bit more information than traditional investors. However, that is where 
the satisfaction of SRI comes in, because it is that extra step that en-
sures that your money is invested where it is doing both you and the so-
ciety you live in some good.23 
Unfortunately, the claim that investors can make a difference individ-
ually is seldom separated in any exact manner from the claim that in-
vestors can make a difference as a collective. In the opening paragraph 
of their book, for instance, Brill and Reder seem to oscillate between an 
individualist and a collectivist interpretation of the pragmatic argument: 
Suppose each of your investment dollars – including every dollar in your 
bank account – could help build the world you want for yourself and 
your family [...]? Well, that‘s exactly what your money can do. With every 
passing day, more individuals and institutions are joining the parade of 
socially responsible investors, which means that their influence is mak-
ing even greater impacts on the marketplace.24 
Since my main concern in this book is the issue of how individual inves-
tors ought to invest, I will, for the most part of this chapter, assume an 
individualist interpretation of the claim that investors can make a differ-
ence through buying and selling shares in certain ways. In section 4, I 
will return to the collectivist interpretation and discuss what implica-
tions there are from the possible fact that investors can make a differ-
ence together for the issue of how an individual investor ought to act. 
3.  THE F INANCIAL EFFE CTS  OF SCREENING  
How could individual investors make a difference through screening, i.e. 
through carefully choosing what companies‘ shares to hold and not to 
hold (what shares to buy and sell)? In order to answer this question, I 
will begin by noting what the main point of screening often is considered 
to be. Obviously, public limited companies need investors first and 
foremost to finance their activities and to raise capital for new business 
ventures. As Domini says, ―[t]he investor stands at the juncture between 
the engine of the world‘s economy‖, i.e. the modern corporation, ―and 
 
23 Brill and Reder 1993, p. 12 
24 Ibid., p. 11 
146 
the fuel‖, i.e. money.25 Many writers suggest that investors play a very 
important part in the stock market-driven world of today. Now, what 
could be the reason for choosing carefully what shares to hold and not 
to hold in light of this? Well, one reason could perhaps be to simply use 
the power over corporate finances one has as an investor to influence 
companies in a socially beneficial direction. According to Domini, again: 
―Why use investment portfolios to build a better world? Because, as 
bank robber Wille Sutton said, ‗That‘s where the money is‘‖26. Accord-
ing to Monahan, furthermore, ―[p]ut quite simply, socially responsible 
investing seeks to hit the corporations where it will really hurt, in their 
pocketbooks‖.27 The main point of screening, according to many writ-
ers, then, is to have certain financial effects on limited companies. 
 In order to further explain the point of screening, and in what way 
influencing companies financially could be important from a moral 
point of view, many writers compare SRI to so-called ethical consumer-
ism (or consumer activism).28 Ethical consumerism is here understood 
as the practice of boycotting certain goods on the market in order to 
apply financial pressure to the producer or the supplier of this good and, 
in the end, to make the producer or the supplier change its ways in 
some manner (compare, for instance, vegetarianism and the fair trade 
movement). Perhaps the SRI strategies of buying and selling shares in 
different ways may be understood in a manner similar to this. The anal-
ogy with ethical consumerism, it should be noted, works better with the 
avoidance strategy than with the supportive strategy. Through boycot-
ting certain shares on the stock market, this idea would seem to go, 
investors could put financial pressure on the managers of the companies 
whose shares are boycotted and, through this, they could make the 
companies change their ways. A roughly similar understanding of the 
supportive strategy could perhaps be that investors can support certain 
companies financially through investing in them, and through this they 
can also make these companies continue along the lines of their pre-
vious activities – possibly making their commitment to ethically worth-
while activities even stronger. Or, perhaps, supportive initiatives could 
have effects on the not-so-ethical companies as well – giving them 
 
25 Domini 2001, p. 13 
26 Ibid., p. 17 
27 Monahan 2002, p. 27. See also Harrington 1992, Mackenzie 1997, Melton and Keenan 
1994. 
28 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Gray et al. 1996, Miller 1991, Sorell and Hendry 1995, Sparkes 2002 
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incentives to change in order for them to be able to receive the support 
that other companies get.29 
 One may now inquire as to exactly how individual investors are 
thought to be able to influence companies financially. What kind of 
financial effects are we talking about here? Well, this is where things 
may start to become complicated, but I will begin by considering a ra-
ther direct kind of possible effects. I said in the previous chapter that 
proponents of the no-harm principle could try to sidestep some of the 
problematic practical implications of this principle by attempting to re-
vise it somewhat. According to one suggested revision, the only relevant 
effects are those which investors cause fairly directly, or which it seems 
reasonable to say that investors ‗hire‘ from companies. The relevant 
moral principle in this case, I said, was that ―if there is an ethical prob-
lem with undertaking an action on one‘s own behalf, there is an ethical 
problem with hiring an agent to do it in one‘s stead‖30. Now, an idea of 
how corporate wrongdoings are commissioned by investors, which I 
noted briefly in the previous chapter but did not have place to consider 
there, was that, even if shareholders are not involved in setting the ac-
tual agenda of companies, it may be argued that buying shares in morally 
unacceptable companies directly provides these companies with fresh 
resources – resources which they then can do whatever they like with. In 
this manner, whatever companies do, perhaps these activities could be 
said to be caused fairly directly by individual investors. I believe this is 
not an uncommon way of justifying the avoidance strategy among pro-
ponents of the SRI movement – according to Domini and Kinder, for 
instance, ―[b]y avoiding investments in ‗bad‘ companies, you‘re saying, 
‗Not with my money, you don‘t.‘‖.31 
 In order to evaluate the pragmatic argument for screening, one may 
start by evaluating this idea about a very direct financial effect on public 
limited companies of buying their shares. Is it true that morally unac-
ceptable companies do bad things with investors’ money? Unfortunately, I 
think it should be fairly obvious that this is quite uncommon. As noted 
already in the previous chapter, most investors buy and sell shares on 
the stock market and, thus, from and to other investors – individual or 
institutional. One may now note an important implication of this way in 
 
29 Cf. Domini 2001, Haigh and Hazelton 2004, Mackenzie 1997 
30 Spurgin 2001, p. 289 
31 Domini and Kinder 1986, p. 3, emphasis in original. See also Beabout and Schmiesing 2003, 
Fehrenbacher 2001, Harrington 1992, Mackenzie 1997. 
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which investments work, namely that individual investors seldom buy 
shares directly from the underlying companies. The stock market is often re-
ferred to as the ‗secondary‘ market for shares and bonds, i.e. a market 
where shares and bonds are sold further between different investors.32 
Since individual investors seldom buy shares directly from the underly-
ing companies, these companies seldom see any of the money involved 
in stock market transactions and, thus, buying shares or bonds on the 
stock market does not generally have any direct effect on the company 
that has issued the shares or bonds.33  
 It may be noted that when a public limited company actually issues its 
shares, either during a new share issue or a bonus issue, of course, it 
receives money directly from those who buy the shares. May we then 
say that investors sometimes pay money directly to companies? Well, I 
believe there are cases in which this happens, but further circumstances 
indicate that such cases actually are very uncommon – at least when it 
comes to companies quoted on major stock exchanges. Ordinarily, the 
owner of the stock exchange, or some major bank, acts as what is called 
an underwriter of the new share issues of these companies.34 This means 
that the bank or the owner of the stock exchange guarantees that the 
shares will be sold on the stock market, and, in effect, that they buy the 
shares in advance. Individual investors, thus, are not even in this case 
paying anything directly to the company. As already noted, furthermore, 
there is a strong tendency for individual investors to hold shares only 
indirectly, i.e. to invest through a unit trust or a pension fund, and, cer-
tainly, investing in such a fund gives no money directly to the underlying 
companies. 
 Perhaps the considerations above create more problems for propo-
nents of the avoidance strategy than they do for proponents of the 
supportive strategy. Although buying the shares of most ‗mainstream‘ 
companies, or companies quoted on major stock exchanges, may not 
have any direct financial effect on these companies and so does not lend 
any direct financial support to their activities, there might be some 
smaller-sized or especially risky business ventures which have no access 
to underwriters but need direct investment capital. The challenge for 
 
32 Cf. Hudson 2005, Keasey et al. 1998, Rini 2002, Schwartz and Francioni 2004, Teweles and 
Bradley 1998, Wyss 2000 
33 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Hudson 2005, Irvine 1987, Lang 1996, Mackenzie 1997, Rini 2002, 
Schwartz et al. 2007, Teweles and Bradley 1998, Viederman 2002 
34 Cf. Irvine 1987, Keasey et al. 1998, Lang 1996, Schwartz et al. 2007, Teweles and Bradley 
1998, Ward 1991, Wyss 2000 
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proponents of the supportive strategy, then, is to identify some such 
ventures which are dedicated to socially beneficial or morally praise-
worthy activities (and I will discuss a class of small-scale social ventures 
which I think is especially promising in section 3.2 below). But the 
avoidance strategy is normally not conceived of as the strategy of only 
avoiding investments in morally unacceptable alternative or especially 
risky companies. Rather, the larger and more diversified a certain com-
pany is, the more likely it seems to be that this company is involved in 
some kind of morally problematic business area or practice (which it 
would be socially beneficial to counteract). So what could proponents of 
the avoidance strategy say here? 
 I think it is remarkable to see that so many SRI proponents fail to 
mention the considerations above. There may of course be a rhetorical 
point of formulating the no-harm principle in terms of fairly direct con-
tributions to corporate harm and, so, the marketing dimension of much 
of the SRI literature (mentioned in chapter II, section 1) may come to 
mind once again here. Explaining exactly how the stock market works, 
furthermore, may be thought to be too complicated to be effective in 
advertising. It may be noted, however, that many academic writers have 
noted these considerations. Irvine, for instance, refers to the considera-
tions above as the old-stock objection – ―average investors, when they pur-
chase stock, virtually always purchase old stock‖35. Now, in reply to the 
old-stock objection, Irvine argues that even though investing in a com-
pany does not have any direct financial effects, a fairly obvious indirect 
effect is that on the underlying company‘s ability to raise capital in the 
future. The argument goes: 
Notice, to begin with, that a company‘s abililty [sic!] to issue new stock 
depends upon the willingness of investors to buy the stock when it is no 
longer new. In particular, no underwriter will buy a company‘s new 
stock unless there are investors who will buy it – no longer new – from 
the underwriter. If investors systematically shunned a company‘s old 
stock, the company would find it quite difficult to issue any new stock. 
Notice, too, that a company that found it difficult to issue new stock 
would be regarded as less creditworthy by lenders than a company that 
could readily issue new stock. After all, this latter company has a source 
of cash – viz., the sale of new stock – that the former company does 
not. Thus, investors‘ reluctance to buy a company‘s old stock would not 
only make it more difficult for the company to issue new stock, but 
would also make it harder for the company to borrow money. In short, 
 
35 Irvine 1987, p. 238 
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investors‘ reluctance to buy a company‘s old stock makes it harder for 
the company to raise capital.36 
I think we should grant that the kinds of indirect effects indicated here 
certainly are possible. As noted above, investors play an important role 
on the stock market in general – at the very least, we can now see, they 
play an important role when it comes to new share issues. If no individ-
ual investor wanted to buy a certain company‘s shares, then few major 
banks or other types of financial institutions would be ready to act as 
underwriters of new share issues of the company in question, and few 
banks would be ready to lend money to the company. And we might 
add other kinds of indirect effects – I will return to this below. Unfor-
tunately, I believe the revised no-harm principle outlined above does 
not have access to these kinds of effects. Even though the harmful ef-
fects of a certain company‘s activities may be sustained by a certain 
increase in the its ability to raise new capital, which in turn is a conse-
quence of a certain investor‘s purchase of the company‘s shares, it does 
not seem plausible to say that this is a ‗fairly direct‘ effect of this inves-
tor‘s investment behaviour. Thus, proponents of the no-harm principle 
are back to the problems of the austere conclusion and the moral unac-
ceptability of selling ‗dirty‘ shares further. However, I will now leave this 
principle and return to the more general pragmatic argument for 
screening. In the remainder of this section, I will argue that even very 
indirect effects actually would seem absent in most cases of individual 
investors‘ screening activities. In section 3.1, I outline my main argu-
ment to this effect. In sections 3.2 and 3.3, then, I note some important 
exceptions to this argument. 
3.1 The  e f f i ca cy  o f  marke t  s i gna l l ing  
Is it true that individual investors can have the kind of indirect financial 
effects on limited companies which Irvine suggested above? Well, the 
first thing one should say about this issue, I believe, is that exactly what 
the effects of individual investors‘ screening activities are obviously is an 
empirical matter and so would best be decided by some hard empirical 
data. Unfortunately, proponents of the SRI movement seldom present 
anything of the kind. There seems to be two ways in which SRI propo-
nents generally proceed when trying to explain why investing in a certain 
 
36 Ibid., pp. 238-39 
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company has indirect financial effects on the company in question: One 
is that they cite some anecdotal evidence which is taken to suggest that 
screening can have a positive impact either on companies directly or on 
society – most often, the success of the South Africa campaign is held 
out as unequivocal evidence of the efficacy of screening.37 The other is 
that they, much like Irvine above, give theoretical or a priori reasons for 
why it seems reasonable to think that screening must have these kinds 
of indirect financial effects.38 A more conscientious answer in the 
present context, I believe, is that more empirical research simply is 
needed. However, given our current state of knowledge, perhaps re-
sorting to financial theory actually is the best one can do.  
 In what follows, I will take a closer look at some aspects of 
contemporary economic and financial theory and discuss how they re-
late to the question above (and I should perhaps already at this stage 
apologise to the reader for the highly technical character of most of 
what I will have to say). In order to answer the question above, I believe 
one should begin by noting the central mechanism through which the 
kind of indirect effects under consideration could be possible. The cen-
tral mechanism which allows stock markets to regulate corporate 
activity, according to most economists, is the share price, i.e. the price 
buyers have to pay for different company‘s shares on the market.39 This 
is a factor which very well could be used for the purposes of social 
campaigns. According to Mackenzie, for instance, it is mainly through 
effects on share prices that a company‘s ability to raise capital and bor-
row money could be affected.40 Maintaining a high share price may not 
only allow companies to have an easier time raising capital and borrow-
ing money, but it may also make them less vulnerable to hostile take-
over bids and other problems associated with being quoted on a stock 
market.41 According to Hudson, furthermore, managers are often 
understood as having a quite direct interest in the share price.42 The cen-
tral aim of managers, at least according to most financial models, is to 
 
37 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Brill and Reder 1993, Domini 2001, Harrington 1992, Judd 1990, Lowry 
1993, Miller 1991, 1992, Ward 1991 
38 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Brill and Reder 1993, Fehrenbacher 2001, Harrington 1992, Judd 1990, 
Miller 1992, Ward 1991 
39 Cf. Byström 2007, Keasey et al. 1998, Schwartz and Francioni 2004 
40 Mackenzie 1997, p. 137. See also Haigh and Hazelton 2004, Heinkel et al. 2001, Hudson 
2004, Judd 1990, Statman 2000, Ward 1991. 
41 Cf. Lang 1996, Mackenzie 1997, Ward 1991 
42 Hudson 2005, p. 649 
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maximize shareholder wealth – i.e. to maximize the share price. If 
investors can influence share prices, then, they may be able to give man-
agers incentives to change their ways in a very straightforward manner.43 
 Mackenzie refers to the idea of influencing companies through share 
prices as the market signalling approach.44 The central question I am inter-
ested in here is obviously how effective this approach can be for indi-
vidual investors – that is, how likely it is that an individual investor‘s 
decision to buy or sell a certain share has any effect on the share price 
and, through this, has any effect on the financial and managerial activi-
ties of the company in question. To be able to answer this question, one 
may first consider how the price of a certain company‘s shares is set: 
According to financial theory, what determines the price of a certain 
company‘s shares is, roughly put, the balance of buyers over sellers of 
those shares on the (stock) market.45 If many investors want to buy a 
certain share, say, but not many investors want to sell it, the price of the 
share will probably go up – as buyers will have to raise their offers to 
attract enough sellers. Conversely, if many investors want to sell a cer-
tain share, but not many want to buy it, the price will probably go down 
– as sellers will have to lower their offers to attract enough buyers. The 
price at which there are just as many buyers as there are sellers of a cer-
tain share on the market is often referred to as the equilibrium price.46 Ac-
cording to financial theory, this is the price that a certain share will tend 
to have at any given time. The equilibrium price, it is sometimes said, is 
basically what the last investor had to pay for buying the share on the 
market (or what the last seller received for the share on the market). 
 Now, can an individual investor influence the equilibrium price of a 
certain company‘s shares? I think there are two major problems with 
this thought. First of all, the dimensions we are talking about here are 
bound to be very small. As noted in the introductory chapter, most in-
dividual investors have only a moderate amount of disposable income to 
invest or not invest in different kinds of financial ventures. This means 
that the difference a single investor can make to the balance of buyers 
 
43 Cf. Hudson 2005, Mackenzie 1997, Powers 1971 
44 Mackenzie 1997, pp. 136-48. Other economists refer to the idea that companies can be 
influenced through this approach as the ‗cost of capital‗ argument – cf. Haigh and Hazelton 
2004, Heinkel et al. 2001, Statman 2000. My argument in this subsection builds to a great 
extent on the arguments of these writers, although their focus is somewhat different from 
mine – see section 4.1 below. 
45 Cf. Schwartz and Francioni 2004, Teweles and Bradley 1998, Ward 1991, Wyss 2000 
46 Cf. Heinkel et al. 2001, Schwartz and Francioni 2004 
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and sellers on the market probably is very small, at best. Consider, for 
instance, the case of an individual investor who decides to sell his shares 
in a company with reprehensible business activities. The larger chunk of 
shares such an investor has, the larger proportion of the market his sale 
represents. Perhaps if he originally held a considerable part of some 
company‘s shares, he would be able to reduce the price of these shares – 
as he would have to lower his offer to attract enough buyers. Few indi-
vidual investors, however, own (or can own) considerable parts of the 
shares of companies quoted on any of the world‘s stock exchanges. The 
average value of the shares of a company quoted on the London Stock 
Exchange was almost £1.2 billion at the end of January 200847, for in-
stance, and a similar figure for the New York Stock Exchange was over 
$6.2 billion at the end of December 200748. 
 To be fair, some SRI proponents seem to note the problem indicated 
above. According to Domini and Kinder, for instance, this problem 
shows why the avoidance strategy is not enough on its own: 
Still, the avoidance strategy can be only a part of an ethical investing 
program. The sums most of us can afford to invest will not, if withheld, 
cripple an industry or even put a crimp in a company‘s stock price. 
Selling stock in a publicly traded corporation has no real effect on the 
company.49 
It is unclear, of course, why Domini and Kinder believe that the sup-
portive strategy scores any higher in this regard. What was said above 
about selling a certain company‘s share, certainly, also goes for buying a 
certain company‘s share. 
 To be entirely correct, I believe the reasoning above actually is a bit 
more complicated than I just said and might be broken down into two 
parts. One factor is the size of the individual investor’s holdings. Another is 
the liquidity of the market for the relevant company‘s shares, i.e. the 
amount of other investors on the market willing to buy the share at dif-
ferent prices.50 What makes it difficult for an individual investor to 
influence the price of a quoted company‘s shares, I believe, is often the 
 
47 London Stock Exchange 2008a. The total market capitalization was over £3.9 trillion and 
roughly 3.300 companies were quoted on the exchange. 
48 New York Stock Exchange 2007a. The total market capitalization was over $17.5 trillion 
and roughly 2.800 companies were quoted on the exchange. 
49 Domini and Kinder 1986, p. 3. See also Brill et al. 1999, Bruyn 1987, Powers 1971, Powers 
and Gunnemann 1969, Simon et al. 1972. 
50 For more on this, see Fontanills and Gentile 2001, Schwartz and Francioni 2004, Teweles 
and Bradley 1998, Wyss 2000. 
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fact that the market for such shares is highly liquid – that is, for each 
seller and (almost) each price there is most often a large amount of buy-
ers willing to buy the shares at that price. Again, if the investor con-
trolled a larger part of the market for some company‘s shares, the 
liquidity of the market for these shares might not be enough to ‗swal-
low‘ the effects of a sale of that part. I think it is safe to say, however, 
that the liquidity of the market for most quoted companies‘ shares is 
enough to minimise the effects of a typical individual investor‘s financial 
boycott.51 On an average day in January 2008, for instance, over £16 
billion worth of shares changed hands on the London Stock Ex-
change52, and a similar figure for the New York Stock Exchange was 
over $160 billion53. 
 In the following subsection, I will note an important exception here 
with regard to some supportive initiatives. Before going there, however, 
I think it should be noted that there is a further problem with the ‗other 
investors on the market‘-factor. This second type of problem arises be-
cause, according to an influential idea in financial theory, companies are 
evaluated on the basis of their ‘fundamentals’ – i.e. estimates of their 
underlying value in terms of ―discounted predicted future profitability, 
and hence dividend yield‖54. What this means is basically that most in-
vestors probably would evaluate a certain company on the basis of what 
profit they think it will make in the future. For estimates of a certain 
clothing company‘s profitability, for instance, relevant factors may be 
the market demand for clothes, the competence of the clothing com-
pany‘s management and the general economic situation in the world. 
These factors, we might say, are the economic fundamentals of the 
company.55 
 Now, estimations of these fundamentals will not change simply be-
cause of a certain transaction on the stock market.56 Thus, if an individ-
ual investor – despite the problems noted above – actually managed to 
reduce the price of a certain company‘s shares, other investors – eva-
 
51 Cf. Mackenzie 1997 
52 London Stock Exchange 2008b 
53 New York Stock Exchange 2008 
54 Mackenzie 1997, p. 140. See also Byström 2007, Keasey et al. 1998, Teweles and Bradley 
1998. 
55 Cf. Byström 2007, Fontanills and Gentile 2001, Haigh and Hazelton 2004, Hudson 2005, 
Keasey et al. 1998, Munnell and Sundén 2005, Schwartz and Francioni 2004, Teweles and 
Bradley 1998, Wyss 2000 
56 Unless, of course, these transactions signal new information about a change in fundamen-
tals (cf. Munnell and Sundén 2005). 
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luating companies on a strictly financial basis – will see that the shares 
are trading at a discount compared to their proper value, i.e. their value 
according to an estimation of the company‘s fundamentals. Thus, I be-
lieve, they will find financial reasons for buying some of the company‘s 
shares. And so, assuming that the original price was the equilibrium 
price based on the company‘s fundamentals, the situation will return to 
the original price before long. The slight fall in share price caused by the 
investor‘s sale of shares will be just that, i.e. a slight fall that will soon 
have been countered by the market.57 
 Interestingly enough, some proponents of the SRI movement seem to 
note also this problem. According to Miller, for instance, this is one of 
the reasons why it is difficult to show that the avoidance strategy really 
makes a difference: 
Indeed, if avoidance investors‘ decisions to sell stocks or not to buy them 
in the first place were secret, those decisions probably would have 
virtually no effect at all. Markets in these issues are so broad and so 
efficient that even if an avoidance investor‘s action temporarily depressed 
the price of a stock by some fraction of a point, other investors, uncon-
strained by considerations of social responsibility, probably would step 
into the breach quickly in order to take advantage of the selloff as a 
bargain buying opportunity and the stock would be right back up where 
it was before very long.58 
I will return to discuss how investors could make their avoidance deci-
sions less ―secret‖ in section 6. From the considerations above, how-
ever, I think it is reasonable to conclude that only very rarely can indi-
vidual investors affect share prices in any straightforward manner by 
buying and selling different companies‘ shares in certain ways. Conse-
quently, only very rarely can individual investors make a difference 
through avoiding certain companies‘ shares or seeking out other com-
panies‘ shares. 
3.2 Community  inve s t in g  
It should be noted that I say ―only very rarely‖ above, and that my ar-
guments in the previous subsection of course were quite schematic, i.e. 
they pertain mainly to what I take to be the ‗standard‘ cases of invest-
 
57 Cf. De George 1999, Haigh and Hazelton 2004, Mackenzie 1997, Munnell and Sundén 
2005, Powers 1971, Simon et al. 1972, Statman 2000 
58 Miller 1991, p. 34. See also Kinder et al. 1993, Powers 1971, Simon et al. 1972. 
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ments by individual investors. Lacking hard empirical data on the effects 
of different individual investors‘ investment decisions, it is obviously 
impossible to say exactly what these effects will be. In order to mitigate 
some of generality in the negative conclusion above, however, I believe 
some important exceptions to this kind of conclusion should be noted. 
According to Mackenzie, the kind of reasoning above would seem to 
indicate that investors may be more likely to be able to influence the 
price of shares for which the market is less liquid, and this is something 
which often may be the case for certain smaller-sized companies.59 With 
regards to very small-scale companies which are not quoted on major 
stock exchanges, furthermore, I noted already at the outset of this sec-
tion that the possibilities of giving a rather direct kind of financial sup-
port may be greater – since large-scale banks and finance institutes are 
less likely to act as underwriters on these companies‘ new share issues 
and loans.60 Now, some writers have suggested that an implication of 
the considerations above is that investors may be more likely to be able 
to make a difference through employing a supportive strategy than 
through sticking only with the avoidance strategy. According to these 
writers, namely, the objects of supportive initiatives more often tend to 
be exactly smaller-sized companies, struggling to get by without the aid 
of many investors.61 Although I cannot comment on how the funds cur-
rently employing an avoidance approach tend to reason in relation to 
the considerations above, I wish to mention what I take to be a very 
promising sort of supportive initiatives in the present context – namely 
the form of direct and community-based banking deals touched upon 
briefly in the introductory chapter.  
 Although it may not have been equally common in the early days of 
SRI, according to many writers, most modern SRI funds put a portion 
of their assets in so-called community investments – a form of investment 
designed specifically to support minority communities or communities 
with poor economic development.62 Most commonly, assets are given as 
loans to small-scale banks or credit unions situated in socially proble-
matic geographical regions, which in turn give loans to local housing 
 
59 Mackenzie 1999, p. 140 
60 Cf. Byström 2007, Lang 1996 
61 Cf. Brill and Reder 1993, Mackenzie 1997, Melton and Keenan 1994, Miller 1991, Sparkes 
1995 
62 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Brill and Reder 1993, Domini 2001, Kinder et al. 1993, Nixon 2002, 
Schueth 2002, Social Investment Forum 2006. Unfortunately, this portion is currently no more 
than 1% (Social Investment Forum 2006). 
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projects or job-creation programs, or they work together with non-
profit organisations to strengthen the local community.63 The reason for 
why community investing has received an increased attention in recent 
years, according to many writers, is because it allows investors to reach 
areas which otherwise are far away from the world of investment and 
finance. Brill and Reder, for instance, write: 
Community development investments serve vital social needs that even 
socially screened stocks and bonds do not touch. Through direct infu-
sion of capital, they help provide jobs, housing, employment, business 
loans, and basic human services to those who have been shunted aside 
by the workings of mainstream economic institutions. In this way, 
communities of economically disadvantaged citizens are helped to trans-
form themselves from victim economies to self-supporting economies. 
This, of course, also helps strengthen social relationships, making those 
communities much more resistant to social problems.64 
According to some writers, although its inclusion into the SRI main-
stream is a fairly recent event, community investing is actually the oldest, 
and may perhaps even be the most common, form of socially responsi-
ble investing since, as Domini puts it, ―[l]ending pools have ancient 
roots. Savings banks were originally chartered for exactly the purposes 
that the community development financial institutions now serve: to 
teach the poor how to save, how to buy a home, and how to start a 
business‖65. One of the most successful examples of community de-
velopment initiatives, often mentioned by proponents of the SRI move-
ment, is the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh which, together with its 
founder Mohammad Yunus, received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006. 
The Grameen Bank has been a pioneer in offering so-called microcredit 
loans to impoverished women in the rural parts of Bangladesh and has, 
through the help of many international investors, become a force for 
alleviating much of the economic depravity experienced in this other-
wise forgotten part of the world.66 
 It is often suggested that community investing is one of the most 
promising, or truly ‗ethical‘, parts of the current SRI movement.67 To a 
large extent, I believe, this attitude on the part of SRI writers stems 
 
63 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Brill and Reder 1993, Domini 2001, Kinder et al. 1993, Lang 1996 
64 Brill and Reder 1993, p. 32 
65 Domini 2001, p. 25 
66 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Domini 2001, Gray et al. 1996, Lang 1996, Sparkes 2002, Ward 1991 
67 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Bruyn 1987, Domini 2001, Gray et al. 1996, Lang 1996. Furthermore, 
Kolers explicitly notes investments in community development banks as a kind of investments 
which may be compatible with the austere conclusion (2001, p. 449). 
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from the fact that community investing is thought to be a very promis-
ing way of actually making a difference and making the world a better 
place.68 Although more and more investors may keep a part of their as-
sets in community investment initiatives, these small-scale initiatives 
need every penny they can get. Domini, for instance, writes: 
Community development financial institutions (CDFIs) [...] directly 
connect you, the investor, with those in need. Every CDFI faces a simi-
lar challenge: The needs it seeks to meet take more funds than the 
institution itself is capable of providing. And that‘s where you come in. 
To do their work, CDFIs enter into partnerships with nonprofits, gov-
ernment agencies, enlightened citizens, and any other resources they can 
find. [...] Grassroots lending institutions play a crucial role in revitalizing 
communities globally and conscientious investors play a crucial role in 
supporting them.69 
I believe Domini‘s characterisation of the efficacy of community invest-
ing here most probably is correct and, thus, that community investing is 
an important exception from the general conclusion outlined above. 
Now, an interesting feature of this kind of investing is that the financial 
returns involved are most often much lower – exactly because commu-
nity investments are so direct and there is a shortage of investors (i.e. 
the market for such investments is highly illiquid) – compared to the 
larger-sized companies‘ shares which are more common in both SRI 
and traditional investment portfolios.70 This would seem to indicate that 
there is a certain price attached to really making a difference through 
market signalling. First of all, there is the price related to the cost of 
finding the extra information needed to ―make the ethical choice‖, as 
pointed out by Brill and Reder above (see section 2) – which will most 
certainly be higher with regards to small-scale initiatives in remote parts 
of the world.71 Over and above this, however, there is also a price re-
lated to the choice of investment per se. Powers, for instance, writes: 
Direct investments in depressed areas of the economy may often in-
volve higher than usual risks and may not offer the potential for normal 
yield or return. Many co-operative developments in minority areas will 
return much of the profit to the local community if the venture 
succeeds, but will leave the investor without his principal if it does not. 
 
68 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Harrington 1992, Kolers 2001, Powers 1971 
69 Domini 2001, p. 108 
70 Cf. Brill and Reder 1993, Domini 2001, Gray et al. 1996, Lang 1996, Lowry 1993, Sparkes 
1995, 2002 
71 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Brill and Reder 1993, Domini 2001 
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Here the distinction between a ―grant‖ and an ―investment‖ is less clear. 
The social impact of such funding, however, can be very great.72 
The fact that community investors accept a lower rate of return is, ac-
cording to Sparkes, actually a reason for not including it in the concept 
of SRI – perhaps it could be called SDI instead, i.e., socially directed in-
vesting.73 I will return to this suggestion in chapter VII. On a general 
level, however, I think the conclusion that making a difference comes at 
a certain price should actually not come as a surprise in the present 
context. As several writers note, even an avoidance strategy, in order to 
be effective, must come at a certain price. In order for an investor with a 
large chunk of shares to able to force the share price down through 
selling the shares, she must try to sell them all as quickly as she can – so 
the market has no time to repair the damage done to the share price. 
But, of course, selling the shares at a discount may cost the investor sig-
nificant sums of money.74 The only way to avoid this is to sell the shares 
off over a longer period of time, and wait for the market to recover in 
between sales.75 Doing this, however, will certainly not be an effective 
way of making a difference through market signalling. 
 I will return to the issue of the demandingness of pragmatism and 
morality in chapter VII. In the next subsection, I will briefly note a dif-
ferent kind of exception to the argument presented above. 
3.3 Changes  in  the  inve s tor  base  
If the issue of whether the investment decisions of individual investors 
have indirect financial effects on companies is to be on the basis of 
theoretical economic reasoning, I have suggested, the answer seems to 
be that this is highly improbable. As we will soon see further evidence 
of, most economists who have discussed the issue of whether SRI can 
make a difference through market signalling have agreed with this argu-
 
72 Powers 1971, p. 118 
73 Sparkes 2001, p. 195. See also Sparkes 2002, pp. 25-26. 
74 Cf. Kolers 2001, Mackenzie 1997, Powers 1971, Vogel 1978 
75 This would actually seem to be how most so-called ethical funds do it. According to 
Mackenzie, ―ethical funds have a strong financial incentive to find a way to sell their shares in 
such a way that minimises the downward pressure on the company‘s share price. Consequently, 
for example, [the largest ethical fund in the UK] does not require its investment managers to 
sell the shares of companies which contravene its criteria immediately, but over a six month 
period – giving them a chance to minimise the effect on the fund‘s financial performance. A 
skilled fund manager will be able to divest himself of a particular stock over time without 
having any effect on the share price at all‖ (1997, pp. 140-41). 
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ment and also answer this question in the negative. However, one ex-
ception to this should probably be noted. According to Rivoli, it is 
actually so that ―theoretical and empirical finance research is consistent 
with the argument that SRI will affect firms through its effect on the size of 
the investor base‖.76 While I cannot go into all of the details of Rivoli‘s 
argument here, I will briefly compare her basic idea with my negative 
arguments above. Rivoli‘s basic idea is that if some of the standard 
assumptions of ‗perfect markets theory‗ are relaxed, economic theory is 
consistent with the claim that SRI investments really make a difference. 
The standard assumptions of perfect markets theory, Rivoli says, include 
such things as ―costless transactions, full information and zero informa-
tion costs, homogeneous expectations, and available perfect substi-
tutes‖77, but many of these assumptions are rather unrealistic. The main 
reason for why a case could be made for SRI actually making a differ-
ence when these assumptions are relaxed is that share prices may be 
influenced by changes in the size of the investor base, i.e. how many people 
are interested in buying the shares. Rivoli cites empirical research that 
also supports the claim that the size of the investor base is relevant for 
share prices.78 
 While Rivoli‘s conclusion initially may seem at odds with my conclu-
sion above, I think that there actually is no disagreement between these 
two lines of argument. First of all, my arguments above do not preclude 
that an individual investor‘s avoidance of a certain company‘s shares in 
principle may influence the price of these shares. If some investor con-
trols a considerable part of the market for some share, for instance, I 
have said that it certainly is possible that a decision to sell these shares 
on her part, or not to buy them in the first place, could have a non-
negligible effect on the price of the shares. Of course, if many investors 
decided to avoid the same company‘s shares, they might also be able to 
reduce the price of the company‘s shares together – that is, if the size of 
the investor base diminished considerably, companies certainly might be 
affected. I have not denied this and, for this reason, I do not think my 
arguments above rest on the assumptions of perfect markets theory. 
 The difference between Rivoli‘s line of argument and my own, I be-
lieve, is that my argument mainly has dealt with the effectiveness of an 
individual investor‘s practice of buying and selling shares in certain ways, 
 
76 Rivoli 2003, p. 283, emphasis added. See also Angel and Rivoli 1997. 
77 Rivoli 2003, p. 277 
78 Ibid., pp. 280-83 
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whereas Rivoli‘s result indicates that the SRI movement as a whole may 
be able to make a difference. Now, on the collective level, I believe, it is 
more reasonable to think that investors can make a certain difference – 
together they may control considerable parts of different companies‘ 
shares, and they might even be able to mess with the standard ideas of 
when to buy and when to not buy shares on the market (i.e. the ‗funda-
mentals‘-factor described above). Exactly how large the SRI collective 
must be in order to make this kind of difference is a matter I will return 
to below (in section 4.1). I will now turn to the issue of how this kind of 
collective possibility translates into moral reasons for individual inves-
tors to invest in a certain way. 
4.  COLLECT IVE ACTIONS  AN D RESP ONSIB ILITIES  
As I noted above (at the end of section 2), it is often unclear exactly 
how to understand the claim that ―SRI makes a difference‖, or that 
―screening can change the way in which businesses operate‖. Some-
times, the idea would seem to be that individual investors can make a 
difference on their own. At other times, however, the idea would seem 
to be that SRI as a whole, or that the totality of all investors, can make a 
certain difference. Even though the purchases and sales of shares by 
individual investors taken in isolation, then, may make no non-negligible 
difference to share prices and corporate practices, the idea is that larger 
shifts in the investor base may make a non-negligible difference. Ac-
cording to Domini, for instance: 
When a large percentage of the owners of the world‘s business enter-
prises believe that profit must not come at the loss of human or envi-
ronmental justice, then companies will respond. They will serve as ef-
fective means of delivering desired goods and services to the population 
in a manner that does not harm their owners, who are – after all – living 
beings. If the owners of the economic engine of the world recognize 
that money doesn‘t help if you can‘t breathe, then they will create rules 
that allow for both breathable air and financial return. [...] The socially 
managed portfolio is a part of something larger than itself; it is a part of 
a global reformation of the way business is done.79 
As I indicated at the end of the previous section, I believe we should 
probably agree with Domini‘s basic suggestion in this passage. Certainly, 
if a large percentage of investors were to adopt the same kind of invest-
 
79 Domini 2001, p. 17 
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ment strategy, whatever that would be, they would be able to make a 
considerable difference to the way businesses are run. If a large number 
of investors were to avoid investing in certain companies‘ shares, for 
instance, these shares would be more or less worthless on the stock 
market and the companies would probably suffer dramatic financial 
losses because of this – probably forcing them to go bankrupt or, at 
least, to seriously rethink their business activities. It seems plausible to 
say that investors together, then, can create corporate ―rules‖ which can 
make society a better place for people to live in. The question is, how-
ever, what this fact implies in form of moral responsibilities on the part 
of investors. 
 Most straightforwardly, I believe, the considerations above suggest 
that investors, or perhaps society as a whole, have a collective responsibility 
to behave in a certain way in relation to certain companies or industries. 
If my arguments in the previous section were correct, individual inves-
tors can only very rarely make a difference on their own by buying and 
selling shares in different ways. Thus, it is only on the collective level that 
they can make a certain difference in this way and, it seems reasonable 
to say, the responsibility to make a difference most obviously falls on 
investors or society together then, as a collective. But how should this kind 
of collective responsibility be cashed out more exactly? Well, according 
to some philosophers, the morality of ‗collective actions’ (i.e. the things 
we do together in some sense) need actually not have any connection with 
the moral status of the individual actions of which they consist (i.e. the 
things each of us do). According to these philosophers, it is possible, for 
instance, that a certain group acts wrongly even though no individual 
member of this group does anything wrong.80 I will not take a stand on 
whether this position is plausible or not. The issue I wish to discuss in 
the present section is, given the more intuitive view that collectives can-
not act wrongly without at least some individuals in this collective doing 
something wrong, how are we to distribute the responsibility of the col-
lective to do a certain thing to the individuals of the collective? 
 In most cases, when most of us talk about collectives as agents who do 
things, I believe, we do this only metaphorically – what we mean when 
we say that Sweden ought to give more in famine relief to the nations of 
the third world, for instance, is most often that the Swedish parliament 
should pass a certain law making this so. This way of talking, I suggest, 
 
80 Cf. Conee 1983, Postow 1977, Tännsjö 1989, 1998 
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may in fact be quite adequate. In relation to some collective which is 
acting wrongly, namely, I think it seems reasonable to hold exactly those 
people who have influence over how this collective acts morally responsible 
for this. The people who decide how much Sweden should give in 
famine relief, for instance, are arguably the people which it is most rea-
sonable to hold responsible for this type of collective behaviour. Now, 
perhaps the appeal to the collective responsibility of the totality of in-
vestors or society should actually be understood much like the kind of 
case just mentioned. It should be noted, first of all, that there is a political 
dimension to the moral problems of the corporate sector which I have 
said quite little about so far. Perhaps we should sometimes seek political, 
rather than individual, solutions to these kinds of problems (I will return 
to this point in chapter VIII). More to the point at hand, furthermore, it 
may be noted that individual investors perhaps can have a indirect influ-
ence over how other investors behave, and thus they could sometimes 
be in a position to influence what different collectives of investors do 
and refrain from doing on the market. It does not seem unreasonable, I 
believe, to distribute some of the collective responsibility of the totality 
of investors to screen their investments in a certain way to a responsi-
bility on the part of individual investors to try to make this so.  
 I will return to the issue of indirect influence over other investors in 
section 6. In the present section and the next, I will discuss two other 
suggestions as to how the responsibility of the collective to do a certain 
thing should be translated into moral reasons on the part of the individ-
uals of the collective to do this thing. Even though I have said that indi-
vidual investors only very rarely can make a difference on their own by 
different kinds of screening strategies, it may be noted that I have ad-
mitted that they can make such a difference together. But, some may 
argue, the possible ‗collective action‘ involved here is only the sum of all 
individual actions, i.e. the sum of many individual investors investing in 
a similar way. Isn‘t it plausible, then, to say that individual investors have 
moral reasons to, for instance, avoid investing in certain companies, 
because they are a part of a collective which can make a certain difference 
by doing this? That is, isn‘t there a fairly straightforward implication 
from the collective responsibility of all investors to do a certain thing, to 
a moral responsibility on the part of each investor to do his or her part in 
this collective effort? 
 In the subsection below and in the following section, I will discuss 
two rather different formulations of the kind of suggestion outlined 
above. Unfortunately, I think there are many problems with both of 
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these formulations. While it seems important to stress the collective re-
sponsibility of investors, or of all of us, to do something about the 
moral problems of the corporate sector, then, I suggest that this does 
not necessarily imply any direct moral responsibilities on the part of in-
dividual investors. Collective responsibility should rather be understood 
either politically or as the indirect responsibility of influential investors. 
4.1 Taking par t  in  co l l e c t i ve  a c t ions  
While individual investors rarely are able to make a difference through 
buying and selling shares in different ways on their own, I have said, 
they could perhaps make such a difference together as a larger collective 
– but what does this imply for the question of what individual investors 
ought to do? According to a first understanding of the suggestion 
above, the salient moral responsibility of investors here is basically that 
they should join whatever group of other investors that collectively 
makes a positive difference. In the previous chapter (section 3), I al-
lowed proponents of the no-harm principle to appeal to what I called 
‗participatory effects‘, i.e. effects which are caused by a group of people 
to which a given individual investor belongs. We may now note that the 
point of this appeal basically was to distribute the moral blame which 
may arise from a certain collective action to those people who constitute 
this collective. As long as I am a part of a group which does something 
wrong, then, I am partly to blame for this – even though I may have 
been unable to change the (collective) outcome on my own. Perhaps a 
similar appeal is possible in the case of the pragmatic argument for 
screening under discussion in this chapter – to the extent that an indi-
vidual investor may become part of a group which together makes a 
positive difference, then, the individual investor may receive some of 
the moral credit for this. The pragmatic argument for screening, on this 
new interpretation, would be that investors have moral reasons to avoid 
investing in (or to seek out and invest in) certain companies because 
they could be a part of a group whose similar activities makes a non-negligible 
difference.81 
 
81 As I noted in the previous chapter, note 82, it is a debated issue whether this kind of view 
can be formulated in terms of ‗participatory effects‘. According to some philosophers, there 
must actually be some kind of individual effects involved in cases of collective actions, because 
there otherwise never could be the kind of collective effects I have described. That is, if the 
collective makes a perceptible difference, each individual in this collective must be making 
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 In fact, I believe this is more or less how Domini seems to reason in 
the present context. According to Domini, it is perhaps not so impor-
tant whether or not individual investors can make a difference on their 
own – this is not her primary focus, in any case. The important fact is 
that SRI as a whole makes a considerable difference, and that individual 
investors can be a part of this: 
Most people care and want to do what they can. Most of us are grateful 
for a chance to have so much impact for so little effort. We can invest 
and achieve results as good as those achieved by ordinary investors, yet 
we can be a part of something greater than we could give ourselves. We 
can be a part of shaping a world of justice and of environmental sustai-
nability and one in which simple pleasures can be enjoyed by all. 
 When a large percentage of the owners of the world‘s business enter-
prises believe that profit must not come at the loss of human or envi-
ronmental justice, then companies will respond.82 
Domini‘s suggestion here certainly seems inviting – who wouldn‘t want 
to be a part of something greater than oneself? Before evaluating this 
suggestion, it may be noted that it perhaps is possible to understand this 
kind of suggestion, not only along the lines of the pragmatic argument 
for screening as I have done here, but also in a rather different fashion. 
Some philosophers have suggested an argument appealing to fairness 
rather than consequences which seems to point in a similar direction as 
the pragmatic argument outlined above. According to these writers, as 
long as some group of people is doing something socially beneficial 
which it is our collective responsibility to do, each other member of 
society has moral reasons to join this group and contribute to this 
socially beneficial collective effort. They have such moral reasons be-
cause it is unfair to rely on others to fulfil our collective responsibilities.83 Thus, 
even though investors are under no obligation to ‗promote the good‘ as 
I have been assuming here, they still have moral reasons to partake in 
the collective effort of making a certain positive difference and thus to 
choose carefully what they invest in and refrain from investing in. Al-
though I cannot find references to this kind of idea in the SRI literature, 
 
some kind of difference on their own which adds up to the collective effect. The suggestion is 
that these are so-called imperceptible effects (cf. Glover 1975, Otsuka 1991, Parfit 1984). I will 
not elaborate on this suggestion here as my argument against the view discussed in the text 
does not hinge on this matter. 
82 Domini 2001, p. 17 
83 Cf. Cullity 2000, 2004, Murphy 1993, 2000. See also Glover 1975. 
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perhaps this is a line of thinking many proponents of the SRI move-
ment would be rather sympathetic to. 
 I will now turn to evaluate the suggestions above. In order to deter-
mine the plausibility of these kinds of arguments, I believe, the central 
question seems to be to what extent SRI as a whole makes (or has a good 
chance of making) a non-negligible difference. In order for it to be 
plausible to say that investors have moral reasons to invest in a certain 
way because they can become a part of a collective effort which makes a 
certain difference, namely, there either needs to be such an effort which 
already is making a certain difference, or there at least needs to be a good 
chance that such a collective effort will occur. Otherwise, it is simply not 
true that individual investors can become a part of a group which to-
gether makes a non-negligible difference. Furthermore, in order for in-
vestors to have moral reasons to invest in this way on the grounds of 
fairness, arguably, there also needs to be a socially beneficial collective 
effort which investors have moral reasons to join – an effort which it would be 
unfair to leave to others.84 We may therefore here return to discuss the 
central thrust of Rivoli‗s argument above in some more detail. Exactly 
how much would the size of the investor base for a certain share have 
to diminish in order for a collective avoidance campaign to have a non-
negligible, and lasting, effect on the price of this share? Well, this is 
obviously an extremely difficult question to answer. According to most 
economists, however, making a difference on the stock market is ac-
tually even harder than the considerations in the previous section sug-
gest – even for collectives such as the SRI movement as a whole.  
 The central focus of most economists who have discussed the issue 
of whether SRI can make a difference, it may be noted, is whether so-
called ethical funds control enough capital to be able to influence compa-
nies through the market signalling approach. Even though such funds 
obviously hold a lot more capital than individual investors, most writers 
suggest that the amount of capital they hold still is far too small to be 
 
84 This is so, at least, according to Cullity‗s version of the fairness argument: ―I am not claim-
ing [...] that fairness always compels deriving individual imperatives from collective ones. No 
doubt, there are very many things that we all ought to be doing, but are not. That does not 
mean that I ought to launch unilaterally into making some active contribution towards each of 
the goals we ought collectively to be pursuing. [...] It is unfair to rely on others to contribute to 
meeting a collective imperative, without being prepared to contribute myself. Obviously, where 
no one is yet meeting that imperative, I am not unfairly relying on other people in this way‖ 
(2004, p. 64). Perhaps some fair share theorists would disagree with this – for a discussion of 
an alternative idea, see the next section. 
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able to influence public limited companies through diminishing the in-
vestor bases of these companies. Matthew Haigh and James Hazelton, 
for instance, write: 
Despite their growth, SRI funds comprise a relatively stagnant fraction 
of total [funds under management (FUM)]. Over the period December 
1999–December 2001, SRI retail mutual funds in Europe accounted for 
no more than four-tenths of one percent (0.4%) of total FUM. Over the 
period September 2000–September 2002, the proportion of total FUM 
represented by retail and wholesale SRI mutual equity funds in the U.S. 
hovered on two-tenths of one percent (0.2%); in Australia over the 
same period, the proportion was no more than three-tenths of one per-
cent (0.3%). [...] Given that equity capital accounts for approximately 
half of total FUM, SRI equity funds at current levels cannot be expected 
to materially impact on company operations. [...] Put simply, SRI funds 
are unlikely to affect companies‘ capital investment programs because 
their holdings account for such a small percentage of the register of any 
corporation.85 
The same point is made by Mackenzie: ―The holdings ethical funds have 
in large companies are tiny. [...] It is unlikely, therefore, that at their 
present scale ethical funds can depreciate the share prices of large com-
panies by selling their shares‖86. Now, Mackenzie asks: ―What if ethical 
funds grew much larger? What if, in a few years time, they comprise 5% 
of the total market?‖87. Unfortunately, Mackenzie suggests, we have no 
good reason for thinking that similar problems will not persist also on 
the macro level: ―Such a level of avoidance may well affect the share 
prices of companies. But, for big companies with liquid markets for 
their shares, the effect would be short term and arbitraged away by or-
dinary financially motivated investors‖88. According to Mackenzie, then, 
even if the SRI movement as a whole grew considerably, the effect this 
would have on the investor base of morally unacceptable companies 
would still be too small to have any lasting influence on share prices, at 
least with regards to larger-sized companies. Furthermore, Mackenzie 
notes, such a rise in investments according to SRI guidelines, i.e. up to-
wards 5% of the total stock market value, seems very unlikely in the 
foreseeable future.89 It may be noted that Mackenzie perhaps is being 
fairly optimistic here – other writers have suggested that the SRI move-
 
85 Haigh and Hazelton 2004, pp. 61-62 
86 Mackenzie 1997, pp. 139-40. See also Munnell and Sundén 2005, Schepers and Sethi 2003. 
87 Mackenzie 1997, p. 141 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid., p. 142 
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ment would have to control closer to 25% of the total stock market in 
order to have a lasting impact on the prices of targeted companies‘ 
shares.90 Of course, a rise to this level would seem even less likely.  
 In connection with this, it should be noted that some economists ac-
tually have questioned whether the so-called divestment campaign di-
rected at the apartheid regime of South Africa really had anything to do 
with why this regime fell. The South Africa campaign, as I have said, is 
very often held out by SRI proponents as unequivocal evidence of the 
efficacy of screening and is probably the campaign where the largest 
number of both private and institutional investors have avoided a simi-
lar set of companies. In a very comprehensive study of the financial ef-
fects of this campaign on US companies with operations in South 
Africa, however, Siew Hong Teoh, Ivo Welch and Paul Wazzan con-
clude that there is little evidence for the suggestion that the campaign 
was financially effective. They write: 
Our article [...] examines both how prices and institutional sharehold-
ings changed in response to social and political pressures around the 
voluntary divestment decisions of U.S. firms with South African opera-
tions. We document that investments by public firms in South Africa 
were small and so were price reactions to the announcement of pressure 
and divestitures. Therefore, potential lost economic opportunities 
through the boycott were too small to be statistically or economically 
significant. Further, the demand for stocks is driven by many investors 
(and from many countries) with many different preferences, so that the 
withdrawal or return of even a large number of U.S. institutions from 
investing in large firms or in entire sectors seems to make very little dif-
ference to stock values. The results also indicate that any potential nega-
tive spillover effects from South African investments onto total profita-
bility were likely small. Finally, throughout the period of most intense 
political pressure, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange reached new highs. 
Overall, the evidence indicates that it is unlikely that political share-
holder activism has large wealth consequences.91 
The considerations suggest that not even SRI as a whole makes a non-
negligible difference to share prices and corporate practices through the 
screening methods which it applies. Thus, the suggestion that investors 
 
90 Heinkel et al. 2001. The exact percentage here depends on a number of factors, according 
to these writers – under certain assumptions, the SRI movement would have to control around 
60% of the stock market in order to have a lasting impact on targeted companies. 
91 Teoh et al. 1999, pp. 38-39. In another study, some other economists suggest that the 
financial effect of the South Africa campaign was not visible until the end of the political 
sanctions – following the end of the sanctions, the stock prices of US and European firms with 
shareholdings in South Africa exhibited abnormal returns (see Kumar et al. 2002). 
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have moral reasons to screen their investments because they in this 
manner can be part of a group which collectively makes a difference 
would seem to fail. Perhaps this suggestion is implausible for other rea-
sons as well.92 Of course, it may still seem plausible to say that those 
who invest in morally unacceptable companies are part of a group which 
collectively supports these companies. I will return to this collectivist 
interpretation of the no-harm principle below. Now, perhaps it is possi-
ble to formulate the argument for a distribution of the responsibility of 
all investors to each investor in a slightly different way which avoids the 
problems above. I turn to this issue in the following section. 
5.  COLLECT IVE DILEMMAS A ND THE GENERAL IS ATIO N  
TEST  
What seems relevant to Domini‗s version of the pragmatic argument for 
screening and the fairness argument discussed above, I said, is whether 
individual investors actually can be a part of some collective that makes a 
certain difference. Since the proportion of the total investment universe 
which currently applies some form of social screens is quite small (and 
there is little hope that this proportion will rise sufficiently much in the 
foreseeable future), I said that it does not seem likely that individual in-
vestors can be a part of such a collective (at least not in the foreseeable 
 
92 According to Regan, it is easy to see how giving individual agents moral credit for collective 
efforts is implausible by considering the following kind of cases: ―Case 1: There are 100 agents. 
A benefit worth 110 units can be secured by the participation of at least sixty agents. Participa-
tion by more than sixty does not increase the benefit. The benefit which each agent can pro-
duce individually and independently of the 110-unit benefit if he does not participate is worth 1 
unit. There are no other relevant costs or benefits. Now, if ninety-nine agents are participating 
in the production of the participatory benefit, what should the other agent, whom we shall call 
Jones, do, according to the contributory consequences approach? If he participates, he gets 
one-hundredth of the credit for the production of a benefit with a value of 110 units. He gets 
credit for slightly over 1 unit of value. If he does not participate, he will produce a benefit 
worth 1 unit. Therefore he should participate, forgoing the benefit he could produce if he did 
not participate, despite the fact that even without him there are thirty-nine more agents partici-
pating than are needed to produce the participatory benefit.  
 Case 2: There are 100 agents. A benefit worth 50 units can be secured by the participation 
of at least sixty agents. The benefit each agent can produce if he does not participate is worth 
one unit. If fifty-nine agents other than Jones are participating in an attempt to produce the 
participatory benefit and forty agents other than Jones are not participating, what should Jones 
do? According to the contributory consequences approach, if Jones participates, he gets one-
sixtieth of the credit for a benefit valued at 50 units, or slightly less than 1 unit. If he does not 
participate, he will produce consequences worth 1 unit. Therefore, he should not participate, 
despite the fact that his participation is all that is needed to secure 50 units of benefit which his 
non-participation will leave unachieved‖ (1980, pp. 14-15). 
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future). But what would SRI proponents say in response to this argu-
ment? Does this argument really meet the most plausible formulation of 
the intuition that collective responsibility, or what would happen if 
everyone did a certain thing, is morally relevant? Perhaps it does not. 
According to another common idea about how we should think about 
moral matters, it should be noted, the relevant question is only what 
would happen if a certain collective acted in a certain way, or if more 
people followed a specific individual‘s behaviour. According to this idea, 
it is irrelevant whether or not other investors currently are screening their 
investments in a certain way – what is relevant is what would happen if 
they would screen their investments in this way. 
 Some philosophers who have defended the avoidance strategy have 
invoked this alternative understanding of the appeal to collective 
responsibility. According to De George, for instance, the suggestion that 
individual investors seldom can influence share prices on their own is 
hardly a reason to doubt the moral case for avoidance since ―simply 
because someone else will act unethically in no way justifies our acting 
in the same manner‖93. The writer who has invoked this understanding 
most explicitly, however, is Irvine. At the end of his paper, Irvine briefly 
discusses the issue of the negligible effects of most individual investors‘ 
transactions on share prices. He calls this the small-purchase objection – 
―the Enablement Principle will almost never classify the stock purchases 
of average investors as wrong because the stock purchases of average 
investors are almost always small‖94. Now, in response to the small-
purchase objection, Irvine argues: 
I agree that small purchases of stock do not, in and of themselves, affect 
the ability of a company to do its business; nevertheless, I don‘t think 
this gets the average investor off the hook, morally speaking. The real 
question, from a moral point of view, is not whether his one purchase 
affects the ability of the company to conduct its business, but rather 
whether his purchase, if imitated by many other investors, would affect the 
ability of the company to conducts its business95 
The reason that Irvine cites for abandoning the kind of individualist 
framework assumed earlier in this chapter is the following type of philo-
sophical examples: 
 
93 De George 1999, p. 480 
94 Irvine 1987, p. 239 
95 Ibid., emphasis added 
171 
There are a number of cases in which the behavior of one person won‘t 
make any real difference to the world. Consider the standard ethical ex-
ample: walking across newly-seeded grass. If one person walks across 
newly-seeded grass, it won‘t harm the grass. Nevertheless, it is presuma-
bly wrong for even one person to walk across the grass. After all, if 
everyone followed this reasoning – that this one case of walking won‘t 
hurt the grass – the results would be undesirable. Thus, walking on the 
grass is wrong, not because one act of walking in and of itself will cause 
any harm, but because the act is not universalizable: If everyone who 
was in a position to do the act went ahead and did it, harm would be 
done.96 
We might call the type of cases Irvine refers to here collective dilemmas97, 
and the type of question he proposes that we should ask to determine 
the moral status of actions, i.e. ‗What if everyone did that?‘, as the gener-
alisation test of actions98. The idea that this kind of generalisation test, or 
the question ‗What if everyone did that?‘, is central to morality, it should 
be noted, is an idea shared by many other philosophers. According to 
Immanuel Kant, for instance, this kind of question lies at the heart of all 
morality since acting morally basically is to act on (what could be made 
into) universal laws. If it is not possible, or desirable, for all people in rele-
vantly similar circumstances to act in a certain way, Kant suggests, act-
ing in this way is essentially to make an exception for oneself.99 This 
kind of idea can be formulated both in a consequentialist and a non-
consequentialist way. Some philosophers who support a consequentialist 
view on morality, it may be noted, have actually defended an idea which 
is not too different from Kant‘s – according to so-called rule-consequen-
tialism, what is important is not the consequences of a certain act as such, 
but rather the consequences of everyone’s following a rule which allows or 
prescribes this kind of act.100 I cannot elaborate on Kant‘s original idea 
nor rule-consequentialism in the present context. I will, however, have 
something to say about the plausibility of Irvine‘s argument for the 
avoidance strategy. 
 
96 Ibid. 
97 Similar kinds of cases have been discussed by, e.g., Cullity 2000, 2004, Glover 1975, 
Narveson 1976, Otsuka 1991, Parfit 1984, Tännsjö 1989. It may be noted that these cases are 
inspired by, but not exactly similar to, what is often called ‗many-person prisoner‘s dilemmas‗ 
or ‗tragedies of the commons‘ – cf. Hardin 1968, Parfit 1984. 
98 This term is from Glover 1975. Parfit calls it the ―Kantian Test‖ (1984, p. 66) and Irvine 
himself says that ―[w]hat I am doing at this point is invoking what ethicists call the Universali-
zability Principle‖ (1987, p. 239). 
99 Kant 2002 (originally published 1785). For an informative introduction to some of the main 
tenets of Kant‘s moral philosophy, see Nell 1975. 
100 For some recent discussions of rule-consequentialism, see Hooker 2000, Mulgan 2001. 
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 When confronted with the fact that individual investors cannot make 
a difference on their own, it is my own experience that many people 
actually appeal to an idea similar to Irvine‘s here. Some react, for in-
stance, by saying that it is too self-centred to care only about the difference 
you yourself can make – why not care about the difference we can make 
together? Others say, more straightforwardly like Irvine, that perhaps the 
important question is not ‗what difference will it make if I do this?‘, but 
rather ‗what difference would it make if everyone did this?‘. I believe this 
reaction is justified, at least to some extent. The existence of the kind of 
collective dilemmas Irvine discusses is certainly something that it is im-
portant to stress in moral settings and ‗solving‘ these is an important 
task for an adequate moral theory. There is also some plausibility in the 
kind of ‗solution‘ which Irvine proposes - if all investors avoided in-
vesting in a certain company, or seek out and invest in a certain com-
pany, this would certainly have tremendous effects on the prices of 
these companies‘ shares. The totality of investors, thus, is surely in a 
position to influence what companies do and refrain from doing. In the 
end, however, I think there are a number of problems with appealing to 
the generalisation test in favour of the avoidance strategy.  
 First of all, consider the kind of problems which Irvine himself points 
out: 
There are, to be sure, any number of problems we encounter when we 
try to give a precise statement of the [generalisation test]. It looks, for 
example, as if the [test] can be used to show that celibacy is wrong, or 
that living in America is wrong. (How would you like it if everyone were 
celibate? Our species would soon be extinct. How would you like it if 
everyone lived in America? Think of the miserable living conditions that 
would result.) The [appeal to generalisation] does, however, have strong 
intuitive appeal, and there is reason for thinking the problems described 
can be overcome.101 
I will not elaborate on the kind of problems which Irvine mentions in 
this passage, so in what follows we may assume that these problems can 
be overcome. The kind of problems Irvine mentions, it may be noted, 
call the plausibility of the appeal to generalisation in question (that is, is it 
really wrong to perform actions which fail the generalisation test?). But I 
will elaborate on a kind of problem which I think is closer to the subject 
matter at hand and which calls the moral relevance of the appeal to genera-
lisation into question (that is, even if it is sound, what weight does this 
 
101 Irvine 1987, pp. 239-40 
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appeal carry as an argument for screening?). This critique is related to 
the kind of problem discussed in the previous section. What seemed 
relevant to Domini‗s version of the pragmatic argument for screening 
and the fairness argument discussed above, I said, was whether individ-
ual investors actually can be a part of some collective that makes a certain 
difference. The problem for these arguments was that not even SRI as a 
whole currently seems to make much of a difference through the 
screening methods it applies – but perhaps this kind of problem could 
be avoided. According to the idea currently under discussion, it should 
be noted, the relevant question is what would happen if sufficiently 
many investors screened their investments in a certain way and, obvi-
ously, this kind of formulation is not open to the criticism that enough 
investors currently are not screening their investments in this way. How-
ever, a related criticism, I suggest, is that appealing to this kind of counter-
factuals seems utterly unrealistic. 
 A fairly straightforward way of formulating this criticism may be the 
following: Certainly, if all investors were to employ the avoidance strat-
egy in relation to some limited company, this would make a considera-
ble difference to how this company is run – but this is a big if. As things 
currently stand, very few investors are doing this, so why should we 
worry about what would happen if everyone somehow started to do so? 
That is, why should the fact that avoidance investors could make a con-
siderable difference if they controlled, say, 90 percent of the stock mar-
ket be relevant to individual investors in our world today, where in fact only less 
than 1 percent of investments are screened according to ethical criteria? 
 Some readers may feel that the lack of realism in Irvine‘s suggestion 
actually is a good thing and not a problem – after all, we are not inter-
ested in what other investors currently are doing, but in what they ought to 
do. Compared to the way in which most investors currently choose their 
investments, Irvine‘s suggestion may seem both radical and important. 
However, I believe it is vital to be clear about what Irvine‘s present sug-
gestion really amounts to. Perhaps the best way of evaluating Irvine‘s 
argument for the avoidance strategy is to compare it with a pragmatic 
argument for the philanthropic strategy introduced in the introductory 
chapter. According to proponents of the philanthropic strategy, inves-
tors have moral reasons to invest in whatever company‘s shares that 
currently give the most dividends and prospects for capital gain and do-
nate the profit made on these investments to some worthwhile charity. 
While it seems possible to combine this strategy with an avoidance of 
certain morally unacceptable companies or industries, I believe it is most 
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interesting when it is considered as a radical alternative to the avoidance 
and supportive strategies. According to proponents of the philanthropic 
strategy, it should be noted, investors may very well have moral reasons 
to invest in, for example, weapons shares – if the return on such shares 
is sufficiently high. How does the philanthropic strategy fare on the kind 
of pragmatic thinking discussed previously in this chapter? Well, while 
there is some debate on the effectiveness of charities and charitable 
donations (which is an issue I will not say much about here102), I believe 
it is interesting to note that, as far as my discussion in section 3 above is 
concerned, it may very well be so that individual investors could make a 
considerably greater difference to, say, the victims of war through 
donating investment proceeds to them directly in this way than through 
refraining from investing in weapons shares. So what could be wrong 
with doing this? 
 Well, according to Irvine‘s suggestion above, I have said, investors 
have moral reasons not to invest in certain (morally unacceptable?) 
companies because such investments fail the generalisation test – that is, 
the consequences of everyone’s investing into such companies would be 
terrible. But the point I wish to make by introducing the philanthropic 
strategy in this context is that, compared to the very tangible difference 
investors may make to certain unfortunate people‘s lives by donating 
investment proceeds directly, it should now be easy to see how the kind 
of positive scenario envisioned by proponents of the generalisation test 
is little more than a distant dream. Certainly, if everyone refrained from 
investing in certain companies, this could force them out of business. 
But choosing avoidance over philanthropy would seem to be to go on 
longing for the dream instead of making a real difference and, in my 
opinion, this is far from a plausible reaction to the very real problems 
facing millions of people around the world today. While it may seem 
plausible to say that it is wrong to walk on the grass (which is Irvine‘s 
example) in a situation where only the possible (collective) effects on the 
 
102 A common argument against charity is that it fails to address the root of the relevant prob-
lem – for instance, it does not address the long-term causes of poverty and it makes recipient 
individuals or countries dependent on charitable donations rather than self-supporting. 
Another argument is that, just like the effect that a single individual investor‘s avoidance of a 
certain company‘s shares makes no difference to the price of these shares, a single individual‘s 
charitable contributions make no real difference to people in need. However, I take these to be 
arguments for choosing certain specific charities and designing charities in a certain way rather than 
as arguments against charitable donations as such. For more extensive discussions of this issue, 
see Cullity 2004, Unger 1996. 
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grass are involved, I believe it seems rather absurd to say that it is wrong 
to walk on the grass if, by doing so, one could save people from war, 
starvation, infectious disease, natural disasters, etc.. 
 The philanthropic strategy, because it is so unscrupulous when it 
comes to recommendations about what companies one should invest in, 
I believe is very provocative to some readers.103 My main reason for 
mentioning this strategy in the present context, however, is to challenge 
the present line of reasoning for the avoidance strategy, or for screening 
in general. A number of other writers have noted similar problems with 
similar arguments. According to some philosophers, considerations like 
those above raise the issue of how to formulate the generalisation test in 
the first place – more exactly, what kind of action or rule the generalisa-
tion test should be applied to (i.e. how to understand ―that‖ in the 
question ‗What if everyone did that?‘).104 In order for the appeal to 
generalisation to be more plausible, it would seem reasonable to make 
exceptions for cases when very few actually are doing what the appeal to 
generalisation tells them to do, or where observation of the generalisa-
tion test would lead to very bad outcomes. The effect of such a move, 
however, seems to be that rule-consequentialism, according to many 
writers, actually collapses into act-consequentialism, i.e. (a version of) the 
straightforward and individualist kind of idea outlined in section 2 
above.105 
 For the reasons above, I believe we should conclude that Irvine‘s ap-
peal does not seem to carry much weight as an argument for a certain 
kind of screening. Even if there are contexts in which the generalisation 
test is an important moral guide, then, the investment context is not one 
of them. Before leaving my argument from lack of realism above, I be-
 
103 While it has been suggested as an ‗ethical investment strategy‘ by some writers (Bruyn 1987, 
Skillius 2002, Zweig 1996), it may be noted, it has also met with rather a lot of resistance from 
certain parts of the SRI movement. According to Harrington, for instance, ―[m]any argue that 
instead of investing in a socially responsible manner, investors should seek to maximize their 
profits and then [...] make contributions and gifts from their gains to aid causes that they [...] 
consider socially responsible. [...] This argument is deeply flawed. It ignores the fact that the 
investment decision in itself may have created or contributed to the social problem in the first 
place‖ (1992, p. 4). However, the considerations in section 3 above would seem to suggest that 
it is Harrington‘s suggestion here that is deeply flawed. According to Kolers, another problem 
with the philanthropic strategy is that it is unjust – ―the people who (primarily) benefit from 
‗down the road‘ philanthropy are usually not the people harmed by the investment‖ (2001, p. 
442). Perhaps this problem can be avoided by requiring, for instance, that profits made from 
investments in weapon companies should be donated to charities directed at the victims of 
war. However, Kolers‘ argument also fails if investments in fact harm no one.  
104 Cf. Glover 1975, Juth 2005, Parfit 1984 
105 Cf. Kagan 1998, Lyons 1965, Mulgan 2001 
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lieve it should be noted that a problem similar to that which befalls 
Irvine‘s generalisation test is actually what I take to befall the argument 
for the avoidance strategy from the collectivist understanding of the no-harm 
principle mentioned a couple of times above. While my argument against 
the appeal to generalisation was formulated in terms of the lack of real-
ism of this appeal, a more general argument could perhaps be formu-
lated in terms of focus. I noted already at the end of the previous chapter 
(section 4.2) how many commentators complain that the avoidance 
strategy is nothing more than a ―head in the sand approach‖, the point 
of which mainly would seem to be to allow investors to ―keep their 
hands clean‖ of certain societal problems rather than to actually try to 
address them. Armed with the kind of reasoning outlined in this section, 
I believe, I am ready to give this kind of argument some force. 
 I argued in the previous chapter (section 3.1) that if the no-harm prin-
ciple makes use of what I called ‗participatory effects‗, and doesn‘t make 
any restrictions on how long and complicated the causal chain between 
investors and companies may be in order for corporate harm to count, it 
would seem to imply both the austere conclusion and the problems with 
selling ‗tainted‘ shares further. And, as noted previously in this chapter 
(section 3), there is no way in which proponents of the no-harm prin-
ciple can avoid these implications if they want to use this principle as an 
argument for the avoidance strategy – if there indeed is a causal link 
between investors and underlying companies, it is both quite compli-
cated and mainly on the collective level. But, what should investors do 
in light of these considerations then? Should they simply choose never 
to invest and distance themselves completely from the world of finance? 
Or should they be prepared to ‗dirty‘ their hands in at least some cases? 
 For reasons similar to those stated above, I believe choosing non-
investment rather than philanthropy or activism here could be criticised 
on the grounds that it seems to express a certain detachment from and 
nonchalance towards the real world and its very real problems. While it 
may be true that there is no way in which one can invest with entirely 
―clean hands‖, I believe, focusing on one‘s own hands, or the part one 
happens to play in the causal chain leading up to harm, would seem 
rather misdirected. As I have argued above, namely, it makes no real 
difference if one chooses to distance oneself from playing this part – 
but by playing it better one could possibly make a considerable difference 
to some very unfortunate people‘s lives. Simon, Powers and Gunne-
mann, I believe, formulate this point quite nicely when they write: 
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Any quest for moral purity alone [...] seems hopelessly naive. To attempt 
to cleanse one‘s portfolio of dirty stocks and to invest only in clean 
stocks would involve one in an endless series of illusions and arbitrary 
decisions. [...] Too many people, however, let the matter rest here: be-
cause one cannot avoid contamination, one cannot do anything at all. 
The complex organization and inter-relatedness of the world is invoked 
in either existentialist despair or bureaucratic indifference, and the guilt 
of all becomes the guilt of no one. This result is unacceptable. We may 
not be able to avoid the world‘s guilt, but we can seek to reduce the 
level of injury. That no course of action is untainted does not mean that 
no course of action is preferable to another or that we cannot choose 
between more and less desirable consequences.106 
I believe Simon et al.‘s point is an important one, but (since they expli-
citly embrace the no-harm principle – see section 3 of the previous 
chapter) perhaps they have not understood its full implications them-
selves. With the argument above, I believe, I have argued against the last 
outpost for proponents of the no-harm principle. If investors indeed 
have moral reasons to avoid investing in certain companies under cer-
tain circumstances, we may conclude, this is not because of their causal 
relation to harm per se. 
 Now, having said all that I have said above, I wish to emphasise again 
that I think it is important to stress the existence of collective dilemmas in 
moral settings. There are certainly a lot of things people do which are 
not too harmful in isolation but which can become harmful on the col-
lective level. As I said above, I believe the most straightforward under-
standing of these things is that it is our collective responsibility to 
counteract such types of harm. Collective responsibility, however, does 
not necessarily imply any moral responsibilities on the part of all indi-
viduals who make up the collective, but should rather be understood 
either politically or as the indirect responsibility of the most influential 
members of such collectives. I will close this book with some brief 
comments on the politics of SRI (in chapter VIII, section 2). In the 
following section, however, I will turn to the issue of the indirect and 
social effects of screening. 
6.  THE S OCIAL EFFECTS  OF  S CREENING  
The conclusion of the discussions in the three previous sections, I have 
said, is that while individual investors only very rarely can make a non-
 
106 Simon et al. 1972, p. 26 
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negligible difference to share prices and corporate practices on their 
own by screening investments, a sufficiently large collective may be able 
to make such a difference. It may be argued, however, that the distinc-
tion between ‗on their own‘ and ‗collectively‘ I have been using in these 
arguments is at best illusory, and that I have neglected the social dimen-
sion of investing (or screening). No investments are made entirely in a 
social vacuum, and thus investments may not only have financial effects 
but also a kind of social ones. Most importantly, one investor‘s avoid-
ance of a certain company‘s shares may encourage other investors to 
avoid this company, which in turn may encourage yet others, and so on, 
and so forth. In this way, individual investors‘ avoidance may in fact 
have a sort of collective effect, because they may cause a further collec-
tive to act. Perhaps this is actually what Irvine is after when he says that 
what matters is what happens if an individual investor‘s action is ―im-
itated by many other investors‖.107 
 In this section, I will discuss this and other suggestions about certain 
social or societal effects of screening investments. Obviously, the kind 
of effects appealed to in the idea above are rather indirect – the effects 
which other people‘s screening choices may have on share prices and 
thus on corporate practices. Before discussing these kinds of effects, 
however, it may be appropriate to discuss an argument which appeals to 
a more direct kind of non-financial effects, namely social effects on the 
managers of limited companies. 
6.1 The  hyper s ens i t iv i t y  o f  manager s  
When I introduced the argument for screening from its possible finan-
cial effects above, it may be noted, I suggested that these kinds of ef-
fects are not important as such, i.e. the point of the argument was not 
simply that screening has certain financial ramifications. On the market 
signalling approach, I said, the reason for focusing on the effects on 
share prices was that these are the central mechanisms by which the 
stock market can influence quoted companies, and this is mainly be-
cause the managers of these companies seem to care (and have reasons to 
care) about share prices. Remember also the analogy with ethical con-
sumerism – according to most writers, the point of screening is to influ-
 
107 Irvine 1987, p. 239. According to Glover, it is often the case that acts which initially seem 
to ‗make no difference whether or not I did them‘ have side-effects that actually make an impor-
tant difference (1975, p. 177-81). 
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ence companies financially in order to influence the managers of these com-
panies to direct their activities in directions which are more socially 
beneficial. But perhaps it is actually not possible to conclude from the 
fact that most individual investors cannot influence the price of some 
company‘s shares in any non-negligible way, the further claim that they 
cannot influence the managers of the company in question to any non-
negligible extent. Well, at least this is what some writers suggest. One 
idea here is that managers care so much about their reputation that even 
the smallest of boycotting campaigns against their company might per-
suade them to change their ways. According to Brill, Brill and Feigen-
baum, for instance: 
Every day, countless investors are dumping stocks in companies they 
dislike. This exerts a downward force on those shares. It‘s hard to know 
how much influence this has on stock prices – it may be quite negligible. 
Nevertheless, corporate CEOs and their boards of directors are hypersen-
sitive to anything that might drag their stock prices down. In the last few 
years, social researchers have gained the ear of upper management; 
companies want those good grades for corporate responsibility and are 
making real reforms in order to earn them.108 
It is perhaps unclear how to understand the reference to social research-
ers here – I will return to this point below. The argument suggested by 
Brill et al. above, I believe, is very interesting – if it is true, it seems, in-
dividual investors may actually be able to influence corporate practices 
despite the fact that their share purchases and sales are too small to have a lasting 
impact on share prices. This is because managers simply are hypersensitive 
to anything that might affect the price of their shares, i.e. they are sensi-
tive even to financial boycotts which for all practical purposes are 
doomed to fail. Should we conclude from this argument that investors 
have pragmatic moral reasons to avoid investing in certain companies 
and seek out and invest in others after all? 
 One may now note a dimension of the kind of reasoning discussed 
previously in this chapter which connects it to my discussion at the end 
of the previous chapter. Even though the SRI proponents and econo-
mists who have discussed the so-called market signalling approach sel-
dom make this dimension explicit, the term market signalling would seem 
to suggest that acts of buying and selling shares could be seen as a kind 
of communicative acts, sending a certain signal on the market which manag-
 
108 Brill et al. 1999, p. 77 
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ers then can pick up. This idea, it should be noted, is similar to one of 
my understandings of the approval argument in the previous chapter 
(section 4.1), namely the idea that investing in morally companies com-
municates a kind of approval to other people. In fact, it should be noted 
that we have already met with the kind of argument about effects on 
managers outlined above, although in another guise. According to some 
proponents of the approval argument, I noted in the previous chapter, 
expressing an approval of morally unacceptable companies may be mor-
ally problematic because it encourages managers to go on with the bad things they 
are doing. According to Simon, Powers and Gunnemann, for instance, 
―an institutional shareholder who votes routinely for management [...] 
lends a measure of apparent acceptance and approval to existing corpo-
rate policies, thus reinforcing the management‘s predisposition to pur-
sue these policies. In other words, until a shareholder ends his acquies-
cence in corporate violations of law or public policy, he encourages their 
continuation‖109. 
 Now, the analogy between acts of buying and selling shares and com-
munication, I believe it should be noted, suggests that certain conditions 
have to be met in order for these kinds of market transactions to be 
effective in the respects indicated above. Most importantly, of course, it 
needs to be clear what the investor‘s message is, so that managers can 
pick up the right signal. I believe there is an ample problem here, both 
for the present hypersensitivity argument and for the market signalling 
approach itself, which is closely related to Miller‗s observation concern-
ing the ‗secrecy‘ of many investment decisions (noted in section 3.1). It 
is perhaps clear what ―social researchers‖ want of companies, and thus 
companies may respond to demands of these, as Brill, Brill and Feigen-
baum suggest. But how should managers interpret the fact that some 
individual investor decides to sell a certain amount of the shares of their 
company? At any given time, there are probably thousands of individual 
investors selling the shares of a certain company for just about every 
kind of reason. On an average day in January 2008, for instance, over 
3.2 billion shares changed hands on the London Stock Exchange110, and 
a similar figure for the New York Stock Exchange was over 3.9 bil-
lion111. Some might sell their shares because of doubts about the com-
pany‘s profitability, some just might feel that the shares do not fit in well 
 
109 Simon et al. 1972, p. 151 
110 London Stock Exchange 2008c 
111 New York Stock Exchange 2008 
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with the rest of their portfolio, and yet others might avoid the com-
pany‘s shares for ethical reasons. How are managers to know exactly for 
what reason a certain individual investor avoids the company they 
manage?112 
 In response to the considerations above, it may be argued that it is 
fairly obvious what so-called ethical funds are after, and so individual 
investors may have reason to screen their investments through invest-
ments in such funds. Ethical funds are called so exactly because they 
tend to avoid certain investments for ethical reasons, and this is a fact 
that most managers should be familiar with.113 I think this suggestion 
only takes us so far, however. Surely, even ethical funds sell certain 
shares for financial reasons and avoid certain other shares for financial 
reasons. So, even if managers of companies that ethical funds avoid 
might have some reason to think that they are failing in some respect of 
social responsibility, they can never be sure of this. There is very little 
empirical evidence on exactly how managers react when ethical funds 
sell shares in their companies – I will return to this below. As I see it, 
however, there is no reason to think that there is a perfect match 
between the intentions of the ethical fund and the interpretation of the 
fund‘s action by the managers – sometimes managers may fail to under-
stand that a certain disposal of shares was ethically motivated, at other 
times they might mistake simple financial motivations for moral critique. 
 The upshot of the considerations above, then, is that, even if inves-
tors actually managed to influence the price of some company‘s shares 
somehow, it is not obvious what effects this would have on the activities 
of this company. This is because there simply is no way in which mana-
gers automatically will understand that they have reasons to steer their 
company in a more socially beneficial or ethically worthwhile direction. 
And the same problem, of course, arises for the hypersensitivity argu-
ment outlined above. But, perhaps individual investors can do some-
thing about this. As already noted, some writers criticise the idea of ‗se-
cretly‘ avoiding a certain company‘s shares, or ―departing quietly‖ from 
 
112 Cf. Haigh and Hazelton 2004, Lang 1996, Powers 1971, Sorell and Hendry 1994. Lang 
notes how the avoidance strategy may backfire for exactly this reason: ―After all, people refrain 
from investing for a variety of reasons, and unless the companies are told why, they may just 
think you‘re chasing better returns elsewhere and so they‘d better attempt to sell more of their 
unacceptable product to attract your money back!‖ (1996, p. 7). 
113 Cf. Sorell and Hendry 1994 
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investments in a certain company.114 Consider, for instance, Miller‘s idea 
here again. According to Miller, it is a mistake to think that most SRI 
investors avoid companies without making this public in some way. The 
main point of avoiding a certain companies‘ shares in the first place 
must reasonably be to create negative publicity around the company. How 
else could a boycott work? 
Indeed, if avoidance investors‘ decisions to sell stocks or not to buy them 
in the first place were secret, those decisions probably would have vir-
tually no effect at all. [...] The fact is, however, that once these decisions 
are made, they are generally not kept secret, at least not by institutional 
investors, but are disclosed in ways intended to create maximum adverse 
publicity for the affected company or companies. When, for instance, 
Harvard University and New York City‘s pension plans determined to 
liquidate their tobacco stock holdings, these actions were heralded as 
front page news throughout the nation. Thus, just as the main negative 
effect of a consumer boycott is seldom the actual direct revenues loss 
but rather is the publicity surrounding the boycott, so too, the principal 
impact of an avoidance strategy on companies subjected to it is often the 
negative publicity that accompanies it. In many cases, this publicity can 
be devastating.115 
I think Miller‘s suggestion in this passage is very interesting. And per-
haps it could be understood as the following objection to my line of 
reasoning above: If it is hard for managers to know exactly for what 
reason a certain individual investor avoids the company they manage, 
the investor simply needs to be more explicit about this. Investors may 
write letters to the companies they avoid for ethical reasons, and explain 
what aspects of the companies‘ activities they see moral problems with. 
Or, they may call the local, or perhaps national, newspapers and tell 
them what they find morally problematic with a specific company‘s ac-
tivities or products. Exactly what strategy they should choose could be 
up for discussion, but the point is that there are ways for individual in-
vestors to let the managers of the companies they avoid investing in 
know that they are boycotting the company‘s shares for moral reasons. 
Thus, on the appeal to hypersensitivity, there might after all be moral 
reasons to implement an avoidance strategy – since the possibility of 
changing a company‘s ways through (an amended version of) the avoid-
ance strategy is greater than I previously granted. 
 
114 Cf. Cowton 1998b, Hudson 2005, Lang 1996, Kinder et al. 1993, Kolers 2001, Miller 1991, 
Powers 1971 
115 Miller 1991, pp. 34-35 
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 The reader can here see that there is no clear cut difference between 
what I have called the avoidance and supportive strategies and what we 
might call an activist strategy. I will return to discuss the possibility for 
individual investors to influence companies through different kinds of 
activist campaigns in chapter VI. Before leaving the argument of hyper-
sensitive managers, however, I wish to suggest that there are reasons to 
doubt the basic idea of this argument. Is it really so that managers are 
hypersensitive to anything that might affect the price of their shares, i.e. 
even to financial boycotts which for all practical purposes are doomed 
to fail? Once again, this is an empirical issue which should be supported 
by solid empirical evidence but, unfortunately, SRI proponents give very 
little of the kind. They give some more anecdotal evidence of cases where 
managers seemingly have changed the direction of their companies‘ ac-
tivities after the public announcements of financial boycotts by different 
lobbying groups.116 As I will suggest in more detail in chapter VI (sec-
tion 2.3), however, it is very hard to draw any specific conclusions from 
such anecdotes.  
 Now, there is no clear evidence against the hypersensitivity assump-
tion either, it may be noted, so there may perhaps be some managers who 
are hypersensitive in this way. If we go back to the kind of economic 
theory which many SRI proponents invoke, however, I believe there are 
further reasons to be doubtful about the hypersensitivity argument for 
the avoidance strategy. With regards to most larger-sized commercial 
companies, it is simply hard to believe that they would hire managers 
who are so hypersensitive to the whims of the smallest groups of people 
as SRI proponents make them out to be. As noted in section 3.1 above, 
on most financial models, the central aim of managers is to maximize 
shareholder wealth – i.e. to maximize the share price. Given this as-
sumption, it is hard to see that very many managers would be hypersen-
sitive to the demands of some group of social campaigners, unless of 
course their demands were backed up by some kind of real financial 
power. Even though managers may not be perfectly ―economically 
rational‖ at all times, it is most often their job to try to be so. 
 However, perhaps the impact Miller refers to should not be con-
ceived of as the impact of individual investors on managers and corpo-
 
116 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Domini 2001, Harrington 1992, Kinder et al. 1993, Melton and Keenan 
1994, Miller 1991 
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rations directly, but rather as the impact on other investors? I now turn to 
this kind of idea. 
6.2 The  snowbal l  argument  
At the end of the previous chapter (section 4.1), I noted that, on the 
understanding of the approval argument which appeals to the commu-
nicative effects of avoidance on others, there were a number of possi-
bilities as to who the thought objects of this communication could be. 
According to one idea, the primary objects were observers, or other investors 
– according to Cowton, for instance, ―[t]o many observers, passively 
holding a stock and making a return from it indicates some support for 
a particular activity‖117. I have already indicated that the suggestion that 
individual instances of screening may have effects on other investors 
also may be an interpretation of Irvine‗s idea that what matters is what 
happens if an individual investor‘s action is ―imitated by many other 
investors‖. If individual acts of buying and selling shares in certain ways 
can have a kind of snowball effect, causing others to buy and sell shares 
in a similar way, the distinction between individual and collective effects 
itself would seem to crumble. Following the philosopher Donald Regan, 
who discusses a similar kind of argument in a similar context, we might 
call this the snowball argument for screening.118 What should we say about 
this argument? 
 Well, before evaluating the argument above, it may be noted that this 
argument actually seems to present a good explanation of why consistency 
or conscientiousness sometimes could be important from a moral point of 
view. In chapter II, I discussed the idea that investors have direct moral 
reasons to refrain from investing in companies which they morally dis-
approve of – direct in the sense that these moral reasons were thought 
to stem directly from investors‘ disapproval of these companies. I said 
that there were many problems with this kind of suggestion, but we may 
now see how consistency could be thought of as at least indirectly morally 
valuable: If individual investors are to be able to influence other inves-
tors to avoid investing in the kind of companies they avoid themselves, 
or to seek out and invest in the same companies, namely, consistency 
between moral principles and investment practice may lend some neces-
 
117 Cowton 1998b, p. 187 
118 See Regan 1980, pp. 43-52. See also Narveson 1976, where this kind of argument is sug-
gested as a general solution to collective dilemmas. 
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sary credibility. Surely, investors will have a harder time persuading others 
to join their social quest if they do not even take their own recommen-
dations seriously themselves. But the real question, of course, is whether 
other investors will take their recommendations seriously, and then act 
on them, even when they are consistent. 
 In response to the snowball argument, I first of all want to reiterate 
the worry from the previous subsection, i.e. that it would seem hard for 
other investors to know how to understand a given transaction on the 
stock market if the moral reasons behind it were not somehow made 
more explicit. For this reason, ‗quietist‘ screening could probably not 
give rise to a snowball effect and, thus, the strategy implied by this argu-
ment would go more in the direction of shareholder activism. I will have 
a lot more to say about the possibilities of individual investors to influ-
ence the general public in chapter VI, where shareholder activism is dis-
cussed. Before leaving the snowball argument for screening, however, 
consider also the following notes: From the passages above, it is not 
obvious exactly what other investors are the supposed receivers of the 
communicative message that screening may send out. But to what ex-
tent this kind of communication may have non-negligible effects on 
corporate practices, I believe, to a great degree depends exactly on this 
matter. I will therefore briefly elaborate on some possible suggestions in 
this context. 
 A rather straightforward suggestion would seem to be that the sup-
posed receivers of individual investor‘s market signals are other individual 
investors. If individual investors indeed have the power to influence other 
people‘s behaviour, this would most probably be people who are in a 
situation which is similar to theirs, or perhaps, first and foremost, the 
people closest to them. While it seems hard for individual investors to 
make a difference on their own, I have said, they may be in a position to 
do so together. Thus, while each individual investor may not be close to 
too many other people, perhaps one investor could actually ‗get the ball 
rolling‘ and, by telling some friends who then tell their friends, and so 
on, perhaps a collective effort could arise. This kind of scenario, I be-
lieve, is the snowball effect in its most straightforward form. But is such 
a scenario probable? Once again, the most conscientious reply to this 
question would probably be that more empirical evidence is needed. 
Lacking this evidence, one can only speculate here. Most of us surely 
want to think that our actions have this kind of effect on the people 
around us. Many would probably despair, and think that their actions 
(or lives) were meaningless, if they felt that they were not able to im-
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press even their closest friends and family members. It is unclear, how-
ever, if they have good grounds for not feeling this way. In my own ex-
perience, people often consider their financial decisions to be an espe-
cially personal matter, and it may thus be especially difficult to influence 
how others make these kinds of decisions. Domini and Kinder relate the 
following story, which I believe is quite interesting in relation to what I 
just said: 
At a recent seminar on socially responsible investing, one of the speak-
ers suggested that the participants tell everyone present what they‘d 
earned in the last year. I caught my breath. A minute later we realized 
her suggestion was rhetorical. I looked around and saw the same relief I 
felt in the others‘ faces. But she had made her point. Money is a deeply 
personal matter. Our finances are so intimate we can share them only 
with our spouses and our tax accountants.119 
Since the considerations above only are speculations, let us grant for a 
moment that most individual investors actually may be able to influence 
at least some other people to join their social cause, and thus may be 
able to increase the group of investors who screen their investments in a 
certain way to at least some degree. The most salient problem for the 
present version of the snowball argument is not the considerations 
above, I believe, but the fact that, as noted previously in this chapter, 
the amount of investors it would take, or, more exactly, the amount of 
stock market power it would take, to have a non-negligible influence on 
share prices and corporate practices most probably is very large. Even if 
one investor influenced another investor to join in, who in turn influ-
enced yet another investor, and so on, and so forth, I believe it is hard 
to see how this could add up to the amount of investment capital 
needed to bring large corporations to their knees. According to some 
recent estimates, private investors only control about 15 percent of the 
total stock market value in the UK.120 Even in the US, where corporate 
ownership is more dispersed, this figure is now way below 50 percent.121 
Although there is some theoretical room for the totality of individual 
investors to influence how businesses are run by screening their invest-
ments in a similar way, then, it seems hard to see how even the most 
effective of social campaigns could attract the vast amount of capital 
needed. 
 
119 Domini and Kinder 1986, p. 1 
120 Mallin 2004 
121 Hawley and Williams 2002 
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 The organisations which control the majority of the holdings on most 
of the world‘s stock markets, it may be noted, are the ones I have been 
calling institutional investors – that is, large banks, insurance companies, 
pension funds and other kinds of financial trusts. In the UK, institu-
tional investors control over 60 percent of total shareholdings122 and 
they stand for over 80 percent of all share trades in the US123. Now, ac-
cording to some writers, the supposed receivers of the communicative 
message of a screening strategy are actually not individual investors but 
exactly these institutional investors. According to Powers, for instance, 
―[t]hose who argue the case for sale or purchase for effect rarely have in 
mind only the economic impact. They often consider more important 
the symbolic effect of one or more large institutions which do not buy 
stock of a particular corporation or sell specific stock in protest‖124. It 
should be noted that, according to quite many proponents of the SRI 
movement, the main reason for why the future of this movement looks 
promising is also that more and more institutional investors are starting 
to become more active shareholders and to screen their investments 
according to ethical principles. According to Russell Sparkes and Chris-
topher Cowton (in a joint paper), for instance, this development signals 
the maturing of SRI, or its move ―from margin to mainstream‖.125 Ex-
actly what this implies for the moral reasons of the average individual 
investor to screen his or her investments, however, would seem rather 
unclear.  
 With regard to the possibilities of individual investors to influence 
institutional investors to screen their investments in a certain way, I be-
lieve it should be noted that these kinds of institutions in many ways are 
very much like large commercial corporations – for instance, they have 
managers which are hired on the basis of their leadership skills and their 
understanding of economics and finance, these managers are expected 
to live up to certain economic goals, they have principals – the trustees 
– which expect a certain return on their assets, and so forth. In fact, 
institutional investors may be more bound to the goal of maximising 
profits than commercial companies – according to the so-called ‗pru-
dent man‗ rule, a legal rule which exists in most countries, trust manag-
 
122 Committee on Corporate Governance 1998, Lang 1996, Mallin 1998, 2001 
123 Mallin 1998, Schwartz and Francioni 2004 
124 Powers 1971, pp. 93-94 
125 Sparkes and Cowton 2004, p. 49. See also Bruyn 1987, Hawley and Williams 2002, Kiernan 
2002, Melton and Keenan 1994, Sparkes 2002. 
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ers are to manage trusts in the sole (financial) interests of the trustees.126 
For these reasons, I believe individual investors do not seem to have any 
greater possibilities of influencing the managers of institutional investors 
than they have of influencing the managers of commercial companies 
directly, at least not through simply being explicit about their ethical 
screens. Perhaps they could reach institutional investors in other ways – 
for instance, through writing letters, organising demonstrations or going 
to the media. I will discuss these possibilities further in chapter VI. 
 Before leaving the current discussion, I will note a final suggestion 
about the possible social effects of screening. While it is often hard to 
say exactly who are influenced by a certain moral example, some may 
argue, surely it must have at least some sort of impact? Even though it 
seems hard to see how individual investors can influence institutional 
investors, or enough other individual investors, directly through their 
screening behaviour, many writers suggest that screening must create an 
increased public awareness of social issues and, as a result of this aware-
ness, perhaps some investors may actually be persuaded to change their 
investment behaviour. Domini gives a similar suggestion in the follow-
ing passage: 
One way that the integration of social criteria in investments makes a 
difference results from the fact that portfolio screening cannot take 
place without good research. The demand for corporate social research 
by social investors has created a large amount of information about the 
ways in which companies affect our lives. Never before has society 
tracked data on the way business copes with diversity, environmental 
impact, community support, or a host of other issues. We do today, 
thanks to social investing. This information in and of itself is an instru-
ment for positive change [...].127 
Comparing the references to social researchers, perhaps this is also how 
we should understand the argument of Brill, Brill and Feigenbaum 
above. An increased social awareness of issues concerning social re-
sponsibility may perhaps in itself make a difference to how companies 
do business. Once again, however, social researchers are probably in a 
much better position to influence the public awareness of these things 
 
126 Cf. Blair 1995, Bruyn 1987, Harrington 1992, Hollenbach 1973, Lowry 1993, Miller 1991, 
Owen 1990, Powers 1971, Ward 1991. Exactly how this rule should be interpreted is not 
always obvious, however, and some writers suggest that it is compatible with taking fairly 
elaborate non-financial concerns into account – cf. Kinder et al. 1993, Simon et al. 1972, Ward 
1991. 
127 Domini 2001, p. 19. See also O‘Rourke 2003. 
189 
than individual investors are. The increased demand for information 
about different companies‘ social records which an individual investor‘s 
screening behaviour creates is, arguably, most often negligible. Further-
more, even though individual investors may get some people to think 
about matters of social responsibility, it is unclear to what extent this 
should be counted as a substantial effect in the present context. Even 
though some more people may be talking about social responsibility, in 
what way is the world a better place? Being content with this kind of 
‗impact‘, I believe, is surely to set the bar way too low. 
7.  CON CLUS IONS  
In this chapter, I have mainly discussed what I have called pragmatic 
arguments for screening, i.e. arguments for the avoidance and suppor-
tive strategies from the supposed fact that implementing one of these 
strategies can make a positive difference, either in terms of changes in 
corporate practices or in terms of socially beneficial societal outcomes. 
According to the most straightforward version of this kind of argument, 
screening can make a substantial financial difference to companies, 
either directly or indirectly, and this kind of financial power can then be 
used to make companies change their ways. Many SRI proponents sup-
port this argument, but I have suggested that they lack solid empirical 
evidence for their case. As far as economic theory is concerned, I have 
argued that it does not seem plausible to think that individual investors 
can influence companies in this way – individual investors do not have 
very much financial power, at least not on their own.  
 Some SRI proponents suggest that investors may have such power 
collectively, and I have agreed with this supposition. However, I have 
said that it is unclear what this implies in terms of what a given individ-
ual investor has moral reasons to do. According to one suggestion, from 
the fact that the collective of investors, or all investors together, have a 
certain responsibility, it follows that each individual in this collective has 
a certain responsibility. I have argued against this suggestion, however, 
mainly on the grounds that its recommendations no longer would seem 
sufficiently sensitive to the circumstances of the real world – as long as 
it is only a dream that enough investors will come together and screen 
their investments in the same way, individual investors do better in 
doing something else which really can make difference. According to 
another suggestion, individual investors may be able to influence the 
behaviour of other investors, thus creating a sort of collective action out 
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of this. Once again, however, I have argued that individual investors 
would not seem to have the power – this time the social power – to 
make a non-negligible difference on corporate practices this way. 
 I have suggested, however, that individual investors perhaps may be 
able to influence both the relevant companies and other investors to 
change their ways through more elaborate measures – for instance, 
through writing letters, organising demonstrations or going to the 
media. We are now approaching the fine line between what we may call 
screening and what is perhaps better referred to as shareholder activism. 
In the next two chapters, appropriately, it is to shareholder activism and 
similar strategies I turn my attention.
 Chapter V 
The Responsibilities of Ownership 
1.  ROLE -SPECIF IC RESP ONSIB ILIT IES AND THE  
RELATI ONSHIP STRATEGY  
The ideas I have been discussing in chapters II to IV, it may be noted, 
have all been concerned mainly with issues of when to acquire, hold and 
dispose of different kinds of investments. According to proponents of the 
avoidance strategy, for instance, investors have moral reasons to refrain 
from investing in certain companies, and according to proponents of 
the supportive strategy, investors have moral reasons to seek out and 
invest in others. In this chapter and the next, I will discuss ideas about 
how investors may have moral reasons to engage more actively with differ-
ent kinds of companies – to make contact with managers, e.g., and vote 
at shareholder meetings. The central strategy in this context from the 
perspective of the SRI movement is obviously what I have called the 
activist strategy, or shareholder activism. According to proponents of this 
strategy, investors may under certain circumstances have moral reasons 
to invest in companies which are otherwise regarded as morally proble-
matic, since by doing so they may be able to have a kind of ‗insider‘ in-
fluence on these companies (compare, for instance, the Slaveholders 
Against Slavery case discussed at the outset of chapter III). But is the ac-
tivist strategy really the most preferable alternative here? In the present 
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chapter, I will compare this strategy with what is perhaps a more 
straightforward idea about how investors have moral reasons to engage 
more actively with the companies they invest in. I will call this the rela-
tionship strategy. 
 In order to facilitate the discussion, we may – just like with the avoid-
ance strategy – distinguish between two broad ways in which propo-
nents of the SRI movement (and other writers) have generally tried to 
justify the activist strategy. According to most SRI proponents, I be-
lieve, the reasons for why investors sometimes should become activists 
are intimately related to the kind of reasons discussed in the previous 
chapter. That is, through raising issues at the annual general meetings of 
certain companies, most of these writers suggest, investors may once 
again be able to make a difference in terms of corporate behaviour or so-
cietal outcomes. Consider, for instance, the following passage from 
Domini and Kinder: 
Some ethical investors want to do more than avoid bad companies and 
invest in good ones. They want to change the bad into the good. For 
these investors there is the activist approach. [...] The activists start from 
one basic fact: shareholders own the company. Supposedly management 
works for them. At least once a year shareholders have the right to elect 
directors, and to propose and vote on resolutions relating to corporate 
policy. If the owners fail to exercise their power to direct corporate 
policy, they waive a powerful means for change.1 
We may refer to the moral reasons of investors to make a difference in 
this way, or promote the general good in society, as the social responsibili-
ties of shareholders in what follows.2 I will discuss the issue of whether 
individual investors can make a non-negligible difference through em-
ploying different kinds of activist measures more thoroughly in the next 
chapter. Although activists who want to make a difference, according to 
Domini and Kinder, ―start from one basic fact‖ – namely that ―share-
holders own the company‖,3 it should be noted that the connection be-
tween the social responsibilities of shareholders and the fact that inves-
tors are generally considered owners of the companies they invest in is 
 
1 Domini and Kinder 1986, pp. 8-9 
2 I am here using this term in a purely technical manner, i.e. as a simple abbreviation of 
references to the idea that investors have moral reasons to make a difference in terms of cor-
porate behaviour or societal outcomes. It should be noted that the phrase ‗socially responsible‘ 
in the wider term SRI, as is obvious from previous chapters, need not only refer to this idea 
about the moral reasons of investors. 
3 For similar formulations, see also Brill and Reder 1993, Lang 1996, Sparkes 2002, Ward 
1991 
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only indirect. That is, it is not the fact that investors are generally consi-
dered owners as such which gives rise to their moral reasons to make a 
certain difference in terms of societal outcomes. Of course, because 
they are generally regarded as owners or, more specifically, because they 
as shareholders enjoy certain rights and privileges in relation to the 
companies they invest in (such as, for instance, the right to propose and 
vote on resolutions at annual general meetings), their social responsibili-
ties may translate into moral reasons to sometimes become shareholder 
activists. The main point of the idea of making a difference, however, is 
not this point about ownership but rather something else – i.e. that in-
vestors have moral reasons to make the world a better place. 
 A second line of argument for the activist strategy, however, I believe 
is exactly the idea that the fact that investors generally are considered 
owners of limited companies as such gives rise to a kind of imperative on 
their part to become shareholder activists. As I noted already in chapter 
III, when you buy the shares of a certain company on the stock market 
you are generally considered a (part) owner of that company – but this is 
perhaps not only something that could incriminate you as an investor in 
a company of questionable moral standards (along the lines of the ideas 
discussed in that chapter). According to many writers, being a share-
holder comes with certain rights and privileges in relation to the companies 
you own and these rights and privileges also give rise to certain moral 
responsibilities (or duties). These responsibilities are often framed exactly in 
terms of the responsibilities of owners of limited companies – the role of 
shareholders, many writers suggest, is exactly to act as responsible owners in 
some sense.4 I indicated already in the introductory chapter (section 2) 
that, according to some writers, there are certain responsibilities which 
are internal to the role of shareholders. In a certain sense, I noted, these 
responsibilities could be said to be the only responsibilities which in-
vestors have qua investors (that is, if this is understood exactly as the 
responsibilities they have in their role as investors). To separate this con-
ception of the responsibilities of shareholders from the social responsi-
bilities discussed above, we may refer to them as the role-specific responsi-
bilities of shareholders, or the responsibilities of shareholders as owners.  
 The idea that investors or shareholders have this kind of responsibili-
ties will be the main focus of the present chapter, and the central ques-
 
4 Cf. Beabout and Schmiesing 2003, Cowton 1998b, Gray et al. 1996, Mackenzie 1997, Owen 
1990 
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tion will be: Does the appeal to the role-specific responsibilities of 
shareholders really strengthen the case for shareholder activism, or do they 
in fact point in a slightly different direction? As I just said, the idea that 
shareholder rights confer duties is commonly taken as an argument for 
shareholder activism by proponents of the SRI movement. According to 
Domini, for instance, ―[s]hareholder activism is possible because as the 
owner of a stock you are a part owner of a corporation. In the United 
States, this gives you certain rights and, arguably, responsibilities‖5. Consider 
also the following passage: At the outset of the previous chapter, I 
noted how Cowton suggested that pragmatic arguments for SRI in gen-
eral often tend to focus on the supportive or activist strategies rather 
than simple avoidance. We may now have reason to consider this pas-
sage in its entirety, however: 
The second discernable perspective, which can complement the first, 
tends to emphasize the consequences of corporate actions upon others, 
perhaps conceived of as different groups of stakeholders such as em-
ployees, consumers, or local communities. This view is often reinforced by re-
garding stockholders not as speculators or even investors, but as owners who not only 
possess rights and privileges but also have responsibilities which entail a degree of in-
volvement. If a duty not to impose damage or harm on other people is re-
garded as a minimum responsibility which runs through all morality, 
then it might be concluded that the avoidance of certain investments is 
appropriate, as under an ―integrity‖ approach. However, a wider view of 
responsibilities is often taken which tends to justify supportive criteria 
or engagement in stockholder activism.6 
The second ―perspective‖ which Cowton suggests here is obviously a 
complex of quite different ideas. On the one hand, there is the idea that 
investors may have moral reasons to make a certain difference, which I 
said in the previous chapter could be understood along the lines of a 
consequentialist moral perspective (that is, a perspective which ―tends 
to emphasise the consequences‖ of actions). Now, a further line of ar-
gument is the idea about investors as owners and a responsibility stem-
ming directly from the rights and privileges of ownership – a responsi-
bility which entails a ―degree of involvement‖. I take this part to refer to 
the kind of role-specific responsibilities of owners outlined above. Ac-
cording to Cowton, this line of argument can obviously reinforce the 
former one. So there is no necessary conflict, then, between the social 
and the role-specific responsibilities of shareholders – both of them can 
 
5 Domini 2001, p. 84, emphasis added 
6 Cowton 1998b, pp. 187-88, emphasis added 
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be used in arguments for the activist strategy. Although I think this view 
is essentially correct, I believe this is far from obvious. The impetus for 
the appeal to responsibilities of ownership among SRI proponents, I 
suggest, actually comes from a discussion in the broader field of corporate 
governance.7 In what follows, I will elaborate on a more straightforward 
conception of the role-specific responsibilities of shareholders which 
can be found in this discussion, and discuss how this relates to the 
vague conception outlined above.  
 Corporate governance has been defined simply as ―the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled‖8 or, more generally, as the ―set 
of legal, cultural, and institutional arrangements that determine what 
publicly traded corporations can do, who controls them, how that con-
trol is exercised, and how the risks and returns from the activities they 
undertake are allocated‖9. In the literature on corporate governance, 
different ideas about what the relation between shareholders and com-
panies should look like, how the board of directors of limited compa-
nies should function, and how the capital structure of companies is 
organised most efficiently, are discussed.10 Because of the obvious con-
nections between the field of corporate governance and the issues 
surrounding SRI, most importantly the issue of shareholder activism, it 
may be noted that the discussions about these things to some degree 
overlap. Some SRI proponents emphasise the close relations between 
the two fields11 and, as I indicated briefly in the introductory chapter, 
SRI is actually sometimes understood as the kind of investing which 
integrates ―environmental, social and governance‖ concerns in the other-
wise strictly financial investment process.12 However, there are also 
many dissimilarities between these two fields, I believe, especially in 
terms of focus. 
 The part of the corporate governance debate I am interested in here 
is primarily the discussion about the (moral) responsibilities of share-
holders or owners. According to many writers in this field, I believe, 
 
7 Cf. Sparkes and Cowton 1994 
8 Cf. Committee on Corporate Governance 1998, Committee on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance 1993, Mallin 2001, Smerdon 2004, Sparkes 2003 
9 Blair 1995, p. 3 
10 For a good overview of the wide range of topics in the literature on corporate governance, 
see Keasey et al. 1999. 
11 Cf. Beabout and Schmiesing 2003, Rivoli 2003, Melton and Keenan 1994, Sparkes 1995, 
2002, 2003, Guay et al. 2004 
12 Cf. Eurosif 2006, Kiernan 2007, Social Investment Forum 2007 
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these responsibilities are ultimately determined by the role which sharehold-
ers normally play in the more general system of governing corporations 
and holding management accountable. At the present juncture, how-
ever, the alleged content of these kinds of responsibilities is perhaps more 
interesting than their justification. According to Jonathan Charkham and 
Anne Simpson, for instance, the ―key role for shareholders is to ensure 
that the board is performing effectively in its role of overseeing man-
agement and driving the company forward‖13. Now, the most interest-
ing part of this suggestion, I believe, is the latter part – the one about 
―driving the company forward‖. On one interpretation of the view of 
many corporate governance writers, it would seem, the responsibilities 
of shareholders are not only determined by what role shareholders nor-
mally play in the more general corporate governance system, but they 
are also most adequately understood as responsibilities towards the under-
lying companies. According to Christine Mallin, ―[c]orporate governance is 
[often] seen as an essential mechanism to help the company to attain its cor-
porate objectives and monitoring performance is a key element in achieving 
these objectives‖14. According to a UK committee on corporate gover-
nance, furthermore, while part of good corporate governance may be to 
contribute to the ―prevention of malpractice and fraud‖, the ―first 
responsibility‖ of those involved in the corporate governance process is 
―to enhance the prosperity of the business over time‖15.  
 How does this view on what shareholders ought to do compare with 
the kind of activist strategy outlined above? Well, first of all, it may be 
noted that there actually are many similarities. Most importantly, share-
holders are thought to have moral reasons to engage more actively with the 
companies they invest in on both accounts. According to Charkham and 
Simpson, for instance, the responsibilities of shareholders include ―an-
nually appointing auditors‖, ―approving various alterations to the capital 
structure or articles of association‖, ―tak[ing] an active interest in the 
nominations process which determines the selection of candidates for 
 
13 Charkham and Simpson 1999, p. 31. For similar formulations, see Committee on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 1993, Smerdon 2004. 
14 Mallin 2004, p. 4, emphasis added 
15 Committee on Corporate Governance 1998, p. 17, emphasis added. See also Guay et al. 
2004, Webb et al. 2003. Of course, I do not mean to imply that all writers in the corporate 
governance field agree with this view. It may be noted that there is a growing debate among 
these writers of what the ultimate purpose of corporations is and a growing tendency to define 
this in a way which includes social and ethical considerations – cf. Blair 1995, Mallin 2004, 
Smerdon 2004, Keasey et al. 1999. 
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the board‖, and, ―when these candidates are proposed giv[ing] proper 
consideration to the voting opportunity‖16. Furthermore, these actions 
are often described exactly as the actions which responsible or involved own-
ers would take17, and the object of many corporate governance writers‘ 
criticisms is pretty straightforwardly financial speculation, or investing for 
short-term gains. This kind of investing, it is generally argued, can be 
morally criticised since it is at odds with being an active and responsible 
owner of a limited company.18 Now, it may be noted that some SRI 
proponents speak loosely of active shareholding19, or simply engagement 
with companies20, instead of using the term shareholder activism – which 
may signal the view that the difference between these kinds of actions 
and more radical forms of activism is one of degree rather than of kind. 
Indeed, on some writers‘ understanding of the term ‗shareholder activ-
ism‘, I believe very many kinds of actions could actually qualify as a kind 
of activism. According to Sparkes, for instance, shareholder activism 
could be defined broadly as ―the usage of voting rights attached to 
ordinary shares to assert and achieve political, financial, or other objec-
tives‖21. 
 As I noted at the outset of this discussion (and as will become clearer 
in the next chapter), however, the term shareholder activism is most 
often used in connection with the more radical kind of shareholder 
campaigns designed, as Domini and Kinder put it, ―to change the bad 
(companies) into the good‖. On this understanding of the activist strat-
egy, I believe, there are obvious conflicts with the recommendations of 
the view above: Not only may the kinds of measures used by activists 
(public demonstrations, media campaigns, etc.) sometimes be very dif-
ferent from the measures recommended by this view, but the objectives 
of shareholder activists will also be quite different. As noted above, 
most SRI proponents defend the activist strategy with reference to the 
social responsibilities of shareholders (or, when they appeal to role-spe-
 
16 Charkham and Simpson 1999, p. 32. According to Sorell and Hendry, this work may consist 
in, e.g., ―keeping up good contacts at senior executive level with businesses in which shares are 
held, agitating for the presence of independent directors on boards, and exercising and enlarg-
ing voting rights carried by shareholdings‖ (1994, p. 116).  
17 Cf. Blair 1995, Corbetta 1994, Charkham and Simpson 1999, Mallin 2004, Moore 1988, 
Sorell and Hendry 1994 
18 Cf. Blair 1995, Charkham and Simpson 1999, Moore 1988, Sorell and Hendry 1994 
19 Cf. Lang 1996, Viederman 2002 
20 Cf. Domini and Kinder 1997, Eurosif 2006, Hellsten and Mallin 2006, Lewis and 
Mackenzie 1997, Sparkes 1995 
21 Sparkes 2001, p. 202, emphasis added. See also Gillan and Starks 2000, Strätling 2003.  
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cific responsibilities, these are thought to give roughly the same result), 
i.e. the idea that investors have moral reasons to promote the general 
good in society. The important difference between this strategy and the 
view outlined above, I believe, is that for investors who take their social 
responsibilities seriously, the point is not to help the company invested in to 
attain its corporate objectives – rather, it is to help society or the world be-
come a better a place. If all a certain company does, e.g., is to pollute the 
environment and treat its employees badly, activists who take their 
social responsibilities seriously seem to have moral reasons to outright 
counteract the (morally suspect) objectives of this company. 
 Tom Sorell and John Hendry, two of the most prominent defenders 
of the view on the role-specific responsibilities of shareholders outlined 
above, note this last consideration. From their perspective, this part of 
the objectives of SRI seems troublesome. They ask:  
[I]sn‘t the ethical investor someone who is not, as he should be, really 
fully committed to the defining purpose of a corporation, namely to 
increase long-term owner value? And aren‘t the interests of ethical in-
vestors in things other than owner value going to conflict with the 
interests of those shareholders who are concerned with owner value and 
nothing else?22 
According to Sorell and Hendry, responsible shareholding requires at 
least ―a willingness to bear with a firm and to endure some of its 
changing fortunes‖23 – it may even require that shareholders ―commit 
their goodwill, loyalty [and] patience‖24 to the companies they invest in. 
I believe the kind of active investment strategy outlined by Sorell and 
Hendry here is what is sometimes referred to as ‗relationship investing‘ 
in the literature on corporate governance. According to Margaret Blair, 
for instance, ―[t]here is no agreement on a precise definition of relation-
ship investing, but advocates most often describe it as a situation in 
which the investing institution is responsibly engaged in overseeing the 
management of the company, rather than remaining detached or pas-
sive, and is committed to the company for the ‗long term‘‖25. Following 
this terminology, I will in what follows speak of the relationship strategy as 
the main contender to the activist strategy here. According to propo-
 
22 Sorell and Hendry 1994, p. 131 
23 Ibid., p. 114 
24 Ibid., p. 125 
25 Blair 1995, p. 172. See also Ayres and Cramton 1994, Gillan and Starks 2000, Melton and 
Keenan 1994, Monks 1994, Sparkes 1995. 
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nents of the relationship strategy, then, the moral responsibilities of 
shareholders are basically to respect the (financial) goals of the underlying compa-
nies and, at least to some extent, to facilitate the achievement of these goals by 
interacting with management and other shareholders in certain ways.26 
 My main focus in this chapter will be on the argument for the 
relationship strategy from the view outlined above concerning the role-
specific responsibilities of owners – essentially an argument against share-
holder activism. The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: In sec-
tion 2, I discuss the issue that would seem to be the main focus of most 
corporate governance writers, namely the issue of speculation, or long-
term versus short-term investing. By way of discussing this issue, I also 
give a more thorough introduction to what I take to be the most com-
mon understanding of the argument for the relationship strategy, which 
I call the institutional perspective on the role-specific responsibilities of 
shareholders. Although the institutional perspective is the most com-
mon understanding of the argument for the relationship strategy, I argue 
that it comes with certain major problems. Among other things, this 
perspective would seem to fail exactly on the issue of financial specula-
tion – since the institutional framework surrounding investments in 
shares is so elusive, the institutional perspective could be invoked both 
by critics and proponents of speculation. 
 In section 3, I argue that, in order for proponents of the above line of 
argument to successfully criticise short-term investments, they should 
instead appeal to what I call the pragmatic perspective on the role-specific 
responsibilities of shareholders. Now, on the pragmatic perspective, it 
would seem, the argument for the relationship strategy has actually 
grown more similar to the arguments for the activist strategy introduced 
above. Judging from a certain kind of examples, I suggest in section 4 
that proponents of the relationship strategy should also accept that there 
may be situations where shareholders have stronger moral reasons to 
 
26 Here are some further descriptions of the relationship strategy: According to Corbetta, 
―developing a governor attitude depends mainly on the willingness to assume responsibility for 
intervening in corporate governance processes. This stage can be reached only by abandoning 
the typical attitude of the investor-shareholder, disinterested in the company‘s affairs, and 
establishing a relationship with management‖ (1994, p. 94). According to Moore, there is 
actually a need for partnership with companies: ―[Speculation] needs to be called in question 
from an ethical perspective, because of the divorce that has taken place between ownership 
and the responsibility that goes with it. Owners should surely act responsibly towards their 
employees and the communities in which their factories are located. [...] It should be a partner-
ship between those who invest and those whose labour produces the goods or services‖ (1988, 
pp. 12-14, emphasis in original). 
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invest according to the activist strategy than according to the relation-
ship strategy. But where does this leave the appeal to the role-specific 
responsibilities of shareholders? Well, on the best understanding of 
these responsibilities, I argue, there is indeed no conflict between the 
social and the role-specific responsibilities of shareholders. Rather than 
being a difference of principle, then, the difference between the activist 
and the relationship strategies is perhaps one of appropriateness. 
 A brief overview of the results of this chapter is presented in section 
5. 
2.  SH AREH OLDERS  AS OWNER S OR S PECULAT ORS  
According to Cowton, as indicated above, a common line of argument 
in favour of the activist strategy is the idea that shareholders should be 
regarded ―not as speculators or even investors, but‖, in a certain sense, ―as 
owners‖27. Interestingly enough, this is also how most proponents of the 
relationship strategy express their position – they argue that investors 
should be regarded as owners rather than speculators or gamblers and, as I 
noted above, the object of many corporate governance writers‘ criti-
cisms is exactly financial speculation or investing for short-term gains. 
On the purpose of their book on corporate governance, for instance, 
Charkham and Simpson write: ―This book is about [...] what reforms we 
consider are needed to allow (and where necessary require) institutional 
shareholders to behave like owners of companies, rather than traders of 
shares‖28. According to Sorell and Hendry, the issue of whether to 
understand investors as owners or as traders is essential in many ways – 
not only to the question of what responsibilities shareholders have to-
wards the companies they invest in, but also to the question of what 
responsibilities companies have towards their shareholders:  
Whether the shareholder is understood as an owner of a company or as 
a member of that company, or merely as a gambler riding on the success 
of that company, is of critical importance for assessing the morality of 
shareholding. A shareholder who acts as a gambler cannot be expected 
to be treated as an owner. Nor should one who has been encouraged to 
participate on the basis of ownership then be treated as if he were a 
gambler. Since a business cannot know which shareholder falls into 
which category, however, it has to treat them all the same way. We shall 
 
27 Cowton 1998b, pp. 187-88, emphasis added 
28 Charkham and Simpson 1999, p. 19 
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argue below that, for this reason and others, there may be strong moral 
grounds for not using shareholding as a form of gambling.29 
In this section, I will discuss the argument for the relationship strategy 
from this conception of shareholders as owners exactly by addressing 
the issue of ownership versus speculation. In order to get a grip on this 
issue, we may elaborate for a while on how to understand the passages 
above more exactly. What does it mean, for instance, to say that inves-
tors should be ―understood‖ as, or ―considered‖, owners (or members) 
rather than speculators (or gamblers)?30 Well, it is interesting to note 
here that most writers who argue that investors should be understood as 
owners rather than gamblers seem to admit that investors do not have 
the status of owners in the strict legal sense – at least not in relation to 
limited companies. That is, ownership of limited companies is perhaps 
not comparable to ownership of, say, cars and boats.31 In the eyes of the 
law, limited companies are generally treated as separate legal entities, or 
‗persons‘ on their own, independent of whoever may control them or 
have influence over them. However, these writers argue, this does not 
mean that investors should not be considered owners in a certain moral 
sense.32 Perhaps the absence of legal obligations on the part of share-
holders in the case of ‗limited liability‗ companies actually makes the 
case for certain moral responsibilities on the part of shareholders more 
acute.  
 This is a view shared also by some writers in the SRI literature. 
Sparkes, for instance, writes: 
We have grown up with the system of limited liability, so that it seems 
natural to us, but it is surprisingly modern. It is a striking fact, which de-
serves greater recognition, that the great Industrial Revolution which so 
transformed Britain from 1780 to 1820 took place without it. Limited 
liability companies, then called ‗joint stock‘ companies, were made illegal 
in the ‗Bubble Act‘ of 1720, passed in response to the frenzied specula-
tion which occurred in the summer of 1720, and centred around the 
shares of the South Sea Company. [...]  
 
29 Sorell and Hendry 1994, p. 114 
30 I here take the terms ‗speculators‘, ‗gamblers‘, ‗simple investors‘, ‗traders of shares‘, etc. as 
being roughly synonymous. Furthermore, as the distinction between ‗investors as owners‘ and 
‗investors as members‘ seems to be of little importance in the present context, I will not say 
anything more about this here. Whenever I speak of the responsibilities of ownership I believe 
this may be substituted for the responsibilities of membership without loss of (moral) content. 
See Mackenzie 1997, pp. 216-17. 
31 Cf. Blair 1995, Charkham and Simpson 1999, Mackenzie 1997, Rini 2002, Sorell and 
Hendry 1994, Sparkes 1998 
32 Cf. Blair 1995, Sorell and Hendry 1994 
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 It seems fair to state that the limited liability company was tried in the 
sixty years up to 1720, and found wanting. Society generally agreed with 
Adam Smith that limited liability encouraged rash ventures and dubious 
share promotions. Smith‘s economics was tied up with his view of 
ethics [...]. Small businesses, run by individual owners, would be aware 
of the needs of others, something a legal fiction could not be. We may 
ask ourselves how modern society can restore this link between ethics 
and economics.33 
I think it is reasonable to conclude from the considerations above that 
what it means to say that investors in limited companies should be re-
garded as owners rather than gamblers, most often, is to say that they 
have (or should be regarded as having) certain moral responsibilities to-
wards the companies they have invested in – moral responsibilities that 
are in some ways reminiscent of those commonly associated with other kinds of corpo-
rate ownership.34 Now, if this is what the appeal to ownership in formula-
tions like the ones above amounts to, however, it would seem unclear to 
what extent we really should accept the idea that shareholders should be 
regarded as owners rather than speculators. It is certainly common of 
people to talk about shareholders as owners and so on, but does this re-
ally imply that investors have moral reasons to invest according to the 
relationship strategy – and that financial speculation is wrong? 
 In the two subsections below, I will continue this discussion and ela-
borate on what I take to be the main line of reasoning from proponents 
of the relationship strategy in this context. This line of reasoning is out-
lined in section 2.1 and, in section 2.2, some problems with this line of 
reasoning are noted. 
2.1 The  ins t i tu t iona l  pe r spe c t ive  on  owner  r e spons ib i l i t i e s  
The question currently under consideration is: If investors in limited 
companies are not owners in the straightforward (or legal) sense, why 
should they be thought to have certain moral responsibilities similar to 
those commonly associated with other kinds of corporate ownership? 
Well, here is one suggestion: Although shareholders have no fully-
fledged legal responsibilities towards the companies they invest in, it 
should be noted, there are obviously many other kinds of connections 
between shareholders and companies that are of a legal nature – the 
 
33 Sparkes 1998, pp. 22-24 
34 Cf. Klonoski 1986 
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rights and privileges which shareholders enjoy in relation to the companies 
they have invested in, for instance, are certainly of a legal nature. If a 
shareholder wants to express her opinion on how the company should 
be run, she has a legal right to do so through proposing and voting on 
resolutions at the company‘s annual general meeting, etc. Now, taken 
together, the shareholders of a limited company could perhaps be said 
to have total control over the company, at least in theory, in very much 
the same way as a sole proprietor has control over an enterprise that he 
or she owns.35 If all the shareholders of a certain company wanted the 
company to go into liquidation, for instance, it would certainly be in 
their power to force the company to do so. The point of emphasising 
this fact would of course be that, contrary to what I said above, owner-
ship of limited companies may in fact not be too different from other 
kinds of ownership after all – it is at least very similar, some may sug-
gest, to the direct ownership of a smaller-sized company. So perhaps it 
is only natural, then, to say that shareholders have moral responsibilities 
similar to those commonly associated with ownership of sole proprie-
torships? 
 Sorell and Hendry, I believe, give an argument very similar to this. 
According to Sorell and Hendry, one way of bringing out the responsi-
bilities of shareholders is through comparing investments in shares with 
other types of investments. Even though investing in shares on the one 
hand may be similar to e.g. holding deposits in a bank, when looking at 
shareholding as a whole, being a shareholder is in many ways closer to 
being the owner of a sole proprietorship. They write: 
[A]s opposed to some forms of investment with a fixed return, share-
holding seems to require a willingness to bear with a firm and to endure 
some of its changing fortunes. This is reflected not only in a share-
holder‘s accepting a variable level of dividend, dropping at times to nil, 
but also in the scope for shareholders having their say about the per-
formance of the management and the composition of the board. Hold-
ing deposits in a bank requires less than shareholding, and has less 
scope for participation, even if the deposits are invested in turn by the 
bank in shares. And holding loan equity comes somewhere in between. 
[...] The upshot of all this is not that shareholders are less justified in ex-
pecting a return than other investors, but that they are less justified in 
taking the return at significant expense to the business [...]. Sharehold-
 
35 According to Corbetta, ownership of sole proprietorships (or ‗family-owned businesses‘) 
most obviously gives rise to the type of responsibilities of ‗governor-shareholders‘ discussed 
here (1994, pp. 92-93). 
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ing, in other words, may carry more responsibilities than other forms of 
investment – at least other things being equal.36 
Now, it is important to understand exactly what type of argument this 
line of reasoning comes down to. What part of the (possible) similarities 
between shareholding and sole proprietorships are Sorell and Hendry 
referring to in this passage? Well, on one interpretation, what they are 
exploring in this passage seems to be what we might call the institutional 
framework surrounding investments in shares, i.e. the set of presumptions 
and regulations about shareholding laid down by law and social tradi-
tion. One part of this institutional framework, according to Sorell and 
Hendry, is the ―the scope for shareholders having their say about the 
performance of the management and the composition of the board‖, i.e. 
the rights and privileges which shareholders normally enjoy in relation 
to the companies they invest in. Another part is the fact that sharehold-
ers normally can be expected to accept ―a variable level of dividend, 
dropping at times to nil‖. I will not go into the specifics of these sug-
gestions here – in what follows, we might refer to this line of reasoning 
as the institutional perspective on the role-specific responsibilities of share-
holders.  
 On a fairly basic level, I believe, the point of the institutional perspec-
tive is actually the simple idea that shareholders should behave like 
owners because they are generally regarded as such, i.e. because this is part of 
the presumptions and expectations surrounding shareholding. Of 
course, there are a number of ways to spell this perspective out more 
exactly and all of these need not refer to similarities between share-
holding and sole proprietorships. The more sophisticated versions of 
the perspective, furthermore, would probably refer the institutional 
framework surrounding shareholding as Sorell and Hendry do, rather 
than to the expectations of people on the street. Understood very 
broadly, I believe a lot of writers – also in the SRI literature – could be 
said to accept this perspective. The conception of the moral responsi-
bilities of investors which Mackenzie finally comes to defend in his dis-
sertation, for instance, bears a lot of similarities to this institutional 
perspective and, as I said in chapter I (section 4), this should not be so 
surprising as there are obvious connections between the institutional 
perspective and the kind of ‗communitarian‗ methodology Mackenzie 
 
36 Sorell and Hendry 1994, p. 115 
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uses.37 Most importantly, both centre on what the relevant traditions or 
communities say and therefore tend to reproduce a bias towards the status 
quo. Mackenzie suggests that ―[b]y becoming a shareholder one enters 
into a relationship of responsibility with the company that cannot be 
absolved, simply by divesting. This is not a legal responsibility, but it is I 
think an ethical one. It arises from the historical conception of the 
company as a self-regulating entity, and the conception of shareholders 
as the ultimate source of control within this entity‖.38 According to 
Charkham and Simpson, furthermore, it is of critical importance to 
understand the socio-political connotations surrounding the ownership 
of a certain thing (e.g. shares) in order to understand what the owner-
ship of this thing implies more exactly: 
Notions of property [and ownership] are not ‗natural‘ but socio-politi-
cal, given force by the law and social mores (‗Thou shall not steal‘). The 
assumptions we make here in the UK are the result of long develop-
ment, and some of the basic concepts which our law reflects can trace 
their origins back to Roman law. The penalties we exact for breaking the 
law have changed. We no longer deem it necessary to protect property 
by a law ad terrorem – and hang people for stealing a sheep or a lamb. 
 Private ownership means many things, according to the circums-
tances.39 
Now, what is the point of the institutional perspective on the role-spe-
cific responsibilities of shareholders? Well, a more sophisticated formu-
lation than the one above could perhaps be that shareholders have 
moral reasons to invest according to the relationship strategy because the 
institutional framework surrounding investments in shares contains a norm to this 
effect. According to Sorell and Hendry, it is actually so that the institu-
tional framework surrounding investments in shares has a certain (so-
cial) purpose. They write: 
[One] of the many defects of the analogy between the shareholder and 
the punter [...] is that buying shares is not only a venture in money-
making, but also a case of participating in a public institution for money-
raising, an institution that benefits individual firms, the economy and so-
 
37 Other writers link this kind of perspective to the line of communitarian thinking found in, 
for instance, Michael Sandel‘s and Michael Walzer‘s work. According to Warren: ―These com-
mentators are calling for more responsible forms of share ownerships. The unencumbered 
liberal who exists behind a veil of ignorance, without a known identity or set of affiliations, is 
being pushed out into the community, and is being asked to take more responsibility for what 
they own and how it is used‖ (2002, p. 16). 
38 Mackenzie 1997, p. 214 
39 Charkham and Simpson 1999, pp. 88-89. For a similar view, see Blair 1995. 
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ciety in a number of easy to specify ways. Although horse-racing, too, 
supports a horse-breeding and betting industry, and generates consider-
able tax revenue, the betting analogy obscures the way in which the 
stock market is specially designed to bring together for the public good 
private sources of money and proven companies with specific plans to 
innovate, to save labour, and to make more efficient use of scarce mate-
rials.40 
Although the reference to ―for the public good‖ above may give rise to 
a certain ambiguity in Sorell and Hendry‘s line of reasoning, an ambigu-
ity which I will return to below (section 4), I think they formulate the 
main point of the institutional perspective quite nicely in the passage 
below: 
It is true that this function of the stock market may not be before the 
minds of those who buy and sell shares; but this does not mean it is not 
the point of the institution, or that investors should not be conscious of 
it and respect it – even when they have rather selfish reasons for coming 
into contact with the institution. And respecting the purpose of the institution 
means accepting the responsibilities it implies.41 
The main point of the institutional perspective, then, is that investors 
have moral reasons to ―respect the purpose of the shareholding institu-
tion‖, which means to assume the responsibilities which this institution 
implies – in this context: to invest according to the relationship strat-
egy.42 Not doing so, for instance simply investing for short-term gains, 
is to fail to respect the purpose for which the institution of shareholding 
was intended in the first place – and this is why speculation is subject to 
moral critique.43 
 What should we think of this institutional perspective on the role-spe-
cific responsibilities of shareholders? In the next subsection I will argue 
 
40 Sorell and Hendry 1994, p. 123 
41 Ibid., emphasis added 
42 According to Sorell and Hendry, the responsibilities here are subject to certain conditions. 
For instance, they are not applicable if the companies in question do not respect their responsi-
bilities – most importantly, the responsibility of full and accurate disclosure and the responsi-
bility of giving a reasonable return (1994, p. 125). See also Spurgin 2001. 
43 Indeed, Sorell and Hendry go as far as saying that investing in this way is ―investing on a 
basis that is at variance with the concept of shareholding‖ (1994, p. 119, emphasis added). They 
write: ―If someone subscribes to a share offer in a privatization simply because he likes the 
idea of being a shareholder, [...] or even because he thinks that he can make a quick profit on 
the day that trading in shares begins, [...] [these] hardly seem to be reasons for an investment 
decision [...]. After all, buying a thing simply because one likes the advertising or simply be-
cause one‘s friends are doing it seems to be a case of buying a thing without reference to what 
use it is going to be to the purchaser‖ (ibid., emphasis in original). On this view, it seems, 
investing in ways which are inconsistent with the relationship strategy would simply not be 
proper investing. I will not pursue this line of reasoning any further in this context. 
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that it comes with a lot of problems. One of its main flaws, I will sug-
gest, is that it cannot be used as an argument against financial specula-
tion. 
2.2 Prob lems wi th  the  ins t i tu t iona l  pe r spe c t ive  
The institutional perspective on the role-specific responsibilities of 
shareholders has obvious connections to the kind of ‗communitarian‘ 
methodology which Mackenzie defends, I have said, mainly because 
both lines of reasoning take certain societal practices, traditions or in-
stitutions as their starting ground. According to many philosophers, 
however, similar lines of reasoning are often open to criticism exactly on 
the interpretation of these very institutions44 – and I think this is correct 
also with regard to the institutional perspective on the role-specific 
responsibilities of shareholders outlined above. Certainly, it should be 
admitted that the institutional framework surrounding investments in 
shares allows investors to commit their ―goodwill, loyalty and patience‖ 
to the companies invested in (and, as will become obvious in the next 
chapter, to a certain extent disallows other ways of using one‘s shares), 
and this to a greater extent than the corresponding frameworks sur-
rounding other kinds of investments do. I have noted repeatedly in this 
chapter that investors receive certain legal possibilities when they 
become shareholders of limited companies – most importantly, the right 
to vote at shareholder meetings etc.. However, and this is where the 
problems start to arise for the argument from the institutional perspec-
tive, I also noted above that the legal framework surrounding share-
holding does not require shareholders to use these possibilities in a cer-
tain way. Now, why should it follow from the fact that a certain institu-
tional setting allows a certain thing, that this thing also is required of those 
who participate in the institution? 
 Another way to put this problem, one which in a stronger way brings 
out its relevance to the issue at hand, is to point out competing institu-
tional settings which investments in shares also could be said to be a 
part of. As noted above, Charkham and Simpson open up for the possi-
bility that there are many ways of understanding ownership and prop-
erty in a given society. One of the most prominent understandings of 
individual ownership, they suggest, is one which seems to allow for 
 
44 Cf. Dworkin 1985, Juth 2005, Kagan 1998 
208 
owners to do whatever they like with what they own (or, at least within 
certain boundaries): 
The concept of individual ownership [...] is so much a part of our herit-
age and everyday lives that we take it for granted; we take for granted 
the rights that go with ownership in regard to exclusive use and disposal 
so long as these do not infringe the rights and interests of others. To 
have laws and for these to provide a remedy against those who deprive 
people of what they ‗own‘ is the mark of a civilized society as is its ca-
pacity to enforce these remedies. Legitimate ownership, in other words, 
gives us title to enjoy our property, and by implication denies it to 
others, and it allows us to deal with it as we will.45 
Now, is it not possible to argue from this conception of ownership, in a 
manner similar to that of Sorell and Hendry above, that investors ob-
viously are permitted to buy or sell shares for whatever purpose they 
can have, be it speculation or something else – since it is a part of the 
institutional framework surrounding ownership that this is permissible? 
In some ways, one might say, ownership of limited companies would 
seem to be an instance of this standard form of ownership, for example 
because shareholders are not required by law to act in a certain manner 
in relation to what they own. Because of this similarity, it may actually 
seem ―disrespectful to the purpose of the shareholding institution‖ to 
demand that investors commit their goodwill, loyalty and patience to the 
companies they invest in, in order to become active owners, if this is not 
what the investors want themselves. On one interpretation, a similar 
point may be what Elaine Sternberg is after when she writes: 
There is, ordinarily, no moral obligation to be, or to continue to be, a 
shareholder. Being a shareholder is only one of the myriad roles open to 
an individual or institution, and the reasons for choosing to be a share-
holder are equally diverse. Although some objectives encourage long 
term holdings, and others do not, all are perfectly valid reasons for 
owning shares. And it is the shareholder‘s objectives for owning shares 
which should determine if a particular holding is bought or kept or sold: 
the long term goals appropriate for a pension fund may not be sensible 
for an individual elderly investor.46 
To be fair, Sorell and Hendry‘s vision of the responsible owner may 
seem preferable to Sternberg‘s in many ways. From the considerations 
above, however, I fail see that they give any convincing arguments for 
why we should accept their hypothesis about what the institutional 
 
45 Charkham and Simpson 1999, p. 88 
46 Sternberg 1992, p. 196 
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framework surrounding investment in shares entails rather than the view 
just presented here. Thus, it seems, the institutional perspective could be 
used both by critics and proponents of financial speculation. The most 
reasonable response to the considerations above, I believe, would be to 
say that there simply are no undisputed institutional characterisations of 
what ownership of a certain company implies in terms of shareholder 
responsibilities, and no idea about what the purpose of holding shares is 
that could be agreed upon by all investors. In some regards, ownership 
of limited companies resembles sole proprietorship more than other 
things, for instance because shareholders have the right to elect direc-
tors etc. In other regards, however, it is closer to other kinds of owner-
ship, as investors e.g. have no legal obligations in relation to the compa-
nies they own. The interesting issue here, one might say, is what share-
holding ought to imply – i.e. whether investors in fact have moral reasons 
to follow one of the characterisations above rather than the other.  
 This last suggestion, I believe, actually points to a more fundamental 
problem with the institutional perspective on the role-specific responsi-
bilities of shareholders. Even if we were to contend that the institutional 
framework surrounding shareholding implies a very specific idea about 
the responsibilities of shareholders (for instance, the responsibility to 
invest according to the relationship strategy), why should these be 
thought to have any moral force? One way of describing the idea of the 
institutional perspective, I believe, is to say that it assigns certain conven-
tional duties to certain people who occupy a specific role – namely those 
holding shares in limited companies. I am here using the terminology of 
Shelly Kagan47, according to which conventional duties are such which 
are assigned to certain roles or people in an ―arbitrary‖ fashion – i.e. 
they could obviously be assigned to other roles or be assigned diffe-
rently in other societies or within other institutional frameworks. Con-
ventional duties are contrasted with natural duties, which are assigned 
because ―there is an essential connection between the grounding rela-
tionship and the ensuing duty‖48, for instance, the duty to keep one‘s 
promises (a duty grounded, Kagan suggests, in the relationship between 
promiser and promisee). 
 Now, why should these kinds of conventional duties be seen as hav-
ing any real moral force? According to Kagan, simply pointing out that a 
 
47 Kagan 1998 
48 Ibid., p. 139 
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certain convention exists would not seem to establish any moral duties – 
think of, e.g., the conventions of dancing with a partner, or the etiquette 
of high fashion dinners. Not all conventions would seem to assign 
moral duties to the people who partake in them or occupy the different 
roles set out by these conventions. What was just said seems reasonable, 
I think, even when the conventions are partially sustained by the kind of 
institutional framework outlined above. Simply pointing out that this 
kind of framework exists would not seem to establish any moral obliga-
tion on the part of certain individuals to adhere to it. So why should 
people accept the responsibilities implied by the framework – rather 
than, perhaps, try to break free from the framework? According to Ka-
gan, ―[c]onventionally assigned duties only have moral force when this 
can be derived from something else – consequences, fairness, promis-
ing, and so on‖49. In the next section, I will present what I take to be the 
most promising idea about the source of the moral force of the conven-
tions of the institutional perspective discussed here. 
3.  THE P RAGMATIC PERS PECTIV E ON OWNE R  
RESP ONSIBIL ITIES  
There are probably a number of ways in which one could try to give 
some more robust moral force to the conventions of the institutional 
perspective outlined above, and I cannot discuss all of these here. The 
most straightforward way of trying to uphold most of the main tenets of 
the institutional perspective would probably be to appeal to the last of 
Kagan‘s suggestions above, i.e. to promises. Some may argue, for in-
stance, that when one invests in a certain company and enters the role 
of shareholder, one has implicitly promised to assume the role-specific 
responsibilities of shareholders characterised by the relationship strat-
egy. In this manner, the conventions referred to by the institutional 
perspective could receive some force from the general duty to keep 
one‘s promises.50 However, I believe this suggestion comes with some 
major problems and I will therefore not make much of it here. As noted 
in the previous section, it is not obvious how to interpret the institu-
tional framework surrounding shareholding, so it seems quite hard to 
determine exactly what investors promise when they assume the role of 
 
49 Ibid., p. 145 
50 For a discussion of similar moves, see Kagan 1998, p. 140. 
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shareholder. Furthermore, as I suggested in connection with my discus-
sion of the approval argument in chapter III (section 4.1), one should be 
cautious with ascribing ‗implicit‘ attitudes or beliefs to investors – it is 
extremely hard to know if they in fact embrace these and, in any case, 
investors could always challenge such ascriptions. On the plausible as-
sumption that what a certain person promises depends largely on the 
attitudes and beliefs of the promiser herself, then, it is not so obvious 
that all shareholders could be taken to promise similar things. 
 The part of Kagan‘s suggestion that proponents of the relationship 
strategy should pursue in this context, I believe, is rather the appeal to 
consequences.51 In the present section I will elaborate on how such an 
appeal may be designed to work as an argument for the relationship 
strategy, and how it relates to some of the things that proponents of the 
relationship strategy say. In the next section I return to the issue of how 
this argument fares in comparison to the arguments for the activist 
strategy outlined at the outset of the chapter. 
 What would an appeal to consequences in the context of the role-
specific responsibilities of shareholders look like? Well, the institutional 
perspective should be contrasted, I believe, with what we might call the 
pragmatic perspective on the role-specific responsibilities of shareholders. 
According to this perspective, it is not the institutional framework sur-
rounding shareholding as a whole which gives rise to certain responsibili-
ties on the part of shareholders. Rather it is the simple fact that share-
holders enjoy certain rights and privileges in relation to the companies 
they invest in and that these can be used to do good things for these companies, 
which gives rise to these responsibilities. Because of the role of share-
holders as owners of limited companies, they are in a unique position to 
perform certain functions which are beneficial to these companies through utilising 
their shareholder powers in a responsible manner (or conforming with 
the recommendations of the relationship strategy) – for instance, to ap-
point good directors and to revise the capital structure of the companies 
in ways favourable to the long-term needs of a commercial enterprise. 
According to the pragmatic perspective, the fact that owners are able to 
perform these functions or, more importantly, the good that the per-
formance of such functions brings to the relevant companies, is the rea-
son why investors ought to invest according to the relationship strategy. 
 
51 Perhaps an appeal to fairness may be possible in the present context as well. This kind of 
appeal, I believe, would be similar to the appeal to fairness discussed in the previous chapter, 
section 4.1. I will not pursue this possibility further here. 
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 Perhaps this perspective could be given slightly different formulations 
as well.52 When looking closer at some of the passages from proponents 
of the relationship strategy already considered, I believe, the pragmatic 
perspective actually does not seem too far-fetched. As noted above, part 
of the reason for why investors have a moral responsibility towards the 
companies they invest in, according to Mackenzie, comes from ―the 
conception of shareholders as the ultimate source of control within this 
entity‖53. In another passage, Mackenzie writes: ―In strict legal terms 
shareholders are not owners of businesses. [...] In any case, this objec-
tion is not a serious problem for my argument. From an ethical point of 
view, one of the most salient aspects of ownership is the fact that own-
ers control their property‖54. But why should the fact that investors con-
trol their property be considered morally salient, if not because of the 
fact that they thereby are able to influence these companies in certain 
ways? Consider also the following passage from Sorell and Hendry, 
where I believe they come very close to reasoning along the lines of the 
pragmatic perspective: 
To come back to our earlier example of the shareholder as a gambler, 
there is a fundamental difference between gambling on shares and gam-
bling on horses. If someone places a bet on a horse race, his action has 
no adverse impact on the horse. Indeed it is only through gambling that 
horse-racing can take place at all. Any purchase or sale of shares, in 
contrast, does affect, however marginally, the fate of the business con-
cerned. To purchase shares other than for the purpose for which they 
were intended is consequently to misuse the relationship of sharehold-
ing to the potential detriment of the business and so is morally ques-
tionable.55 
It is obviously the appeal to ―the potential detriment of the business‖ 
which I find interesting in this context. Now, considering the arguments 
I gave in the previous chapter (mainly section 3.1), the reader may have 
 
52 It should be noted that I here focus on the beneficial effects of individual instances of invest-
ments according to the relationship strategy. On another understanding of the pragmatic 
perspective, it is the fact that this approach, if followed by all or a substantial amount of in-
vestors, could have certain beneficial effects. I will not discuss this understanding here. A large 
part of the reason for why the following of a certain convention by a large amount of investors 
could have beneficial effects, I believe, would arguably be that individual instances of conven-
tion-following (at least under normal conditions, most of the time) have beneficial effects. I 
any case, the idea that it is morally relevant to ask ‗what if everyone did that?‘ was dealt with at 
length in the previous chapter, section 5. 
53 Mackenzie 1997, p. 214 
54 Ibid., pp. 216-17, emphasis in original 
55 Sorell and Hendry 1994, pp. 118-19 
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some justified worries with the particular line of reasoning that Sorell 
and Hendry invoke in the passage above. In the previous chapter, I ar-
gued that we have reason to believe that the transactions of individual 
investors only very seldom are able to influence the price of a given 
company‘s shares to a non-negligible extent. This is true, I argued, even 
though investors under certain circumstances (for instance when em-
ploying the avoidance strategy) actually want their sale to affect a certain 
company negatively. So why should we think that the transactions of 
individual investors who invest for short-term gains would have greater 
effects? Furthermore, if there indeed were any such effects, it would 
seem, these should mainly be positive. As noted in the previous chapter, 
the equilibrium price of a certain company‘s shares will normally be 
greater the larger the number of investors which are ready to buy and 
sell these shares. That is, a high liquidity in the market for a certain 
company‘s shares is probably something that is good for the price of 
those shares, and thus (at least to a certain extent) good for the com-
pany in question. So exactly how could short-term investing actually 
hinder the activities of commercial companies?  
 Perhaps the most plausible interpretation of Sorell and Hendry‘s posi-
tion here is one that appeals more directly to the positive things which 
active shareholders may be able to do for the companies they invest in. 
According to the pragmatic perspective on the role-specific responsibil-
ities of shareholders, I have said, the main point is not that speculation 
is always harmful to the companies involved, but rather that investors 
may be able to perform certain worthwhile functions for the companies they 
invest in if they become active and responsible owners, i.e. if they invest 
according to the relationship strategy. According to this perspective, it 
seems, shareholders have quite clear moral reasons not to be engaged in 
financial speculation – at least if they can influence the companies they 
invest in to a non-negligible extent through engaging with these compa-
nies in other ways (an issue I will discuss further in the next chapter). 
 I believe the pragmatic perspective on the role-specific responsibilities 
of shareholders is the most promising argument for the relationship 
strategy in the present context. As we have just seen, it not only stays 
clear of the problems connected with the institutional perspective dis-
cussed in the previous section, but it also gives a plausible story about 
what may be morally problematic with financial speculation. In the fol-
lowing section, however, I will put this line of reasoning into perspec-
tive when returning to the issue of the relationship strategy versus the 
activist strategy. 
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4.  ROLE -SPECIF IC VE RS US S OCI AL RES PON SIBIL ITIES  
As I noted at the outset of this chapter, most SRI proponents defend 
the activist strategy, or shareholder activism, with reference to what I 
called the social responsibilities of shareholders, i.e. the idea that inves-
tors have moral reasons to make a certain difference in terms of corpo-
rate behaviour or societal outcomes. There is also some evidence which 
suggests that some SRI proponents take the role-specific responsibilities of 
shareholders to give more or less the same result as this kind of social 
responsibilities. I shall now consider how the pragmatic perspective on 
the role-specific responsibilities of shareholders outlined above relates 
to these suggestions – i.e. how this pragmatic perspective relates to the 
kind of pragmatism discussed in the previous chapter. Can the prag-
matic perspective outlined above perhaps be what proponents of the 
activist strategy have in mind when they, besides the social responsibili-
ties of shareholders, also appeal to these kinds of responsibilities? 
 According to Kagan, an appeal to consequences along the lines of the 
pragmatic perspective is one of the most straightforward ways of ex-
plaining the moral force of the kind of societal conventions referred to 
by the institutional perspective. And quite generally, Kagan argues, this 
appeal is available to anyone who believes in moral reasons to promote the 
overall good: 
By conforming to the particular conventions extant in our society – 
meeting our various role based obligations, and pressuring others to do 
the same – we do our part in sustaining these conventions, and thus 
help to bring about the various and sundry goods that these conven-
tions contribute in the production of. In short, meeting our conven-
tional duties is one way in which we can help bring about better results 
overall. Thus, to the extent that we have moral reason to promote the 
good, we have reason – other things being equal – to act on our con-
ventional duties.56 
On Kagan‘s understanding, we might note, there is a natural connection 
between the role-specific and the social responsibilities of shareholders, 
since the former basically receives its moral force from the latter, or the 
idea that investors have moral reasons to promote the general good in 
society. Perhaps this is also how the appeal to role-specific responsibili-
ties by certain proponents of the relationship strategy should be un-
derstood. As noted above, Sorell and Hendry explicitly suggest that ―the 
 
56 Kagan 1998, pp. 139-40 
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betting analogy obscures the way in which the stock market is specially 
designed to bring together for the public good private sources of money 
and proven companies with specific plans to innovate, to save labour, 
and to make more efficient use of scarce materials‖57. 
 Many readers may probably have noted that, with regards to many 
companies, the actions sanctioned by the relationship strategy may not 
only have effects that are beneficial to the company in question but, 
because this company supplies a service that is beneficial to society, they 
may of course also contribute to the overall good of society. In such 
cases, there is certainly no conflict between the appeal to role-specific 
responsibilities common among proponents of the relationship strategy 
and the appeal to social responsibilities common among proponents of 
the activist strategy. According to Sorell and Hendry, it is (at least in 
principle) possible for investors to invest with certain political or social 
causes in mind and at the same time display a genuine commitment to 
the purpose of the company they invest in.58 However, the most 
interesting cases are not the ones where there is no conflict between 
these things – there may, arguably, be cases where what is best for a 
certain company is not what is best for society (think, for instance, of a 
company whose very business concept is to pollute the environment 
and employ child labour in order to produce cheap export goods). What 
do the role-specific responsibilities of shareholders dictate in such cases? 
Sorell and Hendry write: 
Of course it is possible for some shareholders to show concern for 
other stakeholders and to show what appears to be relative indifference 
to increasing owner value. Is it true that in this case people go beyond 
the legitimate limits of the shareholder role?59 
Unfortunately, Sorell and Hendry give no real answer to this last sort of 
question, but they give some indications of how they think it should be 
handled. Answering this question, they suggest, involves settling issues 
of ―considerable philosophical depth‖, for example ―the issue of how 
far the obligations that derive from the roles one has, including that of 
investor, can free one from the obligations that one is under as a human 
being‖60. On one interpretation of this formulation, perhaps Sorell and 
 
57 Sorell and Hendry 1994, p. 123, emphasis added 
58 Ibid., p. 131 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
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Hendry would want to say that, even on the pragmatic interpretation of 
the role-specific responsibilities of shareholders outlined above, these 
role-specific responsibilities are primarily responsibilities towards the compa-
nies invested in. That is, even though the pragmatic interpretation has 
made them more similar to social responsibilities, the role-specific re-
sponsibilities of shareholders still require that shareholders engage more 
actively with the companies invested in for the benefit of these companies. But 
is this position very plausible? 
 In order to answer this kind of question, I believe, it is time to com-
pare the relative merits of the relationship and activist strategies. Con-
sider, for instance, the following case: 
The Stubborn  Shareho lder : Mattias has a habit of committing to 
every project he is involved with, no matter how rational or 
moral he thinks they are. In recent years he has contracted a con-
siderable amount of personal wealth, which he has invested in 
different kinds of shares on the stock market. One of the com-
panies he has invested in is a company that makes cheap wea-
pons and sells these to third world countries at war with each 
other. Now, some of Mattias‘ friends, having read some articles 
on SRI, point out to him that this particular investment may not 
be morally responsible – as a large-scale investor in this sort of 
company, Mattias is probably contributing to the fact that thou-
sands and thousands of people in third world countries die each 
year because their countries are at war with each other. Through 
raising this issue at the company‘s shareholder meeting, further-
more, Mattias may actually be able to make the company upgrade 
its moral ambitions. Being the kind of person he is, however, 
Mattias does not do this. ―I already am invested in this com-
pany‖, Mattias says to his friends, ―so why not go all the way? 
Together we shall build the best goddamn armaments company 
the world has ever seen!‖ 
What should we say about this case? Well, I believe most of us would 
hold Mattias‘ decision to commit his ―goodwill, loyalty and patience‖ to 
the weapons company here to be morally wrong. If investing according 
to the relationship strategy amounts to a failure to put an end to activi-
ties like the ones in this case (which I am assuming are morally repre-
hensible), then we clearly have moral reasons not to do this. Of course, 
Mattias may be doing what he does out of pure stubbornness, but there 
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is still something problematic with saying that investors should be 
committed to the companies they invest in, irrespective of whether 
these companies themselves are dedicated to morally worthwhile activities 
or not. The problem for proponents of the relationship strategy, per-
haps some would want to say, is that being committed to certain com-
panies, irrespective of what these companies are doing, seems tanta-
mount to stubbornness in the face of clear immorality. 
 Now, I believe there are at least two things which proponents of the 
relationship strategy can say in relation to cases like this. One possibility 
here is of course a version of the idea I have suggested several times in 
previous chapters, i.e. to regard the role-specific responsibilities of 
shareholders as just one source of moral reasons among others. Accord-
ing to Sorell and Hendry, as just noted, the important issue is ―how far 
the obligations that derive from the roles one has, including that of in-
vestor, can free one from the obligations that one is under as a human 
being‖. What happens in the case above, perhaps they might say, is that 
the obligations which shareholders are under as human beings (presum-
ably the social obligations of shareholders) take moral precedence over 
the role-specific obligations of shareholders towards the companies they 
invest in. From this it does not follow that there are no such role-spe-
cific obligations, however. Shareholders might still have some moral rea-
son to invest with a certain loyalty to the underlying companies – it is 
just that, in some situations, these reasons may be overridden.61 
 For this kind of response to be available, it should be noted, The Stub-
born Shareholder cannot rule them out completely – that is, it needs to be 
plausible to say that, at least in some sense, Mattias‘ stubborn commit-
ment to the weapons manufacturer is morally praiseworthy. But I don‘t 
think this is the case and, for this reason, I don‘t think the kind of 
response above is very plausible in the present context. To see this more 
clearly, one may break his choice down in smaller pieces. Let‘s say that 
he, from the outset, had the choice of investing either in the weapons 
company, or in a company dedicated to socially worthwhile activities, 
for instance a medical centre. Once he has chosen what company to 
invest in, of course, he has the further choice of either investing in the 
company without caring about what it does, and investing in the com-
pany with the sort of commitment that proponents of the relationship 
 
61 Compare the kind of response discussed in connection with The Principled Warmonger in 
chapter II, section 4 and Slaveholders Against Slavery in chapter III, section 1. 
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strategy call for. What should we say about Mattias‘ choice in light of 
the distinctions I have made here? 
 It seems to me that there is a case to be made for Mattias‘ choosing to 
invest with the kind of commitment discussed here in one of the alterna-
tive paths he could have taken. Namely, if he had chosen to invest in the 
medical centre, it would have been a good thing of him to also invest 
with a serious commitment to that medical centre. This is because in-
vesting with serious commitment would probably increase the positive 
contribution that Mattias makes to the activities of the medical centre, 
which I am assuming here are socially worthwhile. However, if we are to 
rank the four alternative routes he may take, I believe, the one where he 
invests in the weapons company with serious commitment to its activi-
ties is actually worse than the one where he invests in the same company 
without serious commitment. That is, his commitment to the weapons 
company‘s activities, I believe, actually contributes to the badness of that 
route of action because, again, it will probably increase the contribution 
Mattias makes to the morally abhorrent activities of this company. It 
seems to me, therefore, that it is simply not plausible to say that, irres-
pective of what Mattias has chosen to invest in in the first place, in his 
second choice, he has moral reasons to invest with a certain amount of 
commitment. If he indeed has moral reasons to do this, this is only in 
the case where he has invested in the medical centre. 
 The second kind of response which I believe proponents of the rela-
tionship strategy could give to cases like the one above goes as follows: 
As some readers may have noted already, both the relationship strategy 
itself and the role-specific responsibilities of shareholders would mainly 
seem preoccupied with the issue of how to behave toward a certain 
company once you have invested in that company. The role-specific responsi-
bilities of shareholders do not apply, for instance, until one enters the role 
of shareholder in a certain company. Now, it is a different question al-
together, proponents of the relationship strategy may suggest, what 
companies you have moral reasons to invest in in the first place.62 There 
might be something to the idea that you should not invest in companies 
that are engaged in morally reprehensible activities – in the case above, 
they might say, this explains why Mattias acted wrongly. Once you have 
invested in a certain company, however, and investing in this company was 
 
62 According to Cowton, an issue which is seldom discussed in relation to SRI in general is the 
issue of ―the responsibilities of nonowners‖ (1998b, p. 188). 
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not wrong in the first place, you have moral reasons to behave as a responsi-
ble shareholder and commit your ―goodwill, loyalty and patience‖ to 
that company. 
 I actually think we may accept this kind of reply. It should be noted, 
however, where it seems to leave the role-specific responsibilities of 
shareholders: On the best interpretation of these responsibilities, they 
indeed give the same result as the social responsibilities of shareholders. 
If shareholders have any kind of role-specific responsibilities, these can 
only come into play on top of their social responsibilities and augment 
these. Far from being an argument against shareholder activism, then, the 
appeal to the role-specific responsibilities of shareholders by proponents 
of the relationship strategy can indeed also be used by proponents of 
the activist strategy. And perhaps there is really little difference left be-
tween these strategies, at least in terms of their point and fundamental 
justification. 
 I suggest that, rather than being a difference of principle, the differ-
ence between the activist and the relationship strategies is really one of 
appropriateness. The kind of actions which proponents of the relationship 
strategy describe are actions which can do a lot of good – but only in 
relation to companies whose activities are not morally problematic in 
the first place. With regards to these companies, the actions recom-
mended by proponents of the activist strategy would be more appropri-
ate. However, the aim of both strategies would be the same – to pro-
mote the general good in society. Just like the avoidance and supportive 
strategies are similar but directed at different kinds of companies, then, 
the activist and relationship strategies are rather similar but should be 
directed at different kinds of companies.  
5 .  CON CLUS IONS  
In this chapter, I have distinguished between two sources of moral rea-
sons which are often taken to speak in favour of shareholder activism – 
the social and the role-specific responsibilities of shareholders. Although the 
role-specific responsibilities of shareholders are often invoked in favour 
of shareholder activism in the literature on SRI, I have suggested, this 
line of reasoning would seem inspired by the discussion in the broader 
field of corporate governance and, according to a more straightforward 
conception of these kinds of responsibilities which is rather common in 
this field, they rather support what I have called the relationship strategy 
– that is, an active investment approach focusing on what is good for 
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the underlying companies rather than for society in general. Most of this 
chapter has been dedicated to analysing the argument for this approach, 
in order to pave the way for the discussion of shareholder activism in 
the following chapter. 
 In connection with the more straightforward conception of the role-
specific responsibilities of shareholders, it is often suggested that share-
holders have moral reasons to invest according to the relationship strat-
egy because the institutional framework surrounding investments in 
shares contains a norm to this effect. I have called this the institutional 
perspective on the role-specific responsibilities of shareholders. Although 
this perspective may be the most common among proponents of the 
relationship strategy, I have argued that it comes with many problems – 
for instance, it would not seem able to criticise financial speculation in 
an adequate way, which is often the primary objective of proponents of 
the relationship strategy. Furthermore, it is not obvious why the fact 
that the institutional framework surrounding shareholding contains a 
certain norm should give shareholders moral reasons to behave in ac-
cordance with this norm. 
 In order to be able to morally criticise financial speculation, I have 
suggested that proponents of the relationship strategy should appeal to 
what I have called the pragmatic perspective on the role-specific responsi-
bilities of shareholders, i.e. the idea that shareholders, because they are 
in a unique position to do so, have moral reasons to perform certain 
important functions for limited companies. Now, on the pragmatic 
perspective, it would seem, the argument for the relationship strategy 
has actually grown more similar to the arguments for the activist strategy 
introduced above. Judging from certain kinds of examples, I have sug-
gested that proponents of the relationship strategy should also accept 
that there may be situations where shareholders have stronger moral 
reasons to invest according to the activist strategy than according to the 
relationship strategy. Furthermore, on the best understanding of the 
role-specific responsibilities of shareholders, there is indeed no conflict 
between these and the social responsibilities of shareholders. Rather 
than being a difference of principle, then, the difference between the ac-
tivist and the relationship strategies is one of appropriateness. 
 We may now note another similarity between the role-specific and the 
social responsibilities of shareholders. Since both the argument for the 
relationship strategy and the argument for the activist strategy from 
these kinds of responsibilities turn on the fact that investors may influ-
ence companies through engaging more actively with them in certain 
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ways, the extent to which investors have any of these responsibilities, of 
course, would seem to depend on the extent to which they actually can 
influence companies in these ways. If investors only very rarely can in-
fluence companies ‗from within‘ by, for instance, voting at shareholder 
meetings, then neither the relationship strategy nor the activist strategy 
would seem to get any support from an insistence on the social respon-
sibilities of shareholders (nor the role-specific understood along the 
lines of the pragmatic perspective). The issue of to what extent individ-
ual investors can influence companies in this way is the issue I turn to in 
the following chapter.
 Chapter VI 
Shareholder Activism 
1.  THE MANY FACETS OF  SH AREH OLDER ACTIVIS M  
I have noted several times already that most proponents of the SRI 
movement give some room for what I have called the activist strategy. 
That is, they agree that it may sometimes be morally justified to invest in 
companies which are otherwise regarded as morally unacceptable, if 
such investments allow investors to have a certain ‗insider‘ influence on 
these companies and thereby to change their activities for the better. In 
this chapter I will consider to what extent investors actually have moral 
reasons to invest according to this strategy. It may be noted that the 
arguments in previous chapters at best support the idea that activism 
(sometimes) is morally permissible – according to the argument in the 
previous chapter, for instance, the role-specific responsibilities of share-
holders do not run contrary to such a suggestion. In order to determine 
whether investors actually have positive moral reasons to invest according 
to the activist strategy, however, some further questions need to be 
answered. For instance: What kind of insider influence can activists have 
on limited companies? And, is it really true that individual investors will 
be able to exert these kinds of influence? These are the sort of issues 
which will be my main concern in the present chapter. 
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 To get the discussion going, I will first introduce the ideas behind the 
activist strategy in somewhat more detail: I have already noted how cer-
tain social and political campaigns were influential in the forming of SRI 
as such and the rise of the SRI movement. I have also noted how the 
strategies of the SRI movement sometimes are compared to the strate-
gies of so-called ethical consumerism (or consumer activism). In addi-
tion to the South Africa campaign previously noted, many writers hold a 
certain shareholder campaign directed at General Motors, and inspired 
by Ralph Nader‗s call for consumer boycotts of the same company, as 
one of the most influential pieces of SRI‘s history.1 David Vogel, for 
instance, describes this campaign and its importance as follows: 
In February of 1970, a small group of young lawyers who had formed 
an organization called Project for Corporate Responsibility called a 
press conference to announce that by virtue of their collective owner-
ship of twelve shares of General Motors, they were submitting nine 
resolutions to the auto company‘s 1.3 million shareholders. Their action 
signaled an important event in the recent history of citizen pressures on 
business. Previous challenges had not centered on the corporation per se, 
largely viewing it as an instrument for changing public policy. Campaign 
GM departed from this pattern; both its goals and tactics focused pre-
dominantly on the corporate sector.2 
What started with Campaign GM, according to most writers, was the 
rise of so-called shareholder activism, or active engagement with targeted 
companies. The point of departure for this part of SRI, as I noted in the 
previous chapter, is the idea that the rights and privileges which share-
holders normally enjoy in relation to the companies they invest in can 
be exploited as tools for social change. The rights and privileges of cor-
porate ownership, it is often suggested, allow investors to take the 
struggle for an increased social awareness on the part of companies all 
the way into the confines of the corporate boardroom. Domini and 
Kinder, for instance, write: 
Some ethical investors want to do more than avoid bad companies and 
invest in good ones. They want to change the bad into the good. For 
these investors there is the activist approach. [...] The activists start from 
one basic fact: shareholders own the company. Supposedly management 
works for them. At least once a year shareholders have the right to elect 
directors, and to propose and vote on resolutions relating to corporate 
 
1 Cf. Brill and Reder 1993, Domini 2001, Domini and Kinder 1986, Gray et al. 1996, 
Harrington 1992, Kinder et al. 1993, Lowry 1993, Simon et al. 1972, Sparkes 1995, 2002, Vogel 
1970, 1983 
2 Vogel 1978, pp. 71-72 
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policy. If the owners fail to exercise their power to direct corporate 
policy, they waive a powerful means for change.3 
In a similar tone, Brill and Reder put the point of departure of share-
holder activism as follows: 
For investors who really take their activism seriously, one of the most 
exciting aspects of SRI is the ability to influence a company‘s behavior 
from within. When you purchase a share of stock in a company, you be-
come an owner of that company. As an owner, you have the opportu-
nity at least once a year to elect directors to the company‘s board and to 
vote on policy resolutions, because corporations are required by law to 
hold annual meetings of their shareholders. You also have the right to 
take part in discussions at the meeting. And, under certain circum-
stances, you can even propose resolutions that will be put before all the 
shareholders.4 
It may be noted from these passages that, according to most general 
characterisations of shareholder activism, there are many ways in which, 
at least in theory, investors may be able to influence a company through 
becoming shareholders in, or owners of, the company.5 Thus, perhaps 
shareholder activism is most adequately understood as an umbrella term 
covering a lot of more particular strategies. Most obviously, as I noted 
in the previous chapter, shareholders have the right to propose and vote 
on resolutions relating to corporate policy and to take part in the annual 
general meetings of the companies they hold shares in. But it is not ob-
vious that this is the most interesting part of the rights and privileges of 
shareholders in this context. The last part of Brill and Reder‘s sugges-
tions was obviously what was central in the case of Campaign GM – i.e. 
the possibility to send out information about resolutions to all the 
shareholders of a given company. 
 Domini prefers to speak of ―direct dialogue‖ rather than of share-
holder activism and, in part, this is probably to suggest that a wider 
range of options are available to investors here. The most prominent 
form of ‗dialogue‘ is still the shareholder voting process but, according 
to Domini, many other forms are possible: 
The second aspect of socially responsible investing [apart from positive 
and negative screening] is direct dialogue. You can leverage your owner-
ship of a piece of a business to gain a place at the table and to raise a 
broad range of issues. [...] This dialogue takes many forms. Delivering a 
 
3 Domini and Kinder 1986, pp. 8-9 
4 Brill and Reder 1993, pp. 21-22 
5 See also Brill et al. 1999, Lang 1996, Miller 1991, Ward 1991. 
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social audit to a company for enrichment and comment is a way of 
alerting corporate management to issues. Letters written to gain clarifi-
cation or to express either concern over or thanks for a position the 
company has taken can lead to good results. Consumer boycotts, selec-
tive purchase campaigns, and even lying down in front of bulldozers 
have been used. But the most structured and widely used form of direct 
dialogue with corporate management teams is the voting and filing of 
shareholder resolutions.6 
I will discuss most of these types of suggestions in the present chapter. 
The central issue of concern when evaluating these suggestions, I be-
lieve, should be what kind of activism is the most effective in some sense. 
Judging from the standard accounts of shareholder activism above, it 
seems fair to say that the guiding justificatory idea, once again, is that 
this strategy can be an effective way in which investors can ‗make a cer-
tain difference‘ in terms of corporate behaviour or societal outcomes. 
Of course, it may be noted that all of the quotes above invoke formula-
tions about ownership and the rights and privileges of owners and, as I said 
in the previous chapter, such formulations could also be taken to imply 
an appeal to role-specific responsibilities. In the present chapter, how-
ever, ideas about the social effectiveness of activist campaigns will be 
my main concern and I will therefore assume that it is morally permissi-
ble to ―leverage your ownership of a piece of a business‖ in order to 
achieve goals which are different from those of the underlying compa-
nies.  
 In order to fend off the allegation that shareholder activism is some-
thing quite different from screening-oriented SRI, Domini and Kinder 
describe how activism can be a necessary supplement to the supportive 
strategy as follows:  
What does shareholder activism have to do with ethical investing? 
Everything. When you invest positively, you make a statement about 
what you consider vital [...]. But that is not enough. If the drive for cor-
porate responsibility is to have real force, two things must happen. First, 
more shareholders must become aware of their duty to influence corpo-
rate action. The proxy mechanism offers the means for creating that 
awareness. Second, corporations which have not responded to share-
holder concerns must be compelled to face these issues.7 
According to Domini and Kinder here, it would seem, not only is it 
probable that most investors can make a difference in terms of corpo-
 
6 Domini 2001, p. 22 
7 Domini and Kinder 1986, pp. 192-93 
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rate behaviour or societal outcomes through implementing some form 
of the activist strategy but, interestingly enough, this strategy is also seen 
as the most potent part of SRI in this regard. This would actually seem 
to be a common idea among most proponents of the SRI movement. 
As noted at the outset of chapter IV, most writers who refer to the idea 
of ‗making a difference‘ stress the importance of moving beyond mere 
avoidance and more towards the supportive strategy and shareholder 
activism. Indeed, according to some writers, to move more towards ac-
tivism for this reason is the most important challenge of the SRI 
movement as a whole.8 In the present chapter, I will try to determine to 
what extent individual investors can make a non-negligible difference 
through various activist measures.  
 In keeping with the preliminary considerations of chapter IV (section 
2), I will understand the idea that investors have moral reasons to ‗make 
a difference‘ as an appeal to pragmatic, or in a wide sense consequentialist, 
considerations. That is, any more exact philosophical understanding of 
this kind of idea will not be presupposed. The question of exactly what 
kind of difference is relevant here will also be held open – that is, while 
the most straightforward idea may be that activism can make a differ-
ence to corporate practices, suggestions about more general societal ef-
fects are also considered relevant. Finally, my main focus, just like in 
previous chapters, will be on individual investors. Although the idea that 
shareholder activism can make a difference obviously could be under-
stood as the suggestion that some collective of activists may make a differ-
ence together, I will be concerned exclusively with the question of what 
this entails in terms of moral responsibilities on the part of individual 
investors. 
 The remainder of this chapter will roughly be divided into two parts. 
With regards to the first of these: Having indicated that the corporate 
governance view on the responsibilities of ownership is not my main 
concern in this context, it should be noted that many of the more spe-
cific suggestions as to exactly how investors can make a difference 
through shareholder activism are quite similar, at least in kind, to the 
suggestions discussed in the previous chapter (for instance, the sugges-
tion that shareholders have moral reasons to vote at shareholder meet-
ings). In section 2, I will discuss suggestions about how investors can 
make a difference through actions at the annual general meeting – the 
 
8 Cf. Mackenzie 1997, Sparkes 2002 
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filing of shareholder resolutions and voting on matters of corporate 
concern. Even though SRI proponents generally seem to imply that 
such actions could be effective even for individual activists, I will sug-
gest that they give little empirical support for this view. More theoreti-
cally, my argument will be that an important prerequisite for successful 
shareholder campaigns is a well-functioning system of corporate gover-
nance but, even when such a system is in place, I will suggest that there 
is little reason to believe that campaigns by individual shareholders are 
able to make a non-negligible difference in terms of corporate beha-
viour.  
 In section 3, I will discuss some more radical suggestions as to how 
individual shareholder activists can make a difference. Apart from the 
different strategies open to investors in connection with the annual gen-
eral meeting, it is often suggested that shareholder activism can be to 
write letters to managers, talk to the media or take companies to court. I 
will once again suggest that many of these suggestions seem difficult to 
utilise in an effective manner by individual investors. However, if activ-
ists are ready to become truly radical, perhaps there actually are some 
promising possibilities for individual investors here. Although I cannot 
say which these are more exactly, I will at least indicate what I take to be 
characteristics of especially promising activist campaigns. One such 
characteristic, unfortunately, is that successful activist campaigns proba-
bly would demand quite a lot from individual investors, both in terms of 
time and effort and in terms of financial costs. 
 A brief overview of the results of this chapter is presented in section 
4. 
2.  MAK ING A DIF FEREN CE A T THE AGM 
How can an individual investor make a difference through becoming a 
shareholder activist? Well, before discussing the more specific ideas of 
different SRI writers in this regard, it may be useful to repeat some gen-
eral points about the relationship between investors and the companies 
they hold shares in. Although shareholders are generally regarded as 
owners of limited companies, it should hopefully be obvious from pre-
vious chapters that they are quite far removed from the day-to-day busi-
ness of the companies they hold shares in. As I indicated already in 
chapter III, the most direct responsibility over the regular activities of 
limited companies rests with the management of the corporation – it is the 
management that decides on, e.g., the recruitment of workers, employee 
228 
compensation and different particulars concerning production. Even 
though they sometimes may be interested in hearing what certain share-
holder representatives think about these things, managers are not obli-
ged to consult or seek permission from the shareholders of the corpora-
tion when they make these kinds of decisions. Furthermore, as indicated 
in the previous chapter, the most direct responsibility of overseeing the 
managers‘ work of running the company lies with the board of directors of 
the company. It is the directors who act as the primary representatives 
of the owners and who review (and help with) the major decisions of 
managers in order to hold the managers accountable for what they do. 
 When taking all this into account, perhaps one should say that share-
holders only come in third place when it comes to having a regular in-
sight into corporate activities. Indeed, many writers (especially in the 
corporate governance literature) note the problem that it is often hard 
for individual investors to get relevant and accurate information about 
the activities of the companies they invest in.9 If shareholders are sup-
posed to have the ultimate say in how companies are run, some of these 
writers suggest, then this problem of information needs to be overcome 
somehow – possibly by more aggressive legislation.10 I will leave this 
information problem to the side in the present context, and return to it 
later (in section 3.1). Of course, the central question in the present con-
text is not what insight shareholders have into the activities of the com-
panies they invest in, but rather what power they have over these activi-
ties. And certainly, shareholders are not powerless in relation to the 
companies they invest in – even though they are far removed from the 
day-to-day business of these companies, they have certain important 
rights and privileges in relation to limited companies. In this section, I 
will discuss the most straightforward suggestions as to how individual 
investors can make a difference through becoming shareholder activists. 
 The most straightforward suggestion as to how shareholders may 
influence corporate behaviour here is probably the idea that they can 
take advantage of their rights to propose and vote on corporate resolu-
tions. As we saw in the previous chapter, this is also what proponents of 
the relationship strategy focus on. Now, this kind of suggestion, I be-
lieve we should say, takes as its starting point the more basic right of 
shareholders to attend the so-called annual general meeting (AGM) of the 
 
9 Cf. Blair 1995, Charkham and Simpson 1999, Domini and Kinder 1986, Schaub 2005, van 
der Burg and Prinz 2006, Webb et al. 2003 
10 Cf. Charkham and Simpson 1999, Schaub 2005 
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corporation. The annual general meeting is really the only place where 
shareholders can exert their direct power over the corporation, and the 
only place where shareholders get to meet and discuss issues concerning 
the activities of the company with the managers and the board of di-
rectors in a formal way.11 Once a year, limited companies (at least in 
most countries) are required to hold this kind of meeting and to send 
out information about the meeting and its schedule to all of their share-
holders.12 I have already noted some passages where proponents of the 
SRI movement suggest that the AGM is the central fighting scene for 
shareholder activists. According to Domini and Kinder, for instance, 
―[a]t least once a year shareholders have the right to elect directors, and 
to propose and vote on resolutions relating to corporate policy. If the 
owners fail to exercise their power to direct corporate policy, they waive 
a powerful means for change‖13. 
 In the present section, I will focus mainly on the two lines of action 
which I take to be the central ways in which shareholders can be a force 
for social change at the AGM, namely (1) the proposal of shareholder 
resolutions, and (2) the voting on (shareholder and management) reso-
lutions. These will be discussed in subsections 2.1 and 2.2 respectively, 
or, more exactly, I will in these subsections discuss whether investors 
can influence companies directly by either proposing or voting on resolu-
tions. In subsection 2.3, I turn to discuss some suggestions about the 
possible indirect, or social, effects of such lines of action.  
2.1 Propos ing shar eho lder  r e so lu t ions  
How can an individual investor make a difference through proposing 
resolutions at a limited company‘s AGM? Well, a resolution in the con-
text of corporate governance can perhaps be compared to a bill or a 
motion in the context of public policy making (although I will later note 
an important dissimilarity here), i.e. it is a proposition to the effect that 
the company should do something specific or that the corporate charter 
of the company should be amended in some specific way. For instance, 
the set-up of the board of directors, general operational matters and 
 
11 In some countries, an extraordinary (or emergency) general meeting can also be called, but 
this is seldom done – cf. Bottomley 2003, Maug and Rydqvist 2001.  
12 Cf. Blair 1995, Domini 2001, Domini and Kinder 1986, Lang 1996, Maug and Rydqvist 
2001, Sparkes 1995, Ward 1991, Åhman et al. 2003 
13 Domini and Kinder 1986, p. 9. See also Brill and Reder 1993, Lang 1996, Ward 1991. 
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changes in the capital structure could all be topics for resolutions at a 
company‘s AGM. In most countries, both the management and individ-
ual shareholders can introduce these kinds of resolutions and, obviously, 
it is this latter possibility which is the point of departure for shareholder 
activists in the present context. James Melton and Matthew Keenan ex-
plain how resolutions most often are used, and how they can be utilised 
by shareholder activists, as follows: 
Proxy resolutions, which can be sponsored by shareholders or manage-
ment, often are used to address issues, ranging from ordinary and un-
controversial ―housekeeping‖ measures (such as minor changes in by-
laws, or operations), to the creation of new classes of stock or the elec-
tion of an entirely new slate of corporate directors. [But], as social 
activists discovered more than twenty years ago, such resolutions can 
also be used to call attention to a company‘s poor environmental record, 
its bad labor relations, or its involvement in countries with oppressive 
regimes, among other things. In recent years, more shareholders – par-
ticularly religious organizations and public sector pension funds – have 
effectively utilized their access to proxy ballots to make themselves 
heard on a wide variety of social issues.14 
Resolutions on matters like the environment, labour issues or involve-
ment in countries with oppressive regimes are sometimes referred to as 
‗social resolutions‗.15 Certainly, a successful introduction of a resolution 
of this sort could make a considerable difference to the way a certain 
company conducts its business – given, of course, that the resolution 
also receives the majority of votes at the AGM. If a company is asked to 
review its labour practices, for instance, or to consider the impact of its 
activities on the environment to a greater extent, then important social 
progress could perhaps be made. According to Peter Kinder, Steven 
Lydenberg and Amy Domini, in another of their books on SRI, the pos-
sibility of investors proposing shareholder resolutions presents a unique 
opportunity for creating social change: 
Proxy resolutions open the door to corporate management – private-
sector opinion makers whom social activists could not otherwise reach. 
And the resolutions are surprisingly effective. This tactic is somewhat 
like the method generations of hillbilly humorists said Ozark farmers 
used to get a mule‘s attention: They hit him between the ears with a 
two-by-four. [...] A leading specialist in proxy solicitations, Georgeson & 
 
14 Melton and Keenan 1994, p. 45 
15 Cf. Domini 2001, Lowry 1993, Sparkes 2002. It may be noted that I use this term in a broad 
sense here, i.e. to refer to all kinds of resolutions that shareholder activists may wish to intro-
duce at corporate AGMs – including proposals of directors and so on. 
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Company, [actually suggests that] ―it is largely through the use of the 
proxy process that shareholders have succeeded in capturing the atten-
tion of the corporation‖.16 
Now, can individual shareholders make a difference through introduc-
ing social shareholder resolutions? Well, some seem to suggest that they 
can. According to Brill and Reder, for instance, of the many rights and 
privileges which investors ‗like you and me‘ enjoy as shareholders of 
limited companies, it is the right to propose resolutions at the AGM 
―that is the most potent‖.17 As I noted in chapter II, most books on SRI 
are specifically directed to individual investors and give suggestions 
about how individual investors should behave in relation to their in-
vestments. It may be noted, however, that almost all examples of social 
resolutions which are discussed in these books are resolutions which 
have been put forward by large organisations or shareholder lobby 
groups.18 That is, even though the issue of whether individual investors 
can influence corporate behaviour through introducing social resolu-
tions ultimately is an empirical issue, SRI proponents give little empirical 
support for their view. Lacking empirical evidence against their view, I 
can only speculate as well – but I will in what follows suggest that, if one 
considers the legislation surrounding shareholder resolutions in most 
countries, there is reason to believe that the idea that individual inves-
tors can influence corporate behaviour through introducing social reso-
lutions is rather far-fetched. 
 The legislation surrounding shareholder resolutions is often quite 
different in different countries and it is therefore hard to say exactly 
what the possibilities for influencing corporate behaviour through the 
resolution process are for each and every investor. However, in most 
countries and cases, I believe, it seems very hard for individual share-
holders to successfully introduce shareholder resolutions on social is-
sues.19 A first problem does not pertain only to individual investors, but 
is the same for all investors and has to do with the introduction of reso-
 
16 Kinder et al. 1993, pp. 8-9 
17 Brill and Reder 1993, p. 22. See also Melton and Keenan 1994. 
18 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Brill and Reder 1993, Domini 2001, Domini and Kinder 1986, 
Harrington 1992, Lowry 1993, Melton and Keenan 1994, Miller 1991, Ward 1991 
19 It may be noted that I follow the main bulk of the SRI literature here and focus primarily 
on Western countries with relatively well-functioning corporate governance systems (like the 
US, Canada, Western Europe and Australia). Obviously, the possibilities for efficient share-
holder activism are even worse in many other countries where the corporate governance sys-
tems are quite different – cf. Sparkes 2002. 
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lutions on social issues specifically. I said above that the primary respon-
sibility for the day-to-day activities of the corporation rests with the 
management of the company. This is not just a figure of speech – in 
most countries, this means that managers actually have the right to 
ignore resolutions that could be said to deal with the ‗ordinary business‗ 
of the corporation, or there are formal rules which prohibit shareholder 
resolutions on such matters.20 Exactly what should be counted as the 
‗ordinary business‘ of the corporation and what should not is, of course, 
up for interpretation and debate. In very many cases, however, the go-
vernmental agencies which supervise these things seem to have been 
more keen on granting managers exclusive control over central corpo-
rate activities than on allowing shareholders to have a say in such mat-
ters.21 Now, as many other writers have pointed out, many of the ‗social‘ 
issues activists may want to file shareholder resolutions on could often 
be classified as part of the ‗ordinary business‘ of corporations.22  
 The considerations above, I believe, suggest a general problem for 
shareholder activists. Issues about, say, what products a certain com-
pany should manufacture (e.g. whether it should produce tobacco or 
not) or what production process should be used (e.g. to what extent this 
should be environmentally sustainable) could of course, on a certain 
level, be said to be ‗general production issues‘. And issues about dis-
crimination, and whether or not a company should employ equal op-
portunity practices in their employee recruitment, could be said to be 
‗general personnel issues‘. There are many reports on cases where social 
resolutions have been excluded with reference to the ‗ordinary business‘ 
clause. Sparkes reports on one of the most famous cases in the US:  
Shareholder rights are not unlimited [...] as the [US Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC)] only allows ‗resolutions going beyond ordi-
nary business which are therefore suitable subjects for shareholder re-
view through the proxy process‘. Probably the most high-profile SEC 
decision in this regard was over Cracker Barrel in 1992. Cracker Barrel 
was a US store chain that was alleged to have a policy of not employing 
homosexuals. In 1992 the New York City Employee Retirement System 
attempted to file a shareholder resolution requesting the company ‗to 
implement non-discriminatory policies relating to sexual orientation and 
to add explicit prohibitions against such discrimination to their corpo-
 
20 Cf. Blair 1995, Kinder et al. 1993, Lang 1996, Melton and Keenan 1994, Powers 1971, 
Simon et al. 1972, Sparkes 2002, Vogel 1978, Åhman et al. 2003 
21 Cf. Blair 1995, Kinder et al. 1993, Melton and Keenan 1994, Sparkes 2002, Vogel 1978 
22 Cf. Kinder et al. 1993, Melton and Keenan 1994, Powers 1971, Simon et al. 1972, Sparkes 
2002, Vogel 1978 
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rate employment policy statement‘. The SEC ruled that this was a ‗per-
sonnel‘ matter, and as such was part of the ‗ordinary business‘ of the 
company, meaning that the resolution could not be filed.23 
Already from the consideration above, it may seem doubtful that many 
investors will be able to introduce shareholder resolutions on social is-
sues successfully. To this consideration, I believe, should be added that 
this seems especially problematic for the individual investor. First of all, 
most countries have strict rules, not only governing what resolutions 
may be about, but also governing what type of investors are allowed to pro-
pose such resolutions and these rules tend to rule out the smallest play-
ers in the field. In the UK, for instance, in order to be eligible for pro-
posing shareholder resolutions you must either control at least 5% of 
the total voting power of all the outstanding shares of the company 
(which, of course, could be huge sums!), or you must get the backing of 
99 other investors who each hold shares worth at least £100.24 Ob-
viously, these criteria are extremely strict and it seems hard for typical 
individual investors, with only moderate amounts of disposable income, 
to be able to meet them. Things are a bit easier in the US, which may 
explain why shareholder activist campaigns in general have been more 
common there,25 but still only investors who hold more than 1% of the 
total voting power of the corporation, or $2000 in shares, and have held 
these for at least a year, are eligible for proposing shareholder resolu-
tions.26 The restriction on time alone, I believe, could be a serious impe-
diment for individual investors who want to propose shareholder reso-
lutions on social issues – not to mention timely ones.27 
 A further kind of problem for individual investors who wish to pro-
pose shareholder resolutions is that, in most countries, investors are 
 
23 Sparkes 2002, p. 31 
24 Cf. Lang 1996, Strätling 2003, Sparkes 1995, 2002, Ward 1991 
25 Cf. Louche and Lydenberg 2006, Mackenzie 1997, Sparkes 1995, 2002, Sparkes and 
Cowton 2004. An alternative explanation is that the legislation surrounding corporate social 
responsibility and reporting has been less strict in the US – cf. Vogel 1978. 
26 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Domini 2001, Sparkes 2002, Åhman et al. 2003. The latter figure was 
increased from $1000 in 1992 – cf. Sparkes 2002. There are also other formal requirements in 
the US – for instance, the kind of corporate activities relevant to a certain resolution must 
involve more than 5% of the annual income of the company as a whole – cf. Domini 2001, 
Domini and Kinder 1986. 
27 Since proposals should be filed at least 6 months prior to the AGM, in reality investors 
need to have held the shares for at least 18 months. According to Lang, furthermore, ―compa-
nies do not normally announce the actual date of the AGM until a few weeks beforehand, thus 
making it very difficult to dovetail the two dates (particularly since the company is unlikely to 
have ever received an independent shareholders‘ resolution before, and will almost certainly 
not welcome it)‖ (1996, p. 116). 
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required by law to circulate their resolution proposals to all of the other sharehold-
ers of the corporation.28 In many cases, it may be almost impossible to find 
accurate information from second-hand sources about exactly what 
people are shareholders in a given corporation.29 And, even if you some-
how could get access to this information, sending out a copy of your 
resolution to the many thousands who most often hold shares in public 
companies will obviously cost loads of money.30 In some countries, the 
corporations themselves are required to send out information about 
resolutions a few weeks before the AGM, both those proposed by man-
agement and those proposed by shareholders – this is often referred to 
as the ‗proxy ballot‘ or ‗proxy statement‗ of the corporation.31 Certainly, 
if you could get the company to circulate your proposal on this state-
ment you would fulfil the requirement that all shareholders should be 
notified, but, in most cases, shareholders are required to cover the costs 
of this service themselves.32 All in all, some writers suggest, the costs 
associated with filing shareholder resolutions would seem to make this a 
very impractical tool for effective use by individual shareholder activ-
ists.33 
 In light of the problems discussed above, I take it that it seems rather 
difficult for individual investors, at least in most countries and cases, to 
introduce shareholder resolutions on social issues in order to make a 
difference in terms of corporate behaviour. Of course, this does not 
mean that it is entirely impossible – under certain circumstances, indi-
vidual investors may actually be able to introduce resolutions that could 
be very potent. It should be noted once again that the legislation sur-
rounding these things is quite different in different countries, which 
makes it hard to generalise too much in either direction. Now, in order 
to be able to influence corporate behaviour through the successful filing 
of social resolutions, however, these resolutions obviously need to get 
enough votes at the AGM (at least for the resolutions to pass formally). 
In the following subsection, I will discuss what power individual inves-
tors have in this process. 
 
28 Cf. Lang 1996, Strätling 2003, Ward 1991 
29 Cf. Powers 1971, Ward 1991 
30 Cf. Vogel 1978 
31 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Domini and Kinder 1986, Kinder et al. 1993, Lang 1996, Lowry 1993, 
Melton and Keenan 1994, Strätling 2003, Ward 1991 
32 Cf. Powers 1971, Strätling 2003, Ward 1991 
33 Cf. Strätling 2003, Vogel 1978, Ward 1991 
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2.2 Vot ing on  r e so lu t ions  
According to many SRI proponents, as noted above, the most powerful 
tool of shareholder activists is the right to file and vote on shareholder 
resolutions. This would seem to suggest that the most straightforward 
strategy for an individual investor who wants to make a difference 
through shareholder activism would be to first file a shareholder resolu-
tion on some social issue, and to then try to vote this resolution through 
at the AGM. It should be noted, however, that there are other possibili-
ties here as well. Even when investors are unable to propose resolutions 
of their own, they could vote on shareholder resolutions sponsored by 
other investors – under certain circumstances, perhaps other share-
holder activists have successfully proposed a social resolution to be 
voted on at the AGM.34 Furthermore, investors of course have the pos-
sibility to vote on (or, most often, against) different resolutions pro-
posed by the management.35  
 I argued in chapter III (section 4.1) that, according to one under-
standing of the approval argument for the avoidance strategy discussed 
there, what is wrong with investing in morally unacceptable companies 
is basically that investors could do better in some sense. That is, to pas-
sively invest in morally unacceptable companies may be wrong because 
investors for instance could become shareholder activists instead. We 
may now note that one idea of why and how they could do better was 
actually that they have the possibility of voting against resolutions pro-
posed by managers. According to Simon, Powers and Gunnemann, for 
instance, ―an institutional shareholder who votes routinely for management 
and who otherwise fails to complain about corporate practices lends a 
measure of apparent acceptance and approval to existing corporate poli-
cies, thus reinforcing the management‘s predisposition to pursue these 
policies‖36. Although it may not seem to matter much whether individ-
ual investors vote for or against management, according to Domini and 
Kinder, voting against management has been an important part of 
shareholder activist campaigns, mainly because it shows other investors 
―that management doesn‘t always know best‖37. Domini elaborates on 
this point: 
 
34 Cf. Ward 1991 
35 Cf. Brill and Reder 1993, Domini 2001, Lowry 1993, Powers 1971, Ward 1991 
36 Simon et al. 1972, p. 151, emphasis added 
37 Domini and Kinder 1986, p. 9. See also Lowry 1993. 
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Even proxy materials that do not have a resolution filed by a share-
holder can give you an opportunity for action. I, for instance, reject 
boards of directors unless there is at least some female and/or minority 
representation. I even go so far as to photocopy my vote and forward it 
to management with a letter explaining that until they have taken at least 
a first step toward a board that reflects the demographics of the popu-
lation at large, I will not support their slate. Responses range from 
silence or rudeness to solicitousness.38 
I will in the present subsection simply discuss the efficacy of voting as 
such, and return to the possibility of writing letters to managers in sec-
tion 3. Can individual shareholders really make a difference through 
voting on various kinds of resolutions? Well, some writers actually sug-
gest that they can. According to Judd, for instance, ―[t]he crux of [the 
activist] approach is that corporations operate on a one-share-one-vote 
principle, allowing even a shareholder with a small stake in the company 
to bring up questions about social issues at annual meetings and to file 
shareholder resolutions‖.39 In a similar fashion, Domini writes: ―Now 
that you know the impact that even a small positive vote can have, you 
have no reason not to read through the [proxy] material, make a deci-
sion, and cast a vote‖40. Once again, however, none of these writers 
present much empirical support for their views on this matter. It may be 
noted that many books on SRI contain long lists of different social reso-
lutions filed by different campaigning groups, often together with the 
percentages of votes in favour and against.41 However, these lists are far 
from establishing the efficacy of individual activists‘ votes and, further-
more, it is interesting to see that there only very seldom are substantial 
percentages of votes in favour of social resolutions.42 When considering 
the legislative and factual context surrounding votes at AGMs in differ-
ent countries, it should also be noted, there is reason to believe that the 
possibilities for individual investors to influence corporate behaviour 
through voting on resolutions actually are very slim. 
 A first problem for individual investors is that not all kinds of invest-
ments in limited companies carry voting power. As noted already in 
 
38 Domini 2001, p. 103 
39 Judd 1990, p. 10. Other writers who emphasise the rule of one share-one vote are, e.g., Brill 
et al. 1999, Brill and Reder 1993, Bruyn 1987, Domini and Kinder 1986. 
40 Domini 2001, p. 103 
41 Cf. Domini and Kinder 1986, Lowry 1993, Melton and Keenan 1994, Sparkes 2002, Vogel 
1978 
42 Some writers acknowledge this fact – see, e.g., Brill et al. 1999, Haigh and Hazelton 2004, 
Lowry 1993, Melton and Keenan 1994, Powers 1971, Vogel 1978. 
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chapter III, most individual investors invest only indirectly in company 
shares, i.e., they invest in unit trusts or other kinds of funds, and thus 
they obviously cannot cast votes directly at AGMs on their own. On top 
of this, however, it should be noted that many countries have a system 
of so-called ‗A‘- and ‗B‘-shares, and that these shares carry different 
voting rights. While the rule may be one share-one vote with regards to 
‗A‘-shares, the situation is different with regards to ‗B‘-shares – often 
these are only one share-one tenth of a vote, or they simply lack voting 
power altogether.43 While there normally is at least some trade in ‗A‘-
shares on the stock market, the majority of shares available for individ-
ual investors are ‗B‘-shares.44 Thus, in the majority of cases, the shares 
which individual investors deal with actually carry very little in the form 
of voting rights. This is of course the same with bonds and other kinds 
of investments available to individual investors.45 
 The considerations noted above are relatively unimportant in the 
present context, however, since even one share-one vote obviously 
makes it extremely hard for individual investors to be decisive in votes 
at most public companies‘ AGMs. The number of outstanding shares in 
most companies on the world‘s stock markets, it should be noted, are 
enormous – for instance, the average number of shares in a company 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange was roughly 150 million at the 
end of December 2007.46 (The total number of shares in the largest 
company, Exxon Mobil, was over 8 billion.47) Hence, even if some indi-
vidual investor were to hold a considerable number of shares in some 
public limited company, and thus a large number of votes, it would be 
extremely unlikely, even in theory, that his votes would be decisive in a 
vote at the company‘s AGM. 
 To this theoretical unlikelihood of being decisive, as we might call it, 
should be added that the circumstances surrounding voting power and 
voting procedures in most countries makes for an even larger practical 
unlikelihood of individual investors‘ votes being decisive. First of all, as 
noted at the end of chapter IV (section 6.2), so-called institutional 
investors control the majority of shares on most of the world‘s stock 
markets, and individual investors only control a fraction of the total 
 
43 Cf. Rini 2002, Rydqvist 1992, Sparkes 2002, 2003, Teweles and Bradley 1998, Ward 1991 
44 Cf. Sparkes 2002 
45 Cf. Lang 1996, Powers 1971, Ward 1991 
46 New York Stock Exchange 2007a. See also Strätling 2003. 
47 New York Stock Exchange 2007b 
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market value. Now, this is true also with regards to most individual 
companies – that is, the majority of shares in most quoted companies 
are controlled by a handful of large organisations. For this reason, it 
would actually seem totally insignificant how individual investors vote, 
since these large organisations can steer the company in whatever direc-
tion they want. In more than 95% of decisions at AGMs, it may be 
noted, the decision rule is simple majority.48 Add to this a further way in 
which the voting procedure works in most countries. As noted above, 
companies sometimes send out information about resolutions a few 
weeks before the AGM, and this is often referred to as the ‗proxy ballot‘ 
or ‗proxy statement‘ of the corporation. It is called this because share-
holders should be able to vote ‗by proxy‘, i.e., they should not have to 
attend the AGM themselves but simply signal to the management (often 
by way of checking some boxes on the ballot and sending it back to the 
company) in what way they intend to vote.49 
 As noted already in chapter III (section 3.2), very many individual 
investors take advantage of their right not to attend the AGM of the 
companies they hold shares in and, thus, very few individual investors 
actually attend AGMs. What is more, however, is that very few investors 
use the proxy ballot to make an active vote – that is, they just sign the 
ballot and send it back to the company.50 We now come to the heart of 
the present point: In most countries, not declaring ones voting intension 
on the proxy ballot gives managers the right to use these votes in what-
ever way they see fit.51 Thus, one could say that the voting procedure is 
rigged in some sense to go the managers‘ way. According to some recent 
estimates in both the UK and the US, on average only about 3-4% of 
the votes cast at corporate AGMs actually go against the managers‘ 
recommendations.52 And, of course, as the system works, this is only to 
be expected. If managers are opposed to social resolutions, which they 
often tend to be, then, it seems extremely hard for individual investors 
to vote such resolutions through at the companies‘ AGMs. 
 The considerations above may seem quite discomforting, and many 
writers have complained that the modern corporation is far from demo-
 
48 Maug and Rydqvist 2001 
49 Cf. Brill and Reder 1993, Domini 2001, Domini and Kinder 1986, Maug and Rydqvist 2001, 
Strätling 2003, van der Burg and Prinz 2006, Wyss 2000 
50 Cf. Bottomley 2003, Kinder et al. 1993, Melton and Keenan 1994 
51 Cf. Brill and Reder 1993, Brill et al. 1999, Maug and Rydqvist 2001 
52 Cf. Maug and Rydqvist 2001, Strätling 2003, Webb et al. 2003. See also Zampa and 
McCormick 1991. 
239 
cratic.53 Vogel relates the story of one shareholder activist, Saul Alinsky, 
who dreams of the following scenario: 
I want to be able to move those stockholder meetings into Yankee Sta-
dium – and this goes for all corporations. They will have their thousand 
or so stockholders there, and we‘ll have 75,000 people from Proxies for 
People. I want to see the chairman of the board – in front of the cam-
eras and the mass media, with 75,000 people voting ―aye‖ on one of our 
resolutions – announce that 98% of the stock is in his hands [and] votes 
―nay,‖ and they win. I want to see him look at 75,000 people and tell 
them that they haven‘t got a damn thing to say about it.54 
The considerations above should certainly be extra frustrating from the 
perspective of shareholder activism – even though many individual in-
vestors may group together and try to make a company change its ways, 
it seems virtually impossible to get a social resolution passed at a larger-
sized company‘s AGM. Given the poor possibilities in this regard, one 
may of course wonder why shareholder activists bother to propose and 
vote on resolutions at all – that is, why the focus has been so much on 
resolutions in the first place. In the following subsection, I will discuss one 
possible explanation of this.  
2.3 The  soc ia l  d imens ion  o f  r e so lu t ions  
In my discussion of the possibilities for individual investors to make a 
difference at AGMs above, it may be noted, I have focused exclusively 
on the direct impact of proposing and voting on resolutions. Since there 
seems to be very little possibilities for individual investors to make a 
direct difference through doing these things, I said, one might wonder 
why shareholder activists focus so much on resolutions in the first place. 
The answer according to some writers, quite unsurprisingly, is that filing 
and voting on resolutions can have considerable indirect, or social, effects. 
According to Kinder at al., for instance, ―[t]he [shareholder resolution] 
proponents‘ goal is not so much the resolution‘s passage – they rarely 
win – as the start of a dialogue with the company. Shareholder activists 
often accomplish through talk what they cannot through the ballot 
process‖.55 As noted at the outset of the chapter, furthermore, Domini 
 
53 Cf. Blair 1995, Brill et al. 1999, Bruyn 1987, Cordery 2005, Lowry 1993, Maug and Rydqvist 
2001, Powers 1971, Vogel 1978, Zampa and McCormick 1991 
54 Vogel 1978, p. 214 
55 Kinder et al. 1993, p. 8. See also Brill et al. 1999, Melton and Keenan 1994. 
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prefers to talk about ―direct dialogue‖ instead of shareholder activism – 
perhaps we could understand this terminological choice (at least partly) 
in light of the kind of suggestion just mentioned as well. 
 In the present subsection, I will briefly discuss some possible indirect 
effects of proposing and voting on resolutions at a company‘s AGM. 
Unfortunately, I think many of the problems discussed in connection 
with the possible indirect effects of screening (chapter IV, section 6) re-
emerge in this context. In order to categorise the different suggestions 
here, I will start as I did in the discussion in chapter IV, i.e. by consi-
dering who the intended receivers of the communicative message of 
proposals and votes are. According to one suggestion, I believe, the in-
tended receivers are primarily managers and/or directors. According to this 
idea, namely, even though a certain attempt to vote a resolution through 
at the AGM may have little chances of succeeding, it may still have an 
impact on the decisions of managers and directors. Lowry, for instance, 
writes: 
Until 1988 concerned investors sponsoring shareholder proxies oper-
ated under the assumption that their proxies would never pass if they 
were opposed by management; generally that assumption was correct. 
Nevertheless, shareholders were content with 3 to 5 percent of the total 
votes and the frequent media attention their proxies received. In fact, 
most corporate managers take shareholder proxies seriously. They are 
concerned that their annual meetings run smoothly, that controversy be 
avoided, and that most, if not all, shareholders are supportive of com-
pany policies and practices.56 
Brill, Brill and Feigenbaum similarly write: 
Most social resolutions fail to gain more than 10 percent of the vote; 
but they do bring into focus important issues that companies sometimes 
do not want called to public attention. The threat of exposure is often 
enough to motivate companies into taking actions they otherwise would 
not. Exposure is even more of a concern today, when information tra-
vels quickly, is easily available, and is being monitored by social inves-
tors, activist groups, the media, and the public at large.57 
The reader may note the similarities between this suggestion and the 
appeal to the hypersensitivity of managers discussed in chapter IV (section 
6.1). The reason why proposing and voting on resolutions may have a 
 
56 Lowry 1993, p. 27 
57 Brill et al. 1999, pp. 143-44. See also Brill and Reder 1993, Domini and Kinder 1986, Lowry 
1993, Melton and Keenan 1994, Powers 1971, Simon et al. 1972, Sparkes 1995, 2002, Strätling 
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certain impact on managers and directors, even though there is no real 
chance of the resolutions‘ passing, would be that managers and directors 
are hypersensitive to the ‗threats of exposure‘ which such acts are 
thought to consist in.58 Now, once again, I believe it is possible that 
some managers and directors actually are hypersensitive to these things. 
However, SRI proponents have done little in the way of producing solid 
empirical evidence to the effect that this is the case for most managers. 
Obviously, it is hard to measure the social effects of shareholder activ-
ism in general, and the success of these kinds of attempts at influencing 
managers and directors in particular.59 Some commentators suggest that 
even though most managers state that they are not influenced by social 
interest groups, parts of their behaviour indicate that they are.60 
However, this goes the other way around as well – even though some 
managers may state that they pay close attention to what social interest 
groups say, it is not clear whether this actually influences their decisions. 
As I said in connection with the hypersensitivity argument in chapter 
IV, it seems reasonable to assume that most managers and directors pay 
rather little attention to what individual investors do, and would only be 
more attentive if the ‗threats‘ to the company were somehow backed up 
with some kind of real power. As long as individual investors have as 
little influence in the actual votes at corporate AGMs as they do, then, it 
would seem foolish for managers to pay very much attention to their 
resolution proposals and voting behaviour. 
 It should be noted, furthermore, that simply proposing or voting on a 
certain resolution in fact is something quite different from actually talk-
ing to the kind of groups which Brill, Brill and Feigenbaum discuss, or 
even threatening to talk to these groups. Perhaps talking to the media 
and spreading information to other activist groups actually are quite 
promising ways in which individual investors can make a difference to 
corporate practices – I will discuss these suggestions in the following 
section. At the present juncture, however, it is not ideas of this kind that 
we are discussing and, surely, media coverage does not follow automati-
 
58 According to some writers, failed resolutions may have additional possibilities of influen-
cing managers if they reach the kind of figures indicated in the quotes above, i.e. if they receive 
more than 3% or 10% of the votes. Under the US corporate governance system, namely, a 
resolution which did not pass at an AGM can be put back on the following year‘s proxy ballot 
if it receives 3% of the votes the first year. The second year it is 6% and after that it is 10% – 
cf. Vogel 1978, Sparkes 2002, Åhman et al. 2003. 
59 Cf. Mackenzie 1997, Sparkes and Cowton 2004, Vogel 1978 
60 Cf. Mackenzie 1997, Vogel 1978 
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cally from a proposal of or vote on a (social) resolution at a generic 
company‘s AGM. If the media is at all interested in some individual in-
vestors‘ voting behaviour, I believe this would probably be some more 
radical interest groups‘ votes rather than a single, non-affiliated inves-
tor‘s votes – assuming, of course, that the media comes to know about 
the vote at the AGM in the first place. 
 While the suggestion that managers are hypersensitive to the resolu-
tion proposals and voting behaviour of average individual investors 
seems unrealistic in most cases, another suggestion is that such kinds of 
behaviour may influence other investors to propose similar resolutions or 
vote in a similar fashion. As I noted in chapter III, according to Simon, 
Powers and Gunnemann, it is wrong to be a part of a group that sup-
ports morally unacceptable companies. But how should this be under-
stood more exactly? At one place they write: ―By failing to exercise their 
[...] authority within the corporate structure, [shareholders jointly] par-
ticipate in the continuation of a violation. And when an individual share-
holder fails to do what he or she (or it) can reasonably do to bring about 
such collective shareholder action, that shareholder, individually, parti-
cipates in the continuation of the violation‖61. Perhaps another inter-
pretation of the idea of Simon et al. about how the responsibilities of all 
investors translates into a responsibility on the part of each investor, 
then, could be that each individual investor has a responsibility to bring 
about a collective vote on certain social resolutions. By voting in a certain 
manner oneself, it may be argued, one can perhaps persuade many 
others to join in on one‘s voting campaign and, thus, one can make a 
difference as a larger group of investors. 
 The reader may note the similarities between this suggestion and what 
I called the snowball argument for screening in chapter IV (section 6.2). 
Certainly, I believe we should grant that the more of other investors one 
is able to include in a collective voting campaign, the more likely it is 
that the campaign will be effective. Miller correctly notes, in relation to 
shareholder activism, that ―[a]s a lone investor, any actions you might 
take might not be nearly as effective as those taken in concert with other 
like-minded individuals‖62. However, it is not obvious exactly how this 
persuasion of other investors is supposed to work. A first problem is 
that the majority of votes cast at most limited companies‘ AGMs ac-
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tually are proxy votes63 – that is, the majority of the voting shareholders 
cast their votes long before the AGM even starts and it certainly seems 
hard to influence these shareholders‘ voting behaviour by then voting in 
a certain way at the AGM. As I said in connection with the snowball 
argument for screening, furthermore, it is unclear whether even a quite 
successful persuasion of other individual investors will do the trick. Even 
though other individual investors probably are the ones most likely to 
be impressed by an individual activist‘s resolution proposals and voting 
behaviour, the real power over the corporation, as further corroborated 
by the considerations above, rests in the hands of the managers and the 
institutional investors. One may here also note a disadvantage that 
shareholder activists have when compared to avoidance or supportive 
investors. In order for a collective shareholder campaign to work, not 
only need all of the investors in this collective be persuaded to feel sym-
pathetic to the initiating investor‘s social cause, but they also need to vote 
on the same resolutions and in a similar way. As some writers suggest, this 
need for organisation on the part of the initiating investor may in itself 
make proposing and voting on resolutions a difficult way of influencing 
corporate behaviour.64 
 The alternative route is of course to focus on institutional investors 
rather than on individual such.65 However, I noted a problem also with 
this kind of suggestion in chapter IV, namely that institutional investors 
are very much like large limited companies. That is, if it is hard to influ-
ence corporate managers and directors to do a certain thing, it seems 
equally hard – if not harder – to influence the managers of large invest-
ment institutions to do this thing. To this considerations, it may be 
added that corporate managers and directors often work closely 
together with institutional investors in drafting their resolutions and 
setting their agenda, since they know that the institutional investors are 
the dominant owners of the companies and, thus, have the ability to 
dominate the votes at the AGM.66 For this reason, I believe, institu-
tional investors on their part are also more likely to want to collaborate 
with management than with individual investors – especially shareholder 
 
63 Cf. Bottomley 2003, Strätling 2003 
64 Cf. Powers 1971, van der Burg and Prinz 2006. According to Powers, it is actually unclear 
whether such coordinations are legal – they may be in violation of anti-trust laws (1971, p. 93). 
65 According to Vogel, for instance, ―[t]he most important long-term impact of the Campaign 
to Make General Motors Responsible was that it began to erode the practice of institutional 
neutrality in stockholder elections‖ (1978, p. 94). See also Domini and Kinder 1986. 
66 Cf. van der Burg and Prinz 2006 
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activists which, as I have said, tend to be rather anti-management.67 As 
an individual activist, then, it seems hard to influence the voting beha-
viour of institutional investors – at least through simply voting in a cer-
tain way or proposing certain resolutions. Perhaps activists can be more 
aggressive in their campaigns to try to persuade institutional investors – 
I will turn to this issue in the following section. 
 The considerations above suggest that it is hard for individual inves-
tors to influence corporate behaviour through proposing and voting on 
resolutions, even when the possible indirect effects of such behaviour 
are taken into account. Before leaving this discussion about resolutions, 
a final problem with focusing on resolutions as the vehicle for share-
holder activism should be noted: I said at the outset of this section that 
a resolution in the context of corporate governance perhaps could be 
compared to a bill or a motion in the context of public policy making. A 
problem with this analogy, however, is that, unlike legislative bills, most 
resolutions actually are not binding. As Brill, Brill and Feigenbaum put 
it, ―[m]ost resolutions are nonbinding requests or recommendations by 
shareholders to managers. Even with a majority vote, a resolution does 
not become company policy without management approval‖68. We see 
here, then, the ultimate token of the lack of power which individual in-
vestors have over corporate practices as compared to, for instance, the 
managers of the corporation.  
 However, if resolutions basically are requests, why couldn‘t investors 
just raise their hand at the AGM, address the managers straight out and 
tell them what they think they should be doing? 
3.  MORE RAD ICAL ACTIVIST  CAMPAIGNS  
Much of the debate over shareholder activism, as is obvious from the 
discussion above, has focused on the right of investors to propose and 
vote on resolutions at the AGMs of the companies they hold shares in. I 
will now leave this discussion, however, and discuss some other – po-
tentially more promising – possibilities which are open to individual 
investors in this context. As I noted at the outset of the chapter, share-
 
67 Perhaps there are further reasons for thinking this is so. According to Strätling: ―In order 
not to tarnish the reputation of the companies they invest in, institutional investors are more 
likely to approach members of the board directly in order to raise grievances than to resort to 
shareholder proposals or to vote against recommendations of the board of directors‖ (2003, p. 
76). 
68 Brill et al. 1999, p. 142. See also Maug and Rydqvist 2001. 
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holder activism is perhaps most adequately understood as an umbrella 
term covering a lot of more particular strategies, and many other ways in 
which one can use one‘s power as a shareholder to create corporate 
change have been suggested in the literature. Domini, for instance, 
writes: ―Delivering a social audit to a company for enrichment and 
comment is a way of alerting corporate management to issues. Letters 
written to gain clarification or to express either concern over or thanks 
for a position the company has taken can lead to good results. Con-
sumer boycotts, selective purchase campaigns, and even lying down in 
front of bulldozers have been used‖69. 
 Now, some of these suggestions are not things that one needs to be a 
shareholder to engage in (nor that investors can do in their role as share-
holders), for example, consumer boycotts and (simply) lying down in 
front of bulldozers. For this reason, I will disregard those suggestions in 
the present context. However, there are certainly a lot of things which 
investors can do exactly because they are shareholders or investors, and 
which potentially could lead to corporate change or more socially bene-
ficial outcomes. Before discussing the strategic issue of what line of ac-
tion could be the most effective for individual investors, I will simply 
present some of the most commonly suggested lines of action in the 
present context.  
 A first suggestion stems from the fact that the AGMs of corporations 
are a kind of social gatherings where managers, directors and sharehold-
ers meet, discuss and decide on important issues concerning the future 
of the company. In my discussion in the previous section, I focused 
mainly on the part about decisions – i.e. the resolutions which manage-
ment or shareholders can propose and which then are voted on at the 
meeting. According to some writers, however, the discussions at AGMs 
are just as important as the decisions. Most importantly, all shareholders 
– irrespectively of how much voting power one has – have the right to 
ask formal questions to the directors of the companies. Sue Ward ex-
plains the formal procedure at most AGMs as follows: 
The Chair will start the meeting by making a general statement about 
the year‘s performance, and presenting the Annual Report and Ac-
counts. The shareholders will then be asked to approve any changes to 
the Board and the appointed auditors, to ask questions, and occasionally 
to vote on resolutions. 
 You get your opportunity to put a question after the Chairman‘s 
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statement. It can be intimidating to do so, especially at a large company 
meeting, so practice in advance. Give your name, and say whether you 
are a shareholder or a proxy.70 
Asking questions at the AGM is actually a strategy employed by many 
shareholder activists.71 This strategy can be seen as a part of the more 
general suggestion that it is important to start a direct dialogue with corpo-
rate managers or directors. As I noted above, the idea that dialogue with 
companies is an effective way of initiating corporate change is common 
among SRI proponents. Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini, for instance, 
write that ―[s]hareholder activists often accomplish through talk what 
they cannot through the ballot process‖72. Other ways of starting a di-
rect dialogue with managers and directors could be to write letters to 
them directly, to set up meetings with them or to simply go to their cor-
porate headquarters and try to talk to them on location.73 Ward writes: 
―As an example of what can be done, Father Patrick O‘Mahoney, a 
Catholic priest in Solihull, wrote to about a hundred companies on be-
half of the Archdiocese of Birmingham‘s £2.5m investment funds. 
Some companies tried to brush him off, but others took trouble over 
their replies, and in some cases situations seem to have received atten-
tion at board level, which would not have been the case without him‖74. 
 The lines of action suggested above could of course be used in con-
nection with any of the investment strategies discussed in previous 
chapters, and also the kinds of actions discussed in the previous section 
here. According to some writers, the most common campaign strategy 
among so-called ethical funds starts with contacting the managers of the 
companies engaged in activities which are perceived as morally proble-
matic and having a constructive dialogue. If the managers are not per-
suaded to change their ways and give up these activities, however, social 
resolutions are proposed and the dialogue enters a more confrontational 
phase. If the social resolution process also fails, finally, quite often all 
shares in the company are sold and further investments in the company 
are avoided.75 Some writers explicitly distinguish between constructive 
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73 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Domini 2001, Ward 1991. Another suggestion is that one could visit the 
factories or locations where the morally problematic activities actually take place – cf. Ward 
1991. 
74 Ward 1991, p. 135 
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and confrontational ways of talking with companies, and discuss the 
merits and demerits of these lines of action in different situations. It is 
sometimes said, for instance, that dialogue tends to be more confronta-
tional in the US than in the UK, reflecting different cultural and/or leg-
islative traditions.76 
 While proposing hostile shareholder resolutions, or simply threaten-
ing to do so, may be considered fairly confrontational as compared to 
constructive dialogue, some writers suggest that even more confronta-
tional methods may be appropriate. If both talking to managers and 
proposing resolutions (or threatening to do so) fails, one suggestion is 
that activists actively could try to disrupt AGMs by, for instance, orga-
nising a demonstration outside its venue. According to Peter Lang, for 
instance, ―[s]ome organised groups, such as the Campaign Against the 
Arms Trade, have adopted much more pro-active stances at AGMs and 
have positively sought to disrupt the meetings. If you believe the com-
pany can be persuaded to change its stance through persuasion and 
reason, such disruption is likely to make your job more difficult. If you 
believe that a large company is basically ruthless and will pursue profits 
at all costs, then a demonstration at an AGM can focus media attention 
on a company and up the pressure‖.77 Of course, organising demonstra-
tions is not the only option here – another possibility may be to try to 
disrupt the AGM from within. Lang writes: ―The presence of the press 
means directors need to be on their best behaviour – photographs of 
security staff forcibly removing shareholders does not promote the im-
age of a caring and responsible company‖.78 
 The two suggestions above implicitly appeal to the power of the me-
dia, and accept that the media can play an important role in a successful 
social campaign. Now, I have already noted ideas similar to this in my 
discussion of the social dimension of resolutions. According to Melton 
and Keenan, for instance, ―while proxy activists seem unlikely to over-
come the tendency of most shareholders to vote with management or 
decline to vote on resolutions dealing with social issues, they can and 
have changed corporate behaviour. Such resolutions, when combined with a 
campaign to publicly expose the perceived ‗wrongdoing‘ of a corporation, 
can bring results‖79. Of course, rather than simply hoping that the media 
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will write about some other line of action they have pursued, shareholder 
activists could go directly to the media and try to influence both the man-
agers of the company (or companies) in question and the general public 
to see the moral problems connected with a certain kind of corporate 
activity. Although not all reporters may be interested, some reporters 
could be persuaded to see the public interest in certain moral issues 
related to the corporate sector. Ward gives the following recommenda-
tions in connection with her suggestion about asking questions at the 
AGM above: ―Send out a press release in advance and after the meeting, 
speak to any reporters from the financial press who are present. They 
may be interested in you as a ‗news angle‘. Take along copies of your 
literature, and a further press release, to give to them and any other 
shareholders who are interested‖80. 
 It may be noted that the media is not the only power outside corpora-
tions that activists can go to, and the managers and directors are not the 
only ones which activists can start a dialogue with. As noted previously, 
many writers hold the practices of institutional investors central to what 
goes on in the business world. Perhaps individual investors can be more 
aggressive in their campaigns to try to persuade institutional investors. 
Domini and Kinder, for instance, write: 
The willingness of big institutions to vote against management leads me 
to believe that more institutions can be persuaded to support social is-
sue proxy efforts and similar campaigns. This is where the individual 
ethical investor can play an important role. The institutions will not 
move of their own accord. They respond to pressure. So it is critically 
important for ethical investors to know who controls their pension 
fund, for example. They should study the organizations in which they 
are involved – from colleges to charities – and see who runs their 
money. The right questions about their votes may yield interesting re-
sults.81 
As Domini and Kinder indicate here, institutional investors are not the 
only kind of larger organisations which individual investors could con-
tact. They may also contact charities and other kinds of activist organi-
sations, and perhaps they may even try to collaborate further with these 
organisations. Brill and Reder, for instance, write:  
If you qualify to propose shareholder resolutions for one or more com-
panies, you can become a particularly effective activist by informing 
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progressive organizations whose causes you support that you will sub-
mit resolutions for them. In 1987 People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals (PETA), working through friendly shareholders, introduced 
resolutions at major cosmetics companies‘ annual meetings demanding 
the release of animal test data. [...] In 1990 Colgate-Palmolive became 
the first company to make this data public. The Council on Economic 
Priorities reports that Colgate-Palmolive is now a corporate leader in 
substantially reducing its number of animal tests and/or actively re-
searching alternatives.82 
The last resort if both dialogue and resolutions fail, and probably one of 
the most provocative possibilities, according to some writers, is simply 
to take corporations to court. While it should be noted that moral argu-
ments are not always relevant in a legal context, many morally unaccept-
able corporate activities are certainly problematic also from a legal point 
of view. According to Powers, ―[c]orporate law allows the stockholder 
legal recourse [...] if he believes that management‘s practices are ultra 
vires (that is, beyond the powers granted by the state charter), negligent, 
illegal, fraudulent or involve a clear abuse of discretion‖83. If individual 
investors are successful at finding a legal case against a certain company, 
it is not implausible to think that taking the company to court some-
times could be very effective. Powers continues: ―The following exam-
ple shows where it might apply to the social investor. A company, oper-
ating in violation of state pollution laws, has not yet been prosecuted by 
the public authorities. The stockholder can bring a derivative suit in or-
der to force the management to comply with the pollution laws. Again 
in this case, the initiative and not its ultimate success in court, could 
bring the desired result, since the action might persuade management to 
comply in order to avoid prosecution or harmful publicity, or might 
force the public authority to take action to force compliance‖84. 
3.1 Some pos i t ive  sugge s t i ons  
So far in this section I have only attempted to describe in some more 
detail the most common suggestions as to what shareholder activists 
may do apart from proposing and voting on resolutions. Now, what 
should we say about these suggestions? Obviously, they are of quite dif-
ferent character, and the suitability for use by individual investors may 
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vary to a great degree between different suggestions. First and foremost, 
I think we should conclude that much more empirical research is 
needed in relation to all of these suggestions. While the shareholder 
resolution process is discussed at some length in many books on SRI, it 
should be noted, many of the suggestions noted above are only appealed 
to as last resorts when the problems connected with proposing and 
voting on resolutions are discussed. If proponents of the SRI movement 
want to build a strong case for the idea that SRI really makes (or can 
make) a difference, however, some stronger evidence than simply the 
anecdotal one is needed. In the remainder of this section, I will simply 
indicate what I take to be some general characteristics of the kind of 
campaigns that I believe are the most promising in the present context. 
While most of my conclusions above have been negative, I believe it is 
important not to neglect the real possibilities that individual investors 
actually may have for creating positive social change through more radi-
cal activist campaigns. 
 Although it is hard to say exactly what kind of activist campaigns have 
the greatest potential for social progress here, a first general characteris-
tic of especially promising campaigns, I believe, would probably be that 
forces or powers outside the corporations themselves are used to put pressure on 
companies to change. One kind of thinking that is close at hand but 
which I think shareholder activists should focus less on is the appeal to 
the hypersensitivity of managers and directors. If the talk of ‗direct dialo-
gue‘ and asking questions at AGMs is taken at face value, I believe, the 
idea once again seems to be that individual investors can influence 
managers to change their companies‘ ways, either by way of moral argu-
mentation or through some kind of threats of exposure. However, as I 
have suggested many times above, it is not very likely that managers 
actually will listen to individual investors if their threats are not also 
backed up by some kind of real power – financial or otherwise. Other 
writers share this pessimism. According to Brill, Brill and Feigenbaum, 
for instance, ―[i]nvestors with small holdings have only a slim chance of 
reaching the ear of upper management‖85. As long as most activist cam-
paigns explicitly go against the recommendations (and interests) of 
managers, I believe this situation is likely to continue. According to 
Lang, some managers have actually developed quite elaborate strategies 
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which allow them to counteract individual investor‘s asking questions at 
their AGMs: 
As some shareholders and pressure groups have begun to use AGMs to 
put public pressure on companies, directors have adopted some subtle 
procedures to exert control of the AGM. Some companies will direct 
investors who hold single shares to sit together – possibly even corralled 
in by security staff. The chair of the meeting can then try not to call any-
one sitting in that block. [...] Other companies attempt to reduce the ef-
fectiveness of questions by controlling the sound system, so questioners 
seen as troublemakers are seated where they don‘t get the opportunity 
to speak through a microphone. 86 
I will not elaborate on these observations here. The point I wish to 
make is simply that individual investors‘ activist campaigns are much 
more likely to achieve their goals if forces outside corporations are used 
to put pressure on these companies. As we have seen, the managers and 
directors of the modern corporation have immense powers over these 
corporations and their activities, and thus they also have immense 
powers over societal activities in general and over people‘s lives. In or-
der to influence managers and directors, I believe individual investors 
need to appeal to forces which can balance this kind of corporate power. 
When I say ‗forces outside corporations‘ I am thinking primarily of the 
following kind of forces: large organisations (commercial or not), the media, 
governments and the legal system. If individual investors were to get one or 
more of these forces on their side, I believe their social campaigns could 
become a whole lot more effective. 
 Exactly what individual investors should do in order to get these kind 
of outside forces on their side is certainly not obvious. Maybe writing 
letters to institutional investors, sending out press releases or taking 
companies to court could work. The idea that governments are forces 
that social campaigners can appeal to, I believe, is an idea that is not as 
frequent as the others in the literature on SRI (although Powers talks 
about influencing ―the public authority to take action to force com-
pliance‖). To the extent that social campaigns can put pressure on gov-
ernment agencies or officials to make some relevant legislative changes, 
however, I think this indeed is a great power to be reckoned with. I will 
return to this suggestion briefly in the concluding chapter (chapter VIII, 
section 2).  
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 Now, a second characteristic of especially promising campaigns, I 
believe, is that they probably would have to be self-sacrificing in a very real 
way – that is, they would probably cost both a lot of money and a lot of 
time and effort. Many writers note the enormous costs which often 
come with taking influential companies to court. Powers, for instance, 
writes: 
The impediments to successful derivative suits are truly monumental. 
For example, in some cases (though dependent upon relevant state law), 
if the shareholder holds less than five percent of the outstanding stock 
of the corporation or his stock has a market value of less than $50,000, 
he must post security to cover the ―reasonable‖ legal and other costs in-
curred by the company in its legal defence; if the stockholder loses, he 
forfeits the security. Of course, the litigant‘s own legal expenses in the 
drawn-out legal process common in this type of suit will be substantial. 
The investor should also be advised that success rates in this sort of suit 
are low.87 
More generally, however, I think we should conclude that any successful 
activist campaign on the part of an individual investor is likely to be 
both extremely time-consuming and quite costly. To see this, consider 
first the following line of reasoning: Even though the lines of action 
discussed above certainly are open to investors as investors, or as sharehold-
ers, some readers may feel, there is nothing in these lines of actions 
which depend on the fact that the agent in question is an investor. That 
is, also non-investors can write letters to institutional investors, send out 
press releases and demonstrate outside some company‘s AGM. So what 
is the reason for holding out these things here, and not discussing, e.g., 
consumer boycotts and other kinds of more progressive lines of actions 
open to activist civilians? Well, the reason given by most SRI propo-
nents, as should be rather clear by now, is that investors are in a better 
position to use the first group of actions in effective social campaigns. 
Exactly because investors are shareholders in, or generally considered 
(part) owners of, commercial companies they have certain rights and pri-
vileges in relation to these companies that they can use to influence 
these companies‘ activities in a way which non-owners cannot. 
 Now, if the line of reasoning above is to work for the kind of actions 
currently under discussion, I believe, it must be the right to extensive 
information about (and perhaps the publicly accepted affiliation to) the 
company they hold shares in that put shareholders in a better situation 
 
87 Powers 1971, pp. 107-8. See also Ward 1991. 
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than others to influence companies through, e.g., writing letters to in-
stitutional investors and sending out press releases. However, we may 
now return to the information problem noted at the outset of section 2. 
As I said there, many writers (especially in the corporate governance 
literature) complain that it is often hard for individual investors to 
access relevant and accurate information about the activities of the 
companies they invest in. Investors may be in a better situation than 
non-investors when it comes to having access to information about the 
companies they have invested in, but it is often extremely time-con-
suming and costly to get a hold of this information.88 
 Here we see, then, one reason for why I believe most successful activ-
ist campaigns need to become quite self-sacrificing and accept different 
kinds of costs. In order for letters to institutional investors or press 
releases to the media to be sufficiently appealing to these forces, indi-
vidual investors would probably have to gather quite a lot of informa-
tion about the relevant companies and build a strong case about a cer-
tain moral problem related to their business activities. As noted above, 
Domini and Kinder suggest that asking institutional investors ―[t]he right 
questions about their votes may yield interesting results‖89. Furthermore, 
Ward says about media exposure: ―They may be interested in you as a 
‗news angle‘. Take along copies of your literature, and a further press 
release, to give to them and any other shareholders who are inter-
ested‖90. Surely, asking the right questions and presenting a sufficiently 
interesting news angle takes a lot of preparation. And preparation is also 
important for making a strong legal case against some company. 
 There are further reasons to think that the more self-sacrificing a cer-
tain activist campaign is, the greater potential it has to influence corpo-
rate behaviour. Of course, simply printing out information material to a 
large number of investors or reporters may be quite costly. Ward sum-
marises the points above quite nicely by saying that ―[t]he costs of 
running a campaign could be heavy, especially since you will get much 
further if you make your presentation well argued and researched, easy 
to read, and interesting and attractive enough not to go straight into the 
bin‖91. One of the main reasons for why I think the most successful 
 
88 Cf. Charkham and Simpson 1999, Cowton 1998b, van der Burg and Prinz 2006, Webb et al. 
2003 
89 Domini and Kinder 1986, p. 209, emphasis added 
90 Ward 1991, p. 139 
91 Ibid., p. 133 
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social campaigns by individual investors will be rather self-sacrificing, 
however, is because I think many of the suggestions discussed above 
will be actively countered by the targeted companies. Some writers note that 
giving extensive information to reporters, although an effective way of 
influencing the public opinion, may open activists to libel charges. Lang, 
for instance, writes: 
1995 saw the start of one of Britain‘s longest running libel trials when 
Greenpeace London protesters were sued by the hamburger chain 
McDonalds for libel after they wrote a leaflet connecting the company 
with cutting down of the rainforest – an allegation McDonalds have 
repeatedly denied. In Austria the head of the country‘s largest electricity 
company took a Greenpeace campaigner to court for defamation 
because he had said that building a new coal-fired power station was 
tantamount to wilfully killing people because of the additional deaths 
which would result from the greenhouse effect. The Austrian cam-
paigner won, but at the time of writing the critics of McDonalds were 
still in court.92 
The kind of repercussions described above, I believe, are only to be ex-
pected. As suggested repeatedly throughout this chapter, corporate 
managers and directors have immense powers, and also vast resources at 
their hands, and they can use these to circumvent the initiatives of indi-
vidual investors or to try to put the pressure back on the shareholder 
activists. However, this is something that I believe shareholder activists 
must accept if their campaigns are to become really effective. 
 Of course, all self-sacrificing stunts pulled by shareholder activists will 
not be effective in getting powers outside the corporation to influence 
certain companies to change their ways. I should emphasise again that, 
given the available (lack of) empirical evidence, it is hard to say in any 
more detail what individual investors should do to make a considerable 
difference in terms of corporate practices or societal outcomes. 
Through devising a radically self-sacrificial activist campaign and re-
ceiving help from powerful forces outside the corporate sphere, how-
ever, perhaps individual investors could able to push for corporate 
change – at least if these campaigns are sufficiently well-planned and 
carried out with sufficient efficiency. 
 
92 Lang 1996, pp. 42-43 
255 
4.  CON CLUS IONS  
According to most proponents of the SRI movement, investors who 
really want to make the world a better place should become shareholder 
activists and try to influence morally unacceptable companies ‗from 
within‘ to change their ways. In this chapter, I have discussed different 
suggestions as to what this recommendation might mean more exactly, 
and evaluated these suggestions from the point of view of the individual 
investor. Unfortunately, SRI proponents present little empirical 
evidence of the efficacy of different kinds of shareholder activist cam-
paigns for individual investors. Judging from certain general characteris-
tics of the corporate governance systems in place in different countries, 
however, I have suggested that it once again seems quite difficult for 
individual investors to make a non-negligible difference by taking a so-
cial stand in this way. Since the laws and power structures surrounding 
the decision-making at corporate AGMs give individual investors so 
little power, I have suggested that they should seek more radical but 
indirect ways of trying to influence companies. 
 Some of the suggestions that I consider fairly promising are the sug-
gestions that individual investors could write letters to or make contact 
with institutional investors and try to make them vote differently on 
resolutions, alternatively they could send press releases to the media 
with extensive information surrounding some morally problematic ac-
tivities. Another suggestion is that they could try to charge the compa-
nies with unlawful behaviour and bring them to court. Unfortunately, 
these suggestions would probably have to be rather time-consuming and 
costly for individual investors in order to be effective. They may also 
make individual investors open to counter-charges from the companies 
in question, which may be extremely detrimental to both the reputation 
and the wallet of individual investors. This raises the question of how 
much morality demands of individual investors – would it be wrong of 
investors to refrain from doing these things, simply because they are too 
self-sacrificing? This is the issue I will turn to in the following chapter.
 Chapter VII 
Making Money or Making a Difference? 
1.  THE IN SISTENCE ON PRO FITS  
How substantial are the demands which morality imposes on individual 
investors? In previous chapters I have noted that an important, if not 
the most important, idea within the SRI movement on what constitutes 
genuinely ethical investing is the idea that investors ought to ‗make a 
difference‘, or to promote the good – understood either in terms of 
progressive corporate behaviour or, more generally, in terms of socially 
beneficial outcomes. I have argued that, for the most part, it is not easy 
for individual investors to make a non-negligible difference through 
adopting the kind of investment strategies generally proposed by SRI 
proponents. However, even individual investors may be able to make a 
considerable difference under certain circumstances. Investing directly 
in certain small-scale business ventures designed to support minority 
communities or communities with poor economic development, for 
instance, could make a certain difference – or at least so I have argued. 
Through devising a radically self-sacrificial activist campaign and re-
ceiving help from powerful forces outside the corporate sphere, perhaps 
individual investors are also able to push for corporate change – at least 
if these campaigns are sufficiently well-planned and carried out with 
sufficient efficiency. Furthermore, donating (part of) the proceeds re-
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trieved from one‘s investments directly to socially worthwhile causes, as 
the philanthropic strategy suggests, is still a fairly straightforward way of 
making a very tangible difference. The needs of many people, primarily 
in the third world, I believe, are so great that even very small contribu-
tions by individuals here can mean the difference between life and 
death. 
 As suggested in previous chapters, a general characteristic of the lines 
of action just referred to is that they seem to demand more of investors 
than the strategies more commonly proposed by SRI proponents do, 
both in terms of direct monetary losses (or forsaken investment returns) 
and in terms of time and effort. In this chapter, I will turn to the issue 
of how to understand the idea of ‗making a difference‗ more exactly in 
this respect. The main question I am interested is: How much of a difference 
are investors morally required to make? Although I said briefly in chapter IV 
(section 2) that most moral theories contain the idea that moral agents 
have at least some moral reason, at least under certain circumstances, to 
promote the general good, I did not pursue the issue of to what extent 
this is a plausible idea any further there. Furthermore, I did not pursue 
the issue of whether to interpret the appeal to ‗making a difference‘ as a 
full-fledged consequentialist appeal or not, i.e. I did not decide whether it 
implies that investors always ought to produce the best possible effects – as 
opposed to the idea that they at least sometimes ought to produce some 
good effects. It is this dimension of what some have called the issue of 
the demandingness of morality that I will explore in the present chapter.1 
 Exploring the issue of the demandingness of morality is important, I 
believe, because it allows us to raise two questions which are funda-
mental to the whole idea of ‗ethical investment‘ within the SRI commu-
nity yet which, perhaps for reasons having to do with the marketing 
dimension of much of the SRI literature (noted in chapter II, section 1), 
seldom have been explored in this context. One such question is the 
 
1 Cf. Cullity 2004, Eriksson 1994, Mulgan 2001. It should be noted that I understand this 
issue in a fairly wide sense here – mainly because I understand morality in a fairly wide sense 
(see chapter I, section 2). Some philosophers distinguish between how demanding the content of 
morality is, i.e. whether or not agents have moral reasons to sacrifice certain personal values 
for the sake of promoting the general good, and how demanding the authority of morality is, i.e. 
whether moral reasons always trump reasons of, say, prudence or personal need (cf. Cullity 
2004, Scheffler 1992). Since I count all such reasons as moral reasons, however, this distinction 
is inapplicable here. Furthermore, I think this distinction indeed is rather strange (which is why 
I have chosen to understand morality in this wide sense). No matter how we frame the issue at 
hand, I believe, it is the same kind of considerations which are at stake. I return to this point 
below – see note 58. 
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following: If making a considerable (or maximal) positive difference 
through one‘s investment behaviour is very ‗costly‘2, is this a sacrifice that 
investors are morally required to make? I noted in chapter II that one of the 
most prominent features of SRI as it is commonly portrayed is a focus 
on individual investors‘ own moral views on issues such as the sale of alco-
hol, tobacco, weapons and pornography – indeed this focus was visible, 
I said, already in the titles of most books on SRI. Now, an almost 
equally prominent feature, I believe, is a focus on the idea that ethical 
investing is consistent with substantial financial returns on investments – i.e. that 
ethical investing does not have to ‗cost‘ investors anything. Some nota-
ble titles are ―Ethical Investing – How to make profitable investments 
without sacrificing your principles‖3, ―Investing with your conscience – 
How to achieve high returns using socially responsible investing‖4, ―In-
vesting with your values – Making money and making a difference‖5 and 
―Investing with a social conscience – Everything you need to know to 
make socially conscious investments that will still make money‖6. 
 Most of these books contain substantial chapters on the issue of the 
financial costs of different kinds of SRI initiatives, and the point is al-
most without exception to suggest, or even to try to prove, that ‗ethical‘ 
investments fare financially just as well as, or perhaps even better than, 
conventional investments.7 According to many writers, this profitability 
is an essential part of what is advantageous with SRI – SRI ―is not for 
martyrs‖ as Brill, Brill and Feigenbaum put it8. Some writers even sug-
gest that SRI should be defined partly in terms of profitability – according 
to Lowry, as we have seen, ―SRI [...] is putting money to use in some-
thing that offers profitable returns and that actively supports and pro-
motes a higher quality of life, welfare, and social relations in society‖9. 
According to Sparkes, in a similar vein, community investing is not a 
proper part of SRI, but could perhaps be called SDI, socially directed in-
vestment – ―the essence of SDI is that SDI savers deliberately accept 
below market returns in order to help others; this is certainly not the 
 
2 I am here using ‗cost‘ in a wide sense which incorporates both direct monetary losses and 
forsaken monetary gains. 
3 Domini and Kinder 1986 
4 Harrington 1992 
5 Brill et al. 1999 
6 Judd 1990 
7 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Brill and Reder 1993, Camejo 2002, Domini 2001, Fehrenbacher 2001, 
Kinder et al. 1993, Lowry 1993, Sparkes 1995, 2002 
8 Brill et al. 1999, p. 21 
9 Lowry 1993, p. 21 
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intention of SRI‖10. Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini are quite to the 
point and say that ―passing a social screen should never be the sole 
ground for investing: An investment must make financial sense. Social 
screens must always be integrated with financial screens‖11.  
 It is not obvious, however, how passages like these should be under-
stood. According to Brill, Brill and Feigenbaum again, perhaps the two 
foci noted above could go together: 
Every [SRI investor] must come to terms with the very personal subject 
of investment performance. We‘ve seen that ethical values can be inclu-
ded in a portfolio without sacrificing return. This is great news, and we 
hope all of our readers will do their part to let the uninitiated know the 
facts. 
 Although the [studies referred to earlier] make a powerful case for 
[SRI], numbers can blind us to even deeper questions. What if you want 
to invest in something that really moves your soul, something you beli-
eve can make a positive difference? And what if this investment has less 
profit potential than other opportunities? Would you be willing to sacri-
fice some financial return for the satisfaction that making your heartfelt 
choice could bring? [...] 
 [SRI investors] align themselves along a purity spectrum that runs 
from ―I won‘t give up a dime in order to include my values‖ to ―I don‘t 
care at all about return; I want to do good.‖ This is one of the most im-
portant questions to clarify right at the start, as it influences virtually 
every aspect of building a portfolio.12 
I will return to discuss how the ideas expressed in the quotes above 
should be understood more exactly below (section 3.1). Quite generally, 
I believe it is striking how most writers, both within the SRI community 
and in academic contexts, consider the issue of the financial costs or 
benefits of SRI as such an exciting issue. As indicated in the introduc-
tory chapter, an overwhelming majority of the research made on SRI or 
‗ethical investing‘ within the academic community concerns the financial 
side of investments in ethical funds or other SRI vehicles. Indeed, some 
claim that the issue of whether ethical investments are financially sound 
investments or not is the most critical issue for the SRI movement as a 
whole.13 I fail to understand the excitement surrounding this issue, how-
ever, especially with regards to a movement that so explicitly sets out to 
shift the focus in investment decisions away from simple financial con-
 
10 Sparkes 2001, p. 195 
11 Kinder et al. 1993, p. 47, emphasis in original 
12 Brill et al. 1999, p. 65. See also Bruyn (1987), who separates between three types of inves-
tors along this spectrum – the ‗conservative‘, the ‗liberal‘ and the ‗alternative‘. 
13 Cf. Camejo 2002, Schepers and Sethi 2003 
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siderations. Compare, e.g., the formulations above with what Domini 
says in the following quote, about the urgency of making a fundamental 
change in how modern corporations are run: 
A change is needed. We no longer can accept the adages that ―the busi-
ness of business is business‖ and that ―the rising tide will lift all ships.‖ 
It hasn‘t, it won‘t, and it cannot without a rewriting of the definition of 
success. Business is run on a set of rules that solely values making 
money for the few owners. [...] The investments we make today shape 
the world we will live in tomorrow. If our investments are made in a 
vacuum, without consideration for the social or environmental impact 
they may have, the result will be a continual slide toward rewarding that 
which is profitable at the cost of that which is life enhancing. [...] The 
fundamental belief that socially responsible investors share is this: that 
the way we invest matters.14 
Although this passage is open for interpretation, I believe it is safe to 
say that most SRI proponents, at least sometimes, give (and probably 
want to give) the impression that the values which ethical investments 
strategies can realize (e.g., the difference which such investments can 
make) are morally far more important than the possible values for the in-
vestor of sizable investment returns. If this was not a part of the moral 
make-up of these writers, I believe, they would most probably not be 
proponents of the SRI movement in the first place.15 
 That the conflict between the ethical and financial goals of SRI is 
more far-reaching than most SRI proponents assume, I believe, has 
been vindicated in my discussions in previous chapters. In this chapter, 
the question of what moral import the costs for individual investors 
have will be discussed more thoroughly. A second question that will be 
discussed, which I also believe is fundamental to the whole of idea of 
 
14 Domini 2001, pp. 2-4 
15 Later in Domini‘s book, in a comment on the low profitability of so-called community 
investments, she continues the line of reasoning introduced above. Although investments in 
community development financial institutions (CDFIs) may demand some level of sacrifice, 
she argues, maybe one should do it simply because morality demands it? ―Community eco-
nomic development investments suffer under a cloud of below-market returns because many 
loan funds can offer only below-market interest rates. Even credit unions and banks are unable 
to provide investors with the long-term upside that equities or bonds can return. But that is an 
unfair comparison. [...] CDFIs make good investment sense for several reasons. It is the right 
thing to do; it‘s safe; you‘ll be a more involved investor; you might be saved other expenses; 
and it stretches your giving budget. [...] Sometimes a person should make an investment be-
cause it is the right thing to do. Many are rich enough, or care enough, to lend resources to 
enable these extraordinary grassroots organizations to do their work. [...] If we take individual 
responsibility for the future, then we recognize that the right thing to do is to support CDFIs 
with our investment dollars, with our voting policies, with our volunteer hours, and with our 
charitable contributions‖ (2001, pp. 173-74). 
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‗ethical investment‘ within the SRI movement, is the issue of what to 
think of conventional, or ‘non-SRI’, investments – i.e. investments that do not 
purport to take ethical or social considerations into account but are cho-
sen on strictly financial considerations. As noted in the introductory 
chapter, some writers suggest that at least part of the reason for why the 
term ‗socially responsible investment‘ (or SRI) sometimes is preferred 
over the term ‗ethical investing‘, may be a discomfort among SRI pro-
ponents and practitioners about what the latter term implies for con-
ventional investments. As Lang notes, ―[u]sing the term [ethical invest-
ing] raises another difficult question: are investments which don‘t take 
into account ethics therefore unethical?‖16. Well, interestingly enough, 
not many writers say very much about this issue, except for what the 
discussion of the costs-issue above may be taken to imply. In fact, I 
think it is fair to say that this issue is actively ignored by most proponents 
of the SRI movement.17 
 While they do not say very much about this, one may perhaps infer 
what the view of most writers is by noting some other things which they 
do comment on. An interesting circumstance is, first of all, that most 
books written to entice investors into ‗socially responsible investments‘ 
not only contain chapters on the (lack of) financial costs attached to 
different SRI initiatives, but frequently also include a number of chap-
ters on the strictly financial side of investing. That is, many books contain 
in-depth explanations of what different investment vehicles are available 
on the market, what the different terms used in connection with stock 
market trading mean, what levels of financial risk may be suitable for 
different types of investors, etc. etc..18 This could perhaps be taken to 
indicate that a certain application of ‗conventional wisdom‘ to one‘s in-
vestments is at least not something that is frowned upon within the SRI 
community – maybe it is even thought to be sensible.19 There is actually 
 
16 Lang 1996, p. xii 
17 An exception to this may be Lang himself, although I find it hard to understand what his 
position really amounts to. Lang answers the question above (―are investments which don‘t 
take into account ethics therefore unethical?‖) by saying: ―Well, many probably are, but not all 
of them by any means: the answer is rather to be found in the presumption that ethics should 
be an integral part of investing, and the highest ethical standards should be sought by all of us‖ 
(1996, p. xii). 
18 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Brill and Reder 1993, Domini and Kinder 1986, Lang 1996, Ward 1991 
19 Some writers certainly seem to imply this – see, e.g., Kinder et al. 1994, Ward 1991. Accord-
ing to Miller: ―It must be remembered [...] that if something is a poor investment, for example 
in terms of risk or bad market choice, then the fact that the investment in socially responsible 
does not make it any better. SRI is an additional consideration in investment, not a substitute 
for sound commercial judgment‖ (1992, p. 243). 
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some evidence which suggests that most financial advisers who specia-
lise in advice on SRI initiatives also frequently advise their clients to 
choose non-SRI financial products. A factor that may upset the balance 
away from ethical investing, some suggest, is when SRI products simply 
don‘t fit the needs of particular clients. Relating the views of Pat Mee-
han and Giles Chitty, investment advisers at two of the largest SRI-
specialised consultancy agencies in the UK, Sparkes writes: 
Pat feels very strongly that ethics in investment advice necessitates 
starting with the client and his/her needs – which are paramount. While 
he is a keen advocate of responsible investment, he also feels that there 
are times when ethical products are not the best, and therefore there are 
times when they have to be advised against.20 
 
For Giles, ethical investment is part of a way of life. [...] [He says: ―]At 
the same time, our job is to give the best financial advice possible. That 
is why we don‘t only sell ethical products – there are times, such as 
when someone is coming up to retirement, when they need a traditional 
with-profits scheme and there simply isn‘t an ethical product availa-
ble.[‖]21 
I will not address the issue of the ethics of investment advice here,22 but I 
believe it should be obvious from the considerations above that the 
question of what to think of conventional investments is a somewhat 
sensitive issue within the SRI industry. And perhaps this is understand-
able. To be able to answer this question, it would seem necessary to go 
beyond the confines of the discussion of the (strategies of the) SRI 
movement as such, and to engage in a more general discussion about 
the demandingness of morality. Even if this is an issue that SRI propo-
nents have clear ideas about, discussing this issue may scare away the 
investors who are equally motivated to invest in SRI as in non-SRI 
vehicles. 
 In this chapter, however, I will discuss both of the questions outlined 
above. In order to be able to flesh out some possible answers to these 
questions, I will import what I take to be central parts of the more phi-
losophical discussion on the issue of the demandingness of morality. My 
argument will be that morality actually is far more demanding than most 
SRI proponents seem ready to acknowledge – at least in the context of 
 
20 Sparkes 1995, p. 67 
21 Ibid., p. 64 
22 To some extent, I believe, saying these things may obviously make strategic sense – that is, it 
may entice investors to at least sometimes invest in SRI vehicles. I will not pursue this idea further 
here. 
263 
the ethics of investing. More exactly, I think we have reason to believe 
both that morality requires substantial sacrifices of individual investors, and 
that the same goes for all investors – that is, independently of whether 
they have heard of the SRI movement or not. Although this conclusion 
may seem too harsh at first sight, once we take a step back and consider 
the specifics of the investment context, I believe, we will see why it is 
not. Now, taking a wider perspective on the specifics of the investment 
context will also allow us to see how some of the assumptions intro-
duced in chapter I actually are rather arbitrary – in real life, of course, 
we are not only investors but can also fulfil the requirements of morality 
in other ways. At the end of the chapter, I will discuss what my position 
on the demandingness of morality implies for the question of whether 
we have moral reasons to become investors in the first place. Although 
this may not always be so, I will suggest that investing along the lines of 
some of the investment strategies discussed in previous chapters actually 
may be an outstanding way in which affluent people can make the world 
a better place. 
 The chapter will proceed as follows: In section 2, I introduce a line of 
reasoning which some philosophers have taken to suggest that moral 
agents have a general moral requirement to promote the good. This line of 
reasoning is connected to the ethics of investing and I suggest that it 
presents a kind of challenge for SRI proponents – unless there are some 
kind of mitigating circumstances, individual investors would seem mor-
ally required to give up all of their investment proceeds to help people 
in dire need. In section 3, I discuss various ways in which different phi-
losophers have argued against a general moral requirement to promote 
the good and, thus, ways in which SRI proponents could argue that 
there indeed are mitigating circumstances. Most importantly, I discuss 
the idea that morality cannot require of individual agents that they dedi-
cate their entire lives to serve others. Even though this idea may be 
plausible in the grand scheme of things, I argue, it does not work to 
mitigate the requirement of investors to make considerable sacrifices, 
since investments after all are luxury products which affluent people very 
well could do without.  
 In section 4, I make some comments on the problem of delineating 
the sphere of ‗requirements on investors‘ from the sphere of require-
ments on individuals in general. I discuss one way in which my previous 
conclusion could be made stronger – perhaps demands of the sort im-
posed on individual investors here, I suggest, actually befall all of us 
who in a certain sense could become investors. At the end of the section, I 
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discuss what my position on the demandingness of morality implies for 
the question of whether we have moral reasons to become investors in 
the first place. Finally, in section 5, a summary of the main arguments of 
the chapter is given. 
2.  THE CHAL LENGE :  A  GENERAL REQUIRE MENT TO  
PROMOTE THE GOOD  
As I said above, most moral theories contain the idea that moral agents 
have at least some moral reason, at least under certain circumstances, to pro-
mote the general good in society23 – and this is also something that 
most SRI proponents would seem to agree with. But under what cir-
cumstances is this so, and how much weight should be given to this 
kind of reason? Unfortunately, beyond the very weak formulation given 
above, there is no real consensus among philosophers on these issues. 
While some philosophers actually disagree already with this idea (I will 
return to this in the next section), the really interesting debate starts 
when one asks to which extent promoting the good is a moral requirement 
– i.e. to what extent it can be wrong of an agent not to promote the good 
to a certain extent. While proponents of the SRI movement seldom use 
the terminology of moral requirements, some recent parties to the phi-
losophical debate on promoting the good have not hesitated to use this 
terminology. According to these philosophers, it is actually so that all of 
us have a general requirement to do all we can to promote the general 
good – i.e., it is indeed wrong of agents not to promote the good to a 
maximal extent in (almost) all circumstances.24 In this section, I will introduce 
a line of reasoning which is often taken to support this view and suggest 
how it can be connected to the issue of the ethics of investing. This line 
of reasoning, I believe, creates an important challenge for those propo-
 
23 If this is not formulated in terms of reasons to promote the (general or overall) good, it is 
sometimes formulated as the importance of beneficence or benevolence – some philosophers talk, 
for instance, about duties of beneficence in a way which strongly resembles my discussions in 
previous chapters. Others talk about the morally praiseworthy characteristics of taking a benevo-
lent attitude towards fellow humans and animals. Cf. Cullity 2004, Frankena 1987. Without 
further qualifications of these things, I think it is fair to say that the idea that it is morally 
relevant whether or not a certain line of action exhibits a certain benevolent attitude or is in 
line with some duty of beneficence is accepted by most writers from both the consequentialist 
and the deontological camp, and also most virtue theorists, contractualists, egalitarians and 
libertarians. For some further characterisations of these theories and how the issue of the 
demandingness of morality is relevant for them, see Mulgan 2001, Murphy 1993. 
24 Cf. Kagan 1989, Singer 1972b, Unger 1996, Tännsjö 1998 
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nents of the SRI movement who are hesitant about talking about moral 
requirements. 
 Exactly how the general requirement to promote the good should be 
spelled out need perhaps not bother us here. Even proponents of a 
general requirement to promote the good may accept that there are cer-
tain circumstances in which promoting the good to a less than maximal 
degree is morally permitted (and so the requirement only applies in al-
most all circumstances). It may seem reasonable, namely, to allow for 
certain constraints that may interfere with the general requirement to pro-
mote the good – one should not promote the good by, for instance, 
killing or torturing people25. However, my present inquiry does not con-
cern this type of cases. According to the most straightforward propo-
nent of this kind of requirement in any case, whenever a certain action 
does not promote the good to the greatest degree, i.e. whenever there 
was something else that the agent could have done in the situation 
which would have promoted the good to a greater extent, performing 
the first action is morally wrong. Although this position may seem ex-
treme at first sight, some philosophers argue that most people actually 
have certain moral intuitions (or, perhaps better, certain cases can bring 
out these intuitions in them) that strongly favour the view outlined 
above. Consider, for instance, the following case suggested by Peter 
Singer:26 
The Chi ld  in  the  Pond : As you are walking down a forest path, 
you come across a small pond in which a child is about to drown. 
The pond is very shallow and you would be able to wade out and 
rescue the child quite easily. However, the child is unable to 
reach the bottom itself and has yet to learn how to swim. You 
realise that if you enter the pond you will get your clothes dirty 
from the muddy water but, of course, if you do not enter the 
pond, the child will drown. Still, you care so much for your 
clothes that you decide to ignore the child‘s cries. You carry on 
with your walk and, a few minutes later, the child drowns. 
 
25 For a discussion of such constraints and how they are consistent with a general requirement 
to promote the good, see Kagan 1989, pp. 8-9. 
26 The classic and most famous statement of this case is in Singer 1972b, p. 231. However, he 
has restated it in a number of more recent publications (cf. Cullity 2004). For appeals to similar 
cases, see, e.g., Cullity 2004, Unger 1996. 
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What should we say about your behaviour in the case above? According 
to Singer, a vast majority of us would say that your behaviour in the case 
above is morally wrong, or, perhaps even stronger, morally repulsive.27 Al-
though it would cause you some slight inconvenience to save the child – 
you would have to soil your clothes in the mud – it would be wrong of 
you not to make this small sacrifice. Of course, one may assume here 
that you had nothing to do with how this child ended up in this particu-
lar pond. One may also assume that you have no other special relation 
to this child, and you haven‘t promised anyone to save drowning child-
ren on your walks through the forest or anything like that. Still, accord-
ing to most people, it would be very wrong of you not to save this child. 
 Our reaction to this kind of cases, according to some philosophers, is 
a reason to believe that there is a general requirement to promote the 
good. Singer‘s central concern, for instance, is the issue of what moral 
responsibilities people ―like you and me‖, i.e. people in relatively affluent 
countries, have towards those in relatively (or even absolutely) poor 
countries where lack of food, shelter and medical care is common. Ac-
cording to Singer, considering cases like The Child in the Pond is very in-
formative in this context for the following reason: Unless there is a mor-
ally relevant difference between failing to save someone that you know 
or can see (say, a child which is drowning right in front of you) and 
failing to save someone which you don‘t know or can‘t see (say, a child 
plagued by starvation in some remote part of Africa), it seems plausible 
to say that it is just as wrong not to give money to, e.g., famine relief as it 
was not saving the child from the pond!28 A lot of people tend to ignore 
such great world problems as, e.g., starvation and lack of medicine in 
the third world, Singer notes, and the aid that most developed countries 
give to these developing countries has only very seldom risen above an 
embarrassingly low level per capita.29 But all this needs to be changed – 
―indeed, the whole way we look at moral issues – our moral conceptual 
scheme – needs to be altered‖, Singer argues, ―and with it, the way of 
life that has come to be taken for granted in our society‖30. 
 Singer‘s suggestion here is as interesting, I believe, as it is radical. Ac-
cording to Singer, our whole moral conceptual scheme needs to be altered, 
 
27 Singer 1972b, p. 231 
28 Ibid., pp. 232-33 
29 For some further facts about these world problems, what little people of developed coun-
tries have done to help and how easy it would be to do more, see Cullity 2004, Unger 1996. 
30 Singer 1972b, p. 230 
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first of all, because we normally conceive of charitable giving as just 
that, i.e. as something charitable and generous that is ‗beyond the call of 
duty‘. But if the line of reasoning outlined above is correct, to give 
money to famine relief is ―not charitable, or generous‖, Singer says. 
―Nor is it the kind of act which philosophers and theologians have 
called ‗supererogatory‘ – an act which it would be good to do, but not 
wrong not to do. On the contrary, we ought to give the money away, 
and it is wrong not to do so‖31. Furthermore, our whole way of life needs to 
be altered because, according to Singer, it seems reasonable to infer the 
following principle from our reaction to The Child in the Pond: ―if it is in 
our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby 
sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, mor-
ally, to do it‖32. According to Singer, this principle not only gives us 
moral reasons for giving money to charities to save one child but, as long 
as we can make a morally relevant difference for some people without 
sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we are morally 
required to go on giving our money to charitable causes to save the lives 
of many other children. Indeed, Singer argues, not many things which we 
in the Western part of the world are dedicated to in our daily lives is 
really of comparable moral importance to saving people‘s lives. Thus, 
the present principle implies that we ought, morally, ―to be working full 
time to relieve great suffering of the sort that occurs as a result of fa-
mine or other disasters‖33. On Singer‘s view, we may conclude, morality 
demands that we give up almost all of our time and effort, plus all of 
our money, to save the lives of people in the third world. 
 Although Singer‘s view is not directly a view on the ethics of invest-
ing, I will now explain how I believe the line of reasoning above is rele-
vant to this kind of discussion. In previous chapters, I have argued that 
it is not easy for individual investors to make a non-negligible difference 
through adopting the kind of investment strategies generally proposed 
by SRI proponents. However, even individual investors may be able to 
make a considerable difference under certain circumstances. Through 
investing directly in certain community development organisations, or 
through devising radically self-sacrificial activist campaigns designed to 
make companies with morally problematic activities change their ways, 
even individual investors can make a considerable difference to many 
 
31 Ibid., p. 235 
32 Ibid., p. 231 
33 Ibid., p. 238 
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people‘s lives. Now, are they morally required to do this, i.e. would it be 
wrong of individual investors not to invest in these ways? According to 
the line of reasoning outlined above, the relevant issue is the moral im-
portance of the needs of the people that can be helped in comparison to 
the cost to investors of helping them. And it does not seem implausible 
to assume that many people whom investors can help through investing 
in the ways above have needs which are far more important from a 
moral point of view than the slight inconvenience it would cause inves-
tors to help them. According to this kind of reasoning, then, it would 
indeed seem wrong of investors not to invest in a way which allows 
them to make a considerable difference. But which investments strategy 
should they choose? 
 Part of the reason for why Singer‗s example appeals very strongly to 
our intuitions, it may be noted, is probably because it involves saving 
the life of a small child. Once we start to discuss other ways in which 
one could make a difference to people, or to society in general, the kind 
of reasoning above may lose some of its hold on us. So, for instance, 
some philosophers have argued that, although most people agree that it 
is wrong not to save a small child‘s life, it is not be equally obvious that 
it would be wrong not to save, say, a person‘s finger or leg.34 According 
to some other philosophers, it is far from equally obvious to most of us 
that it would be wrong not to promote a certain positive good – say, to 
make certain already well-off people even more well off.35 This is some-
thing that an adequate idea of the moral responsibilities of investors 
needs to take into account. Some of the goods which investors can 
promote may certainly be of this less salient kind – in many cases, per-
haps, the good an investor can promote is ‗only‘ that already affluent 
employees are paid a bit more or that certain already well-off people are 
not discriminated against in the workplace. However, I believe there 
also are cases where investors actually can save lives and alleviate serious 
pain and suffering in others. Here two of the investment strategies, 
which I have found particularly efficient in my earlier discussions, ac-
tually seem to stand out from the rest – namely community investing and the 
philanthropic strategy.  
 Investing according to the philanthropic strategy, it should be noted, 
is obviously very similar to giving money directly to famine relief (which 
 
34 For an extensive discussion of this issue, see Kamm 1993. 
35 For discussions of this issue, see Glover 1977, Ohlsson 1979. 
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is the line of action Singer argues for). By investing in whatever com-
pany‘s shares that give the most dividends and prospects for capital gain 
and then donating the profit made on these investments to some 
worthwhile charity, investors can sometimes make the difference be-
tween life and death for certain people in dire need of, e.g., medical as-
sistance or food. Although there is some debate on the effectiveness of 
charity36, collaborating with particularly effective charities – which are 
already well established and have well worked-out plans for how afflu-
ent people can help the poor in very effective ways – is probably one of 
the most potent possibilities for people in our part of the world who 
want to make the world a better place. Furthermore, that community 
investing can alleviate serious pain and suffering in people whose situa-
tions otherwise are neglected by most mainstream financial and political 
institutions, I believe, should also be fairly obvious by now. As Brill and 
Reder write: 
Community development investments serve vital social needs that even 
socially screened stocks and bonds do not touch. Through direct infu-
sion of capital, they help provide jobs, housing, employment, business 
loans, and basic human services to those who have been shunted aside 
by the workings of mainstream economic institutions. In this way, 
communities of economically disadvantaged citizens are helped to trans-
form themselves from victim economies to self-supporting economies. 
This, of course, also helps strengthen social relationships, making those 
communities much more resistant to social problems.37 
If the line of reasoning above is correct, then, failing to invest in a way 
that makes a considerable difference is roughly on a par, morally, with 
failing to save a child from a nearby pond. And if this is so, it does not 
seem implausible to say that investors are morally required to invest in 
this way – that is, that it would be wrong of them not to do so. But, ac-
cording to some philosophers, this line of reasoning is actually not cor-
rect. In the following section, I will discuss some common counter-
arguments to this line of reasoning. 
3.  SOME COMMON COUN TERAR G UMENTS  
As Singer himself acknowledges, most people tend to think that the idea 
of a general requirement to promote the good is too extreme. According 
 
36 See chapter IV, section 5, note 102. 
37 Brill and Reder 1993, p. 32 
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to what is often called ―common sense morality‖, there is a sense in 
which, as long as I fulfil certain other duties I might have (e.g., the duty 
not to do harm), and perhaps as long as I promote the good to a certain 
minimum degree, it is indeed ‗beyond the call of duty‘ to promote the 
good to an even greater extent.38 Although promoting the good beyond 
the call of duty certainly would be nice of me, or even morally admira-
ble, it is at best supererogatory (to use Singer‘s word) – that is, it can never 
be wrong not to do this. But why is this so? The line of reasoning above, I 
believe, presents a certain challenge for those of us who accept this kind 
of view. If we are to achieve coherence between this kind of ‗moral 
conceptual scheme‘ and our moral judgements in particular cases, as the 
method of reflective equilibrium dictates, we must do one of three 
things: Either (1) we change our judgement about the case at hand (and 
say that saving the child from the pond is only supererogatory after all), 
or (2) we change our moral conceptual scheme (and accept that there is 
a general requirement to promote the good), or (3) we come up with 
some further kind of reasoning which could explain why we are not 
forced to do either (1) or (2) here. In what follows, I will discuss some 
common ways in which different philosophers have tried to mitigate the 
extreme conclusion outlined above. In section 3.1, I will elaborate on 
what I take to be the most interesting counterargument in this context – 
given what SRI proponents commonly say about how SRI ―is not for 
martyrs‖. 
 While it seems fair to say that most moral theories contain the idea 
that moral agents have at least some moral reason, at least under certain 
circumstances, to promote the general good in society, as I indicated 
above, some philosophers actually disagree with this idea.39 I will not 
elaborate on the views of these philosophers here, but it may be inter-
esting to note one way in which such a position could be rationalised 
which has some bearing on my previous discussions. When I introduced 
the no-harm principle as an argument for the avoidance strategy (in 
 
38 Cf. Kagan 1989, Tännsjö 1998. Of course, even on Singer‘s kind of view, it should be 
noted, there is a limit to how much one should dedicate one‘s life to the needs of others. 
Beyond a certain limit, leading a more self-sacrificial life may actually impede one‘s ability to be 
of assistance to those in need – thus, according to this view, one should not be dedicated to 
promote the good to a degree beyond effectiveness (cf. Kagan 1989, Mulgan 2001, Singer 1972b). 
However, common sense morality probably goes beyond this view. 
39 Kagan calls this the ‗minimalist‘ camp and suggests that it includes ―egoists (who believe 
that one is never required to sacrifice overall self-interest), nihilists (who believe that everything 
is morally permitted) and extreme libertarians (who recognize the validity of constraints, but 
deny that there is a moral requirement to provide aid)‖ (1989, p. 5 n.). 
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chapter III, section 3), I discussed the distinction between promoting 
the good, on one hand, and not doing harm, on the other. According to 
some SRI proponents, I said, while doing harm is always open for moral 
criticism, simply allowing harm to happen is not equally morally proble-
matic. Now, if someone suggested that allowing harm actually is not 
morally problematic at all, I believe, he would be defending the kind of 
view currently under discussion. In one sense, it may be noted, this is 
obviously a kind of ‗solution‘ to the challenge above – this kind of rea-
soning suggests that we can take route (1) and say that it would not be 
wrong to fail to save the child in Singer‘s example. But, surely, although 
it may be plausible to claim that it is morally permissible to fail to pro-
mote certain goods under certain circumstances, it is hardly plausible to 
say that it would not be wrong to fail to save the child in the example 
above. I think most SRI proponents actually would disagree with this 
view – even those who suggest the distinction above. For this reason, I 
will disregard this kind of view in what follows. 
 The more sensible route to take for those who are critical of a general 
requirement to promote the good is certainly (3), i.e. to try to come up 
with a reason for why cases like The Child in the Pond do not necessarily 
imply a general requirement to promote the good. Several such reasons 
have been suggested in the philosophical debate, but I will only elabo-
rate on some of the more notable ones here. In order to see their rele-
vance to Singer‘s line of argument, we should distinguish between two 
steps of this argument: The first step is the idea that unless there is a 
morally relevant difference between failing to save someone that you 
know or can see and failing to save someone which you don‘t know or 
can‘t see, it seems plausible to say that it is just as wrong not to give 
money to famine relief as it is not saving the child from the pond in his 
example. Now, a fairly straightforward way of trying to counter this line 
of reasoning would of course be to say that there really is a morally rele-
vant difference between failing to save people right in front of you and 
failing to save people at a certain distance. Although this idea surely 
sounds preposterous, there are actually some philosophers who have 
supported this idea.40 However, I will not consider this idea further in 
 
40 Cf. Kamm 2000, Smith 1990, Trusted 1995. For a very instructive discussion of similar 
ideas, see Unger 1996. The issue at stake here, it should be noted, is whether distance per se can 
make for a morally relevant difference. Even proponents of Singer‘s kind of view admit, of 
course, that there are some differences between The Child in the Pond and the case of famine 
relief. Some of these may also be morally relevant – it is not equally certain, for instance, that 
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the present context – the idea that also the needs of very distant people 
are morally relevant is hardly controversial within the SRI movement. If 
investors indeed can make a difference to certain people‘s lives, it is 
probably very seldom people they know or can see directly. 
 I believe critics of a general requirement to promote the good do bet-
ter, then, by attacking the second part of Singer‘s argument: namely the 
idea that we not only are morally required to give some of our money to 
famine relief but, as long as we can make a morally relevant difference 
for some people without sacrificing anything of comparable moral im-
portance, we are morally required to go on giving our money to famine 
relief. According to Singer, I said, it seems reasonable to infer the fol-
lowing principle from our reaction to The Child in the Pond: ―if it is in our 
power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacri-
ficing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to 
do it‖41. Now, this principle may seem intuitive enough but, according 
to some philosophers, it is actually unclear whether it can be used to 
support the sort of conclusion that Singer defends. Consider first a kind 
of argument that appeals to fairness in a way similar to the idea discussed 
in connection with collective responsibility and screening earlier (chap-
ter IV, section 4.1). According to some philosophers, Singer‘s own for-
mulation of this principle is actually very informative, although Singer 
may not have meant it like that himself – the plight of the needy in the 
third world is something that we ought to care about and that gives rise 
to a requirement on our side. According to these philosophers, the gen-
eral requirement to promote the good is most accurately regarded 
exactly as a collective requirement.42 But what does this collective require-
ment imply in terms of requirements on the part of individual agents? 
Well, the most natural implication is not that individual agents are 
morally required to do everything they can to relieve serious suffering in the 
world, according to these philosophers. Rather, it is that they are re-
quired to do their fair share of the collective requirement to relieve this 
suffering. That is, if we calculate the total cost required to, say, eradicate 
starvation worldwide and divide it by the number of affluent people 
 
one‘s donation to famine relief will save a distant child as it is that you will save the child in the 
pond if you wade out. Cf. Cullity 2004, Singer 1972b. 
41 Ibid., p. 231 
42 Cf. Cohen 1981, Murphy 1993, 2000 
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who are morally required to help, individual agents are only required to 
contribute this much.43 
 This is an interesting argument and, as I said in chapter IV (section 2), 
there is some basis for thinking that many SRI proponents conceive of 
the appeal to making a difference as a collectivist appeal. However, I think 
I have said enough to counter this line of argument in my discussion of 
the generalisation test in chapter IV (section 5). A brief recapitulation of 
my main argument there may warranted: The central problem for this 
kind of ideas, I believe, is that they only seem plausible exactly on the 
collective level and in an ideal world – that is, if everyone were to do his or 
her fair share, of course, much good would be done. As things currently 
stand, however, very few people are actually doing their fair share and, given 
this state of the world, it seems rather implausible to say that it is mor-
ally permissible to fail to do more. After I have done my ―fair share‖, a 
lot of people will still be dying of starvation in many parts of the world 
– so why should I not help them? According to Garrett Cullity, the 
most plausible version of the fair share view should actually accept that 
individual agents have a further moral requirement to help, beyond that 
specified by their original ―fair share‖. Once it becomes obvious that 
some have failed to do their fair share and, for this reason, some people 
are still in dire need, namely, another collective requirement appears. This 
is the requirement on the agents who are left to help to do their fair 
share in helping these people who are still in need: 
In other words, more than one collective requirement applies to groups 
of people to which I belong. First, there is what all of those who are 
able to help ought to be doing by way of helping the people who need 
it. But, because there are plenty of non-compliers with this first re-
quirement, there is a second. This is what those of us who have already 
helped ought to be doing to help those who are still vulnerable, thanks 
to the non-compliers. [...] Once I have done my fair share in discharging 
the first collective requirement, the second still makes it wrong for me 
to stop giving.44 
I believe this argument is sound and, thus, that we should reject the idea 
that individual investors only are morally required to make a difference 
to the extent that a ―fair share‖ calculation dictates.45 In the following 
subsection, I will turn to discuss what I take to be the most interesting 
 
43 Cf. Cohen 1981, Murphy 1993, 2000 
44 Cullity 2004, p. 77 
45 For some further arguments against the fair share view, see Cullity 2004, Mulgan 2001, 
Rachels 1979, Singer 1972b. 
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counterargument to the idea of a general requirement to promote the 
good in the context of the ethics of investing. 
3.1 The  appea l  to  ove ra l l  c os t  
As I noted at the outset of this chapter, according to many proponents 
of the SRI movement, an important feature of SRI, or ‗ethical investing‘, 
is that it does not have to ‗cost‘ investors anything. According to Lowry, 
for instance, ―SRI [...] is putting money to use in something that offers 
profitable returns and that actively supports and promotes a higher qual-
ity of life, welfare, and social relations in society‖46. According to Brill, 
Brill and Feigenbaum, SRI ―is not for martyrs‖47 and ―[e]very [SRI in-
vestor] must come to terms with the very personal subject of investment 
performance‖48. Exactly how these passages should be understood is 
not clear. On the one hand, some SRI proponents seem to be saying 
that it simply is unwise – perhaps even unethical – to sacrifice investment 
returns in order to make a further difference (this is not ‗ethical invest-
ing‘ as some SRI proponents understand it, it should be noted). On the 
other hand, some SRI proponents seem to be saying that this is an issue 
that is up to the individual investor – if the investor him- or herself 
wants to make a further difference by sacrificing investment returns this 
is surely admirable but it is not required – that is, it is supererogatory. This 
latter position is obviously the more intuitive one. But why is it only 
supererogatory, why is it not morally required? 
 In the previous section, I said that Singer‘s line of reasoning in sup-
port of a general requirement to promote the good in fact would seem 
to imply that certain sacrifices on the part of investors are morally re-
quired. It does not seem implausible to assume that many people whom 
investors can help through, e.g., a community investment scheme have 
needs which are far more important from a moral point of view than 
the slight inconvenience it would cause investors to help them. That is, 
from a moral point of view, it seems profoundly strange to keep talking 
about the cost to investors when the cost, even to an individual investor, 
of helping just one person certainly is quite low compared to the cost that 
this person would incur if he or she was not helped. But I will now say more 
about this argument. Some philosophers have argued against Singer‘s 
 
46 Lowry 1993, p. 21 
47 Brill et al. 1999, p. 21 
48 Ibid., p. 65 
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line of reasoning above in a way which also questions whether he really 
can use the kind of principle he presents to support the sort of conclu-
sion he defends. This kind of argument, however, does not appeal to 
collective responsibilities. 
 The kind of argument I am thinking of can be introduced as follows: 
According to Cullity, Singer‘s argument really has a kind of iterative struc-
ture, i.e. the requirement to go on giving money to famine relief is never 
argued for as such, but the appeal is always to the greater moral impor-
tance of the needs of starving people when compared to the cost of an 
affluent agent to make this certain sacrifice. Cullity writes: 
For any endangered life, it is the disparity between what this person 
loses if I do not help and what it costs me if I do that makes it wrong 
for me not to help. No matter how many lives I may have saved already, 
the wrongness of not saving the next one is to be determined by iterat-
ing the same comparison. So, for each further life-saving donation I 
could make, I am required to make it as long as the cost of that dona-
tion itself is small – irrespective of any donations I have previously 
made.49 
Now, a fairly straightforward way of responding to this argument would 
obviously be to say that the overall costs to the agent who can promote a 
certain good somehow need to be weighed in in the moral calculus. Ac-
cording to this line of argument, while the line of reasoning above cer-
tainly shows that other people‘s needs are worthy of our attention, we 
cannot be expected to dedicate our entire lives to serve other people. Ex-
actly why this is so could perhaps be spelled out in different ways. Ac-
cording to Bernard Williams, for instance, the idea that we ought to 
dedicate our entire lives to helping other people leaves us unable to pur-
sue many of the personal projects which, in a certain sense, makes us 
into the people we are. Thus, Singer‘s extreme conclusion could be said 
to threaten our moral integrity, and also our identity and sense of meaning of 
life.50 According to Samuel Scheffler, any plausible moral theory has to 
reflect the ―nature of persons‖, and part of this is the fact that most 
people care not only for other people but also, and most often more so, 
for their own well-being.51 According to a similar thought from Thomas 
Nagel, any plausible moral theory must incorporate some appeal to the 
 
49 Cullity 2004, p. 71 
50 Williams 1973, 1981 
51 Scheffler 1992, 1994 
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―personal point of view‖ of individuals.52 I will not elaborate on the de-
tails of these variations of the present argument here.53 Following my 
general formulation of this line of argument above, we might call it the 
‘appeal to overall cost‘.54 
 This is the most interesting counterargument to Singer‘s line of rea-
soning in the present context, I believe, for a number of reasons. First 
of all, it would actually seem to be the most common way in which 
philosophers have argued against the idea of a general requirement to 
promote the good.55 To some extent, it should be noted, it would also 
seem to underpin the other arguments against this idea – although the 
arguments above did not address the issue of overall cost directly, part 
of the point of these arguments, I believe, is exactly to permit agents to 
do other things in life than simply promoting the good to a maximal 
extent.56 More to the point, however, the appeal to overall cost seems to 
capture the way in which SRI proponents emphasise the issue of the 
(lack of) cost of investing in SRI vehicles. If there is a certain threshold 
of beneficence, beyond which agents are not morally required to pro-
mote the good to a greater extent, there could be a sense in which sacri-
ficing investment returns in order to make a further difference to people 
in need is indeed supererogatory. However, I do not think this is the 
case – that is, I think the appeal to overall cost fails in the context of the 
ethics of investing.57 
 My argument against the appeal to overall cost in this context goes as 
follows: Compared to the very general philosophical debate that I have 
imported arguments from – a debate, in essence, on what the most im-
portant project of moral agents should be – the issue of what investors 
 
52 Nagel 1986 
53 For more extensive discussions of these variations, as well as some other arguments against 
the general requirement to promote the good, see Eriksson 1994 and Mulgan 2001. 
54 Kagan discusses a similar line of argument, which he simply calls ‗the appeal to cost‘ (1989, 
pp. 21-24, 231-33). It should be noted that this is not the argument which Cullity himself 
ultimately directs against the general requirement to promote the good. Rather, Cullity 
introduces what he calls an ―argument from the presuppositions of beneficence‖ (2004, pp. 
128-46). Although this is an interesting argument, it would take me too far from my subject to 
discuss it here. 
55 Many philosophers reject pure consequentialist theories directly, for instance, because they 
have the counterintuitive implication that agents ought to dedicate their entire lives to pro-
moting the good. Eriksson refers to this objection simply as ―the objection from too heavy 
demands‖ (1994, p. 13-17) and Mulgan calls it ―the Demandingness Objection‖ (2001, pp. 3-
4). 
56 This is fairly explicit in many cases – see, e.g., Cohen 1981, Cullity 2004, Murphy 1993, 
Trusted 1995. 
57 For a more general discussion of the appeal to overall cost, see Kagan 1989, chapters 7-9. 
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ought to do, or how we ought to invest, is set in a very specific context. 
As I said in the introductory chapter, on my understanding of the ques-
tion ‗What ought investors to do?‘, the issue is not ‗What ought these 
people, who now happen to be investors, really to do?‘, but rather ‗What 
ought investors to do qua investors?‘ or ‗What ought they to do in their 
role as investors?‘. That is, throughout the book, I have only been con-
cerned with issues surrounding the ethics of different investment alterna-
tives and strategies, and not the ethics of other lines of action. Further-
more, by ‗investors‘, I have mainly understood typical non-professional indi-
vidual investors – that is, regular people with only moderate amounts of 
disposable income available for investments. 
 The reader may now note a feature of this kind of focus, or these as-
sumptions, which is very interesting in the present context. A typical 
characteristic of financial investments is exactly that they are invest-
ments of disposable income. That is, the money which most investors stand 
to loose (or perhaps can come to multiply if they invest successfully) in 
the typical investment situation is money for which these agents do not have 
any direct need in their day-to-day life. Obviously, not all investments need to 
be investments of disposable income, and sometimes people can invest 
money which they later may come to need quite desperately. However, 
as I just said, this seems to be a typical characteristic of investments. 
How does this characteristic affect the plausibility of the appeal to over-
all cost? Well, if the only thing that a certain agent stands to loose when 
she is considering whether or not to help certain unfortunate people are 
things for which this agent has no direct need in his or her day-to-day life anyway, I 
suggest, the appeal to overall cost looses all of its moral force. It seems 
deeply implausible to deny that it would be wrong for us not to sacrifice 
these kinds of things, if we by doing so can alleviate serious pain and 
suffering in others.58 Even though the appeal to overall cost could be 
plausible as an argument against a general requirement to promote the 
good, then, it is not plausible as an argument against a general require-
ment on (most) investors to promote the good. 
 To further establish this point, consider the following variation of the 
example above, suggested by Peter Unger59: 
 
58 It may be noted that it seems to make no difference whether this issue is framed in terms of 
the demandingness of the content of morality or of the authority of morality (see note 1 above). 
The argument simply suggests that it would be wrong for investors not to sacrifice things for 
which they have no direct need, irrespective of whether the appeal to overall cost is framed in terms of 
moral, prudential or some other kind of considerations. 
59 Unger 1996, pp. 135-36 
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Bob ’ s  Bugat t i : Having been a successful car engineer for all of 
his life, Robert R. Roberts could look forward to a quite com-
fortable retirement. However, wanting to live life to its fullest for 
a couple of more years, he has decided to invest most of his for-
tune in one of the world‘s few mint-condition Bugatti automo-
biles. This is not an unfavourable investment as such: Although 
the car is uninsurable, market price for a vintage Bugatti will with 
all probability appreciate by at least 20% per year. The fact that 
the Bugatti is such a nice investment, however, is only part of 
why Bob bought it: Taking this car for a ride is all he can think 
about each morning when he wakes up. Now, one day when Bob 
is taking his Bugatti for a ride, he is somewhat careless about 
where he parks. As he is walking back to the Bugatti, he discov-
ers that he has parked on a set of train tracks and that, some dis-
tance away, a child is stuck in the mud of another set of tracks. 
Suddenly Bob sees a giant train coming with enormous speed 
around a bend in the tracks. As he looks down at the tracks, he 
realises that he is standing right next to a lever that he can pull 
and direct the train‘s way with. He looks up again and realises 
that the train is actually not heading for his Bugatti but instead 
heading straight for the immovable child. Of course, if he wanted 
to, he could pull the lever and redirect the train towards his Bu-
gatti, thereby saving the child. But, not wanting to see his Bugatti 
destroyed, Bob does nothing. And, while the child dies, Bob en-
joys a comfortable retirement. 
Once again, according to Unger, most of us would say that Bob‘s beha-
viour in this case was morally wrong, or even morally horrendous. We 
would not simply say that it would be admirable or heroic of Bob to 
save the child – if he doesn‘t save it, we would say, he has failed to do 
what morality requires of him. Once again, it makes no difference that 
he may not know this particular child, and that he has had nothing to do 
with how the child ended up in the mud of the train tracks (which we 
should assume that he hasn‘t). Nor does it matter, I believe, that he 
stands to loose very much by saving the child. Without his Bugatti in-
vestment, we may assume, Bob will have to go back to work for a 
couple of years more before his retirement and, in any case, his retire-
ment will be quite lousy by Western standards. 
 The case of Bob’s Bugatti is interesting, I believe, for two reasons. First 
of all, it should be noted that it is not iterative in the way that Singer‘s 
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argument is60 – that is, the idea that Bob is morally required to give up 
his whole retirement safety is not justified by a series of comparisons of 
goods and costs but rather from our reaction to Bob‘s behaviour directly. 
Furthermore, the sacrifice Bob is required to make is indeed substantial. 
Shouldn‘t the fact that Bob has spent most of his fortune on his beloved 
Bugatti, at least according to proponents of the appeal to overall cost, 
make us think that it is only supererogatory to save the child? Well, per-
haps some people could actually be persuaded to accept such a conclu-
sion. For most of us, however, here is a story which I think we would 
agree with, and which could explain our response to the case above: 
Even though Bob has spent most of his fortune on his beloved Bugatti, 
and risks loosing his comfortable retirement when it is destroyed, there 
is an important sense in which Bob‘s comfortable retirement is a luxury 
good – that is, this is a good that Bob could easily do without. Even 
though Bob will have a considerably less comfortable retirement, he will 
not be totally destitute and be forced to live on the street, nor will he 
soon die in some fatal disease like a lot of children in present Africa. 
According to Unger, in order to accept the conclusion that it would be 
wrong for Bob not to save the child, we need not go as far as accepting 
the principle invoked by Singer above (i.e. the idea that ―if it is in our 
power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacri-
ficing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to 
do it‖). The following principle would do just as good: 
Pretty Cheaply Lessening Early Death: Other things being even nearly equal, 
if your behaving in a certain way will result in the number of people 
who very prematurely lose their lives being less than the number who‘ll do so 
if you don‘t behave so and if even so you’ll still be at least reasonably well off, 
then it‘s seriously wrong for you not to so behave.61 
At least to me, it seems extremely hard to deny the principle above.  
But, then, it would seem to follow that it is very implausible to deny that 
it would be wrong for most investors not to sacrifice the possible profits 
they can make on their investments, if by doing so they can alleviate 
serious pain and suffering in others. In a certain sense, we might say, 
being able to become an investor is itself a kind of luxury. Most of the 
world‘s population could probably not afford to spare the kinds of 
 
60 Cf. Cullity 2004 
61 Unger 1996, p. 58 
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money that even my small-time typical individual investors can for in-
vestment purposes.  
 The conclusion to be drawn from the discussion above, I believe, is 
that it is hard to deny the idea that morality is very demanding, at least 
in the context of investing. If we accept this conclusion, it would seem, 
there is an important sense in which our whole conception of ethical invest-
ment needs to be altered. According to many proponents of the SRI 
movement, I have said, sacrificing investment returns to make a differ-
ence is at best supererogatory – that is, if the individual investor him- or 
herself wants to do so this is admirable but it is not required. But I have 
now argued that this view is implausible. Far from it being supereroga-
tory, then, it is morally required of (most) investors to make such a sacri-
fice, and it would be wrong of them not to do so. If we accept this con-
clusion, I believe, our whole way of life would not have to change, but 
our whole standard way of investing certainly would. No longer can we ac-
cept the distinction between ethical, or socially responsible, investments 
and ‗non-ethical‘, or ‗non-SRI‘, investments. Investments which fail to 
make a considerable difference to people in great need, I have argued, 
are clearly unethical and wrong. No longer can we go on investing the 
money we don‘t need on the stock market simply to slightly increase our 
living standards. As long as people in other parts of the world are 
starving and dying while we could easily have helped them, our primary 
concern should be their basic needs and not our luxuries. 
 So much for the argument of the present section. In the following 
section, I will give some further reflections on the line of reasoning pre-
sented here. 
4.  BEYOND THE ETH ICS OF IN VESTING  
My argument against the appeal to overall cost above, I said, was not 
that this appeal was implausible as such, but simply that it was implausi-
ble in the context of the ethics of investing – that is, even though this kind of 
appeal could be plausible as an argument against a general requirement 
on moral agents to promote the good, it is not plausible as an argument 
against a general requirement on most investors to promote the good. But 
what does this mean more exactly? Some readers may now feel that the 
central question which I outlined in the introductory chapter actually is 
somewhat imprecise. My main concern throughout this book has been 
the question ‗How ought one to invest?‘, or, ‗What ought investors to 
do?‘. However, considering the interrelatedness of this issue with many 
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other kinds of moral issues which my discussions – not the least in this 
chapter – have illustrated, it is not obvious whether the question ‗How 
ought one to invest?‘ really can be separated from the more general 
question ‗How ought one to live?‘. Before concluding this chapter, I will 
have a quick look at what would happen if we widen our view some-
what and drop some of the specifications or assumptions outlined in the 
introductory chapter. 
 To see more clearly how the interrelatedness of issues within the 
moral sphere could be seen as a problem, consider the following possi-
ble response to my argument against the appeal to overall cost above: 
What I have been discussing is only the moral merits of different invest-
ment strategies and nothing else – that is, I have only been considering the 
difference which investors can make through their investments, or when they 
are investing. Now, if this dimension is taken in isolation, it may perhaps 
not seem too implausible to argue that investments which do not pro-
mote the good to a considerable extent are unethical, and even to argue 
that most mainstream investments in this sense are unethical. However, 
the isolation of this investment dimension is, in an important sense, 
artificial. Lots of investors may obviously do a lot for their community, 
and also for the people in Africa, in other parts of their life. When eval-
uating an individual‘s life as a the whole with regards to, for instance, how 
much she contributes to the welfare of others, it should be noted, it is 
not as obvious that we should criticise all agents who invest to make a 
less-than-considerable difference or who keep other kinds of main-
stream investments. In fact, retaining most of the returns on one‘s in-
vestments for oneself could in certain cases support certain individuals‘ 
other (moral) projects – projects which in other ways could be making 
the world a much better place to live in. We must conclude, then, that it 
is not really wise to praise or condemn certain people‘s behaviour when 
focusing only on a part of what they are doing. If we want to praise or 
condemn people‘s behaviour, we must take also these other parts of 
their lives into account. 
 What should we say about this response? Well, I believe it essentially 
is correct – that is, there is an important sense in which an isolation of the 
investment dimension is artificial. All too often, the issue of the ethics 
of investing is discussed in isolation of considerations that many of us 
take for granted in other areas of our lives – for instance, that it is 
wrong not to help people in need and that a portion of our savings 
should be given to the less fortunate. By subjecting the presuppositions 
of the SRI movement to a more thorough philosophical analysis as I 
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have done here – not least in the present chapter – I hope that much of 
this isolation should have been done away with. One of my aims 
throughout the book has been to discuss the moral merits of the strate-
gies of the SRI movement in a way that should be fairly accessible and 
interesting to so-called ‗regular people‘ who are concerned about the 
ethical responsibilities of investors. Having said this, however, it is im-
portant to be clear about what the central aim of my present inquiry has 
been – that is, to discuss the ethics of investing. If one wants to discuss 
this issue, I believe, there is an important sense in which isolating the 
investment dimension actually is necessary. Even though the considerations 
that are relevant to this question often are quite general considerations, 
the question itself concerns only what investors ought to do qua investors, 
or what investment strategy is recommended from a moral point of view. 
Even though investment decisions are only one type of decisions which 
moral agents make, then, and it seems strange to isolate the part of us 
that could be called ‗the investor’, my concern has only been with the rela-
tive moral merits of different such decisions. 
 Another thing that it is important to be clear about is the inability of 
the response above to allow agents to avoid the kind of conclusion out-
lined in the previous sections. Some readers may be attracted to the kind 
of response above because they think that it allows them to simply 
choose not to become an investor. The only thing I have discussed is the 
ethics of different investment strategies, and I have argued that it would 
be wrong to choose an investment strategy that does not make a consi-
derable difference to people in need simply because this may involve 
considerable sacrifice. But if one cannot invest ethically without giving 
up a lot of one‘s investment capital, a particularly sceptical reader may 
suggest, why not simply refrain from investing altogether and do some-
thing else? Although my primary concern indeed has been with the 
ethics of different investment strategies, I will now note a way in which 
my argument in the previous sections of this chapter actually goes 
beyond the ethics of investing. To the extent that we are justified in our 
belief that it would be wrong not to sacrifice certain luxuries to help 
people in dire need, I believe, we have reason to believe that this is so 
also in contexts other than the context of investments. Nothing in my 
argument above really hinged on the fact that I have only been inter-
ested in the context of investments – what it really hinged on, we can 
now see, was the idea that investment proceeds are a kind of luxury 
products, and that it does not seem implausible to say that affluent 
people are morally required to sacrifice their luxuries if they, by doing 
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so, can alleviate serious pain and suffering in others. So what is really the 
upshot of this line of argument? 
 Well, the more general upshot of this line of argument is the follow-
ing: We should probably say that the moral requirement to make a con-
siderable difference to less fortunate people does not only rest with 
(most) people who actually are, or are thinking of becoming, investors. A 
similar requirement rests on all individuals who in a certain sense could 
become investors of the type discussed above, i.e. everyone who has a fair 
amount of disposable income that they could either invest for themselves or 
do something else with. For all these people, it is true that their money 
could save a lot of lives if directed towards some adequately efficient 
charities and, thus, it would be seriously wrong of them to simply keep 
the money to themselves because they care more about certain things 
that are closer to them. Now, this is not only a more general conclusion 
than the one above but also a stronger conclusion: It is wrong not only 
for investors to fail to make a considerable difference to people in less 
well-situated areas, but probably for most of us in the Western world. 
 At this point it may be noted, of course, that it is not obvious exactly 
how the moral requirement to make a difference should be met by most 
of us. An interesting question which readers may have asked themselves 
during the discussions above is: If we take this idea of the moral im-
portance of promoting the good seriously, should we ever invest in the 
first place? Perhaps we could promote the good to a much greater ex-
tent if we did something completely different – say, donated our money 
directly to the kind of charities I have been talking about. By doing this 
we may, for one thing, be able to avoid the obvious monetary risks in-
volved in stock market trading. So perhaps we should donate our money 
directly in this way, then, rather than becoming investors? Or perhaps 
we should do something completely different? 
 These are all valid questions, and questions to which I can present no 
good answer in the present context. Before concluding this discussion, 
however, I believe it is interesting to note that, according to some pro-
ponents of the general requirement to promote the good, becoming a 
philanthropic stock market investor may in fact be exactly what some of 
us have most reason to do. According to Unger, for instance, to be able 
to maximize our contributions to the most needy, it is important that we 
choose a way of contributing which allows us to keep on contributing 
over a longer period of time. Now, this may be quite hard for some of 
us, Unger suggests. But for a few, perhaps those with larger amounts of 
disposable income, this means more: ―Perhaps by legally binding him-
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self to do so, or perhaps in another effective way, a successful entrepre-
neur must commit his profits to a judicious mix of efficient business 
investment and efficient lessening of serious suffering; then, he‘ll do all 
he can to lessen the serious suffering of others, taking good account of 
both the shorter and longer terms‖.62 
 Perhaps this view on the effectiveness of philanthropic investing is 
too optimistic. To be sure, however, the returns on stock market in-
vestments have far exceeded the returns on many other types of busi-
ness ventures during the last couple of decades.63 Thus, even for those 
interested in philanthropy, the stock market seems to present opportun-
ities for raising capital far more promising than many other markets. 
Perhaps philanthropists should simply become capitalists to a greater degree 
than they have become in recent times, and capitalists should certainly be-
come philanthropists on a greater scale than they are now. The promises for 
a better world through such cross-fertilization, I believe, are quite sub-
stantial. 
5 .  CON CLUS IONS  
In this chapter, I have discussed the issue of the demandingness of 
morality. According to many proponents of the SRI movement, an im-
portant feature of SRI, or of ‗ethical investing‘, is that it does not have 
to ‗cost‘ investors anything. This would seem to suggest that promoting 
the good, or making a considerable difference to people‘s lives, – 
because it requires a good deal of sacrifice from individual investors – 
really is only supererogatory. That is, if the investor him- or herself wants to 
make a difference by sacrificing investment returns this is surely admi-
rable, but it is not morally required. However, I have argued against this 
view and suggested that it indeed is required – that is, it would be wrong 
of individual investors not to make a considerable difference to people in 
need. 
 I have done this my importing a line of reasoning which some phi-
losophers have taken to suggest that moral agents have a general moral 
requirement to promote the good. This line of reasoning starts with our reac-
tion to cases where one can save a nearby child from drowning. Unless 
there is a morally relevant difference between failing to save someone 
 
62 Unger 1996, p. 143 
63 Cf. Brill et al. 1999, Fontanills and Gentile 2001, Harrington 1992, Keasey et al. 1998, 
Teweles and Bradley 1998, Wyss 2000 
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that you know or can see and failing to save someone which you don‘t 
know or can‘t see, it continues, it seems plausible to say that it is just as 
wrong not to, e.g., give money to famine relief as it is not saving such a 
child. Furthermore, as long as we can make a morally relevant difference 
for some people without sacrificing anything of comparable moral im-
portance, we seem to be morally required to go on giving our money to 
famine relief. I have suggested that this line of reasoning easily could be 
translated into the idea that investors are morally required to invest in a 
way which allows them to make a considerable difference, even if this 
involves considerable financial sacrifices on their part. 
 Several common counterarguments to the line of reasoning above 
have been discussed. Most importantly, I have discussed the idea that 
the overall cost to the agent him- or herself needs to be weighed in – 
that is, we cannot be expected to dedicate our entire lives to serve other 
people. However, I have argued that this counterargument fails in the 
context of the ethics of investing – investments are a kind of luxury 
products after all, and it does not seem unreasonable to require that 
such things should be sacrificed if one thereby can help people in 
greater need. Finally, I have discussed what my position on the deman-
dingness of morality implies for the question of whether we have moral 
reasons to become investors in the first place. Although this may not 
always be so, I have suggested that investing along the lines of some of 
the investment strategies discussed in previous chapters actually may be 
an outstanding way in which affluent people can make the world a bet-
ter place. 
 In the following chapter, I will summarise my main conclusions 
throughout the book. I will also go beyond the ethics of investing in 
another way and discuss the political dimension of the moral problems 
of the corporate sector.
 Chapter VIII 
Concluding Remarks 
1.  GENERAL S UMMARY  
The ethics of investing is a rather new, but certainly exciting, field of 
inquiry and there seems to be no limit to the kinds of intriguing philo-
sophical issues it gives rise to. In this final chapter, I will first give a 
general summary of the main conclusions of my many previous discus-
sions. Thereafter, I will try to put some further perspective on these 
conclusions by introducing the political dimension of the ethics of in-
vesting. This dimension, I believe, presents an interesting alternative 
way of analysing and addressing the kinds of issues discussed through-
out this book. The main question I have tried to answer in this book has 
been How ought one to invest? or, more specifically, What ought individual 
investors to do?. I have tried to answer this question by going back and 
forth between quite straightforward and particular suggestions about what 
investors have moral reasons to do (in specific circumstances) and more gen-
eral moral principles, or conceptions of the ethical responsibilities of in-
vestors, which commonly are brought to bear on the kind of questions 
at hand. In order to avoid the accusation of ―ivory-towerism‖ often di-
rected at philosophical treatments in business ethics, I have tried to 
make my discussion sensitive both to facts about how financial investments 
and stock markets actually work and to the views of the relevant ―practitioners 
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in the field”. The starting ground for discussion, for this reason, has most 
often been ideas about the ethical responsibilities of investors suggested 
by practitioners in or proponents of the already existing ‘ethical’ or ‘so-
cially responsible investment’ (SRI) movement.  
 While the SRI movement as such is far from homogenous in many 
respects and proponents of this movement do not always agree about 
how to characterise it, let alone about how to justify it, most accounts of 
SRI revolve around a limited set of investment strategies which are generally 
thought to carry some important moral merit. These strategies have also 
formed the focus points for the many discussions in this book. The 
strategy most commonly employed by so-called ‗ethical funds‘, and per-
haps also the one most commonly associated with ‗ethical investing‘ 
among the general public, is what is often called the avoidance strategy – i.e. 
the strategy of refraining from investing in companies that are engaged 
in business areas or practices which in some manner are considered 
morally unacceptable (as well as selling investments already held in such 
companies). Since this strategy not only is so commonly employed, but 
the ideas of what morally justifies its employment also are so diverse in 
both the SRI and academic communities, my discussion of the moral 
merits of this kind of strategy has been rather extensive (spread out over 
chapters II to IV). The conclusion of this discussion is actually that the 
avoidance strategy only very seldom seems to be morally recommended 
for individual investors. That is, I think it is unfortunate that the SRI 
movement has focused so much on simple avoidance. 
 A first point of discussion with regards to the avoidance strategy (dis-
cussed in chapter II) is how the class of morally unacceptable business 
areas or practices should be defined more exactly, i.e. exactly what com-
panies investors have moral reasons to avoid investing in. A common 
feature in much of the literature from SRI proponents here is the sug-
gestion that it is the individual investors’ own moral views about this which 
should take centre stage. With regards to the avoidance strategy, the 
most common argument in this context is what I have called the appeal 
to consistency, i.e. the idea that it would seem inconsistent to invest in com-
panies whose business areas or practices one morally disapproves of 
oneself. Assuming that most individual investors have certain business 
areas or practices which they find morally problematic, then, they would 
have some kind of reason to avoid investing in certain companies. 
However, I have suggested that it remains rather unclear how the incon-
sistency appealed to in this argument should be spelled out more 
exactly. A more promising line of argument, I have suggested, would be 
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an appeal to conscientiousness, or moral seriousness. But, as long as also this 
kind of appeal allows for the possibility of investors with totally outra-
geous moral views – who few of us would say ought to avoid investing 
in what they consider to be morally unacceptable – the kind of moral 
justification it gives to avoidance investing seems comparably weak. In 
order for the case for the avoidance strategy to get off the ground, then, 
the idea must be that investors have moral reasons to avoid investing in 
companies whose business areas or practices are morally unacceptable in 
some more impartial sense. 
 A second point of discussion with regards to (the case for) the avoid-
ance strategy (discussed in chapters III and IV) is exactly why it would be 
morally problematic to invest in companies whose business areas or 
practices are morally unacceptable in some sense (or, formulated in terms of 
the previous idea, why investing in companies whose business areas or 
practices one morally disapproves of should be regarded as inconsis-
tent). Many writers would seem to think that this is a matter of principle – 
that is, the fact that a certain company‘s activities are morally proble-
matic is in itself thought to make it morally problematic to invest in this 
company, or the moral problems connected with the company‘s activi-
ties are thought to spill over to the act of investing in it. I have (in chapter 
III) discussed three more elaborate ideas about how this ‗spilling over‘ 
works. According to what I have called the tainted-profits principle, what 
makes investments in morally unacceptable companies problematic is 
that it is morally problematic to profit from immoral or harmful business 
activities. Unfortunately, this idea does not really work as a principled 
argument for the avoidance strategy, I have argued, since it is not always 
so that one actually profits from one‘s investments in morally unaccept-
able companies – and, even when one does, the fact that one often 
profits the most when one sells one‘s investments would seem to suggest 
that it can seldom be morally justified to sell investments in morally un-
acceptable companies as proponents of the avoidance strategy suggest. 
When studying cases of profiting but not supporting morally unacceptable 
activities, furthermore, these do not strike us as morally problematic 
and, thus, it is probably more promising to understand the ‗spilling over‘ 
in terms of support than in terms of profit. 
 Compared to the reasoning underlying the tainted-profits principle, 
the idea that it is morally problematic to support morally unacceptable 
companies (or activities) is much harder to spell out in detail, but I have 
discussed two versions of this kind of idea. According to one version, 
which I have called the no-harm principle (discussed in both chapters III 
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and IV), it is morally problematic to support morally unacceptable com-
panies in the sense of sustaining them, or contributing to the harmful ef-
fects of their activities. A problem with this principle, I have suggested, 
is that it is actually much more complicated than most SRI proponents 
have assumed to determine exactly what investment strategy it recom-
mends – mainly since the causal chain from investment to corporate 
harm (if there indeed is such a chain) is bound to be both long and 
complicated. If the principle is understood as only dealing with rather 
direct harm, financial investments only very seldom (only in new share 
issues, for instance) could be said to cause such harm. If the principle is 
taken at face value, however, problems similar to those of the tainted-
profits principle re-emerge – for instance, it can seldom be morally justi-
fied to sell investments in morally unacceptable companies. Perhaps the 
most reasonable solution for proponents of the avoidance strategy here 
is not to try to revise the no-harm principle in some other way but to 
abandon it altogether and instead appeal to a kind of pragmatic argument, 
focusing not only on harm but on overall benefits. 
 According to another version of the idea that it is morally proble-
matic to support morally unacceptable companies (discussed in chapter 
III), the salient sense of support is that of expressing a symbolic support, or 
approving of morally unacceptable business activities. This idea, I have 
suggested, would in fact not be too different from pragmatic arguments 
(or, for that sake, the no-harm principle) if the idea is that it is morally 
problematic to encourage others to invest in morally unacceptable compa-
nies. On a more straightforward interpretation, the idea could be that 
morality requires of investors that they have certain attitudes towards 
these companies – certain business activities, that is, are simply unac-
ceptable and should be morally disapproved of. But from this idea, I 
have argued, it does not follow that refraining from investing in such 
companies is the appropriate way of expressing or acting on such an atti-
tude. A general implication of all three of the arguments above, i.e. all 
putatively principled arguments for the avoidance strategy, seems to be 
what has been called the austere conclusion, i.e. that investors have moral 
reason to avoid investing in almost all companies eligible for investment. 
But to choose non-investment when one instead could try to make an 
important difference, I have argued (in chapter IV), seems to express a 
kind of detachment or nonchalance with the real world‘s problem which is 
far from morally advisable.  
 The last outpost for proponents of the avoidance strategy, then, is the 
kind of pragmatic arguments which appeal exactly to the possibility of 
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making a difference (discussed in chapter IV). Here I have said that 
proponents of the avoidance strategy would need to support their claim 
that avoidance investing actually has an impact on morally unacceptable 
(or any other targeted) companies with solid empirical evidence. Lacking 
clear evidence of this, considerations of economic and financial theory 
suggest that it is very hard for individual investors to make a difference 
simply through boycotting certain companies‘ shares. With regard to 
possible financial effects on share prices and corporate financing, the 
liquidity of the stock market (among other things) makes this hard. With 
regards to possible social pressures on managers or other investors, the 
lack of financial power with which to back up an attempted pressure, plus 
the lack of financial power wielded by individual investors as a group, would seem 
to make this hard. In conclusion, then, it seems very hard for individual 
investors to influence companies simply through an avoidance of their 
shares, and thus only very seldom would the avoidance strategy seem to 
be morally recommended for individual investors. 
 A strategy different (although not too different) from the avoidance 
strategy, which some so-called ethical funds employ, is what is some-
times called the supportive strategy – i.e. the strategy of seeking out and in-
vesting in companies engaged in business areas or practices which are 
morally praiseworthy, or exemplary, in some sense. Compared to my exten-
sive discussion of the avoidance strategy, I have not said even nearly as 
much about this kind of strategy. Since the structure of this strategy is 
rather similar to that of the avoidance strategy, however, I have sug-
gested (in chapter IV) that many of the problems regarding the possibil-
ities for individual investors to influence companies through simply 
buying and selling shares befall also the supportive strategy. Only very 
seldom can individual investors help companies by simply seeking out 
and investing in them and, thus, only very seldom would the supportive 
strategy seem to be recommended for individual investors. However, I 
have argued (in chapter IV) that an important exception here is so-called 
community investing. Since the kind of initiatives community investors can 
support tend to be rather small-scale, and there is a shortage of inves-
tors in these initiatives, this is an especially promising part of the sup-
portive strategy. Unfortunately, community investing is usually not as 
profitable as investments in larger companies with a higher turnover and 
for which the market is more liquid. 
 A third strategy, quite different from both the avoidance and suppor-
tive strategies but fairly commonly employed by so-called ethical funds, 
is what is often called shareholder activism – i.e. the strategy of investing in 
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companies engaged in morally unacceptable business areas or practices 
and using one’s shareholder influence to try to make them change their ways. This 
strategy has also received quite an extensive treatment in this book 
(mainly in chapters V and VI). Besides the idea that investors can make 
a difference through employing this kind of strategy, a common line of 
argument for shareholder activism among SRI proponents is the idea 
that investors, as shareholders in the companies they invest in, could (or 
should) be regarded as (part) owners of these companies and, as such, they 
have moral reasons to engage more actively with their affairs. However, 
I have suggested (in chapter V) that, on a more straightforward under-
standing of this idea – common in the literature on corporate governance –, 
this idea seems to support what I have called the relationship strategy more 
than it supports shareholder activism. According to proponents of the 
relationship strategy, investors have moral reasons to engage more ac-
tively with the companies they invest in for the benefit of these companies 
rather than for the benefit of society (directly).  
 The most common argument for the relationship strategy in this con-
text is what I have called the institutional perspective on the role-specific responsi-
bilities of shareholders, i.e. the idea that the institutional (legal and/or social) 
framework surrounding investments in shares contains a norm to this 
effect. However, because of certain problems with this argument – for 
instance, that the institutional framework surrounding investments is 
rather elusive – I have suggested that a more plausible argument for the 
relationship strategy is a pragmatic perspective on the role-specific re-
sponsibilities of shareholders. And, when we compare this perspective 
with ideas about the social responsibilities of investors (their moral reasons to 
promote the general good), the controversy between the relationship 
and activist strategies more or less disappears. This is because role-
specific responsibilities seem to get their moral force exactly from con-
siderations of the general good. The argument for the relationship strat-
egy discussed in this context, then, is no real obstacle for or argument 
against shareholder activism. 
 When it comes to the idea that investors can make a difference through 
engaging in some kind of shareholder activism (discussed in chapter 
VII), SRI proponents tend to be very optimistic about the efficacy of 
this kind of strategy (or, better, this group of strategies). Once again, 
however, I have suggested that we should demand a lot more empirical 
evidence before we adopt this kind of optimism. General considerations 
about how the shareholder resolution process and votes at limited companies’ 
annual general meetings work seems to suggest that it is very hard for indi-
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vidual investors to influence corporate policies through shareholder 
activism. Perhaps there are some more promising possibilities if inves-
tors are ready to become activists in a more radical sense – they could 
make contact with institutional investors, send aggressive press releases 
to the media or try to take companies to court. Unfortunately, these 
kinds of campaigns would probably have to be quite costly for individ-
ual investors in order to be successful. 
 A final strategy which at least some Swedish ethical funds employ and 
which I have tried to bring out in this book (e.g. in chapters IV and 
VII), but which many SRI proponents are rather critical of, is what I 
have called the philanthropic strategy – i.e. the strategy of investing in what-
ever one can make the most profit from and then donating (part of) the 
proceeds to socially worthwhile charities. If individual investors‘ choice of 
what companies‘ shares to hold and dispose of on the stock market 
makes as little difference as indicated previously, I have suggested (in 
chapter IV) that the philanthropic strategy should not be as morally 
problematic as it is often made out to be. Donating money directly to 
socially worthwhile charities certainly seems to be a rather direct way of 
making a very tangible difference to the lives of people in need. One 
reason for why SRI proponents have been critical of this strategy may 
perhaps be the idea which some of them have that SRI ―is not for mar-
tyrs‖ (discussed in chapter VII), i.e. that there is a genuine difference 
between ‗socially responsible investing‘ and charity. A quite general con-
clusion of my discussions throughout the book, however, is that there is 
a greater conflict between making money and making a difference than 
what SRI proponents are ready to admit. How should this conflict be 
resolved? 
 Well, although my discussion most often has remained sympathetic to 
the goals of the SRI movement (indeed, my attempt at avoiding the 
―ivory-towerism‖ mistake calls exactly for a sensitivity to these goals), I 
believe it is necessary to go beyond the thinking of most SRI propo-
nents on this last point. I have argued (in chapter VII) that it does not 
seem implausible to say that (most) investors actually are morally required 
to invest in a way which helps people in need, even when this is very 
costly for him- or herself – that is, it would be wrong not to choose 
making a difference over making money. Even though it may seem im-
plausible to say that morality requires of all agents that they dedicate 
their entire lives to serving others, I have suggested that investments 
and investment proceeds are a kind of luxury products which we very well 
could do without – and it does not seem implausible to require that we 
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should sacrifice these kinds of luxuries to help people in dire need. The 
exact nature of this kind of moral requirement will obviously differ a lot 
depending on the investors‘ specific circumstances. I noted at the end of 
the previous chapter that this suggests that the specifications on which 
my whole discussion have rested to some degree may be considered 
artificial. The question I have considered has been how one ought to 
invest, given that one actually is going to invest in some manner. But one may 
of course fulfil one‘s requirement to help people in need in other ways 
than through becoming an investor.  
 In the following section, I will note some further ways in which the 
issues which the ethics of investing gives rise to could be said to tran-
scend the confines of my previous discussion. 
2.  THE P OLIT ICAL DIME NSION OF TH E ETHICS OF  
INVESTING  
The question I have focused on in this book has been how people ―like 
you and me‖ ought to invest, or the ethical responsibilities of typical 
non-professional individual investors. That is, I have focused exclusively 
on the investment choices of individual agents, or what we might call pri-
vate morality. Part of the motivation behind the choice of this focus was 
that more and more ‗regular people‘ today are becoming investors, 
either directly or indirectly, and that there thus is a need for many 
people to think more thoroughly about the ethical challenge which this 
presents them with. As I have tried to show throughout the book, fur-
thermore, many of the initiatives of the ‗ethical‘ or ‗socially responsible‘ 
investment movement would seem to be directed at or designed exactly 
for individual investors – it is their support which is sought, or at least 
their investment money is wanted. However, we may now try to go 
beyond this focus. As I noted already in chapter I, my choice of focus-
ing on individual investors should not be taken as an indication of a 
conviction on my part that this is the most fruitful kind of focus in a 
context like this – at least not if one wants to come up with the most ef-
fective solutions to the kind of ethical problems which the SRI movement 
seeks to address. In this section, I will briefly comment on some general 
features of my previous conclusions which seem to indicate that political, 
or legislative, solutions actually may be more suitable for many of these 
problems.  
 There has actually been a growing debate about the role of govern-
ments and the public sector in the academic literature related to the SRI 
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movement in recent years. As indicated earlier (in chapter IV, section 
6.2), the main reason for why the future of this movement looks promi-
sing, according to many writers, is that more and more institutional 
investors – including public pension funds and insurance funds – are 
starting to become more active shareholders and to screen their invest-
ments according to ethical principles.1 This development, some writers 
say, signals the maturing of SRI, or its move ―from margin to main-
stream‖.2 Exactly what such characterisations imply in terms of in what 
direction these writers think that the debate about SRI should go is per-
haps not always clear. It is interesting to note, however, that there is a 
growing debate, not only about the role of (public) institutional inves-
tors, but also about the role of direct legislation in this effort of ‗main-
streaming‘ SRI, i.e. of making SRI more attractive to mainstream institu-
tional investors (or simply making SRI the mainstream investment alterna-
tive).3 A number of writers write very positively about the recent pension 
reforms in the UK, for instance, where pension fund trustees are asked 
to disclose to what extent they integrate ‗social, environmental or ethical 
considerations‘ into their investment practices. Sparkes writes: 
[I]t is my belief that history will consider the day the UK‘s SRI pension 
fund regulations came into effect, 3 July 2000, as a momentous day in 
the evolution of investment management. It was a date of global rather 
than of local importance. For the first time ever pension funds, the 
building blocks of the world‘s capital markets, were legally obliged to 
consider non-financial issues in setting their investment policy. [...] So-
cial scientists sometimes talk of ‗a paradigm shift‘ in public awareness, 
when a belief that is generally accepted becomes obviously outmoded 
and rejected. A good example would be the relative importance of the 
Earth and the Sun; before Galileo it was universally accepted that the 
Sun rotated around the Earth, after him everybody knew that the re-
verse was true. I believe that we are now in a similar situation regarding 
institutional investment, and that ultimate beneficiaries such as pension 
schemes and charitable foundations are now starting to question the 
conventional wisdom that the sole purpose of investment is the maxi-
misation of short-term financial returns.4 
 
1 Cf. Bruyn 1987, Hawley and Williams 2002, Kiernan 2002, Melton and Keenan 1994, 
Sparkes 2002, Sparkes and Cowton 2004 
2 Cf. Kiernan 2002, Sparkes and Cowton 2004 
3 Cf. Dunfee 2003, Haigh and Hazelton 2004, Institute for Sustainable Futures 2005, Sparkes 
2002 
4 Sparkes 2002, pp. 4-5. See also Hellsten and Mallin 2006, Institute for Sustainable Futures 
2005, Kreander 2002, Louche and Lydenberg 2006, Mallin 2004. 
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While I cannot discuss the details of the UK pensions reform in this 
context (nor the possible similarities between this reform and progress 
in our knowledge of astronomy), Sparkes would seem to be on to 
something here and it is probably a good idea to reform pension sys-
tems along the lines that they have done in the UK. But one may also 
wonder how far this really takes us. Even though similar reforms per-
haps could change the climate in the investment sector to a certain degree, 
some writers argue, simple disclosure requirements are a long way from 
solving the kind of problems in the corporate sector which often are the starting 
points for the whole discussion surrounding SRI – continued environ-
mental pollution, the use of sweatshops, weapon sales to countries at 
war, etc. etc. On the effect of imposing ‗ethical‘ or ‗social‘ disclosure 
requirements directly on companies, for instance, Vogel writes: 
The analogy between the impact of the mandatory disclosure of finan-
cial data and that of social data is a deceptive one. The first category of 
information goes to a small group of people who have a direct and un-
ambiguous stake in its impact and who, most importantly, are readily 
able to translate it into a form that corporate executives take extremely 
seriously – the price of their stock. In contrast, reports of corporate so-
cial performance would presumably be for the benefit of the ―public.‖ It 
is true that public opinion can be an important political force, but there 
are limits to the public‘s attention span. How much more knowledge 
about the social conduct of the hundreds of corporations that dominate 
the American economy can the public be expected to absorb and act on 
politically? The public can react to occasional scandals, but can we really 
expect citizens to pay as close and continuous attention to reports of 
corporate social performance as the investment community does to that 
of corporate earnings?5 
According to Vogel, as long as the responsibility for holding commercial 
companies socially accountable rests only with individual investors or 
citizen activists, the corporate accountability movement is virtually po-
werless against the extremely influential and elusive corporations of to-
day‘s world. The only times the corporate accountability movement has 
been really successful, interestingly enough, Vogel suggests is when it 
has been backed by political sanctions. He writes: 
Direct pressures on business can change corporate behavior, but they 
are capable of doing so primarily to the extent to which their demands 
on business expand or complement those required by law. The central 
premise of citizen activism – namely that corporations have become, in 
effect, public institutions exercising a degree of power closely connected 
 
5 Vogel 1978, p. 224 
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to or rivaling that of the state – is actually contradicted by the history of 
the corporate accountability movement itself. Paradoxically, its suc-
cesses are due primarily not to the individual or collective efforts of citi-
zens, but rather to the support of the state – the very institution whose 
alleged domination by business led to direct pressures in the first place.6 
Vogel concludes that corporate activists, ―[a]t best, [...] can supplement 
government regulation; what they cannot do is substitute for it. In the 
final analysis, who governs the corporation is less important than who 
controls the government‖7. I think this actually is a correct analysis of 
the situation. But exactly what kinds of political solutions or sanctions 
does this call for, and how do these relate to the current practices of the 
SRI movement? Taking a step back and looking at my previous discus-
sion as a whole, I believe it should be noted that there are many ways in 
which legislative changes or political sanctions could support the efforts 
of SRI investors. Quite generally, namely, the success of many SRI ini-
tiatives would seem intimately connected with the legislative and societal 
framework surrounding the corporate sector and investments in shares, 
much like Vogel points out. As long as the laws governing the share-
holder resolution process (discussed in chapter VI), for instance, and the 
votes at companies‘ annual general meetings are as undemocratic – and 
biased in favour of management – as they currently are, it is hard for 
individual investors to make a non-negligible difference through pro-
posing or voting on resolutions. Furthermore, as long as it is legally 
permitted to buy and sell shares in weapons companies at the national 
stock exchange, and as long as the profits of such companies are not in 
jeopardy because of other kinds of government sanctions, (as discussed 
in chapter IV) it is hard for individual investors to make a non-negligible 
difference simply through screening investments, since there will always 
be a market for profitable companies‘ shares. But perhaps political solu-
tions should not only complement the efforts of socially conscious inves-
tors and organisations – perhaps there are also cases where political 
solutions can come into conflict with (the premises of) such efforts but 
where the political solutions are preferable? 
 There are several points in my previous discussion, it should be 
noted, where the political dimension has popped up quite naturally, and 
where legislative solutions actually have seemed more promising than 
individual, or voluntary, ones. In my discussion concerning the inability 
 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., p. 225, emphasis added 
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of individual investors to make a difference through screening (chapter 
IV, section 4), for instance, I suggested that a fairly straightforward un-
derstanding of some SRI proponents‘ argument for the avoidance strat-
egy is that the totality of investors, or perhaps society as a whole, has a 
collective responsibility to behave in a certain way in relation to certain 
limited companies. It is only on the collective level that investors can make a 
difference by buying and selling shares in different ways, after all, and 
perhaps we should say, then, that the responsibility to make a difference 
most obviously falls on investors or society together, exactly as a collective. 
Now, I suggested that a fairly straightforward understanding of collec-
tive responsibility is exactly a political one – perhaps collective problems 
also may need collective, i.e. legislative, solutions.8 Politicians, we may 
note, have the possibility of influencing how commercial companies 
operate, either through giving legislative incentives or through imposing 
some kind of direct political sanctions. So perhaps increased regulation of 
the corporate sector directly should actually be welcomed by proponents of 
the appeal to collective responsibility.9 
 Another place where political solutions have popped up in my discus-
sion was in my treatment of more radical activist campaigns (chapter VI, 
section 3.1), where I suggested that governments and legislation 
(through the legal system) may be some of the most important forces out-
side the corporation that could counter the immense powers of modern 
companies. If shareholder activists could somehow get the attention of 
the public authorities and get them to make the relevant legislative 
changes, perhaps shareholder activism could actually be a powerful tool 
– even for individual investors (although it would not be easy for them 
to get this attention). But the power to create social change here ob-
viously rests with the public authorities most directly, and thus this may also 
be where the greatest responsibility lies. If the government were to make 
it illegal to sell weapons to countries at war, for instance, this would 
probably have an immensely greater and more direct impact on weapons 
companies and the armaments industry than individual investors could 
even dream of – even if they banded together and tried to introduce 
anti-weapons resolutions as a collective at some companies‘ annual gen-
eral meeting. So, perhaps increased regulation of the corporate sector 
 
8 I take this to be the classic solution to the kind of ‗many-person prisoner‘s dilemmas‗ 
referred to in chapter IV, section 5, note 97. Cf. Hardin 1968, Parfit 1984. 
9 Similar points have been made by Haigh and Hazelton 2004, Owen 1990, Statman 2000. 
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directly should also be welcomed by proponents of shareholder activ-
ism. 
 While certain kinds of political solutions can complement the goals 
and practices of the SRI movement, it may be noted, the ones discussed 
above would actually seem to challenge the whole set-up of this move-
ment. An interesting observation related to this is the fact that many 
SRI proponents openly embrace the kind of market setting in which 
‗ethical funds‗ operate (as noted in chapter II, section 1) – it is up to 
individual investors to choose what kind of fund they want to invest in 
and it is up to the different financial services actors (even the different 
SRI actors) to compete for these customers. Even when legislative solu-
tions are up for discussion, as just noted, this is so – that is, most SRI 
proponents only discuss disclosure requirements and fail to mention more 
thorough-going political regulations of the corporate sector or stock 
markets directly. According to Thomas Dunfee, for instance, an inter-
esting question relating to the future of SRI ―pertains to the issue of 
what types of public policies are necessary in order to support and sus-
tain an environment in which social screening is a viable option for those 
so inclined‖.10 Furthermore, he says that ―[b]ecause this is a financial mar-
ket phenomenon, only policies essential to the operation of open, competitive 
markets are relevant‖.11 Commenting on this phenomenon among social 
activists generally, Vogel writes: ―[i]t is true that shareholder activism 
can be seen as a contemporary variant of nineteenth-century populism; 
for in both instances the preservation and expansion of private property 
rights are the basis of a challenge to the prerogatives of the corpora-
tion‖12. 
 Quite generally, however, one might wonder why SRI proponents 
seem so keen on allowing individual investors to choose whether they 
want to invest ‗ethically‘ (or in a ‗socially responsible‘ manner) or not.13 
If the companies that sell weapons or tobacco really are as unethical as 
they are made out to be by these writers, wouldn‘t the most straightfor-
 
10 Dunfee 2003, p. 251, emphasis added 
11 Ibid., emphasis added 
12 Vogel 1978, p. 222, emphasis added. See also Bruyn 1987, Gray et al. 1996, Haigh and 
Hazelton 2004. 
13 Haigh and Hazelton suggest a rather pessimistic explanation here: ―As the viability of SRI 
funds‘ marketing strategies depends on drawing a distinction between SRI and conventional 
managed investments, resolving social problems might present a strategic problem. SRI fund 
managers can differentiate themselves in the market only as long as they continue to identify 
socially undesirable investments‖ (2004, p. 67, emphasis in original). 
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ward solution simply be to ban them from the stock market entirely, or 
to impose other kinds of sanctions which effectively put them out of 
business? Or are such regulations problematic for some other reasons? 
If increased regulation of the corporate sector directly is a plausible re-
sponse to the kinds of ethical problems in this sector which the SRI 
movement seeks to address, I believe it should be noted that my discus-
sion of the ethics of investing here seems to have come full circle in an 
interesting sense. I noted at the outset of the book (chapter I, section 1) 
that the general trend towards corporate deregulation and privatisation 
in many parts of the Western world, according to many commentators, 
is an important explanation of the last couple of decades‘ growing con-
cern over ethical issues in relation to financial investments. But perhaps 
the most straightforward way of coming to terms with the ethical prob-
lems we see in the corporate sector of today, then, is exactly a re-regula-
tion or renationalisation of (some parts of the) corporate sector. Perhaps 
proponents of the SRI movement should focus less on the details of 
private morality and more on the larger structures of national and inter-
national politics. 
 The issues which the political dimension of the ethics of investing 
gives rise to are obviously both far-reaching and important. Unfortu-
nately, I can only introduce some of these here – a full treatment of the 
politics of business and investments would require another book. 
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